San Martin and Free Trade, Theory and Fact, 1812-1822 by Pietraszek, Bernadine Florence
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Dissertations Theses and Dissertations
1966
San Martin and Free Trade, Theory and Fact,
1812-1822
Bernadine Florence Pietraszek
Loyola University Chicago
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1966 Bernadine Florence Pietraszek
Recommended Citation
Pietraszek, Bernadine Florence, "San Martin and Free Trade, Theory and Fact, 1812-1822" (1966). Dissertations. Paper 863.
http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/863
W JWlTbi AND FREE 'l'RADE, THEORY AlID FACT 
1812-1822 
b,. 
Bernadine norene. Pi.tn ... k 
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of 
the Requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philo8op~ 
June 
1966 
.. 
VITA 
.......... 
Bernadine Florence Pietraszek was born in Evanston, Illinois, April 6, 
1924. 
She was graduated from Notre Dame High School, Chicago, Illinois, in 
June of 1942, and from Loyola University in Chicago, June, 1949, with the 
degree of Bachelor of Ph110sopqy. She received the degree of Kaster of 
Arts trom 10701a University in Chicago in February ot 1952. 
The author began doctoral work in 1952 and since 1962 has taught Latin 
American and European History at DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois. 
11 
--
PREFA.CE 
The purpose of this dissertation is to study San Martin's ideas of tree 
foreign trade and his execution of the same by negotiations, policies, laws, 
and programs. The investigation w1l1 emphasize San llartin's dealings with 
the Bri tisb and the United Stat.es (governments, officials, private companies, 
and individuals) in matters of trade and commerce, particularl,. atter his 
liberation of Chile 1818 until his resignation of the Peruvian Protectorship 
in 1822. It is not the purpose of this study to (l) vi te a biography of 
San Martin, nor (2) to trace his relations with Argentina or Chile, nor (3) 
to write on his military campaigns, nor (4) on the naval operations, nor (5) 
on his dealings with Bolivar, except in regard to the trade rivalry exlstlll£ 
between them for British and American favor, nor (6) of the domestic econo~ 
of Peru, Chile and Argentina. 
Spanish commercial monopol,., long a source ot aggravation to nations 
desirous ot sharing in a profitable colonial trade, became more odious b,. 
1800. The colonials themselves grew vividly aware of the benefits accruing 
from an unrestricted trade. The success of contraband trade only whetted the 
appetite. Spanish monopolists refused to alter or concede what they believed 
to be their private domain. When th:3 cry of revolution enveloped the Spanish 
colonial empire, one of the tenets espoused by South American. revolutionaries 
was free trade. To what extent this principle was adopted by San llartln forms 
the basis ot this research. 
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CHAPTER I 
Liberation of Chile. Prelude to Peru 
The turbulence of the lapoleon1c era disrupted European politics and 
ecor1OJlT, disaem1.nating repercuasiol1ll throughout the Spanish empire. To 
iaolate England, lapoleon puraued. a policT in the Iberian Peninsula which 
precipitated the separation of the South American colonies trom Spain. The 
removal. ot 'erdinand VII in tavor ot .loaeph Bonaparte in 1808 strained. 
colonial allegiance to the inept »Other Count17. The reatored Ferdinand ot 
1815 only aggravated the stress by his determination to establish absolute 
authori ty in defiance ot the 1812 Constitution. The eftects ot the new 
political ideas awept through the Spanish colonies giving birth to juntas 
imitative ot those in Spain and with them a cognizance of political potency 
which further widened the breach. Representation within the Cortes brought 
no relief. The economic distress grew as the grievances multiplied. Under 
such circumstances it was not surprising that the restless Creoles of the 
Americas listened with great interest to the precursors of the revolutions. 
Miranda, Bolivar, and Moreno, each with his own particular talent and 
philosophy, caught the ears of the di.aatiafied. On lfarch 9, 1812, Jose 
de San Martin formally joined the charmed circle of liberators. 
San Martin, the .future liberator of Chile and Peru, was born on 
'eb!"1lal7 2$, 1778, in yapeyU, province of tissiones on Argentina's northern 
frontier, the son ot a Spanish officer stationed in the Viceroyalt7 of 
1 
• 
• 
La Plata. t'lihlle still a young boy San Nardn departed with his family for 
Spain. Beginning his militar,y life at the age of eleven, he distinguished 
himself in the Spanish army, rising to the position of Lieutenant Colonel 
at thirty-three. There arises the inevitable question, why did San Hartin 
2 
leave a successful career in Spain and cast his fortunes with the daring 
revolutionaries? On one occasion he explained that he desired only to 
sacrifice everything to promote the liberty of his native land and thus 
consecrated himself to the cause of Spanish America. l The friendship of the 
Britisher Lord Fife, through whom he secured passage to South America proved 
important later. Because of this assistance, indictments were levied against 
the British, who were accused of openly favoring South American emancipation 
for commercial reasons. The validity of these charges will be examined in 
this work. 
The Buenos Aires government readily confirmed San Mart!n1s rank of Lt. 
Colonel and he soon began a school for soldiers, choosin:~ his cadets for 
bravery and family background.2 For political reasons, san Martin saw the 
necessity for establishing the Lautaro Lodge.3 The dissension within the 
Buenos Aires government perhaps fired his interest in a constitutional 
monarchy despite the essentially republican sentiment of the people. In 
1. William Spence Robertson, The Rise of the Spanish American Republics as 
~ in ~ Lives .2! their Llberatoi='S'('New YOr'k, 1918), 182. -
2. The EmanciEation of South America, a condensed translation by William 
Pilling of Bartolome Mitre's Ristoria de San Mart!n l de la emancipacion 
~-americana (London, 1893), 45. - - - -
3. ~., 47. 
ti i
i
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Jla,reh 1814, San Martin took command of Belgrano' s forces in the northwest, 
enforcing discipline and loyalty- to the cause of emancipation. In August 
of the same year, he was appointed Governor of CUTO, there nourishing his 
hOpes for the liberation of Peru, the royalist stronghold in South America. 
His first step was the liberation of Chile--bT means of the famed Army of 
the Andes. 
While the Chileans were willing to cooperate in their own liberation, 
the main financial support had to be found elsewhere. San Martin relied 
) 
heavily upon his own province of CU1O. where he had won the affections of 
the people.4 He organized the Arrq of the Andes with discipline and 
efficiencT. cOmmanding great sacrifice from. the submissive inhabitants of 
Cuyo whom he fired with patriotism. The confidence of British merchants 
gave further credit to San Marth.> Assistance from Buenos Aires towarei'the 
Chilean campaign apparentlT was very little judging by San Martin's own 
statements and thOBe of his contemporaries.6 
The rigorism of San Martin's rule in Cuyo evoked allusions to paternal 
despotism. A strict diSCiplinarian, he tolerated no defiance to his law, 
even forbidding the clergy to confess or preach, once their unfriendliness 
to "politieal regeneration" became known. The priests were required to 
4. Caesar Rodney and John Qra.bam. The RepYrts of the Present State of the 
United Provinees ~ South America (LOndon, 819);-2(SJ." - -
5. John Miller (ed.), Memoirs Et! General Miller (London, 1828), I, 88-89. 
6. J. P. and W. P. Robertson, Letters on South America (London, 184), 
II, 262; III, 344 Appendix. - -
z
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preach the sYstem of liberty under penalty of arrest.7 The establishment of 
a branch of the Lautaro Lodge in Nendoza was designed to strengthen further 
San Martin's position. There was much opposition to his emancipation of 
slaves, whom he planned to employ in the campaign. It was final4r agreed 
to free two-thirds after the Andes were crossed.8 San Martin's relations 
with the government in buenos Aires were not entire4r successful. Though 
Juan Martin de Pueyrredon's sympathies l~ with San Martin, the latter 
would have preferred more concrete approval which v;as slow to ma.terialize.9 
The period spent in preparation from 1814 to 1817 finally bore fruit. The 
Army of the Andes became a reality with San Martin its Captain General. 
This was not accomplished without the alliance with Chilean 
revolutionaries. There were two factions fighting for power in Chile--one 
the wealthy Carrera brothers and the other of Bernardo O'Higgins. San 
Mardn favored O'Higgins and was forced to deal severely with the Carrera 
party. One contemporary explained the probable r8asons for the choice. The 
basis of patriotism or strength of party may not have been the criterion. 
Of more importance was the O'Higgins ability to remain aloof from local and 
narrow interasts. The su:,~gestion that the Carrera party was more favorable 
to the United States lihile that of O'Higgins leaned toward the British was 
10 branded as mere bait. The government of the United Provinces sided with 
7. Pilling, &Ilancipation 2! ~ America, 115. 
8. ~., 127. 
9. ~., 128-29. 
10. Henry M. Brackenridge, Voyage !2 ~ ~erica (London, 1820), I, )01-
)0) passim. 
p 
U O'Higgins. 
The crossing of the Andes was soon :rewarded with triumph at Chaeabuco. 
February, 1817. San Martin t. entrance into Santiago was closel,. followed b,.. 
his renunciation of a Chilean covernorahip in favor of O'Higgins, and a 
declaration of independence, which was formally announced on 'ebrull7 12, 
1818. The battle of liaip{", April 5, 1816, Haled Chilean independence. 
Along with revolutionary success came another branch of the Lautaro Lodge, 
this time in Santiago. At this point, Argentine and Chilean 1l1liance wafS 
stressed for mutual self-defense and as insurance for the complete 
emancipation of South America. San Martin, O'Higgins, the A~ of the Andes. 
and the Lautaro Lodge were respectively designated by one historian as the 
80ul, connecting link, muscle and sinew, and the secret mechani_ of the 
a1l1anee.12 However" the relations between San lIarttn and Buenos Aires 
were strained, culminating in his reSignation of the Argentine comrdssion 
and subsequent re-election as general-in-ch1ef of the Chilean anor- In 1819, 
San Hartin was either characterized as a great liberator with DaU€,ht but 
loft,. patriotism or as a demagogue pursuing an arb! trlll7 career for peracnal 
glor,r.13 
The evant a in Chile were of great importance to two major powers--Great 
11. William R. Manning, (ed.), Diplomatic Corre~ndence of the United States 
!oncerniM the Independence of the Latin AmerIcan atlons \lew Yori(. 1925). 
, j53. ThOiis Dal.,.. U. S:-ConsUl at Buenos lins to James Monroe, Secntar,r 
of State. Mar. 3. 1817. 
12 • Pilling, Emancipation.2! South .America" 158. 
13. Strictures on a ~e to South America (Baltimore, 1820). 39-
Brackenridge accUied' odorIC Bland of writing the above. 
Britain and the United ::itates. Both were interested in the commercial 
advantages to be gained in South America and, therefore, watched the man 
who proposed to liberate Chile and Peru, hoping he would throw open the 
ports to free trade giving legaUty to an already existent contraband 
trade. Spain branded British and American wide open free trade with her 
South American colonies as illegal. The British and Americans thought 
otherwisa. 
Sketching briefly tha South American policy toward Britain and the 
United states, official and unofficial, through to Chilean independence is 
necessary for understanding the major problem of this dissertation. The 
6 
riches and markets of the Spanish Empire in ,'Ullerica were always a tanptation 
to canmercially-minded Britain. Unsuccessful attempts to gain access to 
this closed trade by means of treaty found hew hope with the imminence of the 
Spanish American colonial revolutions. In lB05,William Pitt was informed 
of the potential wealth of Sparish possessions to Britain, the resources 
of which were alreaqy tapped by British capital and credit.14 Others 
advocated bypassing treaties ~'ith Spain, favoring assistance to Spanish 
colonials.15 Miranda was cautioned by Sir Alexander Cochrane that nations 
not giving aid to revolutionaries should p~ a duty 10 per cent higher 
14. Charles Vane (ed.), Memoirs and corresyondence of Viscount Castlereagh. 
Second M~ques or Londonderry (London, 1853 , V, 443=44. Observations on 
Bonaparte. s Pacnic Communicat.ions, l".r. Robert Prancis to the Right Honorable 
~illiam Pitt, Jan. 22, 1805. Henceforth Cited 8.8 Castlerea~h Memoirs" 
15. Historical Manuscripts COmmission, Report on the Manuscripts of J. B. 
~ortescue, Esq. (London, 1927), X, 167 .. 59 passim. William \ialton to Lord 
urenVille, Apr. 25, 1806. 
p 
p 
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than Britain. 
16 British enemies were to be completely barred from the trade. 
Castlereagh l s sympathiDs were with the 30uth Americans, especially where the 
Napoleonic threat menaced British security. Economic considerations remained 
paramount. Perhaps Miranda's 1808 reference to the lucrative trade enja,yed 
17 by the competitive American merchants served to arouse British interest. 
18 Wellington held another opinion. Henry Wellesley doubted whether Spain 
would allow the British to trade freelY with the colonials. However, he 
indicated that Spain's financial difficulties might be solved by a British 
loan which in turn would predispose Spain to reconsider British commercial 
concessions.19 Parliamentary discussions found much sentiment highly in 
tavor of direct trade with Spanish colonies. The outcome of the revolutions 
was watched with considerable interest. 
British mediation between Spain and her colonies presented a new 
possibility for seeking direct trade as a "tee" tor services rendered. In 
1812, the Spanish, officially, were not quite willing to make any commercial 
concessions, even for tranquilizing America. Wellesley, however, did not 
despair. 20 The impatience of British merchants found expression in 
16. Castlereagh Memoirs, VII, 419-21. June 9, 1806. 
17. ~., 411. Francisco Miranda to Castlereagh, Jan. 10" 1808. 
18. Philip Henry Stanhope, Notes of Conversations with the Duke of Wellington 
(London, 1888), 69. - - - --
19. The Duke of WelUngton (ed.), Supplementary; Despatches, Correspondence, 
~ 14emoranda 2! Field Marellall Arthur Duke of WellIngton (London, 18bO) , 
VI, >79. Wellesle,y to Marquess Wellesle,y. 
20. Castlereagh Memoirs, VIII, 269-70. Wellesle,y to Castlereagh, July 28, 
1812. 
lY
p, 
8 
parliament with sympathetic men proposing direct trade with the Spanish 
colonies.21 The "most favoured nation" clause figured prominently in all 
debates and correspondence concerning this direct trade. Some individuals, 
among them Wellington, were even willing, at one time or another, to do all 
in their power to discourage rebellion if .:3pain granted certain commercial 
22 
advantages to the British. Aloofness from any British entanglement 
either with the Mother Countr,y or the colonials also seemed to be the policy 
advocated by Wellington. 
From 1815 onward, the mediation negotiations occupied more attention of 
both Spanish and British officials. Numerous correspondence exists between 
wellington and Spanish officials Cevallos, Feman Nufiez and Pizarro. Vaughan 
cited a report of the Council of the Indies, which stressed the loss of the 
colonies if Spain did not relinquish her trade monopoly. Apparently, the 
opening of trade was no longer so repugnant to the Spaniards. Mediation not 
force was the answer to colonial preservation. 23 Although .:3pain refused to 
grant commercial concessions, the fact remains that the British did carry on 
this trade with the Spanish colonies. The successful revolts in South 
America opened markets to the British who no longer felt any real legal 
necessity for seeking Spanish approval. As mediation became more futile, 
21. Great Britain, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, XXVII (1823), 268. 
Dec. 9, 1813. 
22. Castlereagh Memoirs, X, 44. 
23. Charles K. Webster (ed.), Britain and the Independence of Latin America, 
llig-1830 (London, 1938), II, 344. Char18sR. Vaughan to Castlereagh, 
November 16, 1815, based on Con~rsations with Cevallos and discussion of 
Council of Indies Re ort of Jul 1 1815. 
.' -
9 
Britai-,1 asserted the right of the colon13,ls to remain independent, especially 
since Spain could no longer force submission to her laws. British recognition 
of newly-established revolutionary governments was rapidly becoming the policy 
boped for by Latin Americans. British officials, e.g., Earl of Liverpool, 
emphasized the absurdity of Spanish claims in 1818 that British trade be 
24 
carried on only through Sparush ports and under close scrutiny. A requiem 
signalling the end of Spanish colonial domination in the New World had begun. 
Chile was liberated and Peru became the next candidate for emancipation. 
Further discussions of British policy will be covered more fully in other 
chapters. 
The United States was also vitally interested in South American 
commercial prospeots. For man, years, North American ships defied the 
Spanish closed port system claiming Spanish impotenc.y to control the regions 
as nullification of monopoly. Despatching agents to unrecognized states 
indicated clearly official American thought and interest in potential 
markets. Joel R. Poinsett was sent in 1810-1811 but did not observe strict 
diploma~ic decor~~.25 In 1816, Joseph Devereaux was appointed for the 
26 purpose of gathering information "interesting in a political point of view." 
Devereaux exceeded his powers and on January 23, 1817 J William y,Jorthington 
succeeded him as Special Agent to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru. Thomas 
24. v.iellington, Supelementa;!2 Despatches, XII, 823. Earl of Liverpool to 
Castlereagh, Nov. 9, t818. 
25. Henry M. vlriston, Executive Agents !!! funerican Foreign Relations 
(Baltimore, 1929), 414. 
26. Ibid. 
10 
Ha.lsey in Buenos Aires and Matthew Havel in 3antiago were appointed specifi-
cally for commercial missions and Worthington ",as calltioned not to interfere 
in the domestic aff.airs. The object of Worthington's mission WaS to explain 
the mutual advantages of commerce and to transmit pertinent informatIon back 
27 
to Wasrdngton. Worthington assumed too much power and soon was recalled. 
co-existent with such incidents were protestations from the United States of 
28 
strict neutrality. 
To offset the activities of some Special Agents and, at the same time, 
to 7,ather more information regarding the stability of revolutionary governments 
and commerctal prospects, the Rodney-Graham-B1and commission was appointed 
with Brackenridge serving as Secretary. On July 18, 1817, the commission 
received its first instructions.29 At approximate~ the same time, John 
Prevost was selected to reside alternately in Chile and Peru, cooperating 
wi th the Rodney-Graham mission.30 The reports of the commissioners varied 
in their sympathies to the South American cause. Along with a detailed 
account of the Chilean economic position, Bland's report contains much 
information on the political stability of revolutionar,y governments, colonial 
intrigues, conferences with O'Higgins, and some comments upon the liberator 
of Chile. Under~ing all other material is the impression that the 
27. ~., 415. 
28. Worthington C. Ford (ed.), writin~s of John Quincy Adams (New York, 
1915) , V, 5S1. To James Monroe, Mar. 0, 18~ 
29. Manning, Dielomatic Correspondence, I, 43-44. 
JO. ~., 49. 
commissioners tried to convey to revolutionary leaders. the United St.tes 
sought commercial arrangements with the new governments.31 
u 
The active interest taken b,.. the United States in the revolutions 
precipitated voluminous correspondence with Luis de On1s, Spanish mini.ter 
to the United States. One major source of irritation concerned privateering, 
especially from New Orleans and Balttmore.32 However, the United States 
could ba.rdlT hope to convince Spain of her sincere intentions to control 
the privateering when private mercantile interests loudl:y acclailaed. quite 
another polk,... The presence of revolutionar;y agents, sueh as Jlanuel 
Aguirre, further attested to the direction ot private and even official 
sympathies. Recognition waa still not fe.aible. There remained the danger 
of a war with Spain. )Ioreover, while the British were promoting the cause 
of independ.ence, the,.. were reticent to acknowledge tonaall,.. the existence 
of the new states.3) The two nations in 1818 were, officially at least, 
highly interested spectators, while unofficially there was little that 
transpired without their influence. The natural eonsequence of s1lCh a dwal 
policy was their vigilant observation of San MartIn t s actin ties in Chile 
and, at the same time, an active participation in eapecially the economic 
31. U. S. Congress, American State Papers, DocUllJllllnts, Legislative and 
Executive of the Congress of the United State., From the First Session of 
tr.o Fou..-teenth to First Session of the Seventeenth Congress, Class I, 
Foreign Relations (Washington, 18)4), V, 291-312 passim. 
32. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, III, 19lo-19U. 
33. Samuel nagg Bemis, (J:c!l D~o_tic .Ili.sions from Bueno. Aire. to the t!~rr!::-ip;rri;~2t939 to·:tob:roi8:~9~~i68-6~tiquarian SOCi~;-lz
paz 
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life of t.his count17. The following study of British and American commercial 
activity in Chile during San 1W-t!.n's preparations will illustrate the 
1')osition talren by cit.izens .and officials of both powers. How olosel1' did ~ 
BrUJ.sh and Arnericfm policy coincide with San Marttn's economic ideast 
Above all, what were San Martinis views on tree trade up to l818t How did 
he carry out hl.s ideas in the preparations for the campaign, during the 
campaign, and especially wilen he liberated Chile? Bow closel1' did O'Higgins 
ad."'lere to San Martin' 8 economic philoaoplV' What was the extent and nature 
of the Chilean trade? What are the facts? 
As early as 1813 the British were oognisant of San Martinis favorable 
disposition toward them. 34 In 1816, William Sowl.s informed J. W. Croker 
that San Martin had persevered in integrit1" honor, and disinterest, which 
he thought very rare among the liberator's compatriots.';'> On 'ebru&l'7 22, 
1817, San lLart1n wrote to Bowles that an interview between them would 
contribute very much to the mutual welfare of Chile and England. II'oreover, 
he stressed, the presence of British war ships would be very desirable for 
th~ protection of British commerce.36 Pua,Tredon'. letter to San Martin, 
dated February 25, 1817, clearly expressed the oifer made to England and 
France in return for negotiation, iree trade. However, the reply of both 
goverments ind1.oated it was already too late to mediate for Spain would. 
.34. Ricardo Piccirilli, San liart1n 1 La Pollt1ca de los Pueblo. (Buenos 
Airea, 1957), 402. Bowle'8'to eroiC8r, Tan. 26, 1813.-
35. Ibid., 409. Sept. 22, 1816J 1.1.0 see Webster. Britain and Independence, 
I, lO3-ii54, Henry Chamberlain to C.atlereagh, A.pr. 5, 1817. -
36. Webster, Britain!l!! Independence, II, 102-103. 
.... 
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never be able to maintain her colonies • .37 That the British took advantage of 
commercial opportunities in Chile is a fact. Furthermore, theY' kept a clo .. 
watch on competitors, especiallY' the United States. The increased commerce 
also increased the dangers from Spanish ships and enterprising privateers. 
More British ships of war were needed to protect merchantmen.38 The risks 
involved did not deter British merchants from P17ing their wares along the 
Chilean coast • .39 
Bowles was apparently not the only Dri tisher in whom San Martin confided 
his plans for Chile and Peru. Staples wrote to Hamilton on Kay 25, 1817, 
that San Marta requested an intervi_ with him, Meldng Dri tish approbation 
for his schemes. San Martin hoped that some authorized person might be 
assigned to con8Ul t with him private17 upon Chilean affairs, indicating his 
British preferences. The neces.itY' of a British naval force stationed in 
Chilean waters was re-emphasised. If direct assistance would not be possible, 
San liarta at least hoped for British neutrality. However, the statement 
attributed to San lIartin that he did not require money, arms or soldiers is 
suspect. What did be expect from the British? The partial an .... r to this 
question is indicated in another section of the letter which solicited British 
assistance III insurance against the factional rivalry which might develop in 
the event of Peruvian independence. What further te.timon)" is needed to show 
37. Museo Mitre, Documentos del Archive de San Mart!.n (Buenos Aires, 1910-
1911) , IV, 564. Cited henceforth as ~ -
-
38. Piccirilll,!!n Martin :: Politica, 416. Bowl •• to Croker, Mar. 1, 1817. 
39. .!2.!2., 429. Bowles to Croker, !iay 24. 1817. 
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San MartIn's disposition towards EnEland than the statement that Bwhatever 
advantares this country Chile has to offer, its prosperity cChile's2 depends 
on conceding them to England. w40 On June 18, 1817. San Martin wrote to 
Bowles informing him of the letter he had sent to Staples regarding British 
protection for their commerce.41 The high degree of confidence enjoyed by 
Bowles was further attested to by the statement that without this official 
nothing might have been finished. 42 While the above observation probably 
referred to a specific incident, it could well be true of many others. 
The friendship begun in Europe between San Martin and the Earl of Fife 
continued in letters anddBveloped into a b~ correspondence file. In 
addition to reports of military successes and pronouncements against a 
democratic form of government, San Martin's December 9, 1817. letter lauded 
the virtues of the English king. He was certain that if the monarch cast one 
of his "compassionate looks" the Americans would respond with much gratitude 
to his subjects.43 Could one expression of this gratitude be commercial 
advantages? 
More concrete evidence that the offer of trade was not a myth can be 
found in the instructions given to Irizarri, the Chilean agent in London. 
If Britain wished to favor the cause of independence, Irizarri was 
authorized to make the followil)f coneessions: (1) the cession of the Isle of 
40. Webster, Britain and Independence, I, Appendix I, 553-54. Robert 
Staples to William Himiiton. 
41. Piccirilli, ~ Martin Z Politic a, 439. 
42. DlSK, V, 416. O'Higgins to San Martin, Nov. 8, 1817. 
43. Webster, Britain ~ Inde ndenee, I, Appendix, 556-57_ 
AS
!!!!! pe -57.
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Ghiloe and the port of Valdivia (2) the reduction of 10 to l~; per cent tao"\( 
u::.on importations a.nd of 4 per cent upon exportations for all i:>ritish ships 
during Ii thirty-year period.44 
The san Martin-Gastlereagh correspondence further amplifies his trade 
policy with respect to the British. Although not the author of an enclcsure 
to his letter of January 12, 1818, to Castlereagh, its sentiments could well 
mirror S<~n Martin's ideas. The enclosure was a letter written by O'Higgins 
to the British king, dated November 20, 1817. In return for British mediation 
and intervention in behalf of the revolutionary cause, Chile would shower her 
appreciation in several formst tree admittance of British ships to her ports) 
exchange gold from her mountains for British goods; and the political and 
commercial treaties which would contain "advantageous conditions as gratitude 
would owe" to Chile l s benefactor.45 The subject of mediation appeared again 
in San Martin's letter to Castlareagh, April 11, 1818.46 It portr~ed San 
MartIn's admiration of British influence in European politics and the hope 
that it would be exerted in behalf of the South American, cause. San Martin 
sought British aid in political and economic spheres and was willing to grant 
the much sought sweet plum--free trade. 
Did San Hartin treat the other tlinterested party" with a similar policy? 
A letter to Preeident James Monroe, indicated that the United States was 
al~o solicited to lend aid and affluence. containing the oft-repeated ideals 
44. Piccirilli, ~ Martfn l Politica, 443. Bowles to Croker, Feb. 14, 1818. 
45. Webster, Britain ~ Independence, I, 556. 
46. Ibid., 558-59, Appendix. 
-
--
16 
wbich prompte() hir'l t.) free the oppressed from Spanish tyranny, dan Mart!n1 s 
leVLier requested the extension of protection nne assistance to Agui.rre, 
adcing that. the areas under his orders "will not fail to give consistency and 
respect to the p)~omises of both Goyernments.1t47 The O'Higgins letter to 
Monroe, April 1, 1817, expressed a more positive approach to the question of 
Chilt;cID trade. As Supreme Direct.or of ::hile, O'Higgins announced to the 
world the potential resources of this "new asylum" to further mutual 
prosperity and the 6Rtablishment of liberal commercial and political 
relations. The promotion of commercial activities, O'Hig:Sins proIllised, would 
fine. him lnOt1t cooperative.48 Smphasis, however, was upon "all nations" 
rather than favoritism to a particular one. Exclusive commercial advantages 
as the prerogative of Great Britain or the United States was not officially 
favored by either p~~ar. Bagotts letter to Castlereagh, February 8, 1818, 
referred to the "coincidence of sentiment" in this respect.49 
The commercial activities in South America, despite official pro-
no~ncements to the contrary, bespoke a trade rivalry not so easily settled 
by words. The presence of an American officer seemed vital tor the well-
bein~ of mercantile interests. SO Voluminous reports from Special Agents 
47. Great ~ritain, Foreign Office, British and Forei~ ~ate Papers (London, 
t3 30-18 36), Vo lurne 1817 ... 1818, 808. No date given but ~anning stated it was 
pro~ably \pr.·l, 1817. 
48. Manning, Dielomatic Correspondence, II, 899. 
49. Castlereagh !'1emoix:s, XI, hOS-406. 
50.~ Manning, Diplomatic C2rrespondenc2' I, 370. W. G. D. Worthington to 
J. ~. ~damsJ JRn. to, !81~. 
---
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1f. G. D. Worthington and John B. Prevost more than confirm the threat of 
British commercial monopoly. Worthington's letter to Adams, January 15, 1818, 
evaluated the Chilean situation and San MartIn, and cautioned that a ·certain 
great Commercial Power of Europe will get a footing here too firm to be dis-
placed,·51 which he feared would injure American commercial interests. 
Prevost's report, February 13, 1818. indicated that the Supreme Director was 
most anxious to obtain the confidence of the United States as insurance 
against European intervention.52 The Chileans desired the friendship of both 
Britain and the United States and would probably hesitate before committing 
themselves officially to the most favored nation policy until political 
stability was assured. Antagonizing either power deliberately was suicidal 
with the Peruvian campaign already taking shape. San Martin needed consider-
able support he could secure in attacking the Royalist stronghold, and this 
meant the culmination of friendly relations with the merchants of Britain 
and the United States, who would supply his military necessities. 
In the event of any dispute involving commercial interests of its 
subjects, British and American naval forces stood ready and most willing to 
intervene, although their ability to protect their interests vacillated with 
circumstances. 
Working closely with the American naval forces were the Special !fents. 
who managed to be present whenever yreat events transpired or American 
interests needed representation. The official Chilean recognition of the 
51. ~., I, 372. 
52. ~., II, 913-14. 
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"Special Arent" status enhanced the American position in matters of commerce. 53 
For example,Worthinpton made certain of his presence when vessels of the 
Uni ted States confiscated by the Royalists were in danger of being claimed by 
the revolutionaries as royalist property. 54 The further benefit of Special 
!pents was their constant observation of the commerce of their own nation and 
the British. ,San MartIn's relations with the American agents were ~ood and 
Worthj nvton repeatedly spoke hig-hly of him in his reports to Washillf,ton.55 
The pleasant result of amicable relations was the rising ascendancy of 
Un:ited States commerce in areas emancipated by the Army of the Andes. 
Prevost's report of April 9, 1818, clearly indicates the advanced status of 
the United States in South America. That there existed deep feeling for the 
United States, a feeling which should be nurtured to defeat the influence 
of British, waa Prevost's conviction.56 British-American rivalry was ever 
present but San Mart!n personally and throug-h his officials and friends 
efficiently utilized the resources that each commercially minded country had 
to offer him. It would appear, however, that his strongest personal allegiance 
was to the British. Whether this remained true of the remainder of his 
career in South America, specifically in Peru, remains to be investigated in 
succeeding chapters. 
53. ~., 916. Miguel Zaf1artu to Worthington, Mar. 1, 1818. 
'~4 :> • ~., II, 916. Worthinpton to Adams, Mar. 5, 1818. 
55. Ibid., 919. Worthington to Adams, April 8, 1818. 
56. Ibid., 920-21. Prevost to Adams. 
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The patriot victories in Chile were c,3.l'efully noticed and scrutinized in 
?eru. The liberation of Chile was a harbinger of doom for the Great royalist 
bdwark. The Viceroy, Joaquin de 12. rezuela y Hinojosa, :3panish officials, 
merchants, and populace surveyed the Chilean revolation with mixed feelings. 
In addition to military reports, fortifications, and naval encounters, 
royalist attention also centered on British and American commercial activities 
anc; evaluations of the caudlllo San Nart!n. '!'he opening of Chilean ports to 
flri tain and the TJn! ted 3tates, and the extension of unrestricted trade policy, 
salted the wouncl of an already e:-dstent Peruvian uneasiness.57 Pezuela re-
g'lrded Bowles with as much suspicion as he did the commander of the !!.. ~. ~ • 
. , 
Ontario, Captain J ames Biddle. He reaUzp,d fully that the naval commanders 
not on~ protected the commerce of their respective countries, but also aided 
the shipment of arms and munitions to the insurgents.58 The Rodney-Graham 
mi'ssion and AGuirre's solicitations brOUGht further distrust of the United 
3tates.59 Pezuela's instructions to General Osorio included an emphasis upon 
the ne~es0ity of recapturing Chile for economic securit,y. The loss of Chile 
brought a loss of customs duties amounting to half-million [pesos] annually. 
This loss made it difficult t,o maintain the war, and moreover, impoverished 
innumerable merchants engaged in the trade. On the other hand. the insurgents 
e~tab1ished trP.8 commerce enabling them to acquire financial ~ssets for their 
57. Vicente Rodr!guez CasadO and Guillermo Lohmann Vi llena (eds.), Memoria 
~ Gobierno ~ Virrey Pezuela 18l6-~ (Seville, 1.947), 88. Aug. t7, t8U>. 
58. ~., 183. Nov. 12, 1817. 
59. ~., 203-204. Joe. 20, 1817. 
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ca.l':1p".igns tha.t helped but ships to blockade port::smd disrupt Jpanish 
commerce.60 Thus, lihile the Chileans shO't·n~red praise upon J.an Hartin, 'l.he 
roya.lis::'s heltI him greatly responsible for t.hair plight. 
The extensiveness of the Chilean trade, and individuals and compardes 
engaged in this trade from 1814 through the time of Chilean independence 
must be considered. The presence of En tish ships in Chilean waters is noted 
in much of the correspondence for the 1814-1818 period. The ships were not 
all part of the British naval squadron, since many were merchant ships 
carrying arms and munitions with ordinary commodities. At times, the British 
flag flew atop a ship definitely not of British origin, notably the Pezuela.61 
Since the British government officiallY frowned upon open aid to the rebels, 
there is little information for this period concerning the comapnies involved 
in transporting such cargoes. One of the companies mentioned ~ Bowles is 
Neita and Company, Bucklesbury.62 There is more information about Edward 
Ellice, London merchant who through Jose Antoniollvarez, Chilean a.~ent, 
bought and equipped the Cumberland for the patriot cause. Instructions for 
the ~tvarez miss:ton came directly from Jan Mart!n. The Alvarez mission was 
apparentlY not without tribulations, mostly financial.63 However, the final 
contract was signed on l~ovember 25, 1817. Among the various stipulations 
60. ~., 195-96. Dec. 9, 1817. 
61. ~, V, 384. O'Higgins to San Mart!n, July 27, 1817. 
62. Piccirilli, ~ Mart!n l Politiea, 436. Bowles to Croker, June 30, 1817. 
6J. ~, VIII, 231-33. J. A. Alvarez [Coudareo] to San Hartin, Nov. 22, 1817. 
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concerning the payments for the Cumberland is a most interesting clause. 
According to this clause, the supercargo or person authorized by Ellice was 
free to bring in the ship goods amounting to 6,000 pounds sterling with permis-
sion to sell them in any part of Chile or Peru upon the authority of the 
Chilean government completely free of duty. Moreover, the supercargo was to 
export, on returning either the specie or fruits of the country also free of 
any custom charges.64 Since the contract was negotiated under instructions 
from San Martin, or at least the agent Alvarez was informed of his wishes 
in this matter, the contract is one example of 3an Martin's commercial policy. 
American commercial involvements furnish considerably more data about 
the companies and ships which dealt with San Martin or the Chilean government. 
It would be erroneous, however, to judge the extent of the trade solely upon 
the amount of documentation. The contraband trade flourished65 over the 
protests of the United States government. American and British merchant 
ships made a mockery of the Spanish blockade. Despite the watchful eye of 
the naval forces and the Chilean squadron, occasionally the Royalists seized 
ships and rich cargoes destined for patriot use. Information on companies 
and individuals in the United States dealing with San Martin or his 
representatives is fuller than their British counterparts. 
Any stuqy dealing with the sympathizers, b.Y conviction or convenience, 
of the South !Unerican cause will find a roster of impressive names. Although 
64. ~., 191. 
65. ~., V, 413. O'Higgins to San Martin, Oct. 25, 1817. 
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there were many challengers, Baltimore was most often the habitat of the pro-
rebel entrepreneurs. Thus, it became the natural magnet of revolutionaries 
seeking ships, supplies, munitions, and also the center for commercial 
activity with newly independent states. The bond between the Buenos Aires 
government and Baltimore merchants developed early in the revolutionary 
period. Fit-t,ing out privateers was good business and men like Thomas Taylor, 
acting in the capacity of a commissioner, "brought six blank patents for 
disposal among interested merchants."66 
Of greater interest were the activities of Henry Hill who arrived in 
Chile in May of 1817 as supercargo aboard the Salvaje disposing of war 
67 
supplies to San Martin. Towards the close of 1817, Hill and Lynch started 
a mercantile house in Chile, the counterpart of ~ch, Zimmerman and CompaQY 
of Buenos Aires. Valparaiso was Hill's commercial territory. In March of 
8 " 1 1 68 1 ld, Hill was appointed United States consu for Santiago and Va paraiso. 
Hill's business partner was Estanislao Lynch, younger brother of Patricio 
Lynch of Iqnch, Zimmerman and Company. Many of the business transactions 
were aided by DeForest.69 Estanislao ~ch was particularly useful to San 
Martin in the dispute centering in Buenos Aires and involving payment for 
supplies. San Martin published in the Gaceta [in Buenos Aires] on January 3, 
1818, a statement signed by ~ch, to the effect that he had received money 
66. Benjamin Keen, David Curtis DeForest and the Revolution of Buenos Aires 
(New Haven, 1947), 164. He arrived earlY in1815. -
67. Bemis, Early Diplomatic Missions, 40. 
68. Henry Hill, ~.;;..;.:;;.;;..;..;;..;;.;;;.;..;;.;;.;;. ........ ~-=.-.;;....;_ (Boston, 1884), 86-81. ;..; ,;; .; ; . ; ..;. ;.; .- . ..
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and copper bars valued at 62,493 pesos for the cargo of the 3alvaje. In 
~atitude, the merchants received various advantages, amon6 them exemption 
of duty for export gOOds.70 
The firm of Darcy and Didier was well known for its dealing with Chilean 
insurgents. Due to their efforts, Jose Ca~rera sailed aw~ with three ships, 
in December, 1316, guaranteeing p~ent b.1 a still non-existent Chilean 
71 government. Carrera's other contacts were John Jacob Astor of New York, 
Walter and Nixon of Philadelphia, 8.nd Robert Oliver and Thomas Tenant of 
Baltimore.72 How much these men contributed, if anything, is difficult to 
say. The Salvaje, discussed in connection with Henry Hill in earlier 
paragraphs, was furnished and loaded by Darcy and Didier. The Expedition, 
the ship which brought Carrera to the United States, was owned by Henri 
Didier.73 The Aguirre maston, appointed by San Martin in A.pril 17, 1817, 
also involved the compaqy of Darcy and Didier.74 
Working closely with the Darcy and Didier company as the Buenos Aires 
representative was David Curtis DeForest. It was not unusual for the real 
owners to pass nominal ownership to men like DeForest thus protecting them-
selves from the charge of illegaUty. The customary commission for rendering 
such service was a ten per cent commission of net proceeds on the prizes 
70. Diego Barros Arana, Historia General ~ Chile (Sant..iago, 1890), XI, 194. 
71. Keen, DeForest ~ Revolution, 105. 
72. Ibid., 103. 
73. Bemis, Early Diplomatic Missions, 39. 
74. Manning, Diplomatic Gorrespondence, III, 1973. 
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captured by the privateers. DeForest was aided in the equipment of the 
pri vateers by Thomas 'l'enant and George Crownj nshield. 7> lot all of DeForest's 
activities were above reproach, even to parties anxious to secure ships and 
supplies. 76 Joining DeForest in many of his privateering adventures was 
General William Winder of Baltimore, appointed by Pueyrredon on February 2$, 
1518, as special deputy of the United Provinces of La Plata. 77 All of these 
individuals and companies were in various degrees responsible for securing 
ships, supplies, and other necessities requested by the Army of the Andes and 
the Chilean naval squadron. Nhile claiming great personal devotion to the 
cause of independence, more often it was the glitter of gold that prompted 
and sustained the American entrepreneurs in their South American ventures. 
Victory at Kaipu, April 1816, decisively announced Chilean independence. 
During the campaign, the tantalising prospect of free trade dangled continuall 
before the eyes of the two most interested nations, Britain and the United 
States. Chilean independence a reality, what was the commercial and economic 
status of this country? How did the British and Americans fit into the new 
comnercial scheme? Did they secure any of the promised advantages and to 
~hat degree? How far did O'Higgins and the Chilean officials follow the 
trade policy of San Martin now completely absorbed in planning the Peruvian 
campaign? Contemporary documents and accounts furnish much tnformation in 
75. Keen, DeF'orest ~ Revolution, 106-107; Ill. 
76. ~, VIII, 184-85. Matias Irigoyen to San Martin, April 30, 1817. 
77. B~~is, Early Diplomatic Missions, 77-78. 
t"1i s respect. 
Hall IS VoYages contain considerable det,aHs regardinc Chilean commercial 
life, forcipn and domestic. Ch~lean 11beration, and its "consequent establish-
ment of English and Mr.-rtl: American mercantile houses, have wro'Uf'!1t a rreat 
~hnr.re in the whole systEm, It Hell observed. 78 This contemporary paid much 
heed tn the' min1ng nctivities, stressing the British investments in the 
copper trade. wh1ch nc·t only proved financially ac1vE.ntagecu5 uut eliminated 
the services of the Chilean mini ll€ c&.pitalist actillf as the middle rr-.an. 
Moreover, the British goods consig'ned to Santiago merct;.;.nts, Britieh or 
American, were paid for either in specie or copper. Due to this unrestricted 
comr.:erce, the owner of t.he original foods made a rrofit, the Chileans lierE" 
smmlied with commodities previously not tvana~)le, and the nerche..nts acquired 
a lIIaluable return for their e:ervices. The advanta.fes to t.r..e mine owners 'Were 
numerous. However, all t.his -)"189 novel to South America and the consequences 
of recent changes. 79 
Stevenson's Narrative contains the statement that after the revolution 
"e.lmo8t any t.h:i.!¥; ! 1! I!lf'lesa meets with approbation_ n80 From 1817 onward, 
the-;re was a noticea.'!:>le increase :in tl-tc number of wholesale merchants, retail 
dea1ers, Chileans S-"ld foreign :merchant vessels. The ports were ttrivi!'!g with 
business. Whereas in 1809 the Chilean custom-house had receipts amounting 
to 26,738 1/2 dollars, by 1821, the total had increased to h64,387 3/4 dollars. 
'(8. Captain Basil Hall, Voyages (Edinburgh, 1826), II, 54. 
(9. ~., 60-63. 
80. William Stevenson, A Historical and Descriptive Narrative of Twenty Years' 
Residence 1.n South America .... {LOndon71S25), fiI, 161. -
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In 1809, 13 ships, all Spanish, entered and left Valparaiso but, in 1821, 
the number was 142, 21 were war ships and 121 commercial vessels.al The 
monopoly enjoyed by Spanish merchants and its strangling effect upon Chilean 
economic life had disappeared. 
Anglo-American commercial competition in an independent Chile remained. 
The presence of American agents and consuls continually disturbed Bowles, who 
wrote on June 7, 1818, that British merchants needed better, accredited 
representation in Chile.82 The United States, however, encountered maQY 
obstacles in Chile, especially due to Cochrane who seemed to favor and promote 
British commerce, though there were instances where this did not hold true. 
Cochrane's role in the commercial activities during and after the Peruvian 
campaign will be discussed at greater length in other chapters of this 
dissertation. Actually, the greatest percentage of Chilean trade was 
British.B3 
Contemporary American accounts evaluate the commercial status of a 
liberated Chile. One such account referred to the ports, formerly restricted 
by Spanish monopoly, now thrown open to the world.84 Theodore Bland's 
report, part of the Rodney-Graham mission, offers extensive coverage of 
Chilean economic conditions after independence, since Bland arrived in 
31. Ibid., 163-64. 
-
82. Piccirilli, ~ Martin I Politica, 449-50. 
83. Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and the Independence of Latin 
America !§.gQ-1830 (Baltimore, 194t), t~5. - - -
84. Brackenridge, Voyage ~ South America, I, 301. 
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Santiago on Nay 5, 1818. In oonversation with O'Higgins, Bland remarked that 
the United States did not wish to bargain with Chile via treaty for commercial 
advantages but for the ability "to trade freely, upon terms of equality and 
mutual benefit.1I85 Since foreign recognition was of paramount importance to 
Chile, O'Higgins indicated that the nation which shall first reoognize its 
independence would be extended many commercial advantages. He hoped that 
the United States would be that favored nation. Bland replied that he had 
no instructions to speak on this matter but believed the United States wanted 
no commeroial inducements for acknowledging Chile. However, Bland did say 
that the people of the United States would appreciate any municipal regulations 
favoring their oommerce but not as part of any direot treaty.86 
Bland's discussion of Chilean oustoms and taxation indioated the 
fluotuation of import-export duties. In 1818, these duties amounted to 22 
per oent. The excise paid on all artioles sold, the aloabala, was quoted as 
10 per oent, with all foreign merchandize subjeot to this excise. Liquors, 
claret, Windsor chairs, silk and morocco shoes of French fabrio all paid 
double duties. The government itself sold tobacco, snuff, arms and 
munitions, granting speoial permissions to individuals when necessary. 
Bribery and special fees, although illegal, still expedited goods through 
the customhouse.87 
Sinoe the opening of some Chilean ports in February 1817, twenty-four 
85. Amerioan State Papers, For~ign Relations, IV, 293. Bland Report. 
86. ~., 294. 
87. ~., .301. 
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American ships carrying a cargo worth $1,385,000 [a supposed estimate] and 
twenty British ships with a valued cargo of'~1,835,ooo entered the country. 
However, the cost of the goods was not collected immediately.8S During 1817, 
the total estimate of imports into Chile, ~ land and sea, was calculated at 
a little less than $4,000,000 of which $2,000,000 came from England, ~l,OOO,ooo 
from the United dtates, and $1,000,000 from Buenos Aires. The balance of 
trade was definitely not favorable because the exports for the same period 
amounted to about ~2,OOO,000. Two reasons advanced for this deplorable 
state of affairs were (1) the over importation of goods (2) the necessity 
for a middleman in many transactions.89 
At the commencement of the Chilean campaign, San Martin personally or 
through friends or officials, promised commercial advantages both to Britain 
and the United States. The closed port 8,Ystem of the Spaniards was replaced 
by considerable trade activity which grew as Chilean prospects for inde-
pendence became more feasible. With the completion of independence in 1818, 
and de~pite duties, taxes, rivalries, blockades, and political uncertmnties, 
Chile offered free trade. The future commercial growth of Chile, however, 
depended to a large exteLlt upon the outcome of the Peruvian cnmpaign. Braced 
with this thought, the Chileans prepared to give substance to San Martini s 
promise: the liberation of Peru and subsequent extension of free trade. 
88. ~., 305. 
89. ~. 
--
CHAPTER II 
Outfitting of the Peruvian Expedition 
There could be no tranquil nor certain Chilean independence with the 
ever-menacing Royalist controlled Peru directly to the north. Nor did the 
royalists intend either to allow one loss to deter them from reconquering 
Chile or lead to the complete extinction of the:f.r domination in Peru. This 
is precisely what San Jlartin envisaged. To him, the Chilean campaign was 
a means to subvert royalist power and revolutionize Peru with one of the 
watchwords of the period, free trade. While this was hardly the sole tenet 
of the revolutionaries it was, nevertheless, of prime significance in 
motivating the Peruvian expedition. Spanish commercial monopoly opposed 
colonial interests which considered free trade the basis of agricultural 
and industrial wealth. l How extensively San Jlartin imbibed of this 
revolutionary principle and how closely he followed its dictates during the 
earliest stages of the Peruvian campaign will be studied through his 
promises to the Peruvians and his subsequent dealings with officials, private 
companies, and individuals who furnished both the capital and supplies for 
the expedition. 
San Martin had made no secret of his Peruvian plans prior to Chilean 
I1ber~tion.2 Be had publicly expressed his opinions more consistently as 
1. EmHio Romero, ItApuntes sobre las ideas de orden economico durante la 
revolueion por la independencia del Peru," Me~urio Pemano, III, (Lima, 1939), 
36-37. Author cites Riva Aguero's "Las 28 Causas de 1a Lvolueion de ~ •• 
2. Robertson, Letters .2!! ~.!., II, 210. 
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victories :i.n Chile grew, culminating in Maipu. With Chilean successes came 
problems. The Army of the Andes dwindling by desertion and weakened by 
indifference needed employment. San MartIn's difficulties with the Buenos 
Aires povernment over the Army's return to the Argentine resulted in his 
refusal to move back, thereby offending a potential supporter of the 
Peruvian campaign. 3 ChHean confidence brought San Martin a new commission 
as head of the liberatiDf army. Contemporaries appreciated the ripeness of 
Peru for the San Martin project.4 Peruvian insurrection arainst Royalist 
control, fomented by the Chilean revolutiona.ries amoIlf' an uneasy and dis-
"" affected populace. became part of the strate£y.) The Chileans prepared to 
give substance to a dream. 
Designated by a British observer as a great and bold measure originating 
with San Martin,6 the Peruvian expedition was highly propagandized among the 
Chileans. 7 The inhabitants of Cuyo found many d1 recti ves and pleas addressed 
to their attention.8 Even Peruvians sympathetic to the revolutionary cause 
asked the Chileans to advance the sacred cause of liberty and remedy the 
3. Killer. Memoirs, I, 259-60. 
4. DASIl, VI, 290-91, Guido to San MartIn, June 2, 1818. 
5. ~., IV, 402, Jan. 29. 1819, probably wr:ltten by San Mart!n. 
6. Hall. Voyages. I, (1826 ed.), 54. 
7. C. Galvan Moreno, Bandos Z Proelamas del General San MartIn (Buenos Aires, 
1947), 168-69, San Mart!n's proclamation to-the Chi1ean;-c18l8-18l9_. 
8. ~., 179, San Mart!.n, AU[!. 16, 1819. 
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widespread commercial distress.9 Peruvian s.ympathizers were encouraged qy 
emissaries and pamphlets.10 To these must be added the numerous proclamations 
from [;oth O'Higgins and San Martin. In one such address, O'HigGins enumerated 
the Peruvian grievances, among them Royalist monopoly, and praised the virtues 
of independence.ll On November 13, 1818, San Martin explained to the 
Peruvians the viceroy's response to his letter of April 11, 1818, in which 
he suggested reforms. The proposal for a free type of government met with 
insults and San Martin promised that only under freedom could the natural 
riches of the country flourish and commerce expand to its fullest measure.12 
That the Peruvians needed prodding was noted by several contemporaries. 
Hall mentioned that the people had to be prepared for independence,13 this 
despite the many pro-revolutionary s,ympathizers. On September 8, 1820, San 
Martin discussed the activities of the Cortes and the new constitution which, 
he argued could never be successfully applied to the colonies, since distance 
made representation impossible. Although a liberal party in Spain concerned 
itself with American independence, the Cortes was not of the same mind.14 
9. DASH, XI, 269-71 [1820J. 
10. Pilling, Emancipation £! South America, 235. 
11. Galvan Moreno, Bandos 1 Proclamas, 15B-59. 
12. Jose de la. Riva Aguero, Memorias l Documentos para la Historia de la 
Independenci,a .2!1: Peru, l Causas del: !:!!! ESdto (.~aris, l'B>BJ, II, 13:t>' 
13. Hall, Vgrages, I, 183. 
14. Hanuel de Odriozola, Docu.mentos Historicos del Peru (Lima, 1863), IV, 
33-34, San Martin to the PeruVians. --- ----
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October 12, 1820, San Martin explained more fully the object of the Peru 
expedition. He did not seek military glory to gratify his personal views but 
to give independence to his country fulfilling the duties imposed upon him by 
"fate and nature." When Peru will have decided by which form of government 
she would be ruled, he said. then his employment would cease.15 This document, 
like many others, did not specify tree trade as one of the principles for 
which San Martin fourht the Peruvian campaign. The promises made to the 
Chileans and Peruvians were couched in general terms stressinr political 
freedom and material advancement. The general propoganda was calculated to 
stir the patriotic imagination of the masses while specific promises of 
commercial benefits were directed to quarters most likely to profit by them, 
whether they be Chileans, Peruvians, or interested foreign powers. 
One of the interested powers was Oreat Britain. Ho sooner had the first 
pronouncements concernine the campaign been voiced when British officials 
and private citizens injected themselves into the proceedings jn varyinr 
degrees of involvement. British ships stationed jn ChUe or cruising along 
the Chilean-Peruvian coastline noted all activities coneemine military and 
naval preparations. laval lists were compiled16 and numerous commentaries 
revolving around the personality, ability, and motives of San Martin can be 
found in Hall's description of his personal encounter with the liberator. 
15. British State PaEers, 1819-1820, 990, Manifesto of the General in Chief 
of the Liberating Army of Chile on the' failure of the negotiations for 
Peru with the Spanish Viceroy of Peru. 
16. Pedro Torres Lanzas, Independencia de America, Catalogo de Documentos 
Conservados en el Archivo General de fndias de Sevilla (Madrid, 1912), V, 38. 
July, 1820. 
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Hall praised San Martin's political maxims but noted that these were not 
always consistent with his conduct.17 San Martin's sincerity was unquestioned 
and t.he Peruvian campaipn described not as a war of conqvest and glory but t:i 
war of new and liberal principles against prejudice, btgotry, anl~ tyranny.l8 
Other estimates of Ian Martin were less kind. He was accused of carrying 
out the counsels of a British general who wished the emancipation of South 
America for commercial reasons.19 Moreover, the post 1818 rapport between 
San Martin and Cochrane wavered as the admiral continued questioning the 
military strategy of the general. 20 The weakened relations between the two 
elicited much comment both at home and abroad. A correct estimate of San 
Martin's position in the period after Chilean independence is important, for 
upon it depended the amount of support he was to receive for his next project. 
Was he still considered reliable and motivated by highest principles or was 
he succumbing to the intrigues that characterized the independence era? Was 
he in any position to fulfil his commercial promises and had his influence in 
this sphere waned or risen? Opinion in this matter was divided. 
Reports from U.S. agents indicated that San Martin was more than 
capable of carrying out the Peruvian expedition successfully. Worthl.npton 
wrote to Adams, April 8, 1818, that Peru would secure independence, and 
17. Hall, Voyages, I, (1826 ed.), 178. 
18. Ibid., 180-81. 
19. Ricardo Levene, El Genio Politico de ~~ Martin (Buenos Aires, 1950), 26. 
Levene cites Juan B. Irberdi, "El Crimendel'a guerra," Escritos Postumos 
(Buenos Aires, 1895), II, 213. . 
20. DA.SJi, IV, 512, O'Higgins to San Martin, Aug. 7, 1819. 
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expressed admiration for San Martin. 21 In November of the same year Worthing-
ton told Adams that he might probably eat his Christmas dinner in a liberated 
capital of the incas.22 Prevost considered the "Perus" as "irrevocably 
separated" from Spain and able to "maintain themselves as independent 
powers.· 23 Worthington was moat vocal in his admiration of San Martin. on 
one occasion calling him "brave and politic,ft24 and on another "the greatest 
man I have seen in South America.·25 An equally ardent admirer, Hill, 
referred to San Martin as a man of great influence,26 possessing devotion to 
duties, integrity. prudence, and moral rectitude. As a commercially 
interested observer, Hill's comments on San Martin's "enlarged and liberal 
views,·27 so characterized by foreigners, are highly pertinent. All reports 
dealing with San Martin's character and conduct were not so favorable, some 
attribu~ing to him burning ambition for military despotism in his designs 
for Peru. 28 
The Peruvian Viceroy Pezuela remained constantly informed about the 
projected expedition. Some of the reports came via the American ships 
21. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 919. 
22. ~., 1024, Nov. 18, 1818. 
23. ~., 1041, Prevost to Adams, Sept. 13, 1819. 
'24. ~., I, 372, Worthington to Adams, Jan. 15, 181 • 
25. ~., II, 533, ~lorthinF'ton to Adams, March 7, 181 
26. Hill, Recollecti.ons, 126. 
27. ~., 131. 
28. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 308, Bland Report, May 5, 
1818; Strictures, 99-100, Letter of American Citizen, Oct. 12, 1819. 
34 
cruising the Chilean-Peruvian coastline, for example the Ontar1o.29 The 
Viceroy was also well aware of the varied activities of the British ships 
which continuously involved themselves with the royalists and the insurgents. 
In view of the various threats to Royalist control of Peru, the officials in 
Lima sought military aid trom Spain where an expedition was already prepared 
to depart for an attack on the rebels ot Chile. 30 
From the very beginning it was apparent that San MartIn's Peruvian ex-
pedition could not be financed and equipped b.1 an insolvent Chile. Chile's 
critical situation was recorded in many contemporary accounts and 
correspondence.31 Despite Chile's economic plight, constant effort was made 
to acquaint the people with the necessity of freeing Peru as a means of pro-
viding an excellent market for Chilean eoods.32 Earlier, the Chileans had 
given their silver for the sake of independence33 but in 1819, there was no 
money and the economic and financial situation grew worse. O'Higgins wrote 
to 3an Mart!n in January, 1819, pointing to the need for troops, munitions, 
transports, and to the necessity of seeking 600,000 pesos outside Chil0,34 
and in a second letter, January 20, 1819, he again stressed the need for 
29. Casado and Villena, Memoria Pezuela, 247, 255, April 21, 1818; DASM, V, 
82, Pezuela to La3erna, A.ug. 9, 18t~. -
30. DASM, IV, 350, lrigoyen to San Martin, Feb. 20, 1819; 360, Irigoyen to 
San Martin, June 15, 1819. . 
31. Manning, Diplomat:tc Correspondence, I, 372, Ivorthington to Adams, ,Jan. 15 
1818. 
32. DASM, XI, 65, "Manifiesto del Gobierno a los pueblas que forman e1 estado 
de Chile," Bernardo O'Higgins, May 5, 1813. 
33. Rodney and Graham, Reports, 211. 
34. DASM IV, 392-95, Jan. [16, 17, 18J 1819. 
money. An exhausted public treasury and undependable customhouse dictated 
that financial assistance be sought elsewhere. 35 
The helsewher.- proved to be Buenos Ajres which found itself in much the 
same economic distress as Chile. 36 Cooperation between the two countries had 
been established earlier in commercial and political affairs37 and mutual 
interests now demanded further cooperation on the Peruvian project. Viceroy 
Pezue1a's proposal to open Callao to British ships had elicited much common 
concern in 1818 over Chilean and Argentine commercial interests centering in 
Peru. 38 Mutual interests had demanded mutual strategy. 
Of immediate concern was the procurement of supplies desperately needed 
by the Army of the Andes and Cochrane's naval SQuadron. Letters from Zai1artu. 
Chilean lfinister to Buenos Aires, reflected the difficulties encountered in 
securing the needed supp1ies.39 The Argentine Supreme Director, Juan Martin 
de Peuyrredon, also spoke of the troubles associated with providing ships 
and naval artillery. 40 On December 2, 1818, Pueyrredon reported to San Martin 
regarding the preparation of frigates and request for 33,500 pesos made by 
35. ~., 167-68. 
36. Hall, Voyages, I, 60. 
37. Diego Luis Molinari, "La Expedicion Libertadora al Peru y los Principios 
de Derecho PUblico Coetaneo,· Boletin ~ Instituto 2! Investigaciones 
Historicas, II, (Ano II, 1923-1924), 8. Footnote no. 1. 
38. DASK, VI, 314-18 passim, Guido to Supreme Director of the United Province 
Santiago, Sept. 29, 1818. 
39. Ibid., V, 701, Zai1artu to San Martin, Buenos Aires, Nov. 12, 1818. 
40. Ibid., IV, 601-602, Pueyrredon to San Hartin, Buenos Aires, Hov. 1818. 
zanartu.4l lone of San MartIn's pleas for assistance bore fruit, for on 
January 28, 1819. he wrote to Pueyrredon and complained bitterly that not only 
did the United Provinces fail to provide 6,000 men but even the 3.000 requested 
recently. There was alsc the questinn of supplies requested in July, 1818, 
which never materialized, among them hardtack and salted meat. The Army of 
the Andes had needed men, ships, food and manit-ions but the United Provinces 
were silent to the afflictions besetting the expeditionary force. 42 The 
same day San .Martin had written to Jose Rondeau and expressed similar dis-
satisfaction with the progress of the Peruvian expedition.43 
Although noble sentiments ard pronouncements of assistance outweighted 
either financial or other material aid, the Buenos Aires government did 
attf'mpt to aid San KartIn. On February 5, 1819, a spec::!.a.l treaty was 
sirned between Buenos Aires and Chile which had as its purpose the. liberation 
of Peru a.s a joint measure. Both governments pledged themselves to procure 
armed force for the project; to avoid dispute over expenses and eliminate 
allus10n to questicnable motives behind the expedition both agreed not to 
discuss the Te1..mbursement fer the expenses unUl they were able to settle them 
wi th the j-l'lCiependent r.overnment of Lima. At this time, the agents of both 
governments wodd settle amicably the amount, time and ways of repayment. 44 
41. Ibid., 608. 
-
42. Ibid., 377-98. 
-
43. Ibid., 383. San MartIn to Rondeau. Jan. 28, 1819. 
-
44. Riva AgUel"O. Jlem.orias Z DocumentoD, Articles III and IV, 6, 7. 
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l~ere were no specific agrcem6nts with respect to the amount either party 
would contribute to securing the armed force, maintaining it, or hovJ" these 
objectives would be carried into effect. There were further demonstrations 
of mutual assistance.4S 
On JulY 28, 1819, San Martin wrote to O'Higgins first calling him "the 
arbiter of Latin 4merican destiny," then extolling the superiority of the 
Royalist naval forces, a factor which necessitated the cooperation of Buenos 
Aires in building up the Chilean squadron. San Martin Bu:!,;:;ested the 
following terms for the desired cooperation: (1) the United Provinces would 
give the Chilean Government SO,OOO pesos to equip the squadron; (2) from the 
day the squadron would sail, the United Provinces were to pq and clothe 
the division led by Col. Las Heras; (3) 2,500 troops were to remain in 
Mendoza and be emplo.yed for Chilean defense; (4) the United Provinces were 
to contribute 6,000 horses to Chile by next February at the latest; (5) the 
United Provinces were to indicate the amount of provisions and various 
replacements needed by the squadron.46 
Not satisfied with contacting important officials in~3uenos Aires, San 
Martin sought assistance from the governors of the various United Provinces, 
among them the governor intendente of Cuyo.47 His plea was always the same, 
the Peruvian expedition could not materialize much less succeed without arms. 
45. DASM, IV, 285. Letter d~ted March 19, 1819, to Supreme Director of 
Chilean ,State from Francisco Borja ~'ontecilla and Jose Maria Villareal. 
46. ~., Sal, ;;>an Martin to O'Higgins, July 28, 1819. 
47. ~., 470, Aug. 16, 1819. 
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supplies and money. 'The Cuyo inhabitants had Great confidence i.n .:>an 11ar·t.!n 
and, accordine to contemporary reports, had freely yielded up their sla.ves, 
),000 horses, 10,000 mules, plus personR.l services when he readied for t,lle 
Chilean campaign. 48 Now, when hev,ras preparing to strike a similar blovl at 
Peru, the people of Ct~o once again evidenced a noble response especially 
arnoni~ t,he different officers of the municipality and corporations.49 Not 
only did they offer their wrought silver but vowed to do more for the success 
of the expecti tion. The secnlar and regulA.!" clergy, magistrat.es 2nd corporate 
1)odies stripoed themselves of their plate and silver utensils.50 
v,Thile the condition of the army continued to be distressing, that of the 
naval squadron seemed to prosper under the "unremitting assiduity" of Lord 
Cochrane.51 Securir~ and provisioninG Ships, always somewhat of a problem, 
was solved by various means, legal and otherwise. There was much speculation 
about where Cochrane found the ships and the supplies when the scarcity of 
mon~J made both more difficult to obtain. One source credited the British 
merchants. 52 3till another denied the fact that either Cocr~ane or tte 
48. Department of State, General Records, Washington, Special Agents File on 
C. A. Rodney, John ClTaham, Theodore Bland and J. B. Prevost, Rodney Report, 
A, 1818, 29r. Microfilm. 
49. ~., 36v. 
50. ~., 37r, Mar. 5, 1818. 
Sl. Hall, Voyages, I, (1824 ed.), 67. 
52. National Archives, ~1iushington, Despatches from 3pecial Agents, Jeremy 
Robinson, A.ugust 4, 1817-September 21, 1823, Robinson to Adams, June 1, 1818. 
l'1:e88 desnatches are on microfiL'n but orit~lnals were checked. Henceforth 
cited. as Special Agents, Robinson. -
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British Government equipped the patriot navy.53 But the guns, munitions and 
other l'rticles of war necessary to a naval fleet were found as can be seen 
from an account dated January 18, 1319, and signed by Jose Manuel Borgoffo, 
commander of the artillery, who noted that on~ a part of the supplies were 
destined for the naval squadron and the greater portion to the ar~.54 
On Hay 25, 1819, San tl.artin wrote to the Minister of State, Don J. 
Echevarria, enclosing a list of necessities for a maritime expedition of 
four thousand men, which should be able to sail at the latest the middle of 
November. The letter indicated a great need for four gunbonts,55 while the 
list itself detailed all the specific items that would be necessary including 
the necessary trans[jI}rts for the troops.56 An American observer and agent, 
Robinson, reported to Adams, June 30, 1819, that Cochrane would come to 
Santiago to refit his vessels which would then be well supplied with Congreve 
Rockets and with arms and military forces adequate to take the royalist 
p~ssessions.57 Just how did San Martin and Cochrane expect to supply their 
ever increasing need for ships, munitions and war goods? Robinson's letter 
expressed confidence that the rockets and munitions would be there when 
needed by the Peruvian expedition, naval and military. Robinson mentioned 
53. National Archives, Washington, Despatches from U.S. Ministers in 
Argentina, October 22, 1818--April 8, 1820, Worthington to Adams, March 7, 
1819. Microfilm. Cited in future as U.S. Ministers Argentina. 
5h. DASM, IV, 396. 
-55. Ibid., 465. 
-56. ~., 461-63 passim. 
57. Special Agents, Robinson, June JO, 1819. 
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that Buenos Aires and Chile were cooperating happily by sending the military 
and maritime expeditions but no particulars were given about the actual 
source of supply_ With regards to the ships themselves, he said, many were 
purchased either from for~ign merchants, e.g. the British Cumberland renamed 
the General San Martin, or the Columbus, now the Araucano. Chile also 
purchased the Chacabuco for 35,000 pesos.58 It is easy to understand Chilean 
need for money when the cost of the various ships is taken into account, for 
exa;ple the Araucano bought at a cost of 33,000 pesos. Although confiscations 
provided some of the ships, many of them had to be bought, and moreover, 
provisioned. A document with Prevost's name attached stated that San Martin 
had 6,000 men and would receive provisions for four months by those who 
furnished the transports.59 This could well refer to the contract sipned in 
September, 1819 between individual merchants and the Chilean government for 
the purpose of outfitting the expedition, and which will be discussed further 
in the chapter. 
With respect to the provisioning of the ~, land transportation also 
had to be considered. Arrangements were made to purchase mules and horses of 
Which there was a constant shortage. Despite this shortage, import duties 
upon these items existed. In August of 1819, however, the case of 
58. DASM, V. 439, O'Higgins to San Xart!n, Aug. 17, 1819. 
-
59. National Archives, Washinp,ton, Despatches from Special Agents, July 10, 
18l7--Oetober 1, 1825, John B. Prevost, James Biddle, Stanhope Prevost, and 
John Dorr, Extracts of a letter from a gentleman, March 9, 1820. Document 
has the name of Prevost at the top. Xicrofilm. Cited in future as Special 
Ap,ents, Prevost, Biddle, Dorr. 
Matias Morales challenged the payment of duties upon mules. At this time, 
the Chilean gove~~ent decided to enforce the duties on mules but revoked 
import duties on horses for a period of two years.6O 
Increased demand for various supplies was not matched by a prosperous 
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treasury that could accede to the soupht for necessities. Many reasons were 
given for insuff1.cient funds but one especially deserves attention. O'Higgins 
had complained to San llartin in his January 20, 1819, letter of reduced 
profits, citing limited trade as one cause. Free trade had placed much of 
Chilean specie in the hands of foreign merchants but it was not they who had 
to create and maintain armies and a naval sqUadron.61 Disruption of the 
Peruvian trade further depleted the Chilean treasury and added a point to 
the patriotic reasons for extending the revolution jn that dlrection.62 
The lucrativeness of the Peruvian market, expecially without any kind 
of royalist restrictions, weighed so heavily upon commercia1ly-m1nded 
entrepreneurs that they resorted to espionage and propaganda. The benefits 
of free trade were flaunted before Peruvian eyes, using Buenos Aires and 
Chile as exmap1es. O'Higgins issued a proclamation to the Peruvians in 
which he spoke of the foreign nations vying w.1 th each other commercially 
60. National Archives, Washinrton, Communications of Department of State 
from Foreign Leeationa in the United states. Chile, February 20, 1811--
July 16, 185), document sirned by O'Higgins and Secretary of Senate 
Chamber, Jose Karia Villareal and dated August 6, 1819. 1I1crofilm. Cited 
henceforth as Foreign Legations, Chile. 
61. BartOlome Mitre, Historia de San Martin Z de la Emancipacion Sud-
Americana (Buenos Aires, 18901, ~18. - -
62. Barros Arana, Historia Chile, III, 366. 
ane bringin~ to the Chileans not. only their personal aie: but also arns.63 
A.mon:s the sncret aE::n!l'ts operating in Peru was Raf:J.elhrfias, 64 DO!TIingo 
'l'orres,65 Jose Fernandez paredes,66 all of whom received definite 
instructions concerning their mission. The economic conditions in Peru 
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were a prime t~get for observation. Re,orts from LL~a signed by Aristipo 
Emero61 and Senor el 301dado68 gave further evi.dence of Peruvian conditions 
and sentiments. '!he name of ~ochrane, his activities, British interests and 
mercantile speculations formed the basis of many reports. Of con8iderab1e 
importance WaS the auestion whether or not the viceroy wOllld accede to free 
trade in the fa.co of the impending Chilean expedition and the f'lnl'lncial 
disasters already shaking Royalist economy.69 Since the reward of the 
ULerl'l:tion was the prize of free trade, how J!'IJlch support would the British 
or ,':Tl1eric;ms provide to the expedition if the Royalists handed the prize to 
them vlithout demanding loans, supplies or negotiating cont.racts stipulating 
trade concessions in return for assistancp.? The possibility of free trade 
63. u.s. Ministers Argentina, O'Higgins to the Peruvians, n.d., but 
probably 11a;.v 1019. 
6L. .Jarros Arana, Historia Chile, XII, 162; DASH, VII, 161. 
-
65. ~, VII, 1.4. 
06. Ibici., 161. 
-6",. ~., 116, Mar. 16, 1519. 
6,). ~., 152, Oct. 28 [1819]. 
6,). Ibid., 114-15, Juntt. de Corporaciones sobre arbitrios, Guido, 
'" b - () 1'8 -ruery--March, 1019. 
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with Peru was not exactly untenable even in 1818.10 
rear of royalist policies, economic pressures within Chile itself to 
trade in Peru, preparations for the expedition, lack of money and supplies, 
promises of liberation to the Peruvians, promises of foreign aid meant only 
one thing--80mehow Chile would have to equip and maintain the expedition. In 
June of 1819, Joaquin de Echeverria wrote to San Martin concerning contractors 
who had submitted to the Chilean government diverse proposals for outfitting 
the expedition.11 On August 7, 1819, Tomas Guido also wrote to San MartIn 
regarding the contractors mentioning Pena and Sarratea who were to lodge and 
transport 4,000 men to Peru. The proposal of these two men was approved by 
the Chilean senate but as yet nothing had been done although the merchants 
showed great confidence in San Martin as the leader of the movement. 72 The 
same day Guido wrote another letter to San MartIn .. ntioning Cochrane's 
foreign crew which entered the service with the hope of a short and lucrative 
campaign. He closed the letter acknowledging receipt of 50,000 pesos to 
carry out his mission. 73 
The names of licol&s Rodrigues Pefta and Juan Jose Barratea were 
mentioned again in connection with Paulino Campbell. Pefta was a friend of 
70. Ibid., VI, 314, Guido to the Supreme Director of the United Provinces, 
Sept.2'lr.' 1818. 
71. ~., IV, )01, June 3, 1819. 
72. ~., 507, Aug. 7, 1819. 
73. ~., IV, 510-11, Aug. 7, 1819. 
and Sa.rl. l<art:!'n IJ.ad sold Pena pl'operty in 1/}20 v9.1ued at ,30,000 
pr,yment in 1:·22, it 'liaS made clear that the remainir:g amount vJas usee! to l?ClY 
a note signed by 3an Hartin in favor of Campbell to cover the chorter of a 
ship carrying f>orses to the liboruting army of Peru. CaJI'll.)cell V73.S c~ J.3ritish 
merchant who became associated with Perla and. .3arratea in Chile in connection 
with the transport of 3an l'lart1n's troops to Peru. Litig::l.tion involving the 
ahove debts continued even in 1842.74 Th:i.s document is interesting for 
;';8ver"tl reasons. One, it definitely imVlic:ltes several merch2.uts who supplied 
the e:;<p:3dition. Two, it involY8s one. British merchant in the transaction. 
Three" it estaLlishes a tie of friendship between San Hartin and the 
"contractors" for the expedition. Four" it notes an <:unount of money paid 
for the tra.nsport of horses, if the t3'tatement is correct. 
Fhen the r5-nal contract was si;ned on September 2, 1'319, the following 
d.:.natures appeared officiall;yt Bernardo O'Higgins" NicoUs Rodriguez Pen.a, 
JU3.D Jose Sarratea, Felipe Santiago del Solar, and Joaquin de Echeverr·ia. The 
c0ntr?ct l'lW.rie the followin;:: stipUlations: 75 (1) the company was to provide in 
tho month of December, with a difference of fifteen days either way, all 
the preparations m~cessa.ry for the expedi Mon, the nllmber of troops to be 
determined by San Mart{n, these prer:'lrations tJere to be ready and waiting 
i~ the port of Valparaiso. (2) ThA oompany was to pay for the necessary 
tr~nsport of the a~ its maintenance and horses during the departure as well 
711. Barros Arana" !.!!storia Chile, XIII, 690, footnote 58. 
75. ~, IV, 304-308 gassim. 
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as for the return of the expedition, in the event of poor success, for five 
months from the day of leaving Valparaiso. Provisions were made to ship 
camping equipment for the general-in-chief and his aid-de-camp; the others 
would have to paT for the same equipment. () For the desirnated period of 
time, the company was to provide four thousand ready-made uniforms composed 
of a cloak, cap, trousers, two snirts of linen, a pair of shoes and a pair 
of sandals. C4) The company was to be responsible for the administration of 
its accounts accordinp to the ouantity and quality by order of the general-
in-chief. (5) It was not only the sole responsibility of the company to 
provide for the departure and return of the expedition but in addition to 
maintain the army where it might be 'on land only. The company was to be 
reimbursed for the additional expenses and collect in Chile. (6) Tne 
empresarios were to continue their contract for the stipulated five months, 
although the sailing date might be postponed. In ease of partial fulfilment 
of the contract due to the failure of the squadron to sail again, the 
government was obliged to pay the empresarios the stipulated freight, re-
ceiving the supplies at its cost, according to the account which the company 
would present, takillf care to charge the government adequate compensation to 
reimburse the work andgrievanee involved. (1) If the company was not 
ready by the stipulated time to provide the supplies etc., it was obliged 
to pay 1,500 pesos for each day of delay resulting to the expedition. If, 
however, the delay was caused by the government, compensation was to be made 
to the empresarios for their troubles and expenses, 1ncludinp the charges 
paid to the captains of the ships. (8) The government guaranteed to the 
comp~ for each soldier, sergeant, corporal drummer, musician, etc., who 
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embarked trom Valparaiso, sixty pesos, and for each horse seventy pesos. 
(9) The government was obligated to deliver to the company all the ships 
which it had acquired by seizure or qy any other means or title, immediately 
after the signing of the contract, excepting those which would be necessary 
to serve Cochrane in his immediate expedition.' The frigate Dolores was to 
be delivered to the company as soon as it returned from Concepcion, and the 
government was to p~ no more than the costs entailed if she were used by 
, 
the empresarios so long as she remained in the service of the government up 
to one month prior to the sailing of the expedition. ~lhile in the service of 
the government, any damages suffered by the Dolores was to be remedied by 
the government. Spoils taken in the future would have to be delivered to 
the company. The company was to p~ the government 10 per cent of the value 
of the ships at the termination of the expedition and costs determined by 
the government regarding their improvement. Any discount suffered in their 
value was to be borne by the empresarios upon the valuation of appraisers. 
(10) The 'empresarios were to make every effort to acquire sufficient ships 
for the expedition. (11) With respect to mUnitions, artillery, equipment, 
etc., shipped on board the ships belonging to the company, the government 
was to pay their freight at "sanelt prices with the exception of the gun and 
knapsack of each soldier, corporal and sergeant who embarked. (12) The 
government was to pay the company only 2/3 of the total value of the debt 
in the following terms: from the 10th to the 15th of the present September, 
30,000 pesos, and the rest in October, in reaqy money, in the value of the 
ships that may be sold to it, and in the ,~oods that some indiViduals may be 
able to deliver for the present contribution. There were stipulations as to 
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how these goods were to be delivered to the company. The 2/3 that would 
be paid to the empresarios would amount precisely to the 300,000 pesos 
imposed for the expedition. (13) The last 1/3 was to be guaranteed in the 
first enemy country that the army occupied with the first arrivals of 
contributions that they imposed. (14) If the government needed more than 
the 20 horses stipulated in article 1, the company would be reimbursed for 
the same, including their mal,ntenance, transportation, and a 6 per cent of 
their total value as compensation. (15) The company also was to provide 
maintenance for all officials embarking who were not soldiers at the same 
stipulated rate of sl~y pesos. (16) Arrangements were to be made for 
providing 4,000 pairs of shoes. (17) On the request of the company, with 
the sandion of the Chilean government, the general in chief waa entrusted 
with intervening with the newly established government in liberated areaa 
on behalf of the empresarios to remove duties upon 590 tons of foods as 
compensation for servicea rendered and hardships endured. 
While all the articles of the contract are illuminating, of special 
significance are 13 and 17. The speculative nature of the expedition, 
commercially speaking, could prove most advantageous to the empresarios both 
in re8"~ect to the repayment of a third of their expenditures and in importing 
goods duty free into the liberated area. On September 4, 1819, EcheverrIa 
wrote to San Martin and enclosed a copy of the signed contract discussed 
above. He mentioned that the naval squadron had set out upon another 
vigil perfectly equipped and provided with all the necessities for destroying 
the enelBT. It remained only for San MartIn to ready himself for the 
expedition, assured that the Chilean and United Provinces governments are 
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behind his project.76 
There is much controversy OVI3t' who contributed nost to i'ittir.c out the 
PeruV'ian expedition-. Hany of the sources, among +,hem l\rr:.eric:ln obsnrvers. 
creclit the Chilean gov~rnment; for having undertaken such a grand enterpriF>e 
in a singularlY short space of time and in a manner so complete as to 
indicate probable success.11 Robinson reported to Adams, October 9, 1820, 
t,hat there were whispers concerning the rr.rant~ng of a monopoly for a 
speoific period of time to those individuals who had furnished the Chilean 
government with assistance either by w~ of money, ships or supplies. More-
over, further rumors indicated that foreigners would be excluded from the 
ooasting trade. 78 One ca~ speculate whether this monopoly alluded to above 
was granted to the contractors for the expedition or whether it involved a 
completely different group of individuals--if it had been granted at all. 
Nows cf the impending expedition reached the viceroy by the various 
ships which touched Peruvian ports. From the captain of the !!.. ,2. Warrior, 
Pezuela learned that by July 11, 1820, the outfitting of the expedition was 
still delayed by lack of money and tran sport. 79 By August of the same year, 
American sources indicated that the expedition was at least prepared to 
liberate Peru after having been equipped at great expense by the Chilean 
76. ~~iq., IV, 303, 304. 
77. Spe<'ial Ap;ents, Robinson, Robinson to Adams, Oct. 9, 1820. 
"lB. Thin., Robinson to ~_dams, Oct. 9, 1820. 
79. Casado and Villena, Memoria Pezuela, 730. 
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government.BO Still another contemporary, Oharles Gauntt of the Macedonian. 
wrote on August 21, 1820, of the drain that the expedition was upon the 
Chilean treasury and that Chilean credit was very low. He added an interesting 
note when he said that "San Martin has promised to pay to Chili [sic] the 
amount it has cost them to fit out the expedition, the first place he 
conquers.,,8l How did San Martin expect to repay an obViously huge debt to the 
investors of the expedition? What part did spoils and concessions play in 
this repayment? 
Whatever assistance the Chileans gave to the liberating expedition was 
carefully accompanied by explicit instructions to be observed during the 
campaign. One such document is dated June 23, 1820, and contains twenty.five 
articles of which only the last specifically deals with commerce, and then 
on~ to a deputy who would concern himself with the diplomatiC and commercial 
negotiations of mutual interest to both states.82 
Although the Chileans contributed heavily to the San Martin expedition, 
one could hardly overlook the aid given by the British to the project. Partial 
and impartial sources credit the British with considerable sustenance to the 
Cause of Peruvian liberation. As ear~ as 1813, the British were aware of San 
Martin's favorable disposition.8) In 1816, certain British officials still 
80. Hall, Vgyages, I, (1824 ed.), 60, Aug. 1), 1820. 
81. National Archives, T;lashington, Navy Department, Private Remarks of 
Lieutenant Charles Gauntt of the U. S. Ship Macedonian ••• , f. 92. 
82. Riva ~guero, Memoria 1 Documentos, II, 11. 
83. Piccirilli, San Martin 1 Pol!tioa, Documentos, 402, William Bowles to 
J. ~". Croker, Secretary of Adnliralty, Jan. 26, 1813. 
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considered San Martin a man of integrity, honor and disinterest.84 In 1817, 
san Mart!n was urging William Bowles that his presence in Chilean waters would 
be very necessary and contribute much to their mutual interests.85 The opinio 
of the British government by 1817 was definitely in favor of the insurgents, 
considering mediation with the mother country too late.86 In the meantime, 
British merchants interested in the Chilean and Peruvian markets clamored for 
additional protection against both the royalists and privateers alike.81 On 
April 9, 1817, Bowles mentioned receipt of San Mart!n's letter of February 22, 
1817, in which he urged closer ties and pledged mutual benefits. He added 
that he considered San Martin's proposals totally devoid of personal ambitioH~ 
Open and official sanction of San Mart!n was quite impossible and the 
British government issued a series of proclamations prohibiting its subjects 
from taking part in the contest between Spain and her colonies, either by 
personal service or arms and other exports.89 The official attitude of the 
Bri tish government was not shared by many of its mercantile minded individuals 
or officials. Henry Chamberlain wrote to Castlereagh, April 5, 1817, praising 
84. Ibid., 409, Bowles to Croker, Sept. 22, 1816. 
-
85. Webster, Britain ~ Independence, I, 102, Feb. 22, 1817. 
86. DASM, IV, 564, Juan Mart!n Pueyrred6l'l to San Mart:!n, Feb. 25, 1817. 
-
87. Piccirilli, San Mart!n 1 Pol:!tica, Documentos, 416, Bowles to Croker, 
March 1, 1817. -
88. ~., Documentos, 424. 
89. British State Papers, 1816, 1811, 488; 1818.1819, 510; 1818-1819, 519; 
1819-1820, 931. 
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San Martin and his friendly relations with Bowles.90 Of more interest i8 the 
letter written by Robert Staples to William Hamilton, )(ay 25, 1617. In it 
he speaks of San Kartin t s request for an interview wherein he discussed 
prospects for Peru and, what is more important, his chief desire which was for 
the British government to inform him what course he might pursue to gain its 
approbation. Apparently, San Martin considered Chile capable of bearing the 
financial burden but unable to provide ships of war and naval officers. San 
Martin reiterated his desire for a British naval force, acknowledging the 
likely impossibility for any direct aid. In return for British favors, San 
Jlartin was prepared to offer advantages to Britain.91 On June 18, 1617, San 
MartIn wrote to Bowles, again requesting the presence of a British naval 
force in Chilean waters to protect British commerce.92 Bowles reported to 
J. ... Croker on June 38, 1617, that ChUean agents were sent both to the 
United States and Britain to secure ships and equipment and mentioned the 
name of leite y Company, Bucklesbury, acting as Chilean agents in London.93 
That British citizens, especially merchants, contributed to San MartIn's 
campaign was also confirmed by Killer who in his Memoirs wrote that the 
confidence of the British merchants at Buenos Aires was conspicuous, that they 
gave credit to the government for supplies intended for his use. 94 Moreover, 
90. ..ebster, Britain.!:!!!! Independence, I, 103. 
91. Ibid., I, Appendix I, 55)-54. 
-
92. Piccirilli, San MartIn I politica, Documentos. 439. 
93. ~., 436. 
94. liller, Memoirs, I, 89. 
52 
the Spanish government was totally aware of the fact that British citizens did 
aid t.he insurgents in many ways and protested stro~17.95 O'Higgins credited 
Bowles for his cooperation in a letter to San MartIn, November 8, 1817.96 
In his Memoirs, Pezuela constantly referred to the assistance eiven the 
rebels by British officials and merchants, citing the hand of Bowles in the 
expedition.97 San Martin directly thanked the Earl of Fife for "proofs" of 
his friendship though he does not succinctly mention what form this aid had 
taken. 98 British assistance to Chile was not without its rewards. On 
November 20, 1817, O'Higgins wrote to the king George III that Chilean ports 
would welcome British goods.9' Further concessions came from San MartIn who 
in return for British help would proaise a reduction of 10 to 20 per cent 
on L'llports and 4 per cent on exports to all British ships for 30 ,.earl. The 
above concession was treated in a letter written by Bowles to the Foreign 
Office, February 14, 1818, and mentioned further San Mart!n r s liberal 
political idealogy, particularly in respect to commerce.1OO 
95. Wellington, ~lamen~ Despatches, III, 115. Wellington to Sir Henr,y 
We11esle7. Oct. 26, 17. 
96. l?.A.SM, V, 416. 
97. Casado and V1l1ena, Memoria Pezuela, 18), Nov. 12, 1817.; 189, Dec. 1, 
1817; 200-201, Dec. 19. 1817. 
9S. Webster, Britain and Indep!ndence, I, 556, San Martin to Earl of Fife, 
James Duff, Dec. 9. lSir.-
99. Ibid., 5>6. enclosed in formal letter from. San Martin to Ca8tlereagh, 
Jan. 1'2;1818. 
100. Luis O;yarzUn and Juan fernamez V.iJ.dez, "Lo8 Planes Politicos de San 
Martin en 1818," Beletin de 1& Academia Chilena de la Historia, Ailo XVII, 
no. 43 (Santiago, 1950), 7>.76. - -
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A report from the Duque de San Carlos to Pesuela, February 7, 1818, 
refers to the arms and munitions leaving Britain and designated for use of 
the insurgents, and the efforts of various merchants to despatch three ships 
full of merchandise and war goods, ships to be sold later to the rebels.10l 
The London activities of Jose Antonio llvarez Condarco to procure ships, arms 
and munitions proved that Spanish accusations were not entirely incorrect. 
Cochrane, since hi s arrival in Chile, was greatly interested in organising a 
laboratory which could fabricate the effective Congreve rockets, and therefore 
negotiated through the London agent llvarez.102 Pezuela received constant 
information regarding the various arms and munitions that were being delivered 
to the Chileans by the British and Americans and so noted it in his Memoirs 
on April 4, 1818.103 Furthermore, he was fully aware that the destination 
of the new expedition was Peru.104 
The name of the British Ellice, Inglis and Company was involved in 
connection with the Catalina Griffier which sailed from the Thames in Februar,r 
of 1818 carrying war goods contracted for by llvares. 1Iisfortune visited the 
Ihe ship which had to leave for the second time on its clandestine voyage. 
The first time she suffered damage and the second time she was shipwrecked.105 
101. ~,V, 173, 174. 
102. Gonsalo Mnes, Historia de 1a Espedicion Libertadors del Peru (Santiago, 
1887), I, 267, 288, 289. -- -- --- ----
10). Casado and Villana, Memoria Pesuela, 244, 245. 
104. 12!S., 255, April 21, 1818. 
105. Bulnes, E!p!dicion Libertadora, I, 5S, 56. 
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The service of 11varez were further required in the purchnse of the 
Cumberland, with the name of Ellice making another appearance. A Mr. M. Neile 
is also mentioned in regards to the Cumberland. A letter to San Martin trom 
London, November 22, 1817, speaks of the financial difficulties entailed in 
the sale and equipment of this ship.l06 On November 25, 1817, a contract was 
signed between the accredited agent Jose Antonio Alvarez and Eduardo Ellice, 
merchant ot London tor the equipment of the Cumberland. Under the contract, 
Ellice waS to buy and equip the ship and then sell it to the Chilean govern-
ment, with no small profit and a qualified dispensation trom export duties. 
The cargo master ot the ship was empowered to sell goods amounting to 6,000 
pounds sterling in any part of Chile or Peru tree ot duty, also exporting duty 
free speCie and fruits ot the country brought by the sale of his goods.107 
Further munitions were acquired through the British ship ~ _Li .... n .... d_oc---.h, 
John Templeton, master. The munitions came via Buenos Aires and according to 
a September 10, 1818, document, the value of a specified cargo amounted to 
177,464 libraa (pounds) ,108 which is confirmed by another document dated 
September 15, 1818, signed in Buenos Aires. l09 
British interest in Chilean and Peruvian markets continued to grow, and 
accredited rebel agents to London were encouraged to stimulate that interest. 
106. ~, VIII, 231, 232, 233, from (J. A. {lvarez Condorco]. 
107. ~., 189, 190, 191. 
108. ~., V, 684. 
109. ~., IV, 345. 
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Irisarri was given instr'lctions in Dec8rlher o.f 11318 to this effoct, and to 
stress concessions for recosnition coupled with commercial adv~tntages in the 
form of reduced export and import duties.110 ~lthough there was considerable 
ar::ttation on the pttrt of British individuals to recognize antl a.id the 
insurgents, among them the Earl of Liverpool,lll Mr. Ellice,112 and Mr. 
Robert Wilson,113 the official position did not favor open assistance and 
recognition for fear of openly defying Spain and provoking ~ar. 
Unofficially it was business as usual for the British who sought to sell 
mum tions and war goods to the Chilean government. Some of the ships were 
seized even before they reached their destination and taken by the royalists 
to Callao. One such ship waS reported to San Mart!n by Guido on July 8t 
1819.114 The Gazeta Ministerial ~ Chile, September 4, 1819, reported ships 
laden with men, suppUes, arms and munitions in the 'l'hames ready to aid the 
insurgents. ~~ether those ships arrived is another matter not easily proven. 
Quoting "French Papers" the same article stated that in the rear of English 
bayonets l'!I.8rched bales of merchandise.115 On November 13, 1819, O'Higgins 
told San Mart!n about the reason for purchasing the English frigate !l2 which 
no. Barros Arana, Historia ~ Chile, XII, 47-48, footnote 29. 
111. Wel~ngton, 3ugplementa;r Despatches, XII, 823, Liverpool to Castlereagh, 
Nov. 9, ld18. 
112. Hansard, ParUament~ Debates, XL, 370. 
113. ~., 859. 
114. DASM, VI, 402, Postscript to letter of this date. 
-
115. Foreign Legations, Chile, (Sept. 4, 1819J. 
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was well equipped and had eome from England for sale.116 
As the expedition to Peru progressed, British aid was visible. On 
May 16, 1821, for example, O'Bigrins informed San MartIn that the English 
Frigate Laura carr,ying supplies for the squadron. would also convey medicines 
bOth for t,he army and navy. llention was also made of a Diego O'Brien in 
eonneetion with the supply of clothing needed by the army.ll? The Laura 
carried a physician in addition to salted meat, medieines, topmasts and other 
provisions. lIB 
In his )(emoirs, Miller has some interesting comments eoncerning the 
actual assistanee given, fer example, to the Peruvian eampaign by British 
merchants. He believed that they were given far too mcuh credit for acting 
as "eonsignees of a few old ships, and of second-hand sloops and stores •• 119 
The claim of these businessmen to ardent patriotism is hardly valid. While 
they did display a liberality often found in the commercial world, their 
sympathies and interests were closely allied. Ioreover, a better priee trom 
the royalists dictated a sale in that quarter. Miller did mention individual 
merchJ.n'!is -mo gave proofs of their zeals John Begg, Samuel Haigh. Riehard Price 
James Barnard and William. Hodgson.120 One statement made by Killer, however, 
116. ~,V, 482. 
117. !bid., V, 491. 
-
11B. ~., 496, O'Higgins to San Mardn. July 19, 1821. 
119. Killer, Memoirs, II, 221. 
120. ~., 222. 
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shall be pursued with greater detail in another section of this study-the 
strict observance of neutrality laws by the British naval commanders.12l 
Courting of AJr.erican entrepreneurs by the Chilean rovernment through 
S6 
diplomacy and agents suggests that the amount of ships, munitions and 
supplies coming from Britain was insufficient for the demand. O'Higgins 
wrote to president James MOnroe, April 1, 1817, announcinr the solidity and 
durability of his gcv6rnment and the cor~eroial benefits to be derived from 
those investing in Chile's future. The resources of neighboriIlf Peru were 
not overlooked.122 Brackenridge confirmed the liberality of the Chilean 
government in throwing open ber portIS to foreign trade. He did, however, 
mention the rumor that while the Carrera party was more friendly to the 
United States, that of O'HigginS favored the British. Brackenridge denied 
the validity of such a statement.123 
American merchants were interested in extendine their t·rade to the newly 
independent state I and in supplying the proposed Peruvian expedition. It is 
not within the province ot this chapter to dilSCuss mercantile speculations 
and trade in Chile and Peru but merely to investigate those companies and 
individuals who contributed directly to the expedition. The name of Henry 
Hill. of Hill and Lynch. a Chilean mercantile house and counterpart of the 
Buenos Aires firm of Lynch, Zimmerman and Comp~, is often mentioned in 
121. Ibid. 
-
122. Hanninf, Diplomatic Corre!POndence, II, 699. 
123. Brackenridge, Voyage to South America, I. 301, 302, 303. 
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connection with the expedition. Throueh David C. DeForest, Hill became 
personall.v acquainted with San Martin after his victorious Chilean cam.paign~24 
In March of 1818, Hill was appointed U.S. consul for 3antiago and Valparaiso 
and thus was even more interested in Chilean affairs.125 Hill was the cargo 
master on the 3alvaje which in May of 1817 reached Chile, where Hill disposed 
of war naterials to San Mart!n.126 
'!'he activities of Chilean agents in the United citates were observed both 
by the British127 and the ra.yal1sts.128 A document dated March 8, 1811, em-
powered Manuel Aguirre to b~ ships and munitions in behalf of the Chilean 
government.129 During his American sojourn, Aguirre contacted General Mason 
ot Washington, a cannon-founder, who sold to Aguirre as well as to the 
royalists. Mason, inCidentally, supported the appOintment ot Bland as 
District Judge in Maryland.l3Q The firms of Darcy and Didier ot Philadelphia 
and Huget and Tom ot New York were also involved in supplying the Chilean 
insurgents with arms and munitions.131 Regarding the privateering ventures 
------
124. Keen, EeForest ~ Revolution, 123. 
125. Hill, Recollections, 87. 
126. Bemis,~;r Diplomatio Missions, 40. 
127. Piccirilli, San l1art!n 1. Politica, DocUJlli,;ntos, Bowles to ~roker, 
May 24, 1817. ---
128. Casado and Villena, Memoria Pezuela, 204, Dec. 20, 1817. 
129. Foreign Legations, Chile, Mar. 8, 1817. 
130. Charlos .franCis Adams, ed., J.'Iemoirs ol John *iooy Adams ( ... lIdladelphia, 
1875), IV, 426, Oct. 29, 1819. --
131. Barros Arana, Historia Chile, XI, 93, 94. 
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of Baltimore merchants, the "Americcn Concern" with th.e names of Joseph 
Karrick, Mathew Murray, John G. Johnston, J. Gooding, Samuel Brown, John 
Snyder, Joseph Patterson and John S. Skinner is prominent.132 Skinner and 
Bland were connected with the Carreras. During Bland's visit to Chile as 
U.S. commiesioner he busied himself with collecting money which he then lent 
to the Carreras. The money came from the very governments which prosecuted 
the Carreras ae traitors.133 
Aguirre's negotiations with Darcy and Didier were not without difficulty. 
The company received money from Aguirre and offered to transact all business 
regarding the Tessels and to bond them for 5 per cent. Aguirre was unwilling 
to allow them more than 2.5 per cent even thoufh Darc~ and Didier offered to 
pay interest on the money while in their hands. No agreement was reached 
owinp to the small commission that Aguirre was williJ1f to pay and it was 
observed that in the end Aguirre could have saved himself at least 15 per cent 
if he had employed a merchant rather than do the contracting himself. The 
cannon for the ve~sels was made by )(ason. The firm of ten Eyck. Wynans and 
Comp~ made the blocks for the ships and a Mr. Blackwell the sails for one 
of -t.he ships. 134 
San Martin's letter to President Monroe, written April 1, 1817, referred 
132. Charles C. Griffin, "Privateering from Baltimore during the Spanish 
American Wars of Independence,· !a.ryland Historical Ja,gazine, xnv {March, 
1940>, S. 6. . 
133. Adama, Memoirs, V, 56. 
134. Manning, Diplomatic Corre!J?<?ndence. III, 1973, State of New York, City 
of New York, DepoSition of George w. Lynch of City of New York, July 25, 1818. 
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to Aguirre's misston.US An agreement was also reached with an American 
merchant, George Green, by' which the government of Chile v:1 tb the oooperation 
ot the United Prarinces committed 1 tselt to acquire the ships whicb Green 
brought into Buenos Aires.1.36 Aguirre related details ot his mssion to the 
director ot the lIni ted Provinces, dtsoassing American poUcy toward the sale 
ot ships and munitions to the insurgents under exiating laws.1.J7 Bowles 
notified Croker on lovember 19, 1818, tha.t Chilean rebel agents bou.ght ships 
in Now York oosting around 8300,000 but tbat tbese would not be delivered 
until $70,000 bad 'beenpatd.1.38 John !bwaites' letter to San HartIn, 
March 3, 1819, also -re.terred to the Aguirre a1ss10n, pqments tor the- ships 
bought, oommissions entailed, and tbe role pla;yed by Skinner, Davies, D1okaoD. 
and Coapan;r, Pord and Miller and Iqncb and Z1JRm8rman in the transact1ons.139 
Bland.' s report upon his visit to Chile oontains muob information about 
the eoonOJld.c and politioal cond1t10n ot tbe country_ His interviews nth 
O'Higgins in K&7 ot 1818, communicated tbe friendly and neutral disposition 
of the United States to 1;be Cb11ean oau •• and the lack ot any desire to 
secure taTOre<l trade prlvlleps.l.40 O'Higgins, however, stated that Ohilean 
13S. Brlt1ah State P!p,!!8, 1817-1818, 808. 'lhere is quest10n Q to acCUl"8C)" 
of this Lie. 
1)6. Levene,!! Ge~o PolJ.t1oo, 84. 
1)7. llASM, Vln, 20), 206, [Manuel HeraeneeildoJ, Angt1st-October, 1818. 
138. P1ccirilU, San Hartin l PoUtica, Documentol, 4>6. 
139. !!!!,. VIII, 244, 245, 246, 247. 
140. ~r1can State '21"1, Foreign iel.atio1'l8, IV, 291. 
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recogn1t:ton by a friendly power w01ild mean extension of many commercial 
advantages.141 The possibility of a rich and free trade alOl'l8 the Chilean 
and Peruvian coast was not denied. l42 Bland's sympathies were definitely 
wi th the Chilean cause. 
The brig Savase, .the Salvajea named in connection with Henry Hill in 
previous paragraphs, is mentioned again with reference to Chilean payment of 
debts. Rumors circulated that Chile was not punctual in paying for the arms 
recei ved and that fore4':n merchants complained. San Martin. in the Gaceta 
of Buenos Aires of January 3, 1818. published a statement signed by Estanislao 
Lynch wherein Lynch as ProXT for the traders acknowledged the receipt of money 
due the merchants in money and copper bars amountillll. to 62,493 pesos for the 
cargo of the Savage. In return for their good will, the Chilean government 
insured the traders various advant&l?:es such as the exemption from duties for 
goods taken out of the C01.1ntry. The American brig Adeline, is also mentioned 
in connection with the supplyinp; of arms and IlUIrl.tions.143 
Pezuela reported on January 1:>, 1818, that the American brig Chilena 
entered Valparaiso carrying arms for the insurgents.144 Furthermore, on 
April 27, 1818, Pezuela complained tb the .American Command., of the OntariO, 
Biddle, concerning the previously mentioned activities of the Savage and the 
141. ~., 294. 
142. ~ •• 311. 
143. Barros Arana. Histor!. Chile, XI, 194. 
144. Casado and Villena, MeDloria Pezuela, 214. 
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Adeline. How could Biddle expect the Spanish cruisers not to detain American 
-
ships in the face of such obvious lack of neutralityt145 
The reports of special agentB Prevost and Worthinpton are rich in 
contemporary accounts of the Chilean situation. In one of his conversations 
with otHigrins, February 12, 1818, Prevost outlined the necessity for U. S. 
neutrality but that in the event that Lima falls to the independents, and 
acquires some degree of stability, then the United States would aeknowledge 
its independence.146 On March 9. 1818, Worthington wrote to Adams mentioning 
the purchase by the patriots of the British Windham and the "respectable" 
amount of commerce carried on by United States subjects in the area.147 
Prevost reported to Adams, A.pril 9, 1818, that San Martin was now able to 
focus his attention on Peru and her "disaffected population." Economic 
advqages resulting from such a move would be hirh1y beneficial to the 
United states.148 Another agent, Jer~ Robinson, however. indicated that 
San Martin was devoted to England.149 It was feared by many Americans that 
San MartIn would show the British greater favoritism :in the event of his 
complete liberation of Peru. The rlories of a tree Peru market were 
145. Wational Archives. Washjnfton, Waval Records Collection, Area 9 Flle, 
1801-1830 Folder, Box 1. Typed copy of letter sent from Lima. 
146. Special Agents, Prevost, Biddle and Dorr, Prevost to Admns, Feb. 13. 1818 
147. u.S. Jlinisters Argentina. April 26, l8l7-July 9, 1818, Uarch 9, IB18. 
148. SpeCial Agents, Prevost, Biddle and Dorr. 
1.49. Special Agents, Robinson, Robinson to Adams, Kay 16, 1818. 
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oxtolled in Prevost's letter to Ad~~s, June 10. 1815, affirming the possibilit 
that. unless American commercial advantages were SOUfht the British would 
150 reap the benefits of the new markets. Worthington also warned Adams that 
a certain great commercial European power would get too firm a hold unless 
prevented by AFerican policy and action.1Sl 
Worthington's remarks dated July 1, 1818, concerni~ the importation of 
arms into Chile, mention some of the ships which engaged in this practice. 
The ~ibertl of Philadelphia, under the command of Captain Oliver. first began 
importing arms into Buenos Aires in 1812 and in 1817 San Martin crossed the 
Andes wi th about 3500 of its arms. The Savge, mentioned earlier, coming 
from Baltimore was the first vessel which imported arms directly into Chile. 
In June 1817, she arrived with about .3000 stand of arms, .orda and powder. 
The Adeline from Philadelphia came to Valparaiso with about 4000 stand and a 
few swords. The Lion from Providence. R. I., carried 6000 stand; Bengal of 
Philadelphia, 1500; Ariel of Baltimore, 2000 stand; Enterprise from New 
York, 1000 stand; E!£la of Boston 1000 stand. Worthington claimed that the 
Uni ted States was the biggest supplier of arms, and that had i t I~ot been for 
its timely importation into Chile, the battle of Kaipu would have been lost.1S2 
On tkvember 4, 1818, Worthinp-ton wrote to Adams or the friendly attitude San 
Martin had toward the United States, disprovl.ng a statement that was made by 
150. Special Agents, Prevost, Biddle and Derr. 
151. u.s. Ministers Argentina, April 26, l8l7-July 9. 1818, Worthington to 
AdalUs, Jan. 15, 1818. 
152. .!2!£., Worthington to Adams regarding letter of July 4, 1818, but re-
marks dated July IJ Remarks on Chile No.2. 
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Hol.:inson shOVlin; him a devotee of Er1 tain.1S3 A week later, ~lorthinGton 
rei:,orted Ii conversA.tion with San Hart!n wherein he complained of the delay' 
in receivin~; ships frOITi the Unitsd States although~200,OOO hali been sent. 
The delay meant loss of prestige for the United States.1S4 1";orthin~ton dis-
ch:imed the theoI"'lJ tha.t the Ohilean navy was furnished by Cochr".ne adding 
ttat the ~ritish sold only old vessels for high prices.15S 
The Peruvian expedition was complicated by the state of San Mart!nt B 
health which sometime in the earlier part of 1819 involved a successful 
surgery. In ad(~i tion to informing ~.dams of this above fact, Prevost further 
amldtted that San Mart!nls reputation inspired confidence even in Peru. l56 
Numerous obstacles were overcome and on September 28, 1820, Prevost reported 
that the eYpedition finally sailed for Peru.lS7 Incidentally, Prevost's use 
of ~ch and Zimmerman of Buenos Aires or Lynch, Hill and Company of Santiago 
for the purpose of forwarding his official mail during absence from Valparaiso 
is of interest.15S 
In 1820, the supply of arms reaching San Mart1n halted but was renewed 
in 1821. The )araval! of Providence, the ~ of Boston, and the !ea-Plan~ 
153. U.3. Hinisters Argentina, October 22, l81S-April 8, 1820, Worthington 
to ~,dams. 
15L. ~., \Iorthir.£'ton to Ada.ms, Nov. 11, 1818. 
155. Manning, Q!Plomatic Correspond~, I, 525. 
1~6. SpeCial Agents, Prevost, Biddle and Dorr, July 3, 1819. 
157. Ibid., Prevost to Adams. 
-
158. Ibid., Prevost to Adams, Sept. 25, 1819. 
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of New York, carried arms directly to Cochrane and3an Martin in peru.159 
prevost's letter to Adams" June 30, 1821, mentions a Mr. Thomas Eldridge of 
Connecticut who fitted out the ~aipo and caused Prevost much trouble. l60 
Rivadavia informed Forbes on September 20, 1021" that a contract was signed 
on September 7 of the same year for ~20,,500 worth of munitions purchased 
from John Mason through Aguirre. The Buenos Aires treasury was to pay for 
the goods.161 Whether these goods were to be delivered to San Mart!n could 
not be determined. 
Argentina, Chile, Britain and the United States, each either as a nation 
or through individuals contributed to the Peruvian expedition. There is much 
disagreement as to which of these gave the greatest assistance. Before any 
definite judgement Can be made it is first vital to study the second phase 
of assistance given to San Martin, namely the financial. Money and credit 
were essential to the purchase of arms, munitions and other needed supplies. 
The Chilean government consistently claimed a bankrupt treasury and so San 
Martin had to seek other avenues. Where did he look for the key to open the 
door to Peril? 
159. Eugenio Pereira Salas, "Henry Hill, comerciante" vioe-consul y 
rrdssionero," Rensta Chilena .2! Historia 1. Geogx:afia, LXXXVII, No. 95 
(Santiago, 1939), 12. 
160. National Archives, WaShington, Despatches from Special Agents" John B. 
Prevost, February 9, 1818-Januar,y 10" 1825. Microfilm. Cited in future as 
Speoial Agents, Prevost. 
161. National Archives, 1t>;ashington, Despatches from U. S. Consuls at Buenos 
A.ires, July 3t lB2l-August 6, 1826" Bernardino Rivadavia to Forbes, Document No.2. Microrilm. Cited later as Consuls B. A. 
CHAPTER III 
Financing the Peruvian Expedition 
w'hile money may be considered a source of all evil by some, it loomed in 
San Hartin's eyes as the prime source of success for the operation of his war 
machine. San Martin was tormented by the need of money. He had to reckon on 
numerous costs, war materials, ships, supplies, wages of officers, soldiers 
and sailors. His estimated expenditures mounted when details were considered. 
San Martin had no tangible collateral and possible investors hard~ favored 
chancing all their capital on what many considered a poor credit risk. 
Several possibilities tor securing funds presented themselves to San 
Martin who exploited these during his campaign and Protectorate. The govern .. 
ments of the United Provinces and of Chile were called upon to open their 
pockets, foreign and domestic merchants and mercantile houses were solicited 
and when these funds seemed inadequate, forced loans were instituted. The 
latter means were unpalatable and not alw~s successful.l Circulating rumors 
questioning San Martin's ability to pay debts previously incurred2 only 
tightened the purse strings of the money lenders. 
Historical dispute still exists as to which country, the United Provinces 
or Chile contributed most toward the successful culmination of the Peruvian 
expedition. Both countries pleaded a state of bankruptcy and yet both vied 
1. Levene, El Genio Pol!tico, 90. 
-2. Barros Arana, Historia Chile, XI, 194. 
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for recognition as the greater benefactor of Peruvian independence. Reports 
of foreign agents testified that the financial state of Chile was not as 
precarious as might seem. In addition to the regular sources of income there 
was also the classitication of revenue received from "extraordinary contri-
butions. 1t On April 20, 1818, Miguel Zafiartu wrote to \vorthington that Chile 
had no national debt, she had sufficient naval strength to govern the Pacific 
and that the United Provinces had joined Chile in a "strict union" to triumph 
over the royalists.) Bland's report of a conveTsation with O'Higgins on 
Hay 21, l818, further attested to the "bonds of union" existing between Chile 
and the United provinces.4 Commenting upon the state of the Chilean treasury, 
Bland observed that the official accounts of Chilean income were not altogethe 
correct and that the financial resources had been strained. Moreover, there 
was the question of $2,000,000 that had been gathered up "in some way or 
other, (in what manner I could not learn)" and which was difficult to trace.5 
That 3s.n )'1art!n or his backers did have money to pay for ships can be seen in 
another section of the Bland report which indicated that he delivered sums 
of money through Buenos A.ires to Aguirre and GOmez who had been sent to New 
York to contract for the building of war ships. Moreover, Aguirre and Gomez 
had received further financial assistance while staying in the United States,6 
3. U. S. Ministers Argentina, April 26, l8l7-July 9, 18l8, April 20, 1818. 
4. American State Paeers, Foreign Relations, IV, 293. 
5. Ibid., 303. 
-
6. Ibid., 304. 
-
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but from what source is not known. 
The state of the Chilean treasury was the favorite topic of foreign 
agents ~1hose duty i~ was to keep resp8ctive ~overnments informed on the 
stability of the newlY-independent Jovarnmant and, consequently, resources 
to meet aQy indebtedness incurred in the present or future. In addition to 
a recital of annual receipts, duties and other sources of income, Prevost's 
letter to Adams, February 13, 1818, indicated one means by which the Chilean 
treasury profited. This took the form of "donations f1 whereby individuals of 
weal th were called upon by the Oabildo to give any sum of money desi -;nated 
by it.7 The Gazeta Ministerial 2! Chile, June 6, 1818, noted an income of 
6401 pesos 2 reales tor the month ot Mq, 1818, from "Donativos voluntarios y 
8 
empresti tos. 11 The Estado ~ !!! Entrad~ l Gastos que E!!! tenido !!! Coxas 
~ Tesoro Publico ~ Estado listed a total income for this month of 81,546 
pesos and 5 1/2 reales. The expenditures for the same month, which included 
17,818 pesos and 4 raales paid to the Comisario del Exercito de Chile for 
the payment ot troops amounted to 85,312 pesos and 1/4 real. Although one 
cannot judge the entire Chilean econo~ on the basis of this one report, it 
does indicate a none too abundant money supply. Chilean insufficiencies in 
contributions had to be compen3ated for somehow and in June of 1818 San MartIn 
7. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr. 
8. Speoial Agents Robinson, Gazeta Ministerial ~ Chile, Santiago, no. 43, 
Tom. 1. 
9. Ibid. 
-
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had gone to Buenos Aires with the intention of obtaining one million dollars 
for his project.10 
Even while the Chilean resources seemed incapable of sustaining further 
depletion, the povernment was negotiating for the purchase of the Lautaro. 
Some inkling as to how this new burden was met could be deduced trom 
Prevost t s report to Adams, June 20, 1818, who wrote that "the English and 
American merchants who had property embarked in the harbor contributed in 
proportion to their respective interests as the only means ot securing a 
protection upon the departure of the Ontario." Prevost did add, however, 
that the government repayed the individuals for the advancement.ll Miller 
agreed that foreign merchants "did ocoasionally make advances to the new 
governments; but it was always upon terms of profit proportionate to the 
risk.·12 Connected with the process of loans were SUCh names as Hullett 
Brothers and Thomas Kinder. Kinder was a merchant in partnership with Robert 
Ponsoby Staples whose bankers were Everett, Walker, Maltby and Ellis.l ) The 
beginning of July 1818 saw the revolutionaries still without sufficient funds 
to attack Lima. Worthington observed that unless the venture be undertaken 
between July 1818 and January of the next year the golden opportunity would 
be lost. The value of Peruvian commerce to Buenos Aires was immense, he 
10. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Prevost to Adams, June 10, 1818. 
11. ~., Prevost to Adams, June 10, 1818. 
12. Miller, Memoirs, II, 222. 
13. Robin A. Humphrey8, Liberation in South America 1806-1827, (London, 
1952), 122. --
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continued, and while the rebels had the ships they needed the money.14 The 
Viceroy Pezuela was fully aware of the reason for San Hartin's trip to 
Buenos Aires, namely the gathering of money. sailors and troops for the 
proposed expedition.l5 
In the meantime, Pueyrredon continued to apologize for the empty coffers 
and the reluctance of British merchants to cooperate both with respect to 
loans and comn~rcial aotivitiea.16 Pueyrredon'a letter of August 25, 1818, 
further evidenced the inabUi ty to secure SOO,Ooo pesos even if they filled 
the jails with capitalists. The British merchants resisted forcible detachant 
from their word1y goods although Staples attempted to persuade them to give 
voluntarily. However, as Pueyrredon made clear, otten the refusal meant they 
did not have the ability to contribute to the cause and proved it.17 Greater 
exasperation with the financial condition is evident in Pueyrredon's 
September 2, 1818, letter to San Martin. The British had resisted the 
forced loan openly and of the 141,000 pesos they could P~. they had not 
given more than 6,700. Furthermore, packi1'l€ the jails and barracks would not 
raise the half million in cash, nor .:>uld it alleviate the precarious currency 
problem that threatened the national econo~. Customhouse duties .ere paid 
in instable commercial paper rather than in actual currency.18 Difficulties 
14. u.s. Ministers Argentina, April 26, 1817-July 9, 1818, July 4, 1818. 
15. p!!!. V, 82, 'esuela to 1a Serna, Aug. 9, 1818. 
16. ~., 676, Pueyrredon to San Kartin, Aug. 21, 1818. 
17. ~., IV, 596, Pueyrredon to San Hartin, Aug. 25, 1818. 
18. Ibid., 597, 598, Pueyrredon to San 14art!n, Sept. 2, 1818. 
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in raisin/; the loan were voiced from other aources. 19 On 3eptember 16, 1818, 
pueyrredon aeain wrote to San Martin but this time suggested a more positive 
approach for collect.in~ the loan. He would make an example of the British 
merchants who paid no attention to his demands and l-lho by their refusal to 
cooperata led other merchants into error. Since the money was desperatelY 
needed for the continuation of San Martin's military oampaigns, PueyrredOn 
said that on the following claJ, September 17, he would "sugeest" to the 
British merchants that if in the remaining 14 days of Septe~ber they failed 
to contribute the amount assigned to them, their goods would be auctioned, 
their houses closed and they themselves expelled from the country. Pu~red6n 
was confident that the British would not give occasion for such a drastic 
measure and the mone,r would amass even though there would be the devil to 
20 pay. 
This confidence must have been overwhelming and contagious for the ve'r".f 
same day, September 16, 1818, Matias de Irigoyen sent an official notioe from 
the M.inistry of War to San Martin authorizing him to draw against the 
treasury up to the amount of 500,000 pesos. Irigoyen expressed the 
difficulties encountered in raising the necessar,y funds but added that a new 
means had been found to till the coffers.2l Correspondence between Esteban 
Agustin Gascon, Minister of Hacienda in Buenos Aires, and San Martin indicated 
that San Martin did receive money from the United Provinces within a weeK: of 
19. ~., V, 679, Esteban Gascon to San Mart!n, 3ept. 2, 1818. 
20. .!!?!2., IV, 600, Pueyrredon to>an Mart!n. 
21. 11itre, ~ l-lart!n, IV, h94, Sept. 16, 1818. 
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Irigoyen's promise. 22 What remains somewhat of a ~stery is how Pueyrredon 
secured the necessary loans when he consistently bemoaned mercantile 
hostlli.ty and reluctance. Was the threat of confiscation and deportation 
actually used or did its mere possibility secure cooperation? The money 
came none too soon for ships had to be bought and provisioned and the ~ 
could not fight without supplies and munitions. 23 
There is much to indicate that while money passed from Buenos Aires to 
Chile, the sum still represented only a trickle and confidence in the pro-
curement of much needed financing was premature. Extracting JIlOney from 
unwilling subjects even at exhorbitant rates was hardly an easy task. 24 
Letters between San Martin and the Chilean minister in Buenos Aires, Miguel 
Zafiartu, attested to the above difficulty. Zaaartu's December 1, 1818, letter 
did contain interesting news in that it specified the names of merchants who 
were cooperating in some capacity with thB Buenos Aires government in 
liquidating debts, e.g., those of Zimmerman, Lynch and Rfglos.25 A December 4, 
1818, letter, Zaaartu to San Martin, made further reference to the payment of 
debts, crews of ships and loans from the Buenos Aires government.26 
22. DA~ V, 682, Sept. 24, 1818. 
23. Ibid., VIII, 231-233, J. hvarez Condareo to San Martin, Iov. 22, 1817; 
Ibid.;-m9-192J Ibid., 234-236; Ibid., V, 430; Ibid., 682, 683. 
~ - - ---
24. ~., V, 698, 699, Sept. 24, 1818; ~., 700, 701, Iov. 6, 1818. 
25. ~., V, 703, 704. 
26. Ibid., 702. 
-
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The financial state ot Chile was no better than that of the United 
PrOvinces. Between the diminished foreign vade, the clandestine British-
royalist trade and the pa.yaent tor naval ships and supplies, the Chilean 
funds suftered depletion. 27, Ships contracted tor in the Un! ted 'States were 
withheld until the debts were paid. According to reports of British observers, 
the Chilean government bought ships in New York costing around $300,000 but 
the agent in charge ot them was torbidden to make delive1"1 until a debt of 
$70,000 was settled.28 Wbere did OMle find the resources to cover her 
financial obligations, those al.rea.dy contracted and those which prondsed to 
be even greater in the tuturePeruvian campaign? 
The solution to the prohl., or at leut a partial one vas met in a 
similar lIWlner to that ot the Un1 ted Pro'fince ... loans and donations. The 
Gazeta lti.n1ster1al !!! qhil.e, loVEtllber 7, 181.8, cOntained a list of voluntary 
donations given b7 the citizens ot Valparaiso for the naval expedition. 
While some of the donations were in the torm of supplies, a total ot 885.2 
ODZas was presented in 81lver and gold. Listed also were donations ot 
September 25, 1618, which brought the total amount to 1085.2 onzas.29 
Worthington·. report ot November 11, 1818, mentioned $200,000 which vas 
sent to the United Statu tor the purchase ot ships,30 but other documents 
27. ~., VI, .315, Guido to Director ot United Provinces, Sept, 29, 1818. 
28. PiccirilU, au Hartin :. PoUt1ca. 456, Bowle. to Cl"Oker, Hov. 19, 1818. 
29. Special Agents Robinson, 0".81;& M1rd..terial eta Oblle. 3aD1;1ap, no, 6S. 
TOlU, 1, Report of Ooii. 2, 1818. -
.30. tJ. S. M1n:.Lsters Argentina, Octobv 22, 1818-Apr11 8, 1820. 
iL, 
late in 1818 emphasized the urgent demand for more and more money.3l San 
Martin complained to O'HigPcins on December 4, 1818. that the Buenos Aires 
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treasury was incapable of meeting his demands and individuals were reluctant 
to contribute money even though his army found itself in extreme want. 32 
On December 15. 1818, San Martin wrote directly to Pueyrredon painting a 
gloomy picture of army demoralisation for lack of salaries and citing need of 
129.690 3,h pesos. Because the state of Chile was bankrupt and that without 
hope, he pleaded for financial assistance to keep the army from progressive 
ruin. the Chilean government had already pledged itself and had consumed its 
income for several years and the paralysed state of commerce precluded any 
assistance from that source.33 San Martin voiced a similar plea on December 31 
1818, lamentin~ the impossibility of any future success without concerted 
financial and material aid. 34 Attending to San Martin's financial requests 
in Buenos AiresWls one Jose CaperrO., who in several letters to the liberator 
described the difficulties encountered in raising the necessary loans but 
also the ~llingness of his government to cooperate in the project of 
emancipation. The loans raised still seemed far short of the actual needs. 3' 
It was, however, the opinion of many contemporaries, for example,Henr;y Hill,36 
31. Levene, ~ Genio PolitiCO, 91. 
32. ~,V. 2,1. 
33. Ibid., 2,2. 
-
.34. Ibid., 2", San Martin to Supreme Director of United Provinces. 
-
3,. Ibid., 691, Dec. 16, 1818; Ibid., 692, Dec. 25, 1818; Ibid., 692-93, 
Jan. 3, 1819. - -
36. Jlanning, Diplomatic Correa,pondence, II, 705, Hill to Adams, Dec. 21, 1818. 
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that the final San Martin success in Peru would have to be a joint venture 
between Chile and the United Provinces. The way to Lima could net be paved 
without money and neither country seemed capable independently to carry the 
project through to its completion. There was still another source of plenty--
the British and Americans whose vested interests in Chile and Peru dictated 
profi table cooperation. However, reports circulated not only concerning the 
jealou.., existing between Britain and the United States but also the Chilean 
jealousy of foreign interference in the re8uscitation of the exhausted ex-
chequer. Robinson mentioned to Adams in a letter January 19, 1819, trom 
Valparaiso that the British had more trade in this area and could more 
extensively accomodate the government with loans. 37 
The channel through which the foreigners loans passed was often either 
one of the cooperatinR governments, Chile or the United Provinces. This re-
mained especially true of "forced loans." Early in 1819 neither of these 
governments seemed highly successful in this respect; only scattered documents 
testit,y to the extent of success or failure of their endeavors. O'Higgins 
continued to insist that Chile had already done more than her share toward 
the expedition and no remedy remained other than seeking a much needed 600,000 
pesos for the Peru expedition from other quarters. 38 The government of the 
United Provinces was equally certain that it had done its share toward the 
Peruvian campaign but continued to p~ bills that accrued even when there 
37. Special Arents Robinson. 
38. DASH, IV, 168, Jan. 20, 1819. 
-
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seemed no money with which to pay them. ?:anart~ reported to San r~art{n on 
January 10, 1819, the extent to which i'orei.;n merchants and interested parties 
cooperated to assist the cause of liberation. The names of !"ord,:~iller, 
'rhwaites, liYnch and Zimmerman were aGain prond.nent in the project. 39 On 
January 13, 1819, Gascon sent news of .f>Jrther financial assist,mce. ttO Other 
correspondence and documentation indicated that Buenos Aires continued to 
support the San Martin cause through various means.41 
Zanartu correspondence indicated a decided reluctance on the part of 
foreign mercantile interests or money lenders to cooperate and laborious 
inefficiency among Buenos Aires Officials and administrators to aid.42 To 
expedite the voluntary loans, ZafIartu proposed several inducell'ents to the 
merchants.43 For one, the capital invested wOllld be ;':ilaranteed by both 
partiCipating governments, Chile and th.e united Provinces. In return for 
the loan, the merchants would be given up to 50 per cent discount on Chile.tm 
duties. Secondly, in compensation for the risk involved, those ,~iving the 
loan would receive an interest of 100 per cent ~pon their investment, this 
interest payable in the form of a discount in duties collectable in Lima or 
any other ports taken by Chilean arms. Thirdly, the benefactors would enjoy 
39. ~., V, 712, 713. 
40. ~., 693, 694, Gascon to San Martin. 
41. Mitre, ~ Mart:!.!!, II, 26'1. 
42. ~,V, 114, 715, To San Martin, Feb. 3, 1319. 
43. Bulnes, !sEediciones Libertadora, I, 94, 95. 
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the considerations of the Chilean t~o\·ernm.ent and would be as::3isted by it in 
their mercantile specul1'!.tions. The merchants rofused. They had their Otffi 
proposals, more realistic ar.d more certain. In cxch!)11 :r,e for the risk involved 
ir.. making a loan of 120,000 pesos, they demanded the oxclusive privilege of 
introducing yerba. mate in Chile for an indl3finite period of time and .3,t, dOt'!,ble 
the current price. These terms were not accapted and the proposed loan 
failed to materialize. Za.nartu·s letter to San Mart!n, February 29, 1819, 
pinpointed the exclusive and "gratuitous" herb introduction to a term of one 
year. The danger, he added, arose from the f,';let that these -privileged groups 
would aspire continually to retain their monopoly for many years. Under such 
circumstances Chile would lose income.44 
At the same time that Za~tu was negotiating for a loan in Buenos Aires 
the Chilean government sent agents into Peru with the hope of raising a 
300,000 peso loan among discontented royalists. One such agent vlas Rafael 
Garf!as, a Chilean with commercial connections in Poru. To facilitate the 
mission, O'HigGins placed tho Golondrlna at his disposal. The loan ooliel ted 
from the merchants and landowners would bear an interest of 10 per cent a year 
and be backed by the Chilean state rents and properties. On February 28, 1819, 
the Chilean Senate approved the above plan.45 Its experiences with suppliers 
and financiers who demanded a high rate of interest in return for their 
44. DASM, V, 711. 
-
45. Barros Arana, Historia ~, XII, 162, 163 footnote 60. 
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5erv~ces, such as those associated with the ~guirre46 mission in the United 
states, cautioned them to offer a more conservative margin of profit for 
the investors. 
No account of San !1art!n' s a."Cpeditions either to Chile or Peru is complete 
without some mention of the "Logia. 1t U"ter Chilean successes, San lI,artin 
established the Lautaro Lodge in Santiago to w11ich is attributed, just.ifiably 
or not, some of the liberator's Peruvian success. t·aUer in his Memoirs wrote 
. 
th!:tt the Lodge lent its aid to bring disrepute to San Martin.47 ':'hatever tn.a3 
have been its secret machinations, openly and at the beginning of the Peruvian 
eampai;;n, the I·odge supported San t1art:f.n. On April 3, 1819, O'Higbins in-
formed San Martin or the Log1a's great interest in his Peru project and of 
its raising of a 300,000 peso loan to further this plan. O'Higgins' infor-
mation came from Jos~ }!anuel Borgono, who suggested that 2JO,000 pesos of 
that loan should be solicited £rom Buenos Aires, and a commission named to 
facilitate the collection of money, supplies and other necessities.48 Borgono 
wrote directly to San Mart!n on April 5, 1819, and not only mentioned the 
commission, the efforts of British firms supplying preparations which required 
quick expenditure, and the possibility of even further demands on the British, 
but also remarked that the resources for the expedition consisted of 300,000 
pesos plus the contribution from the towns and the 200,000 which would be 
46. DASM, VIII, 244-247, Juan Thwaites to San Martin, March 3, 1819. 
-
47. Miller, Memoirs, I, 259. 
48. DASM, IV, 491, 492, O'Higgins to San Martin, April 3, 1819. 
-
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available at his discretion.49 Guido's letter to San Martin, April 3, 1819, 
however, was more explicit about the Logia'. interest and constructive advice. 
Besides mentioning a commission in charge of collecting the 300,000 peso loan, 
Guido stated that this money should be deposited in the Casa Moneda upon the 
raponsibility of the commission. Furthermore, to facilitate the work of 
supplyinf the expedition, a loan should be demanded or exacted from foreigners 
who repayment whould be pledged on a short term basis.50 However, there is 
no way to determine accurately how much if any financial assistance the 
affluent members of the Lodge or the Lodge itself contributed directly or 
indirectly. 
When Chilean stability had become more certain by Kay, 1819,51 and 
foreigners more hopeful of governmental permanency, the prospect. for toreign 
loans rose in proportion. Oi tizens of the United States, officially or un-
officially, declared themselVes in favor ot loans to finance the Peruvian 
expedition, loans to be subscribed for in the United States. Worthington was 
accused of such imprudent aetioJ2 but defended himself by saying that a loan 
was possible if it came from an individual and did not concern the United 
States rovernment. 53 Money begets money and perhaps Prevost's assurance to 
49. ~., 493, 494. 
50. Mitre, ~ Martin, II, 362, 363. 
51. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Prevost to Adams, May 16, 1819. 
52. Francisco A. Encina, Uistoria 2! Chile (Santiago, 1948), I, 378. 
53. U. S. Ministers Argentina, October 22, l8l8-April 8, 1820, Worthington 
to Adams, Jan. 26, 1819. 
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Robinson that San Martin had obtained a loan of 500,000 dollars for his Peru 
campaign minimized the risk for totential lenders.54 
In July of 1819. money was coming into the San Martin Peru fund but its 
quantity remained insufficient.55 Operating out of Mendoza and through the 
Oabildo. San Martin on July 28, 1819. issued a proclamation also sipnad by 
the Gobernador Intendente, Toribio Lusuriaga, which proposed a partial 
solution to the financial problem. The proclamation provided for the election 
of a commission of assessors Whose principal and primary function was to 
prepare a tax list of resources calculated from 1,000 pesos upward. All 
military, town and ecclesiastical lands and properties were included in this 
tax list, and were to be assessed in proper proportion atter governmental 
approval. Provision was made tor a book containing a perpetual aocount of 
assessments and payments.56 
Despite the countless efforts to obtain financial support through various 
channels, the debts only became greater and the Peruvian expedition remained 
confined to the realm ot planning. Even the efforts of Ratael Oartias, sent 
by the Chilean government to secure loans from discontented royalists, were 
not attended by success.57 Foreign commercial interests would not or could 
54. Library of Congress, Wuh1ngton, Manuscripts Division, Jermy Robinson 
Papers, Notebook on South America, Minute of a Conversation, fragmentary. 
55. DASM. V, 698, JOR Caparras to San Martin. July 3, 1819. Caparroz 
broug~ 21,700 pesos in drafts. 
56. Galvan Moreno, Bandas 1. Proclamas, 173, 177 8sica should be 174. 
57. Bulnes, E!pedicion Libertadora, I, 93. 
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not provide loans. Onq the Cb1lean squadron seeaecl to be resourceful eDOU(Ill 
to keep .ell supplied with rockets .. ams and military .forces.sa Many reuou 
wer'o advanced tor Cb1lean inab111 t1 to And the IlOne:r it needed. !be Qerioaa. 
Robinson, reported to Adams on June .30, 1819, that Cb:ll.e possessed abundant, 
resources and that her need tor monq arose "trOM the novelty ot tho Govern-
ment.nS9 Robinson adrdtted that the 0b11ean governMl1t contemp1.ated remodellDl 
the financial systa b1 several measures I laying internal and direct taxes ill 
some t01'1l, adopting a regular tued import and export tariff.. aDd proposing a 
national bank. He agreed that sucb .easures would tend to instill contidenoe 
not on'Qr w1~hin Ch11~ but also abroad and make the soUcltd:ag of loans on the 
bases ot pu.bl.1c reftnWl and state property that much eas1er.60 Ov.aranteed 
redemption bt sora. degree of econoJd.c stab1Ut)', capitalists would be JIIDr8 
willing to open their purses tor the sacred cause ot Ub$r1iv. The etent to 
which tbe proposed retoru were carried out 1s . not w1 thin the scope of this 
dissertation. What is vitalia that in 'ebru.at"1 ot 1820 the Peruvian c. 
ped:1tion probleBl vas resolved as tar as the oollection ot troops, prov1s1ona 
and munitions but there was no v.lsible .sans to pq naval. and 'land toro.s.61 
Oontemporary observers,luch as Ball, noted the difficulty in proVidinc 
tor the expedition. Ball blamed "indolent habits" tor lack ot real progress 
• 
58. Speoial Agents Robinson, Elobinson ·to Adams, JUM .30, 1.819. 
59. Ibid. 
-
60. Ibid. 
-
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which he belined did not come until March of 1820, two ;,ears attar the battle 
ot laipo.62 !be moat difficult commodity to r1rxl was moneY' and the bard-
pressed Chilean treuU1"7 continued to resort to forced loana to supplY' the 
delici t. Late in 1819 the Chilean goverlllDent aeccrdillf t.o degNe b~&n col-
lecting • recentlY' levied contributicn63 which was augmented by 6\.."lOth£ll' cegfte 
ot April 1, 1620, imposing even gre.ter tinancial demands upon foreigners and 
Chileans of means. The li5t eor~ta1ned lION than 2)0 names and their quotas in 
pesos. While thF! majority of loans was under 1,('.00 pesos, there were ttlOH 
who, "were assesaed" a. tho\l.sand to e1£:ht thousand. 64 
62. Hall, 'omee, I, 60, 61. 
63. Foreign Legations, Chile, handwritten cOPY' of 1tem in Ga..tao tini.ttrl~ 
de C:yilo, Sat~lrdq~ C'8pt. 18. 1619. 
-64. Luis de Amesti, ed., tlDocU'IIlentos sohR la Exped1c1on Libertadora del Peru. 
Bol.tin de 1& .Academia Chilena de 1& IUstoria .. Aao lVII, no. 43 (Santiago, 19~>' 
81=M: lione those who contribUted-were, Sa Ana Josera Azua. 4,OOOJ Don 
Joaquin Aguirre, 4,000, Don lligue1 Eohenique, l,SOC,; Don Carmen I.ecaro8,l.OOOJ 
Dof'1a Agust1na Montt, 4. SOC; Don ToUl CalIe.burn, 4,OOOJ Don JOM Antonio 
Jlodria'uea. 2,5OOJ Deb liatilde Salamanca, 4,600; Do11& Carmen l.anda, 3,000, Don 
'licente Huldobro, 8,000; Dofta Carmen Moralea, 2,000; Dofla I,~nao1a 'aIdes, 2, ~OOJ 
Dona Antorda De11os. 1,000, J)ofta Ana Jo_fa. Sot.&, 2,000; lld\a J4ariana Saldivar, 
J,OOO; Don Juan Antonio Fresno. 4,000; Don Jeronimo Medina. 1,000; Don Jos& 
Santiago Solo de Saldivar. 2,500. Don Juan l4anuel Crul, 7,000; Don Vicente Cruz 
6,000; r •• ta:lrteDtarl. de don Ce1edonio 'illata, 1,500; Den Pedro Ramirea per 
don Dlae Osorio, 1,000, Doi1a Antonia s&nchfla '1 aua hijaa, 1,000; Don Vicente 
IZquierdo, 1,000. Don JOM Montee, 1,500; Dof1a Jo .. f. Excandon, 1,000; Don Jose Antonio Valdea, 2,500, Don Franciaco Amor, 1,800; Don Diego Valenauela, 
1,000; Don JON 'Ior1b10 tarraln. 6,000; Don Francisco Borja Valdes, 2,OOOJ Don 
Juan ManuelEehaUl'l'8n, 1,000; Don JOM Valentin Valdivieso, 1,700; Don Iam1Aoo 
Valdivieao Y' VU'lU, 2,,)00; Don Joee Santiago Sra". de Baravoa, #2,000; Don 
Antonio 1uenaaUda, 1,800} Don Ignacio Aranguiz, 6,900; Don Jose hria ~ 
1.000; Don Anacleto Cantos, 4,ooo} Don Rosario Portales, 1,000, Don Franciaoo 
Ruiz Tarle, 6,000. Don Pedro Prado Jaraquemada. 2,800; Don Juan J;ugst!r. Aleade, 
2,000; Don Jo8.qu!n TrIleio., 1,000, Don Vioente Ovalle, 2,000; Don Martin Calvo 
Enc&lada., 6,OOO} Don Joae 11colU de 1& Corda. ),500; Don Diego !..arra!n, 1,500; 
DofIa Agustina lo.1as, 2,000, Don Juan Jose Aldunate, 1,0001 Don Felipe Santiago 
del Solar. 2,000; Don Gregorio Arcomedo, 1.600; Don licoli.B Rodr:!e-tlez, 1,500; 
Don Estanislao L1lich, ),000; Don Jose Rlglos, 1,100; Don Antonio Arcos, 1,000; 
Don F'orturutto •• ias, 1,000, Don ~.~QoOiI:;..l,$OOJ Don Juan Orr, 3,000; lloIl 
Santiago Larraa. 2.000. DoxaJoaqu1n de la tdoranduis. 1,000; Don Francisco 
Vicurla, 1,OOOS Don .10 .. Antonio 1ludre., 1,000. 
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There were only a few names easily recognizable as associated with commerce. 
Some of the others do, however, appear in ,-arious other documents of the 
period dealing both with the supplies for the expedition and for Chilean and 
Peruvian trade. To trace these here would be tedious and ineffective; with 
proper perspective they will be introduced later in this work. One fact does 
stand. outj there were people who could be assessed such sums of money and a 
goodly percentage of them women. 
The Peruvian expedition "drained the country to the last cent" and San 
Martin promised to pay the Chileans the amount expended from "the first place 
he conquers. tl So wrote Charles Gauntt of the !!.!. Macedonian on August 21, 
1820.65 On October 9, 1820, Robinson sent word to Adams that great credit 
was due Chile for fitti ng out the expedition in such a short time and so 
completely. But the novel part of Robinson'. private report concerned the 
monopolT that was to be granted or had been granted for a specific period of 
time to individuals who contributed either money, ships or other supplies for 
the Peruvian expedition. lIoreover, foreigners were to be excluded froll!. th.., 
coasting trade. The Chilean debts ioorea.ad to an amount between one and a 
half and two 1Ij111on dollars; funds for the expedition were raised by paper 
money. forced lans, exactions, voluntary contributions, and specific duties 
and taxes. Ro!:>1nson commented that the paper DlOney was 30 per cent below par 
value and duties were paid one half by specie and one half by government ~ 
65. Cauntt, Private Remarks, f. 92, Aug. 21. 1820. 
66. Special Agents iobinson, Rob1mJon to Adams. Oct. 9, 1820. 
jiP 
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An October 2, 1820, letter midst the Jeremy Robinson papers with a postscript 
dated October 1, 1820, also referred to a Peru trad.e monopoly granted for a 
S9ecific period to several individuals lIDO had furnished money and proviSions. 
Robinson remarked upon the continned exorbitant duties.6? 
Although the United Provinces and Chile both at times claimed that the 
efforts of foreign merchants weT'e negligible in preparing and sending the 
PeruVian expedition, contemporaries took another view. Haigh, in his Sketches .. 
wrote that the expedi tioa suffered troll. lack ot money and "it was tinal1:y 
accomplished through the aid of foreign merchants, Who afforded tthe needful', 
by a handsome loaato the Ohile goyernment.,,68 In his l!emoirs, Miller praised 
the libttral1.ty ot the lI1erchants for their "tiMly" assistance in equipping 
the expedition, trJf:' if it tdled, "the terms ot their contl"acts, which they 
entered into vi th the goYeroment, would most probab'l:y neyer haTe been hl-
filled.,,69 JIill reconated an utual cOnT8rsation with San Mart{n in which the 
latter expressed billse1t !"egU'ding the nltle of mercantilo support. San 
Hartin soUeited three merchants connected with the Chilean and foreign 
cOImIerce tor a t?S,OOO lOath In retul"n, the merchants wen to raeeiTe pra-
mssory notes with a 1G8. ot 25 pM' cent. It Peru gaine<lindependanee, thea. 
merchant. were promised that to!" each thousand pesos that they" lent thejl" 
would be allowed to export tree of tiutT tme toll ot goods. The above 
1ndlleeunta obYionsl1 proftd tempting for the $1,,000 needed. 'by the a.ft{V' was 
-
67. JerEIJIY Rob1naoa Papers, Vol. " 1820-1824. 
68.3amuel Haigh, aketches of Buenos .~~~ Chite and Peru (London, 1831), 
)08, Dec. 23, 1820. Tbe latecoutd Se""""i'"1:fttt. tater. -
69. Hiller. Memo1rs. I. 263. 
70 loaned. 
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1Ihether the merchants gave voluntarily, lured by commercial concessions, 
!. of no great consequence. Spealdng in general of the Latin American revolts, 
Lon, a London merchant, wrote to Canning about the readiness with which loans 
were riven and the bountiful returns in terms of trade.7l Haigh, however, 
praised the naval efforts of British officers who on many occasions prevented 
improper exactions from being levied on British merchants. 72 
Individuals or companies that contributed loans, forced or otherwise, did 
eo with the expectations of remunerative return, in kind and in concessions. 
On Aurust 11, 1821, Robinson informed Monroe that Chileans who loaned money 
for the Peruvian expedition on the promised condition of exclusive privileges 
and monopolies looked for "indemnification and reward." If the expedition 
failed, a revolt in Chile was "inevitab1e_,,73 !he fall of Lima brought econcai 
changes wi thin Chile. A temporary embargo was laid on vessels destined for 
Peru not only to rai.. funds, but "likp.wiae to give to those persons who had 
loaned money to the Government to assist in fitting out the expedition to 
Peru, on condition of enjoyinp- certain cOJlDllercial privileges, a fair opportmi.'tv 
of profi t1ng in the highest possible degree by their contracts." 74 
'0. Henry Hi,ll, "Incidencias en Chile, Sud-America," Revista Chilena de 
Ristor!a Z c,eograf'fa, LXXXVII, no. 95 (Santiago, 1939), hOe -
71. John Lowe, "A Letter to the Ri~ht Hon. ~orge Canning, M.P •••• on the 
Pelicy of Recognising the Independence of the South American States," The 
P!MPhlateer, III (London, 182.3), 409. -
72. Haigh, Sketches, .31.3. 
73. Special A£f:Tjts Robinson. 
71~. Ibid., RoMnson to Adams, Aug. 24. 1821. 
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controversy still exists as to who pave most towards the finaneinF of 
San Martin's expedition. Miers wrote that Chile, "by means of her own re-
,curees alone •••• eontributed 80 efficiently toward the liberation of tower 
peru ••••• 75 He did admit that the Chilean ~overnment ·was greatly relieved 
from the pressure of its finaneial difficulties by the British merchants, who 
came forward 'With 10a11s of money •••• " 76 The diff1cult,. came later. for the 
loans were secured by debentures and were acceptable in payment of duties upon 
British imports. furthermore, individuals holding debentures found it dif-
ficult to exchange them foraoney and at a considerable discount sold them to 
the British merehants "who alone were able to obtain the value they repre-
sented by payinr" them into the custom-house in discharge of duties." 77 
Historians, espeeially ennean historians, agreed that the greatest 
financial burden for the Peruvian expedition was borne by the Chilean govern-
ment. Barros Arana elaimed that in 1819 Chile and Argentina agreed to a 
joint effort on the projeet. but internal disturbances with1n Argentina foreed 
Chile to depend on 1 ts own resources. Th.!s opinion 1s shared by Ernesto de 
1a Cruz and Benjamin Vieuaa. 78 Bland. a U.S. agent, believed the Chileans 
capahle of susta.tn1nr: th~ eXPedition al thouph 0' Hi~~ins and other Chilean 
officials disagreed with this view. In addition to payiJlf for ships and 
7,. John Miers, Travels in Chile and La Plata ••• (Lcndon, 1826), II, 166. 
------.- - . - ....... --
76. Ibid. 
77 . ~1:.<\.. 166, 167. 
78. Fritz L. Hoffman, "'!'he Fjnancinp of San Ma.rtin's Expeditions, tI Hispanic 
!!nerican Historical Review, XXII (November, 1952), 634-3~. L 
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pplies, Cr.ile raised 600,000 pesos for tht:' final Peruvian preparations. 79 JU. 
On the Argentine side, Emilio Hansen claimed that a large part of a 
h,50o,000 pesos dsbt was due to the Argentine by Chile and Peru. Earlier, 
the Chileans had received from the Arf!entine four to five million pesos for 
their O~~ liberation which indebtedness the Chilean povernment refused to 
recognize. Both Hansen and Lopez are Argentine historians. 80 A present day 
American historian claims that Argentina contributed 501,931 pesos and 1 real 
for the Peruvian expedition but th i s did not represent many other expenses 
involved. An attempt to collect this debt, plus one of 1,062,313 pesos owed 
for Chi1~~n liberation, proved fruitless in 1822.81 Hoffman believes that 
neHher country, ChHe or Arrentina, was individually responsible for 
finandng an expedition t.o Peru but that. each probably contributed between 
1,500,000 and 2,000,000 pesos. 82 Taki~7 into account the internal conditions 
of Chile ano Argentina, their relaticn~~ip with San Martin, their ability to 
obtain money from commercial sources, and considering other available documents 
dealinq with this phase of the Peruvian campaign, evidence points to a joint 
Tenture on the part of both Chile and Arrentina 'With the greater share con-
tributed b::t t.he fO'MRE'r. Adequate or not the Pf;ruvian expedition was financed 
and Lima. fell tc the revolutionaries. San Martin, or those backinf' him. made III 
Ml'lny !,rf'l'r1 ~'" Anr! afl:rer>mfl!nts. Later chapters w1.l1 discuss the manner and 'Ii I ,
extent to which these promises we~ fulfilled. 
79. ~., 637. 638. 
Be. ~., 634. 
81. ;!bid., 6.36. 
82. ~., 638. 
CHAPTER IV 
Cochrane and the Blockade 
The man of the hour Ilq have been San Jlartln, but looming as the more 
cOJllDanding figure was Thomas J.. Cochrane, who, backed by his naval equadron, 
tended to become a law unto himself. Destruction of Royalist naval power in 
the Peruvian campaign was but one of his accomplishments. In his position 
a. admiral of the Chilean naval squadron he not only came into open conflict 
with British and American commercial interests, but also with San Martin 
whose policies he often chose to disregard. This chapter will investigate 
the extent to which Cochrane carried out San Martin's ideas, policies and 
practices, his self-interest substituted in their place, and the effect his 
individualistic naval tactics had upon the interested foreign powers and the 
liberation of Peru. 
From the moment of his appearance on the Latin American scene, every 
phase of Cochrane's activities was subjeoted to speculation. Contemporaries 
attributed to him great wealth,l considerable naval skill,2 and the organizatia 
of the Chilean fleet.) Cochrane's "allegiance" to British interests provoked 
critioism from the Americans and denials from the British, who during the 1$18 
1. National Archives, Washington, lavy Department, C. J. Deblois, The 
Private Journal kept on board the .!!.!.!. Kacedonian, 1818, 1819, I4ay 24, 1819. 
2. Hall, VOl!,es, I, 67. 
3. lanning, Diplomatic Correapondence, I, 525. 
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to 1822 Peruvian campaign found sufficient reason to question that allegianoe. 
3till, this view was not shared by' all, tel' Stevenson wrote ot the indb'eot 
help given to tbe British. Had it not been for Cochrane's valor, military 
skills, and "assiduit:y,· Spain wOll1d still baTe oommand over tbe western baU 
of South America and ftBritish Commeree· would have been excluded from the 
extensive market which it enj018.u4 
to serve American interests better and miniMize a1J7 possibl.e British 
favoritism, ships Uke the !. 1!- ~. Ontario were stationed along tbe ooast 'Ot 
Chile and Peru. Captain J_ee Biddle, of the above 9ntltM:,g was instructed t'O 
protect United states oi tizens at onoe from the Spaniards and trOll the 
Uarbitrat7 measures of the Patriots,'" and in this ease he ran &toul ot 
Cochrane. 1'he embargo ot Valparais06 and confiscation et American propert,y7 
ocoupied the attentions ot United States agents and naval ccmrma.nders. On 
April 9, 1818, Prevest notified Adams that the presence ot the 2,ntar1;C! aleng 
the Chilean ooast beth enhanced the Amerioan poaition in the area and deore 
British int1.uenoe.8 Captain Jebn Downes ot the !!.. ~. 1!. Maoedonian was 
likewise directed to sateguard the person and the property ot Aurioan 
4. staYenaon, B.1storical. Narrativ." III, 219. 
5. National Arcbiyea, Waahingtont Despatches trOll U.S. Consuls at Buenos 
Aires, January 10, 181tJ...June 16, l621, Hal.aq report to A.dams, Jan. 10, l818. 
Microt1la. 
6. NatioaalANh1ves, Washington, Navy Depart.mGnt, Log and Journal ot the 
U.S.!. oaR' book dated October 4, 1.817-Apnl. 12, 1818,t. 'OJ u.s. Minis-
ters-Argent , April 26, 1817-Ju'q 9, 1818, Worthington to Adams, Mar. 9, 181.8 
1. u.s. M1n1sten. Argentina, April 26, 1817-Jul;y 9, 1818, Worthington to 
Adula, Mar. S, 161.8. 
B. Speo1al Agenta Pl"evost, Biddle, Dorr, Prevost to Adams, Apr. 9, 1818. 
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Citizens "wherever and whenever such protection may be needed.,,9 The efficacy 
of the Macedonian' 5 tour of duty was attested to by Hill who wrote that this 
10 
ship protected American commerce along the coasts of Chile and Peru. 
The Ontario achieved much notoriety among the Royalists for defending 
American ships confiscated by them for illegal trade and among the Chilean 
naval squadron tor interfering with Cochrane's blockade. Biddle was thanked 
profuselY for saving American propert,yll but incurred Cochrane's displeasure. 
This displ.oasure increased when Biddle notified different ships anchored in 
ValparaiSO tha.t he would give them sate conduct if they wished to sail with 
12 him when he lett for Lima. Nor were feelings mollified over the question 
of a proper salute which Cochrane demanded and Biddle ignored. Although 
Cochrane believed that Biddle carried Spaniards and enemy goods out of Lima, 
he claimed that he WOuld not forCibly board the American ship, arguing in the 
face of the American guns, that it was against the polley of the Chilean 
government. However, Biddle departed from port abruptly and without saluting 
the Chilean flag.l.) This Cochrane protested in a heated correspondence which 
9. National Archives Washington, Navy Department, Private Letters, February 
1, 1813-January 20, 1840, f. 253, B. Crowninshield to Downes, Sept. 2, 1818. 
10. Hill, Recollections, 123. 
11. Barros Arana, Historia Chile, XI, 547. 
12. Robinson Papers, Diary, June 6, 1818. 
13. U .5. Ministers Argentina, October 22, 1818-April 8, 1820, Joaquin de 
Echeverria, Jan. 8, 1819, no. 2; also Cochrane to &':heverria., Dec. 31, 1818. 
From seamen who deserted the Ontario Cochrane learned about Spaniards who 
had boarded the Ship, and of i920,OOO aboard belonging to RoYalists. 
I.! 
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ensued regarding the salute.14 Biddle replied on December 28 indicating that 
it was a matter of a mutWll gun salute that was under controversy, presumably 
,inee his country had not recognized Chile.15 Cochrane asked whY it had to 
be an equal gun salute? 16 Biddle insisted the salute was optional and only a 
courtes.y.17 On the 30th of December, Cochrane forbade Biddle to sail from 
Valparaiso for a specified period of time.18 Biddle answered he would deIa;y 
tor only one day.19 
While Cochrane and Biddle clashed, the latter courted the favor of San 
lartln whom he fthandsomelyG entertained along with other important officials. 
lorthinpton referred to the Ontario as a safety measure not only for the 
Americans and British but also for the patriots.20 Be shared Biddle'. distrust 
of Cochrane's intentions calling Ban Martin the more republican of the two. 
furthermore, Worthington doubted if Cochrane was amicably disposed toward the 
United States.21 
14. ~., Cochrane to Biddle, Dec. 27, 1818, no. 3. 
15. ~., Biddle tc Cochrane, Dec. 28, 1818, no. 5. 
16. Ibid., Cochrane to Biddle, Dec. 28. 1818, no. 6. 
17. I1?,i~., Biddle to Cochrane, Dec. 28, 1818, no. 7. 
18. Ibid., 
-
Cochrane to Biddle, Dee. 20, 1818, no. 11. 
19. Ibid., Biddle to Cochrane, Dec. 30, 1818. 
-
20. ~., Worthington Diary, 4th part, 
,1819 •• 
From Santiago to Valparaiso, liar. 4. 
21. ~., Worthington to Adams, Jan. 6, 1819. 
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British ships had their own difficulties with Cochrane. The fact that 
the British were trading :in Peru and even looked forward to an extension of 
that trade, quite naturally conflicted with Cochrane' 5 blockade. The British 
COJlllllanders openly entered the Peruvian ports and even offered Worthington pas-
sage to Lima if he so desired. 22 A.t times. British ships boldly protected 
American vessels threatened by the Royalist squadron. For example, on 
)larCh 19, 1818. three American captains wrote to Captain Sheriff thanldDg him 
for his intervention.23 More often British interests prevailed and Americana 
looked on with envy. Commodore William Bowles noted Prevost t s mission in 
Chile and urged the British governaent to send adequate representation to 
.afeguard their commercial activit1es.24 Earlier, San Martin had written to 
Bowles requesting his presence and stated that British ships of war would 
afford "much for the protection of your commerce.·25 It was these very 
lhips of 'War that now grieved Cochrane. 
The viceroy of Peru, Pesue1a. wal not oblivious to either the need or 
wisdom for opening Peruvian ports t.o British trade. Keenly aware of the 
need for caution and prudence in soing so. on September 29. 1818, Guido wrote 
22. ~ •• Worthington to Adams, Oct. 22, 1818. 
23. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr. Letters of U.S. Naval Captains to 
Sheriff, Callao, March 19, 1818. Fred. Arthur of the Russell, John Brown of 
the John Adams.. and Peter Paddock of the ThOll .. S, told Sherif'f' that American 
cO~Ander8 would do the same for ~ British ships in need of' protection. 
24. Jose Pacifico Otero, Riatoria del Libertadora Don Jose de San Martin 
(Buenos A.ires, 1932), II, 432. 433.-ao.le8 to Admiralty, June-7;-iS18. 
25. Webater, Brittin.!!!l IOOependeno" If 102, 103. San Kartin to Bowles, 
Feb. 22, 1817. 
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to the Supr<'1l1e Direcor of the Uni.ted Provinces about the dangers resul tlng 
from such a proposal. He specificall, mentioned the activities of Captain 
Sheriff and ~.!.!. Andromaca in connection with the Lima trade, and the 
dilficulty in enforcing a blockade. 26 Other sources al80 mentioned the 
jnciromaca and the Ryperion as manauvering between Chilean and Peruvian ports 
-
while declaring their neutrality.27.The Royalists often distrusted the British 
and accused them of aiding and abetting the insurgent cause. Cochrane like-
wise indicted the British commanders and their ships for endangering the 
expedition and hampering his naval operations. The fact that a blockade was 
decreed was one thing, its enforcement was something else. Both the British 
and the Americans had little regard for a blockade where absence of blockading 
ships or bigger guns made it ineffective. 
Cochrane answered the defiance by arming himself with a decree issued 
Jlarch 1, 1819. which blockaded Peruvian ports. This decree was published in 
various periodicals in the United States and Britaln,28 and, therefore, known 
to any ships proceeding into the blockaded area. Authorized by the Chilean 
government, Cochrane decreed' (1) The port of Callao and all other ports, as 
well as the coastline from Guayaquil to Atacama in a state of formal blockade. 
(2) All sh:i.ps were prohibited from carrying on any trade or communication with 
26. ~, VI, 316, 317, Guido to Supreme Director, Sept. 19, 1818. 
27. Otero, Historia del Libertador, II. 770, Intorme del contra-Almirante 
Jurien sobre Chile y ~campaaa Libertadora de San Martin, Archivo de la 
Marina, No. BB4 407. Doeumento D, December 182,. 
28. Barros Arana, Historia Chile, III, 23). footnote 38. 
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the stipulated area. (3) After eieht days, from the promulg~tion of this 
deoree no ships belonging to neutral powers presently anchored in Callao or 
the other ports blockaded would be permitted to sail. (4) The flaG of neutral 
powers was not to be used to mask the transport of Royalists or royalist 
property. (5) Any ships carrying false or double papers and unable to prove 
the ownership of property carried was to be considered in the same category 
and suffer the same penalties as en~ property. (6) Neutral ships which 
carried on board either officers, masters, supercargoes or merchants of 
countries subject to Spain would be sent to Valparaiso for judgement to the 
law of nations.29 
The above decree raised many doubts and Cochrane took it upon himself to 
amplify the meaning and extent of the blockade. For one, the blockade was 
effective purely by being declared. Without such a concept, it would have 
been absurd to blockade the coast of Peru with only four ships of war. 
Second, ene~ property was not neutralized under the protection of a friendly 
or neutral flag. Third, if the owner of the ship also owned the oontraband 
goods both the ship and goods were subject to confiscation. However, if the 
~~er of the ship and the owner of the contraband were tvo different persons, 
then only the contraband goods were subject to confiscation. A belligerent hac 
the rii1,"ht to confiscate contraband sold to an enemy. Fourth, it was alreactr 
understood in Europe that an item such as grain was subject to contraband 
restrictions. Cochrane explained that if the matter were left to his judgem.eni , 
29. Odr:l.ozola, Dooumentos, Ill, 359-60. 
. 1, 
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all kinds of provisions would constitute contraband of war as far as the 
present situation of Peru was concerned. These were the principles which 
guided the conduct of the Chilean squadron along the Peruvian coast during 
the 1818 to 1822 campaign.30 In fairness, it m.ust be added that these were 
not the sole bases for Cochrane's attitude toward neutral powez's that chose 
to disregard his dictates. 
On April 20, 1819, O'Higgins issued a further decree relative to the 
blockade. Referring back to the March 1 decree, O'Higgins confined the 
blockade to all ports and anchorages situated between Iquique and Guayaquil, 
inclusive, Itin pursuance of the Orders of Lord Cochrane.1t According to the 
second stipulation, all neutral ships entering the ports com.prehended by this 
decree and proceeding from Europe, the United States or IIIslands of American 
were to be notified of the blockade by Cochrane; after such formal notificatior. 
these ships would not be permitted to enter the blockaded ports nor carry on 
commerce with them.. The third point covered the time element involved in 
carrying out the preceding article. The fourth point waS practically identical 
to Article 6 of the March 1 decree concerning the adjudication of confiscated 
property and ships. The fifth point made it clear that any neutral vessel, 
havin,~ been given time by articles 2 and 3 and having been duly informed of 
the blockade, found in the ports so blockaded would be sent to Valparaiso for 
judgement. The sixth was similar to Article 5 of the earUer decree.31 'rhe 
30. Bulnes, Espedici6n Libertadora, I, 259-261. 
31. British state Papers, 1818-1819, 1110-1111; also U.S. Consuls B.A., 
January 10, lBt8:June 16, 1821, for original decree. 
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Chilean governmont was not too anxious to promulgate Cochrano's decree for 
32 fear of Con3cqucnces. 
cochrane swiftl¥ meted out justice to transgressors. On f1arch 26, 1819, 
he wrote to "'anteno about an American schooner which carried munitions, naval 
provisions and other articles of war for the royalists and noted that t:19 
owner of the schooner also owned the goods. Cochrane insisted that his 
capture of this ship was perfectly in accord with maritime law and produced 
pa.pers to substantiate his assertions.33 On April 8, 1819, he again wrote to 
Zeoteno and among other things mentioned the troubles with the Macedonian. 
captain E. 3nrl.th, and its contraband cargo and money. He charged this ship 
with carrying royaUst property and the captain with being in the viceroy's 
service.34 The very same d~, he sent another letter to Zenteno in which he 
pointed to the actiVities of the l·1acedonian and the British ship Columbia. He 
furthor discussed the insidious behavior of neutral ships that continued to 
serve royalist interests by carrying gold and other money to safety. These 
same ships were also accused of bringing spies into Chile. For example, where 
the French brig Gazelle was suspected of concealing money belonging to the 
Philippine Company, Cochrane sent the Galvarino in her pursuit.35 
The effect of Cochrane's decree and poUcies was rapid and British 
32. 13ulnes, Espedici6n Libertadora, I, 259. 
33. Odriozola, Documentos, III, 336-37. 
34. Ibid., 343-45. 
-
35. ~., 341, Apr. 8, 1819. 
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commanders became most vocal on the subject. SOurces indica.ted tha.t "Bowles 
did not appear to . like lord Cochrane" and that be notified bis captaina not 
W salute hila.36 Bowles had previoU/51T complained to the Admiralty;about 
Cochrane' a dispute with Capt.a1l'l Sheritf over the question ot saluting and of 
his own problems in this matter.31 There was 1IJlcb to be said for Cochrane's 
behavior wben he found British and American na:'al coman_s obviouil,-
conspiring witb tbe royalists and condoning il11cit trade. Juan T'bwutea 
advised SanMartin in bis letters of Marcb 1.6, 1819 .. and April 10, 1819, ot 
some specific infractions of tbe blockade and Cocbraaet s right to enforce the 
law more '¥igorottsl,-. He mentioned the Androaaoha ad the Resource, both 
British ships,alld referred to others as carry1.ng arms etc., but did not name 
them in the lettlJrs.38 Capt. Sher1tf of the Androuc~, ftinclined to favor 
tbe patriots,' protested the extension of the blockade to ships ot war 
belonging to neutral nations. Cochrane, of course, aware of the u.ny in. 
tactions iMurred by these ships of war, be they' British or American, quite 
strictlT refused to modtt,y his decree,» consequent'b', the Peru ports remained 
under strict blockade. laO Gu.1do's letter to SaD Mart{n, April 27.t 1819, 
did mention that Britilh mercbant. "were screaming" against the blockade 
.36. U .5. Mini8ters Argentina, October 22, 181.8.April 8, 1820, Worthington to 
Adams, March 7, 1819. 
37. Piccirilli, San Kal"tfn Z Po1!t1ca, 4S8-S9. Bowles to Crok81", Feb. 27, 
1819. - AA 
)8. DA.Sl, nn, 2la9-S0, Hareh 16, 1819. 2)2-S3, April 10, 1819. 
39. BalTOI A1"an&, H18to1"ia Chile, III. 267 and footnote 9 8 .. page. 
40. DASM. II, ,46, Zenteno to San Mu-t!n, April 21, 1819. 
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because of their personal interests in Lima but that Sheriff and Downes had 
acknOWledged it.4l An American contemporar,y pictured Cochrane as displaying 
a good deal of national feeling and added that he "probably keeps a return 
home and a restitution of his lost honor in view.,,42 This same souree, 
Robinson. admitted that British ships of war had been engaged in contraband 
trade and were in the habit "of receiving for tar servioes a commission of 
troa 2 1/2 to $ pr.ot.--upon the amount.·43 
American reaction to the blockade was equally distressing to Cochrane 
who not only found his orders challenged by the Americans but supported their 
position by ships of war. The llacedonian continued to plague the admiral by 
protectinr American, English and french merchant vessels. The journal of 
the )lacedonian recorded on )larch .31, 1819, that prior to this ship's arrival, 
patriot cruisers committed great depredations upon whalers and other ship. 
but now no longer dared to perpetrate such insult and plunder.44 At times, 
Capt. Downes of the Macedonian with a request not to enter Callao lest it 
prejudice the revolutionary cause,4$ but in other instances he dropped anchor 
and "let Lord Cochrane know that the Jiacedoman must enter Callao, blockade, 
41. ~., VI, .384, Guido to San MartIn, April 27. 1819. 
42. Special Agents, Robinson. Robinson to Adams, JulY' 29, 1819. 
4,3. Ibid. 
-
44. Deblois Private Journal, Wednesday. )(arch .31, 1819. Valparaiso. 
4$. lationa! Archives, Washington, laT,f Department, Captains Letters. Vol. 4, 
1819, Joaqu!n de Echeverna to Downes, April 17, 1819, also Downes to 
Echeverr!a, April 20, 1819. 
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no blockade.·46 The Mac.donian's defiance increased the friction between 9!- __ ':::';;.,;;.o---
DoWnea and Cochrane but brought applause from American and British ships in 
Callao which either carried large sums of money or traded in this area. Over 
Cochrane I s protest, Downes insisted he would remain in Callao until all Ameri-
oan merchant ship. had .aU.d. 47Th. merchant captain. .xpr .... d their 
gratitude to Downe. on many occa.ions, happily aware that hi. BUCC ••• aided 
48 their interest •• 
Of major con.id.ration during the blockade controver-.y was the legality 
of the ·paper blockade.w Downes prote.ted to O'Higgins against the exclusion 
of American ships fram the Peruvian coa.t unless the port wa. apecitically 
blockaded.49 Prevost wrote to Adam., lay 16, 1819, that although the trade 
to Lima and adjacent port. at that time was too precarious to be of any real 
value to the United States, there was still the erroneous principle of the 
blockade to be corrected. Prevost referred to his protest of the paper 
blockade and said that it -.as met with great frankness and all claim of 
tortei ture for any infraction was disavowed as to any place where no actual 
force was employed, and that the form was preserved only to deter unfriendly 
neutrals trom entering for the purpose of carl7ing information. ,,50 
46. Samuel Holbrook, Threescore Years, An Autobiograp& (Boston, 1857), 257, 
1819. --
47. Ibid., 259, 1819. 
-
48. Ibid., 270, .1819 or 1820 •• 
-
49. Captains Letters, Vol. 4. 1819, Document 63. Downes to O'Higgins. 
~cedonian, April 23, 1819. 
50. Special. Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr .. Prevost to Adams. Kay 16. 1819. 
9L - .:::._:;.;:;.;;.;;;;; ....... 
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.An entrr for May 24, 1819. in Beblois' journal on the lacedonian, stated 
that the blockade would ·play the devil with merch. t vessels, vessels of all 
nations are prohibited entering aJl31' port in Peru, if our merch. t vessels 
particularly whalers of which the Pacific i& full of are excluded from 
entering some ports for wood. water and refreshmen, their voyages will be 
entirely ruined.--.51 The Macedonian proved invaluable in escorting mer-
~ 
,I 
I 
chantmentt out ot Callao while British cutters did the same for British shiPs.52 ,I: 
American ships needed 'protection" especially when they carried cargoes ot 
.askets, pistols, powder and other warlike stores. The Chilean Lautaro seised 
one such American ship and Downes was most anxious to effect her rescue.53 
Prevost believed that Cochrane's spoilations were perpetuated mostly upon 
American shipping but that plundering prize money from neutrals was hardly 
the way to "sustain his situation--Jealousies are already awakened and the 
plunder of a few ll1dividuals detailed in an illegal commerce will not suffice 
to allay them ••••• 54 As far as Cochrane was concerned even a tew individuals 
supplying arms and munitions to the enemy could not be tolerated. And they 
did supply the ene~ as Guido's letter to San Martin, July 8, 1819. indicated~5 
Although Prevost admired Cochrane' B ability to organize poor working materials 
51. Deblois Private Journal, 1818-1819, Monday, May 24, 1818. 
52. Holbrook, Autobiograpgr, 274, c1819 or 1820 •• 
53. ~., 273, 274. 
54. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Darr, Prevost to Adams, July 3. 1819. 
5S. DAma. VI, 402, Guido to San Martin. 
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into an effective naval torce, he disapproved of the tactics.56 
Downes was equally ft.r'1 ot Cochrane's intentions and activities, although 
the commander ot tbe Chilean Galvarino assured Downes that Cochrane ttdid not 
I 
intend to inforce the blockade of Peru to the full extent imbraced in the 
proclamation, but that Lima, and suob otber ports, as he should keep a com-
petent torce before, would alone be considered as str1.ctl1" blockaded •• 57 
Downes wrote that he would sail 1mmed1ate'b' tor the PeruT.1.an ooast ttto watch 
the motions ot Lord Cochrane and give protection to our vessels on the coast. 
-I am oonfident that Lord Cochrane's reelings towards us are hostile in the 
extreme, and that be 11111 throw every obstacle possible, in the VIq of our 
O0llDl8l"C8 on the ooast ot Peru ..... sa Downes was aware that some ot ·our 
CommeX"Oe· oonsisted or an arms trade nth the i.oyaU,.ts, e.g., the Montezuma 
which vas oaptured b7 the Chil.ean squadron as she entered l.J.aa.59 
'On November 9, 1619, Cochrane armed with extracts t'rCIIl the Law of Nations, 
e.g. HUllCCius, Va.ttel, Burlamagurl, to prove bis theory ot the blockade sent 
his argwaents to Downes. Downes repUed on the same &q' to the effect that 
he could not comment on these extracts. Cochrane maintained, supported b7 
the above extracts, t,ha,t tbe erl8lV vas not to be helped in &lV'vq, a neutral 
could not 08l"1"7 eneJIiV property' nor engage in oODllerce with a b1.ookaded port.6O 
56. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, !)orr, Prevost to Adau, Sept. 13, 1819. 
57. Captains Let.ters, Vol. 4, 1819, Down •• , Macedonia!l, Oct. 20, 1,819. 
5S. Ibid. 
-59. Ibid. 
-60. Ibid., Vol. 1, 182°1 Classified under DO. 11, Cochrane to Downes on board 
the oTiDiena, Nov. 9, 1l:i19. 
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nownes for his part attached an extract from Sir William Scott which stipulated 
that a blockade must be so declared that other countries have a knowledge of 
it. existence, there must also be an adequate foree to enforce it, else it 
.a. ineffectual.61 This very same day, Iovember 9, Lt. Charles Gauntt of the 
laCedoDian made a most interesting ohlerTation. Referring to his ship 'os stay 
-in Valparaiso, Downes apparently received information that Cochrane intended 
to .ink the Macedonia if she should attempt 'to enter Callao, a blockaded port. 
Downes prepared for this eventuality although he doubted its possibility. When 
Cochrane stationed his ships for the blockade, there was speculation whether 
or not Cochrane was blurfing or actually intended to carry out the threat. Bo, 
the hcedonian "lighted matches, sanded deck.. guns trained at the object, .. n 
at quarters on both sides,- and -gave other indication. of readiness to fight." 
Cochrane must haw been impressed for be later hailed the llacedonie and 
wished her a ·pleasant passage- to the anchOrage.62 
lt the same time that Cochrane experienced difficulties with Britain and 
American ships, he alao found himself at var1anee with San Martin's milit817 
8trateg)". Two ot Guido'. letters to San Martin, both dated August 7. 1819, 
referred to Cochrane's disapproval of the plans for revolutiOnizing Peru. In 
one Guido repeated Cochrane's boast that he was not afraid of the English 
aquadron.6) In the other he also mentioned a different naval strategy trom 
61. Ibid. 
-
62. Gauntt, Private Remarks, f. 69-70, Iov. 9, 1819. 
63. ~ IV, $06, Guido to San Martin. lug. 7, 1819. 
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that presented by San Kartin. Cochrane wanted to attack Callao directl;y.64 
!'he same day 0' Higgins also wrote to San Martin and described a detailed. 
conference with Cochrane reiterating Guido's statements. Cochrane believed 
San Martin f s plan to be prejudicial to Chil. and. to the' general cause.65 In 
other matters Cochrane sought official sanction trom San Martin, e.g. in 
exempting the goods of the Potrillo' from taxes.66 However, Cochrane further 
diSObeyed instructions when he abandoned the blockade of Callao for a period 
ot time. Information to this effect was .sent by O'Higgins to San Martin, 
December 4, 1819.67 ' 
The various controversies which raged about the blockade were inaufficient 
to convince either San Uartin. Cochrane or the Chilean government of it. 
tutili ty in the campaign. A blockade. • ..... n wi th it. 1U.1l7 inadequacies. W&S 
a necessity if P.ru were to be liberated. How .lse could the rebels control 
the Royalist supply line and, moreover, supervise the commercial life of this 
area? The amount of contraband trade that eluded the blockading squadron, the 
dealings of both British and American ships with the Ro;yaliata, and the obvious 
need to define the meaning of the term Mblockade" as far as the rebels were 
concerned meant only one course of action--a llew decre.. In A.ugust of 1820, 
Charles Gauntt of the Macedonian reported the rigorous state of blockade of 
the coastline from Iquique to Guayaquil inclusive. 68 Downes informed 
1;4. IbId., $08. 509, Aug. 7, 1819. 
65. Ibid., 512, O'Higgins to San hrtin, Aug. 7, 1819. 
66. Ibid .. , VIII, 300, Cochrane to San Martin _1820 or 1821.. 
-
67. ..!E!!!., V, 484. 
68. Gauntt, Private Remarks, f. 92, 93, Aug. 21, 1820. 
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Salith ThOMPson, Secretary of the Navy, 1ugust 22. 1820, about the new Chilean 
deCree effective August 25 although -it is not possible for the blockading 
torce to arrive there sooner than the first part of the next month.-
69 Ap-
parently, the mere declaration of the blockade made it effective. The actual 
decree was announced on August 20, 1820, and signed by O'Higgins and Zenteno. 
It providedt (1) that any vessel of -whatever Nation" was prohibited. from 
entering the bloc Wed ports as stipulat.d in the first paragraph-from 
Iquique to Guayaquil. (2) Proviaions .... r. made for various lengths of tiM 
by which interested nations were to be informed of the decree. (3) The 
penalty for transgression was confiscation. (4) Ineluded 8JIOllf contraband 
of war were: arms and _unit ion of all classes and uses, every description 
of "Vilitary Stores, - provisions of all kinds, naval stores and, lastly, all 
items that aided the enelR1 in carrying on the war. (5) Carrying of double 
papers by neutral ships made them liable to seiaure. (6) Care was taken for 
neutrals to embark their property from enemy ports. (7) 111 ports which were 
under the protection of the liberating &rm1 were d.clared -free and exempt 
from this Blockade." (8) lleutral ship a carrying royalist goods or properties, 
"under whatsoever pretext" were to seized and sent to Valparaiso.70 
The blockad~ was not to the liking of the British, who through Commodore 
Thomaa Hard,. protested to the Chilean government challenging its purel,. 
69. Captains Letters, Vol. 3, 1820, part of document 49. 
:,/0. British State Papers, 1820-1821, 1218-1219, Decree of Supreme Director 
of ChIn, declaring the ihock:ade of the Ports of Peru, Aug. 20, 1820; also 
in Captains Letters, Vol. J, 1820, part of document 49. 
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fictitious basis. 7l The Chilean Ministro de Karina, through JOM Ignacio 
z.nteno, replied to Hardy on December 6, 1820, to the effect that there was 
DO intention of violatine British rights and that the government "trataria de 
que el bloqueo Be ajustara a las reglas navales britanicas.w72 
American reaction to t,he blockade was equally quick and vocal. Robinson 
notified Adams, October 2, 1820, that While the Viceroy opened the port of 
Lima temporarily to the neutrals, Cochrane t s blockad.e would render such 
permission unfeasible. 'urt.hermo~, Robinson indicated the presence of forty 
American mercha."'lt vessels trading alone the Chilean and northwest coast, 150 
whaling ships, 80 British whalers and 50 to 60 British vessels trading along 
the same coastline. He also li1entioned the Maeedonian and the !merion going 
to Lima while the Andromaoha waited. at Valparaiso to be relieved by another 
ship comine; from Rio de Janeiro.73 Two days later, October 4, 1820, Robinson 
further advised Adams of the blockade explaining that the restrictions imposed 
would cause much annoyance to neutral ships and tend to "interrupt legal 
commerce. a In view of such circumstances, Robinson urged that "a greater 
American Naval force than is at present on this station might be advantageous1 
employed, and may become indespeDsably necessary to a due respect and 
71. Charles W, Centner. "RelacionEls Comercia.les de Gran Bretafla con Chile 
1810-1830, w Reviata Chilena de Historia l Geografia, XCI, no. 103 (Santiago, 
1943), 100-101, footnote 20.--
72. ~., 101, footnote 21. 
7~. Robinson Papers, vol. 5, 1820-1824, Robinson to Adams, Oct. 2, 1820. 
protection of the interest, nag, and rights of the United States in this 
quarter of the world.-fI 74 On October 30, 1820, Gauntt of the Macedonian 
noted the friction existing between the patriot and U.S. naval force~ at 
Callao. 75 
Cochrane' s "plundering" brought protests from American mercantile interata 
He justified the seizure of the French Oazelle by contending that it was pri-
vate propert,.., 111 thout any ostensible Ol'O'ler. and, captured on an enemy coast 
as an "infringement of blockade. tI He claimed the money seized aboard this 
ship was privately shipped to prevent its confiscation. Iliphat Sm1th, master 
of the lfacedonian. also lost money during one of the confiscations. One 
source noted that Cochrane exempted Gua:rmey even from a paper blockade and 
permitted all neutral ships to enter this port. In delanse of Smith, this 
same source, Forbes, wrote that Smith first tried to sell his cargo in 
Valparai80 but was unsucce88ful and therefore sold it in L1ma. 76 This, of 
course, was forbidden by the con8tituted blockade. 
The Peruvian blockade was not totally successful for "more than one 
merchantman slipped pastil and Cochrane's ships already few in number could 
not 'IDe bllocated. Previous to the liberatlne expadi tion, foreigp merchants 
had enjoyed a profitable contraband trade with royalist ports which during 
the blockade became JtK'Ire difficult and dangerolls to enter. British vessels 
74. .!h!E.., Robinson to Adams, Oct. 4, 1820. 
75. Gauntt, Private Remarks, f. 97, Oct. 30, 1820. 
76. u.s. Consuls B.A., January- 10, l8l8-June 16, 1821, Forbes to Echeverr!a. 
Nov. 16, 1820. 
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actually sailed to Peru "under Spanish 11ceooe." Under such conditions 
Coohrane found himself eonstant~ at variance with British naval commanders 
who guarded MUsh mercantile interests while "the Merchants, who had a.t 
first eagerly looked forward to the U.beration of Peru, were :filled with 
exasperation by San Martin's Fabian tactics." 77 'fb.e reference to san Martin 
is mat enlightening sino. available source. se. to indicate that Cm:hrane'. 
role in the blockade question was the dominant onth It wa.s Cochrane who 
enforced, m.od1tied, interpreted and often demanded BlOre stringent b1.ookade 
measures. What part San Martin played in this phase or the expedition is not 
easi1¥ discovered. Hem lJ.ke :Segg and Barnard cQfQp1ained about the blockade 
and its disastrous effect upon their commerc1alintereats. In 1820 and 1.621 
Begg ,corresponded with Pariosa1em. and in one instance in July of 1.821. wrote 
that "Bad not this b1.oc:kade of the Ooast been abandoned 10U were ere this have 
seen a British squadron in tront of Callao and the port open to even contra-
ba.nd of war.,,18 Barnard also cried out agaiDst the blockade with even more 
gloom. A. third British merchant, J. P. Robertson showed meh impatience and 
added tha'~ "the large stocks Of goods in the bands of the fterchants, uke the 
Goyernment impatient and the EngUsh uneasy about the delay." 19 
The Maoe<loniau achieved further notoriety in Cochrane's qes when ber 
n. Hwapb.reyB, Liberation South Americ!l. 91, footnotes 4. 5. 6. 
18. Ibid., 92, footnote 1,2. 
-
79 •. !2!2-, footnote. 2 and 3. 
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e::lptiain, Dmmes, referred to his blockade as piratical warfare. Downes urged 
the necesnity c,f protectir.g A.'llerican C01ll1nerce, provided of course that contra-
bane of war was not involved. Be added it was ridiculous for Chile to patrol 
a 1200 mUe coast vr1 th three fritates lI one corvette and three brigs.80 In 
July of 1820, Cochrane t s confiscatioll of' money from E. Smith only added to the 
disappointmflnt which was hardly relieved by Smith's insinuations that the 
American agent Prevost was too much inclined toward the rebels to seek proper 
redress.81 In August, 1820, both O'Higgins and San Martin were guests on the 
Macedcnian.82 Evidence sUbstantiates ~~8' friendly relations with OtHlggin 
and his acquiescence to aome of the restrictions imposed by the blockade. 
Downes wrote to 0 'Higgins on August 18, 1820, mainly on the question whether 
Downes could enter Lima after the liberat1ng expedition was in command. 
Earll.ar Downes was informed that he could net attend to American mercantile 
interests in Lima until 52.r: MartIn occupied. the area. Onder rebel control, 
Lima was to be ma~e ~cesib1e to Americ~~ shiPe. B3 
Downes continued to be very skeptical of Cochrane I., intentions and 
act:l.vlties, writing to Washington that American ships needed the "acedonian'e 
80. Captains Letters, Vol. 1, 1820, Doe. DO. 11, Downes to Secretary of 
State, Jan. $, 1820. 
81. JlarmiDf.. Diplomatic Correspondence, I, 13$-1)6, Adams to Prevost, July 10, 
1820. 
82. Gauntt, Priy&te Remarks, f. 91. Aug. 11, 1820. 
83. Captains Letters, Vol. 3, 1820. 
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protection.84 The case in point was the Lou::i,s&, detained by the Chilean 
sqvadron. ncnmes appealed to San ~a.rtln 'o'lho, interesting to note, told the 
A,"!}oriCR'1 captaln that he ~mly bad povrer over the squadron in military af'fa,lrs. 
Hownver, San Martin added that he wOJ.ld see to it that American ships received 
a f:lir tr1.al a.nC be set free if pa~')ers 7fere in order. 85 The effect of San 
Ma.-t!n I S reply upon Downes c.an be clearly seen [rota Ga.untt t 8 journal, 
DecenlJer ?a, 1820. He referred tc it as '3vasive, "which determ:ined Captain 
Downes on takinr her out with the Macedonian." 011 Decem.ber 29, 1820, the 
Msc.edcnian left Huacho with the Louisa. under her protection. The Lautaro 
followed but di<i not t'se force to regain the deWned stip.86 On December 28, 
DClVnC':) informed S.a.n Me.rt!n of his dccieiom It! am now under the necessity of 
t&~~nf upon ~8elf, the responsibility of releasing her cLouisa. that she 
may proceed on her voyage_ we7 A.pparently San liart!.n left Ruacho 1'1ithout 
givir~ Downes any satisfactory reply to an earlier lptter. Downes wrote 
o 'Hif-r;ins on February 21, l821~ about the Loui~ incident accusinE Cochrane 
of desiring to destroy American coruerce and ruining the Louisa.',. cargo.88 On 
Feb!"lary 24., 1821~ Downes lfrota to Pr(;voat that no appeals had been of avail 
a'1d he justified his action fer re1easin,g her from Cochrane' 8 cust.ody. He, 
84. ~ •• Vol. L. 1820, Downes to Smith Thompson, iov. 20, 1820, orr Callao. 
85. Special Af,ents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, San Martin to Delme., Dec. 27, 1820. 
86. Gal.~nt.t, Prlvate Remarks, f. 109 and no. 
87. Capt(;cins Letters, V(11. ,3, 1821, DC'WIleS to San Martin. Her cargo W&8 such 
that it might indicate condemnation, Downes to San Martin, Dee. 28, 1820. 
88. Ibid., Downes to San Martin_ 
-
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moreover, told Prevost that the Louisa carried 1,000 muskets and was headed 
for Callao seeking wood and water. More, the tate at the Louisa should not 
o 
have been lett to Cochrane but the ship, it datainsd, should have been sent 
immediatelr tor adjudication.S, On June 19, 1821, Downes reported the atfatr 
to the Secretary of the Navy. He wrote that the Louisa was seued on at ... 
tempting to enter Lima. To protect American interests, Downes recalled his 
interview with san Martin who was camped near Httache>. 
"The General declared to me that he con.sidered 
ber detention at Bucbo u~ u.stt bat that he bad 
n.o authority to release her. I stated to hirn tha.t 
I could not lea.,. ber in the saae uucertain sta.te 
inwbich I found her; that unless he would pledge 
his word sh. should be released or sent to Chile 
tor . adjudication in the space ot eight tiqs, I 
sb.ou.ld be _del' tile neo •• s1ty of tald.ng her to 
sea. with me; after some little hesitation be 
was pleasH to sq that be would. gi.,.. .. sucb 
pledge.·90 
"expresses himself with great warmth both as 
to DGtmes and R1dgeq, the tONer tor his conduct 
in the atrail" ot the Louisa heretofore deta! led, 
the latter tor baviDg attorcled an uy1nm to 
'esuela on board the Oonstellation until he was 
.nabled to etfect bis .scape-Indeed 80 great 
wu the irritation at one lBOment that it was 
in ag1tat1on to "strict our 1IltercovIB b7 
the 1aposition of additional dutie., the idea. 
h ...... baa been abandoned and .... l"emaill on th. 
89. Ibid •• Dolmes to San Martin, Dec. 26, 1820. The Louisa had on board. oarg 
ot $~, 80118 in perishable goods_ 
90. Ibid., Dowes \0 Secr.tar,r ot state, June 19, 1.821. 
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same footing with othera.w9l 
If anything, the above documents point clearly to the fact that Cochrane 
exercised a great deal of freedom as commander of the Chilean squadron and 
that San Martin often had little influence over him. The escape of the 
Louisa under the Macedonian's cover attests to the degree of confidence Downes 
-
had in San Martin's pledge to aid. 
Encounters between Cochrane and British ships grew to the dissatisfaction 
of both parties. Since the Chilean conquest was not a reality, British 
merchants refused to cease their Peruvian trade and commanders like Captain 
Searle of the J!Yperion were placed in the uncomfortable position of defending 
British intereats.92 Captain Hardy protested that the Chilean blockade hurt 
British commerce, raised cries of its illegality, and insisted on the rights 
of British neutrals. The Chilean ~overnment had other views on the matter, 
considering neutral ships in Chilean and Peruvian ports as transports and 
mail carriers of Spain. Robinson agreed that "there is too much truth for 
them to be viewed or treated lightly._93 
The British had received many privileges from the Chilean government, 
among them permission to enter 081lao. 94 These privileges were noticed by 
91. National Archives, Washington, Jiav;y Department, Cruise of U.S.S. Franklin, 
Prevost to Adams, Oct. 16, 1821. Diplomatic correspondence included with 
this cruise has also been used. 
92. Centner, "Relaeiones Comerci81es,- 101, footnotes 23 and 24. 
93. ~., 102; alao footnote 28. 
94. nASI, VrrI, 11, Cochrane to San MartIn, leb. 16, 1821. 
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the Americans. For ~\.8mple, Downes noted ·'~t the Eritish did not P83 duties 
on certain Uquors and shoes. ECheverrIa. informed Downes tha.t the British 
commander 01 the Andromacba. solicited Chile lor permission to transport 
liquor tram British ships £01' its own use, and. the perDdssion wu granted. 
He maintained that similar privileges would be granted to Amerioan ships it 
requ.ested." Captain Sheriff of the An*omacha had his own idea.s about the 
privileges of neutral ships durluga blockade, buina his theories on inter-
national la:fi. O'Higgins, CochratLe and San Marttn rejected Sheriff' a ini;er ... 
pretation of the ftcU"tel" and blockades that had no other object than to 
oollect tees from PC"Jldts.96 Cochrane made his attitude quite olear by' con-
fiscatiug ships that violated the blockade, tor example, the British 
Colombia..91 'When a ship ttescapedlt he made arrallgements to have it stopped 
at another port, as in the oase of the ~ Cathcart.98 
Despite Cochrane's indignation and !lnotwithstanding the blockade," there 
were many Amerioan and British merchant ships in Callao in May ot 1621.99 
Captain C. G. Ridgel\1 of the U. S. 5. Constellation l.am.ented Cochrane's 
.. - -
seizures and informed. the Secret.ary of the l(av that he would. cruise 
9S. Special Agents Prevost, Bid.dle, Don, E.ch.tmrrr{a. to Downes, Oot. 30, 
1.819. PNVO.~ to Icheverfia, Jan. 7 j 1820. 
96. DASM, V, h89, O'Higg1na to 3aD Kar~{n, April 21, 1821; Ernesto d.e la 
Cru.:I,~stolar1o !! l!. Bernardo O'HiGgins (Madrid, 1.920), II, 72, footnote 1. 
97. DA~, VIn, )2" Cocbrau to San Mart!n. Hq 23, 1821. 
,S. Ibid.. 
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along the Peruvian coastline assisting any American in want. He addeds -'rom 
Lord Cochrane being on that coast & prohibiting all intercourse I fear I will 
find maDT in want."lOO Ridgely further described the lucrative trade carried 
on by American citizens from China to Chile and Peru urging the beneficiality 
of another war ship. He had previously indicated that the British government 
had four war ships and the British with the United State. carried on all the 
commerce 1n this area.10l 
Smith Thompson of the lavy Department wrote to Ridgely on March 22, 1821, 
admitting that while the United States did not recognize the legality of the 
blockade, it was prudent to avoid a~ collision with the Chilean squadron so 
as not to prejudice the rebel cause. Washington evidently nw the sldes of 
independence brightening. Neutrality waa the order of the day. Ridgely was 
directed to Beek only the honor of the American flag and to act defenaively. 
Any infringement on neutral rights was to be met with "strong and spirited 
appeals" through American agents assigned to the Chilean government.102 
Though San KartIn concurred with the idea of blockading all Royalist held 
porte,lO) the existence of an unenforcible blockade continued to irritate the 
two neutral but interested powers. According to Prevost, the Bri tim commander 
100. Bavy Area 9 File, 1801-1830, ro1der, Box 1, Duplicate copy, f. ). 
101. Ibid., folios 2, 3. and 4. 
-
102. Ibid., Duplicate copy; Private Letters, Navy Depdment. February 1, 1813-
Januar'Y2i5, 1840, f. 319, Thompson to Ridgely, March 22, 1821. Similar orders 
were also given to Capt. Charles Stewart of the Franklin. f. 324-27 pass1a" 
Sept. 8, 1821. This last document also in Private Letters, Navy Department. 
103. DASM, VIII, 526, Forster to Antonio Vicara, General de Marina, May 31, 
1821. -
11.3 
HardY' addressed m.erchants of Santiago respecting the blockade. Again it was 
a question whether a blockade was legal if no permanent force existed to 
enforce it. Prevost insisted that a competent blockading force was essential 
for 1egality.104 
On June 22, 1821, O'HiSf,ins issued a decree which modified the one 
published on August 20, 1820. His basic reasons for the change were 
principles of equity and justice and the successes of the 1iberpting exped-
ition. Therefore, "having understood that a certain modification in this 
respect m.ay be favourable to the operations of the War, the happy termination 
of which is already at hand", the Chilean government ordered the August 20 
decree operative for twenty more days and then to be effective only between 
the area from Ancon to Pisco inclusive. Designated as a state of rigorous 
blockade, the decree stipulated that a sufficient force would remain in 
front of every port along the whole coastline between the two ports.loS This 
decree coincided with San Martin's promise that once the liberating force 
commanded former royaUst ports, they woc:ld be opened to commerce.l06 
The idea of an "adequate force" remained a source of controversy even 
after the promulgation of the modified decree m.entioned above. Echeverria 
104. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Prevost to Echeverria, June 18, 
1821; Manning, Diplomatic Corre!pondence, II, 1051-1052, O'Higgins to Prevost, 
June 2,3, 1821; American state Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 827. 0 'Higgins 
agreed regarding presence of adequate force to blockade ports and would so 
inform Hardy. 
105. British State Papers, 1820-1821, 1220. 
106. DASI, VIII, 526, Forster to Antonio Vicara, May ,31, 1821. 
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replied to Prevost. June 25. 1821, that the blockade was to extend to areas 
only where such a foree was stationed.107 Prevost, in turn, wrote to Adams 
on June 30. 1821, discussinp the diverse points of view in this matter. In 
this same letter he referred to the ~ng conflict between San HartIn and 
Cochrane. lOB Cochrane informed San Martin on July 22, 1821, about Hardy's 
views on the blockade, and himself insisted that not a moment be wasted in 
declaring all royalist ports in a state of blockade rather than those between 
Pisco and Ancon.109 
There was good reason for the British to dispute the issue of the blockade 
since they violated the decree in t he fullest sense of the word. Dri tlsh shjps 
entered Callao and other ports carryiIlp' supplies and enemy property, and 
Cochrane so informed San MartIn on July 2, 1821.110 To make matters worse, 
there was some indication that the success of the Peruvian expedition was 
~orse than doubtful, it is now almost despaired of •••• •lll 80 wrote Forbes 
on July 3, 1821. He further mentioned Hardy', angry discussion with the 
Chilean government about the ·paper blockade" and the capture of several 
British ships that dared to vl.olate this kind of blockade. What incensed 
Hardy even more was the sale of the confiscated goods without his being 
107. Special Agents Prevost. Biddle, Dorr. 
108. American State P~ers, Foreign Relations, IV, 826. First part in 
British State Papers, r 21-1822, 390-391. 
109. DASM, VIII. 330. 
110. ~ •• 55. 
lll. U.s. Consuls B.A.. July 3. 182l-August 6, 1826, Forbes, July 3, 1821. 
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present and "without legal adjudication." After writing to the Chilean govern 
ment. Hardy then informed the British merchants 
"that the blockade of the Coast of Peru, pro-
claimed by the Government ot Chili, was illegal 
and ths.t, under a sense of all these injuries. 
he wanted no advice or remonstrances from the 
Merchants, that he has decided on the course 
he intended to pursue and merely gave them 
notice that he was determined to protect by 
foree British rights and property afloat but 
that the British Merchants must provide for their 
own aecuri ty an shore or leave the Country as he 
could not !~ena any protection to them or their 
propert;y.tt 2 
Forbes seemed confident that the Ch.1lean Government would "yield to the 
menaces of the British.·ll) Moreover, to compound the misunderstandings and 
diffieul ties over the "paper blockade" the Peruvian Vj.ceroy declared Callao 
ann Lima trade free to all nftutral nags.ll.4 On July 6, 1821, Robinson ad-
v1.sed Adams that, the difficulties between Hardy ann the Chilean r,overnment 
had been amicably settled, a8 Chile relinquished its pretensions to a blockade 
of the whole coast ann confined it to such places as could be successfullY' 
controlled.llS A postscript to the above letter is most enlightening. 
Robinson said that the Chilean government would under certain conditions permit 
the export of Chilean produce to Peru. He continuedc "If this statement be 
112. Ibid. 
-
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correct. c the measure will tend to protract:t t.he war in Peru and perhap. add 
••• nefl and interesting teatures to the contest tor independence. nl16 
In 1821 it became increasingly clear that not only did the Chilean 
government issue licenses to tradel17 but that Cochrane took it upon himself 
to establish fta floating custom-house." HavinE contacted the cargo masters 
of British vessels in Arica. he offered to "relieve them from the annoyance. 
they never ceased to feel trom the custom-house officers. that the cargoes 
sbould be landed i\ithout obstruction. upon their fixing the valuation thell-
selves, and payinp to him on account of the government of Chile the moderate 
118 duties of eiehteen percent on all goods equally.- The cargo masters re-
joiced at the offer and paid in quicksilver and a quantity of cables and 
other naval stores destined for the Viceroy of Peru. Controversy arose over 
the institution of such a dangerous precedent, were Cochrane to dietate to 
British commerce in the area by means of such a "custom-house. nl19 Cochrane 
alse issued a license to the Admiral Cockburn to trade in all Peruvian ports, 
Chaneay to Lima inclusive, May 12. 1821. This license was granted in vin of 
the need of naval provisions requested by the squadron and supplied by the 
Admiral Cockburn. throu.gh Higman and Orammond, charterers cfietadoresa. In 
return for their provisions, Higman and Crammond were conceded privileges to 
116. ~. 
117. DASM, VIII, 10, Cochrane to San MartIn, Feb. 16, 1821. 
-
118. Uiers, Travels i!! Chile, II, 63. 
119. Ibid., 
-
64. 
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dispose of their wares in tha stipulated ports.120 Prevost cited the issuance 
o! such licenses in his report to tdams; July 6, 1821. In the letter Prevost 
said: 
-The ex1iraTagent cow:klct of W. Cochrane was 
the subject ot the adTices to 511' Thomas Hare.V' 
•••• It appears that UDder color of duties bis 
Le!. ship hubeen selling Ucanses to trade on 
the Oout and in OIle instance to proceed to the 
Capital. The Brig Robert Forae ot Liverpool 
paid upnrds of $19000. and the RebM{,& near'1;r 
as l'IlUcb tor the like priv11ege •••• tt '121 
Charles Stewart of the hankUn also called attention to the Ucenses in his 
Il 
report to SlId. th 'l'hompson, stating that "Cochrane by means ot licenses to his 
agenta aDd paJ'tnera in co.erce, enabled the place to hold out, and was thus 
enricbing b1ueU, wb11e be was defeating the ob., eet ot SaD Martin ...... 122 
Tb.e reterence was to L1u. and Oallao and the affair took place duriftg the 
Protectorate. 
On Au.gust 2, 1821., Robinson referred to the lI&'9'al 81staa .,tabUshed. b7 
Cochrane as "auction or contribution." rus trpe ot tribute or bush ... 
was in no 11188 acreeab1e 100 the lords ot c_eree. Acoordinl to Cochrane', 
arrangEflllent, all neutral vessels prior to entering .A.r1ca 1I6re to pay Cochrane 
18 1/2 per cent dutr on tho amoUDt ot their cargoes and. would still be subject 
to the lIltmicipa.l. dnties or customs in the pert itself. Batur&l17 tbe British 
120. Sf)eo1al Agents, Prevost, Biddle, Don. 
121 .. Ibid. 
-
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merchants became excited and Hardy rushed to their assistance. The blockade 
was confined to Ancon down to Pisco and, according to Robinson, tacitly 
assented to by Hardy previously. After the unreasonable exactions would have 
been imposed, Robinson believed Hardy would not admit to any blockade. This 
report also ind5..cated the policy of the Chilean government to grant trade 
privileges, a course of aotion whioh many believed prejudiced the oause of the 
liberating expedition. It was true that a bond was exacted for such a privi-
lege as assurance that the goods would not go to the Royalists. still the 
high prices the goods would bring in Peru would be most tempting to merohants. 
However, the British failed to comply wi th the restrictions and neglected to 
post the necessar,y bond, but Robinson added that Hardy would protect aqy 
British ships involved.l23 O'Higgins was .tully aware of the nature of 
Cochrane's "customhouse" and the evils it would precipitate if allowed to con-
tinue. In a letter to San Martin, December 12, 1821, he expressed the British 
disgust over this situation.124 Cochrane's further "license" and "custom-
house" activities specifically during the Protectorate will be discussed more 
appropriately in a later chapter. What might be pertinent is the contemporary 
British estimate of such arbitrary measures. In his Sketches, Haigh praised 
the high calibre of British naval officials stationed along the Peruvian and 
Chilean coastline and their suitability for furthering British interests. 
One such statement follows. "On many occasions both firmness and conciliation 
123. Special Agents, Robinson, Robinson to Adams, Aug. 2, 1821. 
124. ~, V, ,02, ,03; Bulnes, Espedici6n Libertadora, II, 308, 309. 
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were requisite, to prevent improper exactions being levied upon the property 
of the English merchants •••• ,,125 Singled out for their public and private 
character were Bowles, Sheriff, Falcon, Hall, Hardy, Hon. R.C. Spencer, Hon. 
Orlando Bridgemen and Captain D. O'Brien.126 
The blockade also brought retribution to CochrA.ne, who found himself in 
sore need of supplies and was sometimes faced with unwilling suppliers. In 
such circumstances, Cochrane wrote to Monteagudo and asked for San t4art!n's 
intercession in softening the re1actant merchants.127 Apparently he acceded 
to Cochrane's requests, for on Augnst 27, 1821, Monteagudo was able to report 
that permission was granted to make arrangements with merchant ships. However 
if the ships in question resisted such an arrangement, they were to leave the 
port and be prohibited trom ~ commercial activities. Since the blockade was 
still considered vital in August of 1821, it was hoped that the acquisition 
of the needed supplies would ~uarantee its continuance.128 At times there was 
no question of payment; Cochrane simply "detained" ships with large amounts 
of American property.129 Ships not c~rry1ng a customhouse permit or bill of 
lading were especially vulnerable as was the case of the Louisa.130 Although 
the degree of need for supplies fluctuated throughout the expedition, Cochrane 
125. Haigh, Sketches, 312, 313. 
126. Ibid. 
-
121. DA~, VIII, 428, Cochrane to Monteagudo, Aug. 21, 1821. 
-
128. Ibid., 430, Monteagudo to Cochrane, Aug. 27, ,1821; same 
found ~ulnes, ESpedicion Libertadora, II, 345-40. 
document is also 
129. Captains Letters, Vol. 4, 1821, C. G. Ridgely, Captain ot Constellation 
to Secretary of Nav.y, Aug. 29, 1821. 
130. DASM, VIII, sept. 15, 1821, receipt or list tor goods signed b,y Cochrane 
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was resourceful in securing much that he required. In June of 1819, RobiruJon 
noted that the squadron came back to Chile to refit and there it would be well 
supplied with Congreve Rockets and with -arms and military forces adequate to 
taking possession ot such position ••• a. it may be deemed eligible to hold. n131 
The contributions of Cochrane t s business cODlpanions, tor example Willia 
Hoseason, might also bear inv8stigation.132 lome ot the supplies came from 
a lIr. Beale of the British ~ .... Land= .... o.. k" to whom Cochrane paid 80 pesos for 
a gun instead ot the 120 demanded.133 A document of Jul7 21, 1821, evideneed 
a transaction whereby Cochrane received goods from the Laura, R. L. L. Lawa 
captain.l .34 
In his zealous attention to the duty of acquiring supp1iea and money to 
meet the payroll ot the crews Cochrane plunged headlong into an even more 
bitter conflict with San Jlart,h. The correspondence that evolved around the 
admiral's questionable and unauthorised activities clearly indicated the wide 
breach that had opened between the two. Letters from Monteagud0135 to 
131. Special Agents, Robinson, Robinson to Adams, June 30, 1819. 
132. Robin A. Humphre7., ed., Documentsl - .lame. Paroissien'. Iotes on the 
Liberating Expedition to Peru, 1820,· Hi!paniC American Historical Review, 
ruI (1a7. 1951), 255, August 29, 1820. ootnote 10 citing i. vicllBi Lckenna, 
The Firat Britons in Valparaiso (Valparaiso, 1884), 31, said he was a business 
companion of Cochrane's. 
133. Barros Arana, Historia Chile, III, 305, footnote 49. date somewhere 
around Aug. 25, 1819. 
134. DASII, fIll, 435-.36, Ju17 21, 1821. Lists the supplies received by 
Cochrane and signed by him and Pablo del Rio as Contador. 
135. Bulnes, E~dici6n Libertadora,. II, ,346, lIonteagudo to Cochrane, 
Sept. 1, 1821; =47, IiOnteagudo to Cochrane, Sept. 15, 1821. 
_ok " 
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Cochrane, even those from San Martinl36 himself, referred to the unorthodox 
methods Cochrane had employed during the campaign. In the midst of this 
controvers,y, San Mart!n as Protector issued a new decree, October lS, 1821,137 
which again modified the extent of the blockade. Only certain ports remained 
in the state of rigorous blockade, while neutral and friendly nations were 
warned against transgression. 
Of particular embarrassment to San Martin and, quite naturally to 
0' Higgins was the obvious lack of rapport existing between Cochrane and the 
British. In a letter to San Martin, written by O'Higgins, August 6, 1821, 
attention was called to the need of conciliating the British for the madness 
exhibited b.1 Cochrane and a directive sent to him to be guided by moderation 
and tact.l38 The British appealed directly to San Martin when their ne-
gotiations with Cochrane to win modifications of the blockade bore no fruit. 
Their demands did not go unheeded.139 
The Americans fared no better with Cochrane. An agent, Hogan, wrote to 
Adams, November 4, 1821, about the confiscations that took place and the 
friction that Cochrane's activities produced. Hogan at the time was on his 
way to Santiago to speak with O'Higgins and determine "whether his Acts that 
he may commit or that he is not commiting [sic) are to be recognized by this 
136. DASM, VIII, 34S-46, San Mart!n to Cochrane, Sept. lS, 1821. 
-
137. British State P!pers, 1821-1822, 804-805. 
138. DASM, VIII, 276. 
-
139. Ibid., 414, Monteagudo to Cochrane, Aug. 20, 1821. 
-
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Government as the Acts of the Admiral of Chile •••• n140 This information vas 
necessary, for a "Capt. Rn was determined to resist any insult to the hmerican 
flag. Hogan also stated that in public estimation "Cochrane borders upon a 
Pirate belonging to no nation •••• it is possible this Govt. ms\y Countentmce him 
till they can ge~ the Fleet out of his hands ••• he is too much for them all ••• 
there r;o longer exists any cause for Blockade." 1.41 This was the Cochr~e 
that San Martin had to vork with when he began his Protectorate. 
San Martin was further incensed when he learned that Cochrane had con-
fiscated $600,000 from the Royalists and appropriated it to pay his crew. 
San Martin insisted that it belonged to the government but Cochrane decided 
1.42 , 
otherwise. Forbes wrote to Adams, November 13, 1821, that Cochrane 
pursued this course "in defiance of the strong representations of the General • 
••• that he has not dared to put his foot on shore since he took this violent 
measure. n143 The dispute over wages was of long duration. Once San Martin 
became the Protector of Peru, one observer noted that he refused to pay any 
debts which belonged to the government of Chile and even asked Cochrane to 
join hiJn and employ his ships for Peruvian service. Cochrane refused and 
according to Miers, San MartIn ordered 1/5 th of the customs receipts to be 
put aside and used for the purpose of paying the ~ and navy. Since customs 
1.40. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 1060, Hogan to Adams, Nov. L., 
1821. 
141. Ibid. 
-
112. Captains Letters, Vol. 5, 1821, Ridgely to Secretary of the Navy, 
Nov. 2, 1821. 
143. British State Papers, 1321-1822, 390. 
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receipts were small at this time, Miers continued, ttThis pretence of the 
protector fully convinced every man on board the neet that he had no 
intention ot paying them a single dollar.·144 The validity ot such an accua-
ation will be investigated in anpther chapter. Hiers also wrote that the 
interposition ot Cochrane curbed and hulabled San MartIn's power.14.5 .l 
biographT of Cochrane praised his resourcefulness in the Peruvian campaign 
but indicated that San Martin "proposed to subject it .Peru. to a milital')" 
despotism ot his own ... 146 Another statement in the Bourne biographT pointed 
out that while Cochrane was welcomed as the great deliverer of Peru it was 
San MartIn who won the honor of liberation.147 
During peace negotiations with the Royalists in June of 1821, the 
controvers,y between Cochrane and San MartIn entered into the discussion. The 
question ns raised whether or not Lord Cochrane was subject to the orders of 
San Kartln.148 Evidence showed that Cochrane at one specific time in September 
144. tiers, Travels in Chile, II, 66-67) Thoma., 11th Earl ot Dundonald, and 
H. R. rox Bourne. ifhe~i!e of Thoma., Lord Cochrane (London 1869), I, 19.5-96) 
Cochrane told San iUtin he could not Ca'.iiCef hi. debts, Bourne, Cochrane, I, 
197; San Martin said he never ·engaged to pay the amount" and "that debt is 
due from Chili, whose Government engaged the seamen, n Ibid., 198; Cochrane 
later said Chile trusted San MartIn to see to the paymenr-and he failed, the 
money was there to do so, Ibid., 200; Cochrane then called San Martin a tyrant 
in a letter to O'Higgins, lbId., 206; Cochrane even suggested that after hi. 
resignation of the Protectorate San Martin should have been tried for treason, 
.!!?g., 210. 
145. Miers, Trave~s ~ Chile, II, 86. 
146. Bourne, Cochrane, I, 191-192. 
147. ~., 193_ 
148. Lanzas, Inde~ndencia de America, V, 288, LaSerna to the DipJEtado. de 1& 
Junta de Pacificacion, June~, 1821. 
t
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1821, even demanded that the royalists surrender Lima to him .~ !! calidad 
.2! separado i: !!!l inteligencia ~ ~ Ifartin ••••• 149 This last line was 
printed in bold type in the edited version of the document cited. 
American agents and officials also reported the ever widening rift that 
was taking place between the two personalities. Prevost wrote Adams on June 3 
1831, that Oochrane directed his naval force "to a different point, with 
objects distinct from those contemplated by the General.-150 The same report, 
dealt with the pillaging of Pisco and Arica by Cochrane and mentioned that 
this was the third or fourth time that different sections of the coast were 
so besieged ~ a mode of warfare injurious to the Cause, a1w&1s at variance 
wi th that strictly enjoined and a 8' rigidly adhered to by the General •• 151 On 
December 7, 1821, Prevost noticed that there was a possibility that Cochrane 
would disobey orders from the Ohi1ean yovernment but be himself believed 
otherwise -not from a!\1 confidence in the rectitude of his LdShip, but from 
an impression that he will make any Sacrifice to obtain the favor of Chile 
in oppostion to the Protector wham he now reviles •••• n152 Prevost noted the 
prevailing dispute and chose to attribute it to nothing more than San Martin's 
state of health although it might have stemmed either from his inaction or 
other activities connected with his rule. As yet Prevost wa3 uncertain which 
149. Ruben Vargas Ugarte, S.J., Manuscritos Peruanoa (Lima, 1938), II, 293. 
150. British State 'ap!rs, 1821-1822, 390. 
151. Ibid., There was also mention of the injury done to the British flag, 
Ibid.,390-91. 
-
152. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle. Dorr. Prevost to Adams, Dec. 7, 1821. 
.
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was the real reason.1S) 
While Cochrane sou£"ht more command :in ports not under San MartIn's in-
fluence,154 speculation grew as to whom the Chilean government would support 
......san Martin or Cochrane. Conflicting reports circulated on this subject. 
One American source, Capt. Ridgely, observed on June 14, 1822, that "Lord 
Cochranes whole conduct with San Martin is ~blickll approved of by the 
Director of Chili and the people of Chili are with him, but there is no doubt 
of a secret understanding between General San Hart!n &: His ExcY' O'Higgi.ns, and 
Lord Cochrane must & will be sacrifioed, whenever he shall have returned to 
Chili with his tleet.·1.5.5 rorbes related quite another version. On October 1, 
1822. he tnformed A.dams that the Chilean government took aides with Cochrane 
"who it is said, has proposed that the Chilean government should unit with 
Bolivar to wrest the doubtful domination of Peru from San Martin. ,,156 In 
tact, Forbes said that Cochrane had rone to Guayaquil to see Bolivar, but 
this was atter San Martin and BolIvar had already met at Ouayaquil. Then 
Forbes made a most important statement concerning this meeting. He said; 
"I conceive tha.t i.t has been the kiss of Judas Iscariot.,,1.57 This turn of 
events pleased Forbes, who really hoped that Bolivar would triumph and put 
153. ~. 
154.. .!!?!!!., Prevost. to Adams, June 12~ 1822. 
IS5. Captains Letters. Vol. 4, 1822, Ridgely to Smith Thompson, June 14, 1822. 
156. u.s. Consuls B.A., July 3, l82l~ugust 6, 1826, Forbes to Adame, 
Oct. 1, 1822. 
157. !2!,g. 
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an end to the civil war then raging in Peru. Furthermore, he called San 
Yart!n a military despot.1SS The outcof.le of the Guayaquil conference 1a an 
hi~tor~eal fact--San Martin retired. What part Cocl1Tane played in this 
btrt~g1e for power has not yet been fully explored. However, evioenc8 sub-
stantlates the claim that the role was no minor one. The effect of all this 
turmoil upon free trade as decreed and practieed durine the campaign and 
Prot.ectorate belongs more appropriate1;r to other chapters. At the moment it 
suffices to state that diverse policies were often pursued. What one deoreed 
th(~ other could very well override nth the means !:'!laced at his disposal and 
by 11is immediate presenoe in the area involved. 
Thus tar little notice has been given to Cochrane's persenal views on 
the subject of tre. trade. These may be found in three speoific documents 
dates 1821 and 1823. The first document is Cochrane's address to the 
Peruvidns dated either April or M«1_ 1821, containing the oft used phrases 
denouncing Spanish policy and offering independence, liberty, just laws, com-
meree, properous agriculture and peace. To emphasize the benefits ot freedom, 
Cochrane asked several questions. Where was the coasting trade to transport 
Peruvian goods to a :nore advantageous m.arket? ·Rhere were the ractories? 
Where was the foreign trade? Sparrl.sh pOlicY' plundered 'he co10,nies bY' 
c1osinp; t~e ports, forced higher prices through land traffic and destrQY'8d 
the prof! ts of the miners, landcmers and the merchants. lS9 
1.58. Ibid. 
1S9. ~ VIII, 17-18, Habitantes S! ,l!! Provincias ~ Sur, April or Kay, 
1821. -
, 
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The second source is a proclamation issued by Cochrane to the inhabit-
ants of Guayaquil, probably in November ot 1821. Atter a pledge ot mutual 
assistance, gratitude tor the welcome received by the Chilean fleet, and 
congratulations upon their newly-acquired liberty, there followed a tirade 
against the monopolists and the evils the qstem created. Cochrane urged 
the people to rise aeainst the monopolists who by controlling, among other 
items, cotton, coftee, tobacco, and timber, demanded exhorbitant prices. 
The exclusion ot foreign trade was not to the best interests of the country. 
The surest means to acquire riches and political power was to see domestic 
goods for the highest price and toreign goods at the lowest. Oochrane urged 
importation of toreign goods and permission for toreign merchants who brought 
capital or industrial competence to settle freely. Camp*tition was healthy 
and under a new economic policy property would increase in value and the 
ports and rivers would ~ tilled with ships ot all nations. Moreover, Cochrane 
advised moderate customs duties to prevent amuggling and to promote a greater 
consumption ot both domestic and toreign goods. He apparently did not consider 
import duties as a means ot reverrue. Since Guayaquil by its position was a 
"central republic," there was no reason why' it could not also be the center 
ot agriculture and co_erce in this portion ot the globe.l60 
The third and last document is a letter addressed to the British 
merchants residing in Chile, January 4, 1822, signed by Cochrane. Expressing 
160. .!E!!!., II, ,1)-,16 2as,dJll. The Dolphin Catalog no. 41 (1962), Latin 
America and the Philippines, page 17, item no. 10" ottered a copy ot this 
proclamatIon Tor i55 and the date citecl is 10TeJllber 27, 1821; it .. ema 
identical with the source used. 
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satisfaction at seeing their commerce increased through the opening of ports 
once exclusively controlled by Spain, Cochrane apologized for the restrainta 
imposed during the liberating expedition. While such "reatrainta" grieved a 
few individual a "who wre desirous to avail themselYea of accidental c1rcum-
stances presented during the conteat," they were neceas&r7 for the common 
good. Cochrane further atated that a.n:y "who conceive themeelves aggrieved 
by my conduct, I have to requeat that they will make known their complainta, 
with their names affixed, through the medium of the public press, in order 
that I may have an opportun1 ty of a particular reply •• 161 Keeping in mind. 
Cochrane I S activities, there were Il8llY who were "aggrieved" and remained. 
vocal in their protestations. Some of the difficulties were resolved in 1822. 
The Protector, San Hartin, stepped aside for the Liberator, Bolivar, but the 
resourceful A.dJI1ral Cochrane, remained. 
161. Stevenson. Historical Harrative, III, 466-67, date cited is Jan. 4, 1823. 
Robinson Papers, Vol. $, has an atmOst identical copy of the letter but it ia 
dated Jan. 4, 1822 and adelreaaed to the lIerchanta of England and other nationa 
trading in the Pacific. This coPY' left out ·by m:r conduct." Some of the 
wording is different. 
CHAPTZR V 
Economic State of Peru: l8lb-182l 
The Peruvian e..~pedition was hardly a ';uarded secret. Its politic<"l and 
eccnomic implications were widely disseminated in Penl even before San Vartin, 
already respected for his Chilean successes, arrived within its boundaries. 
As the Chilean land and naval forces moved north, contemporaries specnl:1ted 
upon the propitious state of Peru, carefully weighing the economic benefits 
to be derived from an early victory. The economically realistic Viceroy 
Pezuela understood the necessity of fighting the revolutionary tenets as well 
as the physical forces that threatened. This chapter will deal essentially 
~'ith Pezuela's efforts in the realm of free tra.de; the support or opposition 
he encountered in Peru; his negotiations with San Martin; arrangements with 
commercially-minded powers, e.:~. Britain and the United States; his 
supplications to Spain; Spanish policy and the result of this policy upon 
the preservation of the viceroyalty. The invest.igation will revolve around 
the policy of free trade as proposed b.1 Pezuela or denied by monopolistic 
interosts rather than the practice which belongs more properly to the 
following chapt~r. 
The successful revolutionizing of Chile and its consequences upon rqyalis 
Peru have been duly notedl and discussed. Contempo~aries viewed San Martinis 
1. Odriozola, Documentos, III, 317, Discurso del Virrey del Peru en la Junta 
Extraordinaria de Tribunales, Despues de la Batalla de Maipo, Lima, May L, 
1318. 
129 
130 
victories and proposed plan for the Peruvian expedition hopefullY and in terms 
not conducive to royalist tranquility. Worthington and Prevost belonged to 
this optimistic category. On November 18, 1818, Worthington referred to the 
effect of rebel successes, citing a probable revolution in Lima. Although it 
waS still too soon to be a certainty, he thought it by no means improbable 
that he would eat his Christmas dinner in the liberated capital of the Incas.2 
Reporting from Lima, Prevost notified Adams that there was much consternation 
and depression at the expeotant arrival of the patriot forces.3 
Although laoking modern communioation faoilities, news of the proposed 
expedition nonetheless reached Peru and eventuallY Spain.4 Taking into 
account the length of time required to forward information and the varj,ous 
means by whioh this information was acquired, the content was surprisingly 
accurate. Much of the credit is due to the various Ships, British and 
American, that voyaged between Chilean and Peruvian ports. Cochrane and the 
activities of the Chilean squadron were watched oarefullY.5 Pezuela was kept 
informed of San Martin's movements6 from suoh souroes as He~ique Villansey, 
2. U. J. Ministers Argentina, Ootober 22, lSlS-April 8, 1820, Worthington to 
Adams, Nov. 18, 1818J also Manning, Diplomatio Correspondenoe, II, 1024. 
3. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Prevost to Adams, Jan. 15, 1819. 
4. Julio F. Guillen, Indea;rdenoia de Amerioa, Indioe de los Papeles de 
Expedioiones de Indias (Ma d, 19~3T; tI, 16~, Sept. 12, 1820. 
5. Lanzas, Indepenciencia de Amerioa, IV, 410, Minuta de Oficio al rU,nistro 
de la Guerra; Oct. 3, i818,-Casado 7 Villena, Memoria Pezuala, 392, Jan. 2, 
1819J DA~. V, 175, Pezuela to San Carlos, Mar: 8, 1819. 
6. Casado y VilleM, J.!emoria Pezuela, 638, Jan. 29, 1820. 
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cargo master of the British Libonia 6 7 and trom the captain of the j[.j.§.. 
Warrior. 8 The answer to the rebel threat was the promise of a Spanish ex-
-
pedition9 that somehow failed to materialize leaving the Peruvian royalists 
mostly to their own devices in coping with impending disaster. 
One phase of the campaign that created economic and psycholofical havoc 
amongst the royalists was the restrictive blockade by the Chilean squadro.n. 
It most certainly plunged Peru into a distressi~ economic state. Adding to 
the discomfort was the knowledge that the rebels were aided and abetted by 
foreign powers which took advantage of the situation by carrying on a contra-
band trade.10 It was unlikely that Cochrane·s naval operations would be 
unchallenged, whatever the strength of the royalist squadron. The minister 
of Marine advised the Cortes, July 12, 18206 of the need for more warships 
in Callao waters,ll and measures were taken to alleviate the si tuation.12 
7. Ibid., 716, 717, Hay 28, 1820. Included in this notation waa a Gaseta 
£! Ch1."le"; 
8. ~., 730, July 11, 1320. 
9. DASl4, IV. 3.56, 357; Ibid., IV, )60, 361, Irigoyen to San Uart!n. June 15. 
1819; IbId., IV, 303, Ech8V8rr!a to San Ilart!n. July 22, 1819; Ibid., IV, )12, 
,- J. 8 -o Hig{!ins to San MartIn, Aug. 1, 1 19. 
10. Fernando Valdes Hector Sierra Y' Guerrero, Conde de Torata, ed., DocUJllentoa 
pasa 1a Ristoria de 1& Guerra Separ.1st& del Peru (Madrid, 1894-1898), II, 234, 
23 , 314-1), JoSIRueda to 'esue1a, 'eb. ~lB21; "Corsarioa en los sig10s 
XVIII Y XIX," Revista del Archivo lacional del Peru. IVIII (Lima, 194)-1946), 
84. Pezuela to seHore8~ior 7 donsUles del~ar-del Tribunal del Consulado, 
lay 13, 1817) C.sado y Vilana, JleJlllOria 'eluea, 248, 249, 2», April 21, 1818. 
11. British Stat! Paper!, 1819-1820, 1062. 
12. Guillen, ~~dependencia, II, 172, Aug. )0, 1820. 
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As all added incentive the ConS'..llado of Lima, influenced by Cadiz merchants, 
offered rewards for captured ships.l) In another document the Consulado de 
Lima offered 50,000 pesos for each Chilean ship captured.14 Royalist naval 
forces proved insufficient to thwart the Chilean squadron's objectives. Aa 
the liberating campaign advanced, royalist protestations against the land and 
sea blockade mounted.1S 
iiili tary and naval strategy is not wi thin the province of this study' but 
the economic factor as a prime cause of the revolution is of paramount iJIl-
portance. The economic thought, based on the principle of free trade, waa the 
special propaganda devise motivating the expedition. RiTa AgUero, in "Las 
28 CaBsas de la Revolucion de .America", clearly irx:licated that the abMnce of 
free trade was a powerful and realistic motive for what transpired in Peru 
during 1818 to 1822. Free trade, he argued, was profitable to colonial 
industry. agriculture and wealth but diametrically opposed to the interests 
of Spain. The basis of economic prosperit11fas liberty.16 Romero'a discussio 
of the economic theories held by the fathers of independence brings out more 
13. Humphreys, "Paroiasien Notes, It 270, Oct. 16, 1820. "The Conaulado of 
L5.ma has been prodigiously generous in their offers of re~'8rd6 for the head 
of San l.Iartln, Heras &: c, which are valued at from 10,000 dollars to 250 
accordlnr. to class, and the aMps are from 25,000 to )00,000." 
14. Bulnes, E!pedlcion Libertadora. I, 479. Footnote no. 1 tc the Proclamatio 
Nov. 5, 1820. 
15. Odr1ozo1a, Documentos, IV, 128, LaSerna to Minister of War, Karch 7, 1821. 
16. Emilio Romero, ..... punte. sobre las ideas de orden economico durante 1& 
revolucion :por 1a indiipendtmcia del Peru, It Mercurio Peruano, In, Ailo IlV 
(Lima, 19)9). 36. 
l 
133 
rully the importance of gearing the economy to free trade. Among the notable 
figures cited by Romero are found the Jesuit Juan Pablo Vizcardo y Guzman who 
condemned the monopolistic system in his famous Carta ~ !2! Espa60les 
Americanos17 and Manuel Vidaurre whose Memoria sobre !! Pac1ficaci6n ~ !! 
America lieridional (lS17) favored a more liberal commercial arrangement 
between Spain and her colonies.1S Bulnes, in EspediciOn Ubertadora, claimed 
that Peruvian economy was geared to the benefit of a few privileged merchants 
wi th the mine productions of prime consideration. The sole effect of Spanish 
policy only made more imperative the need to overthrow the economic barriers 
~ revolutionary means.19 
Not all writers agreed as to the degree of Spanish oppression in the 
Peruvian viceroyalty. Distance between Spain and Peru worked to the decided 
advantage of the colonials.20 Stevenson contended that the loudest protest-
ations came from the monopoUsts who had most to lose by a free trade. They 
already' SaW a forecast of things to come when British and American ships Itunder 
the protection of passports tram the constituted sovereignties of Spain" 
arrived in Lima. One of Stevenson's remarks bears challenging. He stated 
that although the creoles sutfered along with Spaniards they remained silent.21 
The credibility ot such a statement will be discussed throughout this chapter. 
17. Emilio Romero, Historia F.con6mic.!.2!1 ~ (Buenos A.1res, 1949), 263. 
18. ~. 
19. Bulnes, Espedicion Llbertadora, I, 3$0, 353, 354. 
20. Stevenson, ~storical Narrative, I, 354. 
21. Ibid., III, 120-21. 
-
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Proctor's ~arrative stressed the difference between wholesale and retail 
activities under the viceroyalty and the Protectorate. Under the royalist 
sya~m., privileged merchants were able to amass gre~t fortunes without. 80 
much 8.S keeping a /jingle account. 22 A.long ~ith special conceded privileges 
to foreign commerce, the monopolists dreaded the steadily increasing· amount 
of contraband that found its way into PerUvi&l markets. 2) 
'I'lle main concern of this chapter, however, is not the problem of the 
monopolists but that of the liberal merchant who endured the rigors of 
restrictive colonial policy. Just how much appeal did revolutio~1' pro-
nouncements have upon the discontented element? Was the time really ripe for 
the proposed venture? Guido informed San Martin on June 2, 1818, that the 
Peruvian disorder coupled with lack of sufficient arms was irreperable and tha 
this was the opportune tt.e for crowning their work. 24 Juan Garc!a del Rio 
wrote to O'Higgins irom Pisco, October 12, 1820, regarding Peruvian sentiments 
for independence.25 Taking advantage of the obvious discontent, San Martin 
and Cochrane issued proclamations to the Peruvian populace. Cochrane' 8 
address, ejther April or Kay of 1821, contained the usual palliatives. He 
22. Robert Proctor, Harrative 2! ! ~ournei Across !h! Cordillera 2! !h!. AndeB, 
and 01' a Residence in Lima •••• (London, 182~).. 291. 
-- - - ~....-.-. 
23. Vicente Rodrf~uez Clisfi>do y Jese ii.ntcmic Calderon Quljar..c. E?ds., Memoria 
de Gob1erno de Joselernando de Abascal y Sousa, Vlrrey del Perc., 1806-1816 .. 
\SeTil1e, 1944), I, 179, 200. 
24. ~, VI, 290, 291, Guido to San Martin. June 2, 1818. 
25. Bulnes, Espediclbn Llbertadora, I, 460-61, Garoia del Rio to O'Higgins, 
Oct. 12, 1820. 
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explained that the Chileans came as liberators and friends for they could not 
stand helplessly by and watch Peru enslaved. To make this appeal even stronger 
Cochrane pointed to the lack of free trade as evidence of the plundering policy 
of a distant country--Spain. Cochrane also used a direct approach by offering 
liberty, just laws, commerce, prosperous agriculture and tranquility a.s the 
fruits of independence.26 
The actual situation of Peru is amply described in the various corres-
pondence that transpired between American agents and Washington after the 
liberation of Chile. l-lorthington expected Peru to fall to San Mart!n if he 
attacked Lima "between this & January next." The letter, written in July of 
1818, evidenced the "golden opportunity" presently existing because of the 
complex difficulties of the Royalists.27 Prevost's letter of April 9, 1818, 
28 
also referred to Lima's "disaffected population" and military weakness. 
On June 10, 1818, Prevost admitted that "notwithstanding all the restrictions 
of monopolies ••• 1t Lima "is a place of great commerce." Prior to the San Mart!n 
eA~edition several hundred mines were opened but in 1818 only one hundred and 
thirty were being worked successfully'. "In Peru the state of development is 
onconceivable, (sic] the mind appears to have lost all its energy and with it 
26. DASH, VIII, 16, 17, 18, Oochrane to the Inhabitants "de las Provincias 
del 3ur," April or May, 1821. 
27. U.s. Hinist8rs Argentina, April 26, 1817-July' 9, 1818, 398, 399, 
'fi·orthingtont s rem.arks on a Prospective Glance at Peru, regarding July 4, 1818, 
letter. 
28. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Prevost to Adams, April 9, 1818. 
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all its character.,,29 Two other Prevost letters describe affairs in Peru even 
more succinctly. The first, dated September 1.3.1819, and baaed on existing 
conditions considered the Perus irrevocably separated trom Spain • .30 The 
second written approximately a year later predicted the outcome of the Peruvian 
expedition. "I «Prevost. however do not hesitate to offer my conviction that 
unless a material change has taken place at LiJIla during rq absence, it will 
succeed. ,,)1 
Before progressing into actual discussion of the Pesuela regime, a briet 
study of Peruvian opinion on the subject ot tree trade would prove beneficial. 
How did the people feel about the liberating expedition, what were their senti-
ments regarding tree trade and its etfect upon their economy. Added to this 
discussion will be so-called espionage reports that kept the rebels aware ot 
actual concii tiona. Some of these used or)'Ptio oode signals while others re-
mained . entirely anoll)'DlOus. 
Casper Rico enumerated the disadvantages ot free trade, condemned the 
insidious but luorative contraband activity, showed British ingenuity in 
commercial transactions, and repeated the cry ot the monopolists-tree trade 
and absolute ruin were united and inseparab1e.)2 Equally, it not more vocal, 
were the elements that found in revolution the answer to Peru's economic 
29. Ibid., Prevost to Adams, June 10, 1818. 
-
.30. !2!!!., Prevost to Adams, Sept. 1.3, 1819 • 
.31. 1.!:!!!!., Prevost to Adams, Sept. 28, 1820 • 
.32. AASK. VII, 1.32, 1.3.3, 1.34, 1.35, Arbitrios, Gaspar Rico, 'eb. 10, 1819, 
r ----P""'" ---------, 
137 
plight. Acting in the capacity of obeerTers, more casually and colorfully 
called spies, men like Aristipo hero carefully noted all phases of Peruvian 
life, the effect of Cochrane's blockade upon the morale of the royalists and 
people, the British and American activities "in the area, and espeoially the 
efforts of the viceroy to staali .. the eoonomic as well as politioal situation. 
Emero reported a forced loan of one million pesos demanded of royalist m.ercl'anu, 
clergy, and other inhabitants, ot whioh the merchants apparently were respondie 
for 400,000. 33 Signed only "Sef1or e1 Soldado" another report dated October 28, 
1819, obviously from a patriot agent, 'ave further insight into Peruvian eco-
nom:r and political stabilit,.. The above report indioted Coohrane for his 
high handed measures but even more descriptive were the royalist suspicions 
and condemnation of British intent and aotivities. Still another document 
was written around 1820 by a Peruvian whose sentiments favored the saored 
cause of liberty. This was a proclamation to the people of Chile expressing 
fond hopes for the expedition and illustrating the sad result of oppression, 
abandoned mines and ruined commerce. 34 
A different category of reports came from other than political and com-
mercial sources. Bartolo-*, Archbishop of Lima, reterred to the hardship 
caused by a six month blockade and inabill ty of royalist troops to wi thatand 
rebel forces.3' Fray Felix gave an account of the state of Lima in 'ebruar,y 
33. .!2!S., VII, 116, 117, Relacion de Lima, Ilaroh 16, 1819. 
34. Ibid., n, 269, 270, Proclama to the Habitantes de Chile. 
-
35. Ibid, V, 1,6, 157, to Sefiora Dofla Violante Freira de Andrade, Feb. 1, l82L. 
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of 1821. In addition to much bloodshed. 10s8 of more than thirty million 
pesoS, there were other costs too numerous to mention. Of vast importance 
was Cochrane t s blockade strategy that cut off supplies. Wi th t he approach 
of San Martin's ~, the land routes further restricted the food supp1igs 
so needed by the people of Lima. Fray P'elix believed independence very 
probable notwithstanding the vigi1ence of the rove:mment and fidelity and 
love for the eovereign. 36 Royalist or rebel. m~ commentators refused to 
identity themselves in their correspondence. There is a June 5. 1821, letter 
• 
from 180 if •• to "senor don 190-160--." that describes some of the panic 
arising out of rebel rictories.37 
Hall's VOYages yields further insight into the state of mudd1ement in 
Paru. Hall points to San Hartin's use of agents to gather the people into 
the revolutionary camp. 
ItBy means ot political publications, aided by 
the exertions of numerous and active agents, 
be carried his intrigues not only into the 
provinces, but into the very heart of the 
capital; in process of time ehe has. acquired 
sufficient influence in the surrounding dis-
tricts. to cut off the principle 8U~ly of 
provisions to the capital by land.-3O 
After a conversation with the vieeroy, Hall believed that before long Lima 
would surrender 
36. Ibid., 158, 159, Fray P'elix to 1t)(1. muy amada Juanita, - Feb. 10, 1821. 
Fray JeiTx refers to Juanita as daughter. 
37. Ibid., VII, 291. 
-
38. Hall, V21ages, I, 72. 
"not so much to the foree of San Martin's 
army, as to the overwhelming influence of 
public sentiment, the tide of Which had 
decidedly turned, and was at this time 
nowing d1rlQtly against the Spanish 
authority.aJ'! 
1.39 
In fact, San Martin told Hall that "The capital is now ripe tor declaring its 
sentiments, and I Shall give them the opportunity of doing 80 in satety.·40 
Despi te numerous pronouncements to the contrary, Hall indicated that the 
people of Lima were considerably surprised tlthat they should be so treated by 
a man whom they have been taught to consider an enemy.·4l 
Of major consequence is the Viceroy's position under the pressing advance 
of revolutionary torces. Pezuela's efforts to cope with the realistic demand 
tor tree trade and the ingrained bias of the monopolists is necessary to an 
understanding of just what San Hartin tried to change and how much of a change 
really took place during his Protectorate. Under obl~ation to fulfil ordera 
from Spain to prohibit free commerce with the colOnies,42 Pesuela nevertheless 
found the restrictions unapplicable. He was well aware of the tree trade 
offers made by the revolutionaries in exchange for material aid.43 The status 
of clandestine trade was a further grievance for the Peruvian royalists who 
39. Ibid., 85, about the end of 1820. 
-
)~o. Ibid., 181. 
-
41. Ibid., 190. 
-
42. Barros Arana, Ristori. CMle, II, 248-49, about 1817. 
43. Casado y Villena, Memoria Pez_la, 88, Aug. 17, 1816. 
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proceeded to legislate against it.44 News that some restrictions had been 
lifted in other Spanish colonies,45 as in Guba, hardly promised any definite 
solution to Peruvian economic problems. The loss of Chile was an economic and 
political blmi that Pezuela refused to accept. On December 9, 1817, he 
considered the recuperation of Chile intima.tely connected with the wellbeing 
of Peru, naming the various products that were exchanged between the two 
areas. The "reciprocal and necessary commerce" brought in considerable 
customs duties, enabling the ra.yalists to carry on war and preventing the 
elimination of innumerable merchants who lived by this means. An independent 
Chile could sustain itself with foreign trade and furthermore find the 
necessary resources to carry the war to Peru.46 
Impressed with the need for action, various agencies within the Vice-
royalty devised means to raise the revenues and curb the illicit commerce that 
thrived. A commission sent a plan to the Junta de Tribunales which sug~ested 
among other things an increased tariff on wheat and fats coming from Chile. 
Pezuela noted on January 16, 1818, that this plan also suggested more reason-
able duties on goods imported by the CompaTiia de Filipinas.47 News from the 
Duke de San Carlos, attached to London, made immediate precautionary measures 
44. "Corsarios,n 7S-76! Pezuela to Real Tribunal del Consulado, Nov. 6, 1811; 
Ibid., 76, 77, 78, 79, ~O, Copia de los articulos de 1a Acta de la Junta . 
Particular erigida para impedir contrab&,dos. 
4>. DA.3-1, V, 180, 181, El Conde de Casa Flores to Pezuela, Nov. 30, 1817. 
46. Casado y Villena, Memoria Pezue1a, 195-96, Dec. 9, 1817. 
47. ~., 217. 
r 
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that much more necessary. On February 7, 1818, 3an Carlos informed ?e~mela 
of the aid given to the insurgents as the result of ~lvarezts influence, 
especially upon British mercha,nts.48 On r-1'arch 31, 1818, Pezuela wrote to 
Cas a Flores that he had done ~ll in his power to conserve the colonies for 
Spain. Most of the reverses suffered by the royaUsts could be traced to the 
valuable assistance given the rebels by the ~mericans. Despite American 
Congressional legisl~tion, the rebels received arms and munitioL3 from the 
United 3tates which also harbored privateers that preyed upon Peruvian 
commerce. Pezuela referred to San Mart:!n as uE:1 caudillo principal" and 
recounted his meetings with Bowles wham he described as having excessive 
partisanship for the enemw. This letter nlrther described the procedures 
initiated by Peru for b10ckadine the coastline and confiscation of all ships 
that defied that blockade. Cited for their notorious support of the rebel 
cause \-Tere the 3alva~e and Adel1na, both carrying arms and munitions.49 
In May of 1818, growing Chilean successes crowned by the battle of Maipu 
prompted the Junta General de Tribunales to action. One of the measures pro-
posed was the lifting of some trade restrictions so as to encourage greater 
commerce and thereby increase the revenue. To effect the desirec end, the 
naming of a Junta Permanente de Arbitrios was proposed to study specifically 
the problems involved. ~ong the sirsuatures found on this document were those 
h8. ~, V, 113-74, Casa Flores to Pezuola, Feb. 1, 1818. 
49. Ibid., 1.86, 188, 189, 190, Pezuela to Casa Florea, embajador de s.a.c. 
en 1& corte de Portugal, Mar. 31, 1818. 
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of Bartolom'. Archbishop ot L1m.a, Ignacio Mier, Pedro Abad!a and Francisco 
Xavier de Ilcue.SO Pezuelats notation ot Mq 4, 1818, referred to the aboft 
conmissiotl, and the subject ot trade. Named to this commission vere D. Juan M. 
Ollves, (Intendente de Lima), D. Manuel Pardo (Regente de Cuzco), D. Ignacio 
Mier (Arc~ de L1:rrla), D. BartolO'!'d M. Salamanca. (Intendente que tus de Are-
quipa), D. JOM IrigO)"EHl (01dol" de Chareu), Jos6 Manuel Blanco ABcoua 
(Procura.dor General), D. Jos' Cabero (Rector de la Utd:fttrsidad), D. "Pedro 
Abad!a (Factor de F1Upinas), D. Francisco Izctte (Comerciante), D. Jos6 
Arizmendi (Coaerciant.e) ,and D. Antotno ~lvarude Villar (Seeretario con 
Yoto).Sl Some ot these indj,:ri.duals were involved in commerce. 
'fb.e possible extension ot Peruv1an trade was more than a .re rumor, 
according to American sources. Robinson claimed that British merchants 
obtained trade privileges not accorded. to the ADltricans. He spec1f1ca.11T 
52 
accused Oaptains Meley and Sheriff' of "entering into commercial arrangements." 
On Ju'q' 7, 1816, Robinson again noted that Britain might obtain some exclusive 
trade privileges which be would do all in his power to prevent. After a con-
versation with Abadia concerning the opening of Peruvian ports to foreign. 
cOlllMl"ee, Robinson quoted Abadta .s s¢ng that such trade would be upon 
reclproeal. pri.ncipl.es.SJaobiuson was not wrong, for Pezuetat s notations 
So. ;rot-ata, Doc_ento., II, 3>6, Mq 4, 1816. 
,1. Casado '1 V111eua, Meaoria Pezue1.a~ 262-63, to all the Tribunates en Junta. 
Mq 4, 1.818. 
52. Robinson Papers, DiU'1, (Mq 22..June 27, 1818), on board the U. S.5. 
ODta:r1o, J1lUIe 14, l1n.a. - --
S3. !!>!!!_, (June 28-Septalber 22, 1818). 
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of July 24, 1818. reterred to a proposed free trade agreement with the 
British.54 Substantiating the above statement. is a notation in the Pesuela 
)(emoirs of September 23, 1819, to the effect that the British Catalina was 
-
procedint! from Huanchaco with 1,000 fanegas of wheat, and that the Catalina 
had received. permission to transport supplies to Callao from other ports of 
the Peruvian Viceroyalty. 55 However, the picture was not entirely in British 
favor, for on September 9, 1819, and September 16, 1819, Pezuela referred to 
the Palas and the Elena Maria both American ships and both with trade perm1t~6 
Rapport bet1reen Spain and Britain fiuctuated. In December of 1818, Pezuela 
was informed by the captain ot the American !!! Volador that a treaty of 
commerce had been signed between Britain and Spain.57 In lay of 1819. Pesue18 
wrote to the Secretario de istado Y' del Despacho de Gracia y Justicia pre-
venting the introduction of British publications into the viceroyalty.58 
Enterprising Americans were not tar behind the British in .. eking out 
trade priorities or at least trade concessions. The avant garde consisted ot 
individual merchants but I\Ost frequent and regular contacts came through 
naval commanders and assigned agents. Of the naval commander8, Biddle ot the 
Ontario was both welcomed and suspect. In April ot 1618, Biddle and Prevost 
54. Casado y Villena, Memoria Pesuela, 295-96, July 24. 1618. 
55. ~., 527. 
56. Ibid., 
-
521. 
57. Ibid., 391, Dec. 30. 1616. 
-
58. tan.as, Ind;pndencia de America, IV, 436. lay 30, 1619. The publications 
cited .. "n IspdOCon.tltuC1oDal" and "El Gabinete de curio8idades politic .. 
1 literaria8 de iapaAa e India •• " 
144 
came to Lima, holding conferences with the viceroy and Don Felix Blanco ot 
the Philippine Compaqy "ho entertained all strangers.-59 The president ot 
the Philippine Comp8D1' was listed as Don Pedro !bad!a. The Ontario journal 
mentioned a rewarding visit to Lima.60 
The purpose of Biddle's visit to Peru was manifold. First there was the 
need to safeguard American ships against Spanish cruisers. Biddle wrote to 
Pesuel&, April 25, 1616, requesting that American ships presently in Valparaiso 
be permitted to leave unmolested. The letter mentioned previous correspondence 
to this effect and. then Biddle denied au,r knowledge of a Spanish blockade. 61 
Pezuelats letter. April 27. 1818, firmly indicated the contraband trade that 
U,S. subjects carried on with the insurgents. Be argued that the blockade waa 
legal on the grounds that the royalist blockade was not one imposed by a 
foreign nation but a blockade by a mother country against rebel forces, 
Therefore, there was no need to give notice of its existence. The Spanish 
colonial system guarded against foreign intercourse with the colonies and. the 
present state of revolt did not prevent the mother country from pursuing her 
policy. Plzuela admitted that since the American violations might have been 
private and not condoned officially by the United Statea govermaent. and 
since he was desirous of retaining harmo~, he would give the necessar,r orders 
to the Spanish commander to permit .American ships to leave Valparaiso. How-
ever, henceforth all entry into rebel ports would be prohibited and. the 
59. Ontario Log and Journal, I, April 12, 1818. 
60. Ibid., III, .Jan. 29, 1818 •• 
-~~. lavy, Area 9 File. 1801-1830 Folder, Box 1, msa. copy of Biddle' s 1,tter 
to-Pezuela, A ril 25 1818. Another co is in Ca: tains Lette 8 Vo 
blockade enforced rigorously.62 Biddle conveyed the Viceroy's instructions 
to Worthin;.ton, who was to inform any American merchant ships that they might 
leave under the Ontario's protection.6) 
Prevost and Robinson also became involved in Peruvian affairs. On 
June 10, 1818, Prevost informed Adams of his meeting with the Viceroy and the 
subjects discussed, among them the status of the confiscated Canton and Beaver. 
The Viceroy promised not to interefere with U.S. vessels and was found willing 
to use neutral ships for the purpose of prisoner exchange and cessation of 
hostilities. Prevost said that this would mean a sacrifice, but if it 
afforded greater protection for American ships it should be considered. He 
mentioned discussing this point with Biddle. One statement in the letter 
meri ts emphasis. Prevost observed that despite the existing monopolies, Lima 
was a scene of great commerce. He specifically mentioned imports of woolens, 
cottons, and finer goods valued at fifteen million dollars. The Indian product 
was coarse compared with the better quality goods of the British. The chief 
exports were sugar bark and vicufia wool. Prevost claimed that "crooked" 
British policTwas understood in Peru.64 On July 27,1818, he complained that 
Pezuela had not kept his promise regarding the Canton and Beaver, as both were 
62. ~., typed copy of April 27, 1818 letter, Pezuela to Biddle. 
63. Captains Letters, Vol. 2, 1818, Biddle to Worthington, doc. no. 132 in 
book, June 1, 1818. Another copy is in U.S. Ministers Argentina, April 26, 
l817-July 9, 1818. Biddle 80 instructed U.S. ships on June 6, 1818. 
64. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr .. Prevost to Adams, June 10, 1818. 
l
Ih6 
still G.ot:-:.imd nne still wi thOllt a h",arin3;" althouGh Pe7.'lUl:l nffect3d",:ood 
f:d.'!;'h, he l,TOuld roma.in in Uma for some time to watch dev.:::lopmants.65 
Robinson's'stwJ in Lima, as reco!'ced in his d:ia:ri~s, inclu(;cc d!.scussions 
~;ith\bad!a, htjnd of the Philippine Company. On July 16, 1818, he al'ru8:i with 
,\bn(l:!a re;;3l'din~the right of American ships to enter ports, !~ven though 
closed, f.or purposes of shelter and suppli0s, and the right to sail the Pacific 
with cari~ocs. \bad:!a denied this right. 'Robinson's rejoinder "a3 fl. cit.ation 
of'L"l1eric ~m power and resources and annoyance tefi th Spain if ,4mericans were 
66 
thw'1rted. In l\.l.lsust Robinson conferred with the Viceroy about frOG commerce 
and his own personal involvement with the Patriots. Robinson's letter to 
I 
Adams, postmarked Au-::;ust 9, 1818, carried the follOlving notation: "The Vice 
King is ostensibly in favor of free trade. ff67 But on August 12, 1313, R0bin-
son believed that the Peru trade would be closed to foreign interests. The 
Consalado preferred to ?ay :;'150,000 into the treasury rather tha.."l depart from 
the ex.istinJ monopolistic system. Since the state of the treasury wa.s prc-
ca::oious, Robinson cCiTlsidered free trade of b,zo.efi t both to the Vicoroyalty 
nnd foreicn commerce. Robinson a..;rln made the statement that the Viceroy was 
openly advocatinG free trade. He qpoteo the revenue at fJ,OOO,OOO and the 
expenditures over $,,000,000, the loss made up by loans and contributions.68 
65. ~., Prevost to Ada.ms, July 27, 1813. 
66. Robinson Papers, Diary, (June 28-3eptembcr 22, 1818), JulY' 16, 1818. 
67. Special Agents Robinson, iiol,inson to Adams, Al4g. 9, 1813. 
68. Ibid., Robinson to Adams, Aug. 12, 1818. 
-
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The most illuminating part of the letter, however, proposed the grant of 
special licenses. Robinson claimed that Blanco was authorized bor the Peruvian 
government 
"to grant licenses to secure vessels from 
Spanish capture, that would go from Chile 
to Callao and that the real object of his 
mission was, first to disposses the patriots 
of their Ships and militar.y resources, and 
secondl\v to make a grand oommercial speculation 
in which doubtless this Govt. has some interest. 
Mr. Blanco and loIr. Abadia are both Factors of 
the Philippine company, who contrary to their 
interest and to probability, affeot great69 friendShip for foreigners and free trade. 
In general, Robinson believed that foreigners were disliked in Lima, but 
that the British were accorded better treatment than the Americans. Peru, ric 
in motals, would prove valuable under a liberal government. So far, the spiri 
of revolution was preValent in Lima but the people still had no clear idea of 
what they would do with their freedom. 70 Pezuela realizing the gravity of the 
economic situation and the impetus it gave to the rebel oause, apparentl\v re-
solved to compete with San Martin by offering a free tra4e program. His 
c(.)mmunications to the Conde de Casa Flores71 and Secretario del Estado y del 
Despacho de Hacienda 72 evidence this concern. The letter to the Secretario 
included proceedings in the Junta General de Tribunales concerning a proposal. 
of free trade with Britain for a two-year period. 
69. Ibid. 
-
70. Ibid. 
-
71. ~,V, 210, from Pezuela to Conde de Cass. Flores, Aug. 26, 1818. 
72. 
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Deliberations in the Junta General de Tribunales became public, for 
San Martin was informed of the various proposals considered by this body. An 
anonymous communication accompanying a letter of July 22, 1818, Guido to San 
Martin, furnished light on the dissension aroused by the proposal of free 
trade. 73 Discussion of the major ideas in the communication follows. Blanco 
and Arismendi heatedly favored free commerce but were vigorously opposed. The 
monopolists lashed out against the British as their greatest enemies and belie! 
on their part respecting a free trade was only self-deception. Apparently it 
was resolved earlier to permit trade with Britain and Brazil for a two 1'I&r 
period with a 30 per cent duty and with Chile for two months but the monopolist 
preferred to supply the treasur,y with loans rather than submit to such a scheme 
The Viceroy had infOrmed the prior and consuls in the Junta de Tribunales that 
if they poured 150,000 pesos monthly into the treasut'7 he would annul the act 
of commerce with Britain and Bra.il. The sum total of the disagreement between 
various royalist factions .ave the patriots great advantages in Peru. Even i.C 
the Vieeroy chose to threw open the trade doors he would still be opposed in 
Spain. Dri tish goods destined for Lima would be barred from entry, and the 
sole recourse of the British would be treaties with independent governments. 
This last step indicated recognition. 
On September 9, 1818, Ouido again wrote San Kartin about the free trade 
proposal. Sheriff, the commander of H.M.S. Andromacha supposedly was 
73. Ibid., VII, 57-60, "AnOn1mo COJIlllnicado por Guido a San Xartin en carta de 
Julio"2'2 de 1818, Oomo Envlado por Belgrano. )(qo 16, do ~ de 1& libertad 
1 30 de 1& independencia.-
......-=------------. 
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instrumental in influencing Pezuela I s thinking along these lines. As yet the 
project was inoperative and gave rise to many speculations, but the British 
belleved it would be realized around Iovember of 1818. 74 Twenty days later 
Guido wrote to the Supreme Director of the United Provinces 7S of La Plata about 
the viceroy t s tree trade proposal and a means to paralyse that meuure. Guido 
bad earlier suggested that an accredited person, sent to Lima to negotiate with 
the Viceroy on the matter of commerce, lIOuld serve the threefold purpose of 
observing the negotiations pending with Captain Sheriff, gain time for the 
Peruvian expedition, and obstruct a~ definite resolution with Captain Sheriff 
and his demands for mercantile preferences. Such favoritism to the British 
lIOuld be prejudicial to the patriot cause. However, the only measure taken 
by Chile was closing the port of Valpara180 for a term of one month to allow 
the naval squadron time to prepare for the expedition. Scarei ty of grain in 
Lima and the high prices such grain would bring aight be a temptation to 
Chilean business acumen, but Guido believed the prohibition of such traffic 
would serve the revolutionary ca.... Lack of revenue, however, prompted 
O'Higgin8 to concede permits for the exportation of grain to Lima. This trade, 
coupled with the highly lucrative contraband trade that existed, aided the 
royalists. The Bri ti8h enjoyed an advantageou8 trade under the protection of 
the Andromaeba whose captain furthered Briti8h interests by conspiring with 
the Viceroy, Similar remarks were addressed to San MartIn on October 2, 1818.7 
74. Ibid., VI, 305, Guido to San Kartln,. 
-
75. Ibid., 314, 315, 316, Guido to Supreme Director of United Provinces, 
Sept.2lr, 1818. 
76. ~., 312, 313. Guido to San Martin. 
I
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Guido insisted upon the necessity of delaying Briti8h commerce with Peruvian 
ports. again emphasizing the vicera,y's predisposition toward the British. 
In 1819, the Viceroy inclined even more toward liberalizing the commercial 
policy- Sensing the change taking place. eTen tho Russians pressed their 
demands for trade. Pezuela admitted that Spanish laws could not be relaxed 
without some harm but that he ,would do all in his power to help 'elix Dutel,.. 
the Russian emis8ary who arrived on board the American ship, Flying !!.!h.11 
Proposals made by the Junta Permanent. de Arbitrios, as noted in the 
Pezuela Memoria,. throw light on the economic problem. The January 29 notation 
again emphasized the controversy that plagued Peru--the opening of tree trade 
for revenue purposes.18 The cleavage between the elements favoring such a 
trade and those strenuously opposing it widened. The Vicer07, urgently pressed 
for money found ways to circumvent the powerful and entrenched monopoli8ts. 
Though not willing to throw the ports open to all trade indiscriminately. 
royalist merchants availed themselves of trade privileges by means of royal 
licenses issued in payment for donations and customs dutie8. Such was the 
case of ArismeDdi and Abad!a who figured prominently in the coAti8cation8 
concerning the lacedonian, Oapt. Eliphet Smith. Since the contracts79 signed 
between the Viceroy and ArismeDdi will more appropriately be discussed in the 
next chapter on the actual trade with Peru prior to emancipation, it is 
77. Ibid., V, 218-19. Pezuela to Conde de Casa Flores, Jan. 1. 1819. 
-
78. Oa8ado y Villena. Memoria Pezuela, )91-98. Jan. 29. 1819. 
79. u.s. Oongres., Senate, Document 58, 35th Cong., 1st Se.s., 1858, 154, 
Oet, )0, 1819; Ibid., 158, Aug. 19, 1820. 
-
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necessary only to state that in return tor the first contract Arismendi offered 
to pay $200,000 cash. Of this amount $50,000 was gratuity and the remaining 
n50,000 served as credit toward the p~nt of customs duties accruing from 
the imporations he would make. In return for this :~and sum, Arismendi was 
permitted to import goods either from Asia or Europe up to this amount a.nd 
bring them in one or two vessels of any nation he chose. The goods thus 
imported would pay on the invoice cost, with 20 per cent added thereto, 23 per 
cent of royal and 7 1/2 per cent consular duties making a total of 30 1/2 per 
cent. Ex:ports to Asia on $400,000 worth of goods would pay 8 per cent, of 
this 4 per cent went to the king and 4 per cent to the consula.te. The second 
contract signed August 19, 1820, brought the Vicero,y a bonus of $10,000. The 
shortage of marine supplies and naval stores induced the Vicera.r to permit 
the importation of the necessar,y items from the Luited States, all of course 
subject to the same duties paid by goods imported from Cadiz. 
Although the above contracts were more concerned with goods imported from 
the United States and A~ia, 1819 was also a highly favorable year to British 
interests. On March 20, 1819, Cast1ereagh was advised that the Viceroy issued 
an order opening the port of Callao to British trade for a two-year period. 
This latter traffic, however, required a Spanish conSignee acting as a kind of 
middleman. The duties set for this trade were 30 per cent of the estimated 
value; export duties ranged from 7 per cent on silver and a per cent on gold 
down to 3 per cent on all other goods exported.aO Spanish documentation 
80. Dorothy Burne Goebel, ttBritish Trade to the Spanish Colonies, 1796-1823," 
American Historical Review, XUIl (January, 19.38), 319, footnote 151 cites 
p. C. Tupper to Castlereagh, Mar. 20, 1819. 
-
further substantiates the existence of a Spanish consignee of European 
resources. This same source makes known the dire necessity of raising a 
contribution of a ndllion pesos to sustain state expenses and notes just haw 
81 
much support could be expected from the mercantile group. 
Although the various roya.list concessions could hardly be termed free 
trade, nonetheless they approached in varying degrees upon one of the best 
selling points of the revolutionaries. A brief survey of rebel reaction 
to the l8l9 pronouncements and policies rosy be instructive. On February l2, 
1319, Joaquin de Echeverru. received a letter from a writer designated only 
as Philadelpho describing current events in Lima. In regard to the proposed 
free trade with the British, Philadelpho characterized all Spanish merchants 
as implacable enemies not only of British commerce but of all particular 
British. Despite this anti-British feeling, Philadelpho cautioned that the 
captain of the Andromacha was a decided enenv of America and interested in 
the accUlIlulation of money. To this end he would continue exerting influence 
upon Pezuela going so far as to pay the Viceroy a percentage for protecting a 
definitely contraband trade. Pezuela's announcement of a free trade worried 
Philadelpho who deemed it indispensable that Chile and Buenos Aires contravene 
a1\'l such plans. Already it was a notorious fact that Pezuela was instrumental. 
in making it possible for a "multitude" of British ships to enter Callao. 82 
81. DA3M, VII, 124-25, Representacion de las c~rporaciones sobre la contri-
bucioii"d'8 un ndllion de pesos, F'eb. l7, 1819. 
82. Ibid., 119-22 2ass1m, Philadelpho to Joaquin de Echeverria, 
Feb. 'i2";-1819. 
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Guido himself commented upon the Junta de Corporaciones and the Viceroy's 
proposed free tr~de. Asking a question whether the Viceroy would permit free 
commerce, Guido illustrated the two distinct factions, each holding consider-
able sway in the Peruvian capital. The monopolists were opposed for reasons 
already well kn~m. The forei:;n merchants, especially the British, exerted 
considerable influence upon the Viceroy to gain a decision in their favor. 
Coupbd with the great need for money, it was very likely that the Viceroy 
would succumb to a lucrative temptation, ostensibly for the preservation of 
roYalist control.83 Contemporary periodicals substantiated Pezuela's need 
for money and the means he would take to secure it, namely, contributions or 
free trade, or both. 84 
Pezuela's report to Casa Flores, June 15, 1819, chastised selfish mercan-
tile interests and stressed the conservation of "estos dominios" as the first 
85 law to be qbserved. His memorandum to the Real Tribunal del Consulado, e.g. 
that of ;3eptember 24, 1819, further attests to his bUsiness acumen in matters 
relating to trade. In his way of thinking, relaxation of Spanish maritime 
laws need not prejudice the royalist cause. He advocated the moderate use of 
a foreign carrying trade to circumvent the dangers presented by Cochrane's 
33. Ibid., 114-15, Junta de Corporaciones sobre arbitrios, Guido [Februar,y-
MarehJ,'""t819. 
84. ItInventario de Documentos PubUcados," Bo1etin del Inst1tuto de Invest-
igaciones Hi storie as, III, no. 2, Sup1emento (Auenos-xrres, 1924-1925), 49, 
Periodicos; Chile, Mar. 13, 1819, from Gaceta ~ Buenos Ayres, no. 117, 
April 14, 1819. 
85. E!:!l, V, 220-21, Pezuela to Casa Flores, June 15, 1819. 
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naval maneuvers, 86 but encouraged royalist coastal trade which now was 
practically in the hands of the contrabandists. 
The economic situation of Peru in 1820 continued to degenerate for want 
of money, domestic and naval provisions. and the external influences of the 
San MartIn expedition that slowly gained a stranglehold on every aspect of 
Peruvian life. A disaffected populace hardly made the Viceroy's position 
enviable. Private reports from Robinson to Adams credited Pesuela with al-
lowing a ·covert trade" with the Viceroyalty 1n neutral ships.57 !ecording to 
a late decree, Robinson's private memorandum of February 9. 1820, showed that 
vessels carrying on this ·covert trade" had to pay their duties in cash and 
were under the ,rotection of special licenses. "The Vice King of Peru permits 
this commerce also under a pretence of receivi.ng provisions and military 
supplie s. _II 88 
With respect to the various factions, Pesuela's difficulties only 
multiplied. '!'he privileged merchants. grown rich under protect.ive monopolies, 
resisted change. Rahter than relinquish privilege, this eroup chose to raise 
funds by other means such as forced ccntr:i.butions. Any efforts on his part 
to quiet or to influence the privilered merchants only brought suspicion of 
venality upon the Viceroy, suspicion that gradually seeped down into the 
population. 89 
86. Torata, Documentos, II, no. 31, .354-55, Pezuela to Real Tribunal del Oon-
sulado, Sept. 24, 1819; Casado y Villena. Memoria Pezuela, 527; Barros Arana, 
Ristoria 2! Chile, III~ .317-18, 1819. 
87. Special Agents Robinson, Robinson to Adams. Jan. 17. 1820. 
88. Ibid., Robinson's Private Memorandum, Feb. 9, 1820. 
-
89. Bulnes, Espedicion Libertadora, I, .399, 420. 
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Ttle Junta de Com.ereio, after much cUscu8s1on t(\ the contrary. preferred the 
"safer" alternative of contributin{' jnto the bankrupt treasury instead of 
openly relaxing existing commercial la1's. 90 
A major problem facine the Royalists and therefore the most widely dis-
cussed, contraband trade, brought vi triolic demmciations in the asseiltbled 
juntas and the Real Tribunal del Consulado. 91 Pezuela advised the Tribunal 
to curb the contraband trade for the best interests of the Viceroyalty_ Hot 
only did foreign ships, like the British, engage in sllch trade but wealth was 
taken out of the country at a time when it was most reqlrlred for stability.92 
Pezuela addressed himself in similar terms to Brigadier D. Tomas Blanco CabI1n. 
On May 4, 1820. after consulting with the Tribunal del Consulado and Junta de 
Arbitrios, Pezuela issued a decree naming Jose Ramon Rodil to investigate and 
sllppress the clandestine trade. 94 .A study made by the Junta permanente de 
arbitrios achnowledged the disastrous effects of an uncontrolled commerce.95 
The benefits of a free tra.de, or at least of one that permitted notifi-
cations baaed on expediency were extolled by Jose de 1& Serna, Jose de 1a Kar, 
fo. Torata, Documentos, II, no. 32, 357, document signed by Pezuela, Torre 
taele, etc., 'eb. 28, 1820. 
91. Ibid., I, no. 13, 117-18, to Pezuela, April 10, 1820J Ibid., 118-19, 
Vay 27'1]'20; ~., 119-20, Kay 4, 1820. -
92. Ibid., no. 12, 115-17, Pezuela to the Real Tribunal del Consulado, Way 2, 
1820.~ 
93. ~., II, no. )0, 351-52, May 2, 1820,; ~., 352, \fay), 1820. 
94. !b1q., 353-54, Kay 4, 1820. 
95. Ibid., I, no. 14, 121-22, Junta Permanente de Arbitrios to Pezuela, May 6, 
1820. --COmposed of ~uel Pardo, ,Bartolome M.a de Salamancas, I Dacio ?fier, 
Francisco Arias de Saavedra Jose Cabero Antonio Alvarez d Vi 
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Manuel de Ll!.lno and rl~anuel Olagv.er Feliu. Had it not been for the material 
aie: brought a-J forei.;;n ships, ei th';)r the ArrJY nor the I1arine could have been 
outfitted.96 The principle of expediency prompted others to admit the 
necessity of foreign trade if the royalist forces were to be supplied. The 
consequence of such thinkine; resolved itself to tolerating .a limited tr"'l.de 
upon limited bases.97 ,a.mong the J ereIl'\f Robinson papers t"'as a letter dated 
october 2, 1820, written to Adams and verif~ying the opening of Lima to neutral 
ships. Cut off from the traffic were ships carr~~nc Chile~n produce or 
manufactures. A note to the letter used the word "temporarily" and then added 
that Cochrane's squadron would "render this permission of the vice King 
(negatory.)1198 However, Robinson1s letter to Adams, November 21, 1920, stated 
that the ports of Peru were "not proclaimed open, but all neutrals are allowed 
aL1'!1ost free ingress and egress by the ViceKing •••• n99 What followed in the 
letter is eVGU more pertinent. Robinson observed that Peruvian commerce was 
increasing and if a 
rational syatenl of self Government is acted upon, 
--which shall guarantee permanency it will 
become of great magnitude and importance to every 
commercial state, and especially to those most 
remarkable ffS their manufactures and commercial 
enterprises. 0 
96. ~., II, no. 26, 344 [probably May 16, 1820). 
97. Casado y Villella, Memoria Pezuela, 709, May 18, 1820; Ibid., 713-14, 
Hay 25, 1820. -
98. Robinson Papers, vol. 5, 1820-1824, Robinson to Adams, Oct. 2, 1820; 
S'pecial ftgents Robinson, Robinson to Adams, Private, Oct. 9, 1820, also 
mentions the port of Lima as open to neutral vessels except those carrying 
Chilean goods. 
99. Special Agents Robinson, Robinson to Adams, Nov. 21, 1820. 
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Robinson was quite eorreot when he decuced tha.t Cochra'.e's n;wal squ.adron 
tJould have m.uch to f'I?y about the shipp:tng enter-iu; Perllvian ports. On 
December 10, 1820, Pezuela wrote to Caga Flores reearding the rie;orous blocka.de 
Commerce was absol11tely obstrpcte0 iy the Chilean squadron which had no respect 
for the flag if the carlo proved rich enough. tathin the last days Cochrane 
seized two British frig:--,tes comine; from Europe, but earlier, he employed 
Sri tish ships, e.g. the HyPerion" to attack the Esm.era Ida.10l It seemed that 
no one could rely upon Cochrane to restrain bimself from rich spoils. 
v;ith the advance of 58.n }~art!nt s expedition, royalist economy suffered 
even t~eater disasters. wnile Cochr~ne policed sea lanes, San Martin closed 
land routes. In January of 1821, justifiably concerned rOYI3.Usts blB.meC' the 
commercial losses upon the scandalous contraband trade D.nc.1 the toleration of 
forei~:ners, forei~:ners who looked after their own interests ~_nd rejoiced wj.th 
the enemy.102 Earlier, a. revolt in :'~pain challenged Ferdinand VII with a 
liberal Cortes. From January 1820 to 1823 the lirleral Cortes in power was 
c.mrinated by the Jl'!iUtary clem.ent.. Royalist defeats me3.nt administrative 
chr.ulbe. Word came from the Cortes to IJima resLl.ltin;1 in cha.nge in polley and 
removal of Pezuela as viceroy and demanding his return to Spain. Per.uela was 
replaced by Jose de 1.a Serna, and by 1821 La. Serna was dealing with San 
~1art!n in the name of the Spanish liberal Cortes. Pezuela found it necessary 
101. n~SM, V, 245, Pezuela to Casa Flores, Dee. 10, 1820. 
danian also helped Cochrane in the Esmeralda venture. 
r 
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102. Odriozola, Docllll1entos, IV, 120, Disposicion del Virf1y Pezuel& per los 
jefes del ejercito real. No date given here but Torata, Docum.entos, II, 300, 
uses Jan. 29, 1821. 
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to defend his earlier position. One of the charges levied against him was his 
handling of the contraband trade and tolerance of foreign trade.10) Not all 
contemporaries judged him so harshly. Foreign trade was considered a boon to 
Peruvian econo~ under existing conditions and with prudent restrictions. The 
sole decision for permitting this trade was not dependent upon the government, 
for the monopolists and profiteers were most interested in salvaging it not 
enlarging their fortunes. On April 7, 1821, J. R. H. wrote to Senor Don F. de 
E. that had tree trade, with its restrictions been a real1t,y three years ago, 
104 the political existence of Peru would not nov be so critical. Short 
sighted selfish mercantile interests generously prepared the ground for San 
Mart!n. The task facing La Serna was great, challenging him not only 
militarily, politically, but also econimically.10' Driven by want, public 
sentiment veered toward the man who offered a panacea for their ills. 
Contemporary accounts vouch for the impact that tree colonial trade .would 
have produced not only upon the people but an empty Spanish ra.yalist treasury. 
Hall acknowledged that tbere were some farsighted monopolists who still could 
103. Torata, Documentos, II, 268-80 passim, Manifiesto en que el Virrey del 
Peru, Don JoaquIn de la Pesuela y :3anchez Munoz de Velasco refiere el hecbo y 
circunstancias de su separacion del mando; de nuestra la falsedad, malioia e 
impostura de las atrooes imputaoiones en el oficio de intimacion de 29 de Enero 
de los Jefes del Ejercito de Lima, autores de la conspiracion, y anuncia las 
causas de este acontecimiento. Madrid MOOCCXXI. 
104. Ibid., 449, written by a subject of Lima to one in Rio de Janeiro, 
April7,l821. Part of Trla Folletos Anonimoa contra los que depuaieron al 
General Pezuela. 
10,. "Documentos inedi toa para 180 guerra de 1& Independencia, It Revista 
Historicry VI, (Lima, 1918), 9,-96, Viceroy La Serna to the inhabitants of 
Peru, Ju 8, 1821. 
-.ee ample profits under a competitive B,Ystem but no such measure was pessible 
without direct licence from Spain. The efficacy of the Chilean squadron 
thWarted any possible move in such d1rection.l06 Hall credited one royalist 
bUsinessman with promoting the tree trade policy, a man of great stature and 
highest influence, but wrote that narrow interests prevailed. Om passage in 
Hall's account mentioned the adoption of the liberal views held by this 
"sagacious· indirldual but these were adopted too late. "'rhus these bigotted 
and narrow views of the real principles of commerce, not only pa'V8d the way 
for the conquest of the colony, but in the end brought total ruin upon them-
selves. ,,107 
Another contemporary, lliers, had even more to say on the subject of free 
trade. He credited Pesue1& with using the eystem of licences to fill his 
coffers. Emphasizing the rigid laws of the Spanish colonial s.ystem, Miers 
explained that no foreign ship could enter So Spanish port without a lioence 
or permission *previously obtained." Be added that in time of war it was 
usual to grant licenses to toreign Yessels oarr.y1ng Spanish oargoes to sate-
guard them from capture. The Viceroy Pezuela had granted, according to Miers 
and other contemporary documentation, licenses to at least one of the principle 
Spanish merchants in Lima, lbad!a. Abad!a • s connection with Ariamendi was 
discussed in earlier portions of this chapter and will be more thoroughly in-
vestigated in Chapter VI dealing with actual Ro;ralist trade. Miers commented 
that Cochrane was fully cognizant of such trade licenses, both in law and 
106. Hall, VOY!lJ;es" I, 116-17. 
107. Ibid., II, 76. 
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practices. The viceroy Pezue1a had granted "for notable consideration" a 
license to Abadla who was involved with other rich Spaniards and foreign 
merchants. The.e license. permitted the importation into Peru "of full 
cargoe8 from Spain" in eight British ve8se1s" which ill consequence claimed 
protection from the Spanish authoritie8 as if they had been Spanish bottoms ••• 
•••• 108 It was necessary under such conditions to give the appearanee that 
the ships and cargoes constituted British property so as to escape the 
vigilenee of the rebel authorities. To protect them from Sp&nish legal 
entanglements they had to "wear the garb 'I of Sri tish property. Miers was 
explicit in his description of how to circumvent these legal entanglements.109 
A1 though not wi thin the province of this chapter, some mention must be 
made of the ViceroT Pezuela's mediations with the San liart!n forces. A. most 
important one took place at J4iraflores in the Fall of 1820. Representing San 
MartIn were To~s Guido and Juan Garc!a del Rio and for the Vicero,y, Conde de 
Villar de Fuente and Don Dionisio Capal. During these negotiations, the 
economic objectives were not overshadowed by the mi1itar,. and political, al-
thour,h the latter two proved harder to reBOlve. Under the armistice .. both 
parties agreed upon reciprocal commerce between Chile and Peru, sea and land. 
wUh provisions made for future agreements relative to such commerce. British 
and American naval co_anders played their role in these negotiations.110 
108. Miers, Travels in Chile, II" 50-51. 
109. 1bid., 52. 
-
110. Odriozola, Documentos.. IV, 74-7" Sept. 28, l820J Ibid." 78-79, 
Sept. )0, 1820. ----
161 
The meeting at Miraflores failed to bring concord in view of the barrier of 
basic political differences.lll The next major conference came at Punchauca 
in l-!ay of 1821. Conmercial arra.ngements between the two countries were 
discussedl12 but once again the failure to reach an agreement could be placed 
upon political issues. On June 30, 1821, San Mart!n and the new Viceroy 
La Serna, however, reached an agreement to provide the Lima populace with 
much needed provisions.ll) 
Final decisions still had to come from Spain, a kingless Spain and a 
liberal Cortes determined on the preservation of the raN wealth of the 
Spanish colonies. Ferdinand VII aired his difficulties before the European 
courts, seeking not advice but forceful intervention. In the course of much 
clamor for actual assistance, ~pain offered concessions to Britain in return 
for mediation. These concessions centered upon free commercial access to 
colonies long legally off limit to foreign entrepreneurs. The sum ~tal of 
many years' controvers.y and diplomacy was British 2! facto recognition of 
114 
colonial independence. Aware of French interest in the Latin American 
111. British State PattI'S, 1819-1820, 986-90 eassim, Manifiesto of the Genera 
in Chie? of 'the L!t5era ng Arm:y of Chile on the FaIlure of the Negotiations fo 
Peace with the Spanish Vice-Roy of Peru, Oct. 12, 1820. 
112. Odriozola, Documentos, IV, 155, 2a Nota de los diputados del general 
La .sarna, 1>1ay 7, t821J IbId., 158,) Nota de los diputados del general San 
Mart!n contestando la anierior, May 10, 1821. 
113. ~., 196-97, Convenio sobre la entrada de v!veres en Lima, June )0, 
1821. 
114. For a more complete discussion of British and Spanish negotiations for 
this period, consult Bernadine Pietraszek, "Britain and Direct Spanish American 
'frade," ~-America, XXVI, no. 2 (Chicago, 1955). 
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trade and taking into account the fact that France might back the policy of 
restoring Ferdin~d with the hopes of securing this trade, Prime Minister 
c~nning wanted a joint statement with President James Monroe to proteot the 
new nations of Latin America. Monroe finally issued his famous doctrine in 
1823. 
It would be completely erroneous to assume that no thought was given to 
the possible effect stemJtttng from a relaxation of oolonial trade laws upon 
snstaining the rebel colonies wi thin the empire. Spain was ooncerned. Rebel 
successes in Chile prodded consideration of free trade as insurance against 
further insurrections.l15 In 1818 much attention was given to pacifioation, 
the beRt means to secure and preserve it. Sometimes the discussions on trade 
revolved around the preservation of the status quo and then there were the 
116 
novel and dangerolls suggestions of allowing little to preserve much. Various 
"Expositions" and rtMemorias" were addressed to the king, the Cortes and public 
sentiment. SOMe of these were written by Jos~ Pizarro, Marqu~s de Casa Irujo 
and the Duke de San Carlos.ll7 Attention also focused on the colonies in many 
ll:;,~ Lanzas, Indetendencia.2! America, IV, 284, Informs anonimo de un Conjero de l .... stado, July 18 7. 
116. Barros Arana, Historia Chile, XI, 621, London, 1818, Representacion 
hecha a .3.11.<':. el se!ordon P'e:rna..'"ldO VII en defensa de las cortas, written 
by F'lores Estrada. 
117. Jaime .Delgado, "La Pacificacion de America en 1818," ReVista de Indias, 
X, no. 40, pt. II (April-June, 1950), 275-79 passim, Memoria 981 nuq-de San 
Carlos, con las observaciones de Humboldt sobre 1& Pacificacion de America, 
December, 1817; ~., 307-308 p!!sim, Exposioion de Don Jose Pizarro al Re,y 
del Marques de Casa Irujo a Fernando VII, Sept. 21, 1818. 
sessions of the Cortes.118 
The 108s of Chile made the Royalists even more nervous about Peruvian 
safety. But, in response to Pezuela' s numerous solicitations for greater 
military and naval protection came generalizations on the status of mediation 
and promises of aid which were only feebly kept.119 Instructions were given 
commissioners to pacify the rebels but their powers were l1mited.120 Pezuela 
frantically appealed to Spain when it became quite apparent that Peru was to 
meet the Chilean fate, referring also to the Dcaudillo" San KartIn and the 
negotiations at Miraflores. l21 The Consulado de Lima122 and "augustios& del 
comercio de Limaw123 pleaded for assistance. The response was not alwqe what 
the royalist colonials hoped for. One document suggested that Callao be closed 
to foreign commerce.124 Another,ian official report from theS.cretar,r of 
Finance, D. Ratae1 Morant, diacussed free trade and the deplorable state of 
118. Spain. Diario de las Actas I Diaeusiones de las Cortes, Legis1atura de 
los af10s de 18~0 7 1821;-1' (1820), 353::.5fi, July26;-r820; Ibid., II, 244-45, 
Aug. 9, 1820; Ibid., II, .344-356 passim, Aug. 13, 1820; Ibid:; VI, 1-25 ~ 
Sept. 16, 1820}lbid., X, 17-44 :eass1m, Oct. 24, 1820; Ibid., XI, 26-32 ~, 
Iov. 8, 1820. - -
119. DAS!f, V. 197-99 passim, Casa nores to Pezue1a, Feb. 11, 1818., 
120. Torata, Doclxmentos, 111-2, no. 69, 246-56 Eassi.. June 18, 1820. 
121. Julian Paz 7 N:agdaleno, ed., Dooumentoa Relativos a Ift1aterra (1254-
1834), Seeretario de Estado, Archivo de Simanea., Cataiogoff (iadrid, 1947), 
414, 1egajo 8.223; ~., 346, Legajo 8.179; .!2!!!., 469-70, Legajo 8.298. 
122. Guillen, IndeE!ndencia, II, 175, leb. 22, 1821. 
123. Ibid., Hay 31-September 22. 1820. 
-
124. Ibid., 175, Jan. 1, 1820. 
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tne present commerce.12' The Minister of War reported to the Cortes, July 11, 
1820. that althoug-h the v:iceroyalty of Peru 'was at thE.t time tranquil. its 
126 
:croximtty to Ch1h: ard BUEP...oS Aires !lulde its position rrecaricus. The 
ccnt~:;ned barrage of correspondence indicating that this tranquility would be 
cnly short-lived. if not presently fictitious, precipitated some action in 
SPain. Cochrane's activities were to be met b~ sending additional ships and 
. 
lten, c.p. the S.;Hl Juli&n, Asia. and San Pablo.127 Whatever assistance came, 
- ---. -- -..;;.;.;;;;;-.-
was toe late and too ineffectual. Lima fell to San iIlartin in July of 1321. 
One might well ask where was the king to whom so many colonials awed thei 
allegiance. Ferdinand VII was busy maintaining his own weak position, pleading 
with the colonials to "hear the tender voice of their King and }!"athar" and 
askinG' thorn to put aside their weapons and return to the fold. Whatever help 
he offered came only in the nlost ambiguous terms, e.g., reconciliation through 
constitutional changes.128 In 1821 their possibility and effectiveness were 
hirhly dubioua. Rebel guns drowned out the cries of "Long Live the king." 
125. Lanaaa, Independencia de America, IV, 377. May 4, 1818. Discussed in a 
representation trom the ConSUlado de tima, Kay 3, Itl7. 
126. British Sta~e Papers, 1819-1820, 1056. 
127. Lanzas, IndeE!ndencia de America, V, 82, D. Ratae1 del Valle to Mlnistro 
de Ultramar, Sept. 20, 18~OJ-nu!11en, Inde~endencia, II. 48, Uay 3l-8eptember 
1820; Ibid., 49, October 20-November 2;, 1~20; IbId.. Feb. 22, 1821; Ibid •• 
166, July 19, 1~21. lne last is Pezue1a's repo~o Spanish Ambassador-at 
London upon the critical state of affairs and need for maritime forces. 
128. Britis~ State P!pers, 1819-1820. 281, Address of the King of Spain to the 
inhabitants oftha spanish American Colonies, March, 1820; Ibid., 857-860 
£ass.!!!, Speech of the J(il'lf on openin.r of Cortes, July 9, 18~Odriozola, 
Documentol!' IV, 89, Ferdinand VII to the Inhabitants of Ultramar, Oct., .1820j 
copy also found in DASI, II, 316, 317, Manifiasto del Rey Fernando a 10. 
habitantea de u'ltramar; British State Papers, 1820-1821, 1214, Speech ot the 
King of Spain on the olosing of the Cortea, June 30, 1821. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Oontraband Trade with Royalist Peru 1816-1821 
The prohibitive forces of 3panish laws and rebel squadron curbed ouly 
the frail of spirit while the bold and adventurous tradesmen continuee to 
bring their goods to the Peruvian market. The mercantile zeal of the Eri tish 
and the Americans was often matched by that of the Ohileans and Argentines 
who tended to overlook the broader aspects of the revolutionary movement in 
favor of immediate financial gain. Trade with Royalist Peru was "a going 
\ business" attested to by numerous sources. The prime concern of this chapter 
is to explore as far as possible the specific nature of this trade solcq 
during the time of the San Mart{n campaign. As is often the case with illegal 
trade, 80 much that transpired was based on verbal commitment. Still, the 
physical evidence of the trade with royalist Peru is clear and bound by the 
limitations of source materials we shall investigate the who, the what, and 
the how much. 
LogicallY, the British trade makes a good starting point. Scattered 
figures showing British exports to Li~ prior to the Peruvian revolution 
acknowledge the existence of such a trade. In 1814, these exports amounted to 
1 
approximatelY 9,509 pounds while in 1816 there was a drop to 1,429 pounds. 
The incompleteness of the above figures must be kept in mind. The principal 
1. British State Papers, 1816-1817, 571. Reference is to pounds sterling. 
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port was Callao. making Lima the general market for all foreign and domestic 
commerce. A contemporary account showed Peruvian preference for British goods 
citing the presence of English gla8s, brass furniture, tables, chairs, linens, 
clothiIlf, kitchen and table utensils in Peruvian homes.2 This yery trade 
grieved the Spanish merchants who saw a lucrative monopoly slipping from their 
group-
British merchants who came to Latin America went quite a step beyond the 
sale of their wares. Men like John !egg, Samuel Haigh, Richard Price, James 
Barnard. and William Hodgson armed themselves and joined the Chilean patriot 
calV&r,1 as volunteers.) Other British merchants or industrialists listed as 
establishing themselves in Chile _eret Josue Waddington, David Barry, Proctor, 
Brandt, Head, Schmidmeyer, JUers, Caldclugh, John Sewell. Alexander and Robert 
Walker, Henry and George Good, John Barton, William. Anderson, R. Macfarlane, 
R. Parrish, Thomas Davies. George Perkins, Thomas Green, M. Walton. J. G. Brown 
Charles Black, A. Livingthone, Y. Young, Y. D. Dawister, J. J. Hoorrey, F. 
P. Campbell, Onofre Dunster. Thomas and Edmund Eastman, David Ross, George Lye 
Samuel Lang, Diego Clark. Many of these British confined themselves to solely 
Chilean business though others, such as, Antonio Gibbs and Sons, apanded into 
Peru. 4 
Venturing into Spanish controlled porta was not without haurd. The 
2. Stevenson, Hiatorical Narrltive, I, 349. 
3. Killer, Memoirs. II. 222 footnote. 
4. Encina, Ristoria Chile, I, 1$4-55. 
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penalty for illegal trade was confiscation and on M~ 24, 1817, Bowles 
notified Croker about the capture of British merchant ships by t~e Spanish 
~lthorities in Valparaiso and Lima.' Both royalist and rebel authorities were 
fully aware of the fact that British flags flew stop royalist ships. O'Higgi 
indicated to San Mart~n, in a letter dated July 27, 1817, that the Venganza 
and Pezuela entered ValparaiSO under a British flag.6 William P. ~~te's 
letter to Se~or D. Nicolas Rodr!guez ?~, November 22, 1817,7 further 
showed the interest that Britishers harbored with respect to Peruvian trade. 
~lite's reference to British ships of war protecting the fruits of such a 
trade reflects on the "unofficial policy" pursued by the British government 
at this time. There are virtually no statistics to pinpoint the exact amount 
of commerce curried on in 1817 between the British and rqyalist Peru. That 
it did exist is borne out also by the Royalists themselves, e.g. Pozuela, who 
constantly referred to British ships entering Peruvian uorts.8 li~hat disturbed 
the Royalists even more was the contraband trade that flourished right under 
their watchful e,yes. 
More satisfying statistics are available for the year 1818. American 
sources cite the grateful thanks given to the Americ3.n naval cOIllrr'.anders by 
5. ?iccirilli» ~ :HartIn 1 Pol.!tica, 429. 
6. DASM, V, 384. 
7. Ricardo R. Caillet-Bois, "Documentos referentes a Guillermo p. White," 
Boletin del Instituto Investigaciones Historicas, V, no. 32 (Buenos Aires, 
1926-19217; 703-704. 
8. Casado y Villena, Memoria Pezuela, 121-22. 
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British merchants trading in and around Santiago. The Ontario, Captain Biddle, 
protected the interests of Chs. Higginson, John Begg, Sam. Haigt, lI. Reynolds, 
, 9 
R. Newton, C. Delagal, J. J. Barnard, C. Campbell, and W. Hodgson. Henry Hill 
note dated April 11, 1818, referred to the British ship Will, Francis Hartley 
master, which had entered Callao and Hill's own assistance in helping take in 
cargo.10 The !ill. was involved in other commercial ventures which will be 
mentioned later. 
The jealous American kept e. steady eye on the British entrepreneurs seElldqr 
a market in Peru. Robinson' s diary for June 14, 1818, stated that British 
merchants were obtaining facilities from the Government of Peru, facilities 
that were denied to the Americans.ll On October 22, 1818, Worthington accused 
the British of attempting to open trade at Lima and secure advantages for their 
own commerce, speoifically mentioning the Andromae~ and the ~ as cruising 
the Pacifio with such intent. Worthington added that whereas a short time ago 
1t was criminal to speak of openinr- the trade with Lima, it was presently 
agitated, discussed and talked of treely.12 Worthington's letter to 
Echevarria, December 17, 1818, Santiago, had a notation to the effect that the 
9. u.s. Ministers Argentina, April 26, 1817-July 9. 1818, »arch 2, 1818. 
10. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Received in Prevost's of April 9, 
1818, dated April 7. IB18. On bottom Hill's notation is dated April 11, 1818. 
Deposition of Hill as vice consul at Valparaiso. 
11. Robinson Papers, Dia!7. June 14, 1818. 
12. U.S. Ministers Argentina, October 22, lBlB-April 8, 1B20, Worthington to 
Adams writing trom Santiago, Chile. 
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British and A_r:1ericans were '"mgaged in the Lima trade and made use of the 
American ship ~ Cntherines. Jines the supercargo, captain and governnent 
of U .. Jna u~r(l cognizant of this fact, and "se<9med to like it" he did not "care 
1.3 
a pin about \·mat they were dcrtng." 
!\. communication sent by Guido to 3an !'1art!n, in a letter dated July 22, 
1319, noted the British activities !lnd the royali3t discussions for opening 
the trade at cryrtain tax -ates to the British.14 The Peruvians needed grains, 
a:rrnn:; other i terns, and efforts were made to rais(! the restrictions. E3pionaga 
uncovered further interesting bits of information. Mat!as de lrigoyen wrote 
to San Y·!art!n, ~ugust '-7, 1818, that the British ship Anfion was involved l1ith 
the Conde de Casaflores and a contract w:l.'th the houses of Hill, i"larch and 
Turner to purchase armaments. The British ship Alexander was also involved 
in the supplying of munitions. l ' On September 2, 1818, Guido inf'ormeti 3an 
Martin th:lt the commander of the British Andromacha, Sherif,f ... had asserted th:l 
British ships should be permitted to deliver goods into Callao.16 Sheriff's 
negotiations wl th Pezuela were further studied in Guido's letter to San Mart1.n, 
September 9, 1818. Sheritt tavored tree trade and propagandized the Lima 
11 
CO:1::';'.llado and cabildo with hi::> plans. Bri Ush pressure centering; on the much 
13. ~., Worthington to 1<~heverr!a, Dec. 18, 1818. 
11~. fJ\SH, VII, ,7-60 a:8Sim.. Anonimo comunicado pOI' Guido a San Mart!n en 
carta'"(If;-Julio 22, 181~ como enviado por Belgrano. 
15. Ibid., VIII, 203. 
-
16. Ibid., VI, 414. 
-
17. Ibid., 30" Guido to San f.iart!n, 3apt. 9, 1818. 
-
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needed grains was applied in Chile for licenses to trade with P<eru.18 The 
tact that the Viceroy Pezue1a himselt had proposed opening the trade to 
Bri tish sbips stirred fear among the rebels .... ho among other troubles saw their 
own profits evaporating and those of the British rising in proportion. Again 
the "grains" were of prime consideration in the concessions.19 Guido's letter 
to San Martin, October 2. 1818, also reterred to the proposed Dri tish trade 
wi th Peru which found much favor w.l. th Pezuela, but gave little comfort to 
rebel torces. 20 
The best source of British-Peruvian trade during the year 1818 is the 
royalist correspondence and Pezue1a t s own Memoria. On lebruar.y 13, 1818, 
Pezuela noted the presence of the Anf'ion in Callao. 21 Eight days later he 
referred to the leni.%, another British ship .... hich came into Callao trom Val-
paraiso. Other foreign ships in the port .... re also noted. 22 fezusla IS 
Memoria tor April 4, 1818,23 and his letter to the Spanish Ambassador in 
London, Karch 30. 1818. 24 refer to the Britiah "!I.. orw.lpat,· probably !f.2, 
• 
18. Piccirilli, San Hartin l Politica. 463, O'Higgins Resolution, Sept. 24, 
1818, Inclosure to-JOWi.a. 
19. DA~ VI, 314-18 Eass~ Guido to Supre. Director of Un! t.d Provinces, 
Sept.29. 1818. 
20. ~., 312-13. 
21. Casado,. Villena, Memoria P~zuela, 229, Feb. 13, 1818. 
22. ~., 234, 'eb. 21, 1818. 
23. ill9.., 244-4S. 
24. Spain, Archive de Simancas, Seccion Estado, Legajo 8,291 r. 39, Pezuela 
to Ambassador in London, March 30, 1818. Manuscript 19pated t.hrough Julian 
SPaz y Jlagdaleno, Documentos Relativos)a I~laterra (1254-183ll), Arcbive de 
S;tmancas, CAt.alo~~ .. XVll 1Iidf'id, 19117 -; ~ure citanons-mi be Archive de )~a". Jlicroll..la. 
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.hich came to Callao for commereial purposes and with an interesting pro-
position. The captain ot the .lsp, .John lent., suggested to 'ezuela that in 
return for securing rifle a, sabres and a last corvette for the ra,yalists, he 
.ould be allowed to import at the same time a proportionate amount of com-
JDSrcial cargo. Pezuela pleaded with the ambaasador in London to lend his 
.eight toward obtaining permission for such a transaction, since the state 
of Peru waa precarious and he waa without the much needed rifles or aunitions. 
On April 4. 1818, Pezuela again wrote to the ambassador in London and mentioned 
British ships trading in Peru. .bong these was the !!1; Capt. John Kent, and 
again mentioned were munitions and the name of Ari_ndi, a Royalist merchant. 
Pezuela also mentioned Juan and Eduardo DuBois 1'de ese Comereio· and Kenne)" 
.y Page" "encomendados deade aqui por Arismendi p.a consumarlo. w He further 
stressed the high tariffs which were highly prejudicial to commercial 
interesta.25 On Jul.7 29, 1818, Pezuela again informed. the ambassador, Duke 
de San Carlos, of varioua British ships nen aquellos m&rea. w26 
It mpt be mentioned that not all Bri tlsh shipa coming to Peru are 
engaged in a ·proven" trade. Some were used by the royalists as "messengers" 
for their own correspondence to Europe, and at other times supplied the 
royalists with information concerning the revolutionary movementa. One ship 
which did carry news of rebel aaneUTers was the British Andromaca. This ship 
25. !2!!!., Legajo 8.291 F. 42, Pezuela to Ambassador at London, April 4, 1818. 
lame of this ambassador was Duke de San Carlos. 
26. Ugarte, Manuscritos Peruanas, II, 376. 
,
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despite its usetulnes8 to the RoyaUst was highl,y silspect. It was beUaved 
that she not on~ favored the rebels but protected British interests in 
Peruvian waters. 27 For that matter, the Andromaca was also suspected by the 
• 
rebels tor transporting royalist property out ot Peru.26 Juan Tbwaites wrote 
to San Martin on March 16, 1819, further intormin& him ot the Andromaoat 8 
ra,ralist tinge and also indicated that the British were at onoe supplying the 
rebelt with munitions and the royaUsts 1t1f the pnce was right.1t Tbwaites 
mentioned a Bri Usb. ship which headed from Rio d. Janeiro to Lima 'td.th a rioh 
cargo atter having obtained a 11cense tor such activities trom the Spanish 
ambassador on condition it would also briug in ritles.29 On 1pr11 10, 1819. 
Tbwaites again informed San Martin that a British ship was carrying _DiUon. 
to Lima, this t11lc the Recurso, Captain Picktord. He added that th13 trig ate 
abou.t which he bad. previou.sq written, wu despatched by the same persons 111 
tio de Janeiro who sent a munitions laden ship into Oallao.)O 
The Obi1ean blockade pl.qed havoc with British cOlIlIerCe. Ouido sent 
word to San Mart{n, April 21, 1819, that the British merohants "screaaodtt 
after learD1ng of the restr1ct! ... e blockade because the great part. of thea 
had their intere.ts in Lima. However. Guido added that Sher1tt I the oODlNnder 
of the Andromac,., ackaow1.e4&ecl the :rebel blockade u did Captaill Downes, of 
.. 
27. Cuado '7 Villena, Maori,. Pezuela, )80, Noy. 11, 1818. 
28. ~~, '911, 118, ae1&oi&1l de L11Ila b7 Aristipo Ela.ero, Mar. 1.6, 1819. 
29. !2!!!., VIII, 24'..)0, Juan 'lhva1tes to San Martin, Mar. 16, 1819. 
30. ~., 2.5), April 10, 1819. 
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the U.3.~. Macedonian.31 Not all the hazards had to do with the rebel blockade, 
---
for some of the British ships were captured b,y the royalist navy, e.g. the 
32 ~uila. 
Pezuelats Memoirs again offer pertinent information on the British trade. 
He wrote that the captain of the British Indian~ had been granted trade 
concessions.33 This captain was permitted to bring into the port of Pacasmayo, 
free of duty and in good condition, one million bundles of tobacco at the 
price of two reales, and moreover allowed to bring in goods from Chile, such 
as wheat, tallow, beef, almonds. 'lwenty thousand pesos was to be discounted 
from the total price so that the captain could buy a ship or charter one. Of 
the sum total of 280,250 pesos debt he was to p~ 60,000 pesos in reaqy cash, 
80,000 upon the return of the ship from Valparaiso, and the remainder, 140,250 
, 
pesos, were to be paid from the duties of the p~nt of the 80,000 pesos, in 
installments of 23,375 pesos each month. 
TWo weeks later, Pezuela told the Catalina which was coming from 
Huanchaco with 1,300 fane gas of wheat. It was of British registr,y and one 
of those permitted to transport supplies to Callao from other ports of the 
vice-ro.yalty.34 One d~ earlier, Pezuela referred to the British 31an!l, a 
corvette of war, Captain O'Brien, and its arrival in Call8o.35 
31. Ibid., VI, 384 • 
.......... 
32. Lanzas, Independencia de America, IV, 4W~, Pezuela to Secretario de 
Estado y del ~epacho Universal de Gracia y Justicia, July 7, 1819. 
33. Casadu y Villena, Memoria Pezuela, 520, Sept. 7, 1819. 
34. Ibid., 527, sept. 23, 1819 • 
.......... 
35. Ibid., 525, Sept. 22, 1819 • 
.......... 
.
It was obvious that in 1820 the British were still trading in Peru, this 
despite the advance of the rebel forces and the pronounced Chilean blockade. 
Holbrook's AutobiograpSl referred to the lacedonian, an American ship, which 
escorted merchantmen out of Callao accompanied by British cutters which also 
protected British merchantmen. 36 Cochrane found himself at variance with 
British commanders who protected British traders operating in the Pacific 
under Spanish licenses, Uen like Begg and Barnard found that their interests 
were not served by the restrictive measures initiated by Cochrane or San 
lIartln. San lartln's "slow" liberation of Peru irritated the British whose 
well stocked warehouses sought new markets. J. third irked Britisher was 
probablY' J. P. Robertson)7 
fezuela listed the presence of the Andromaca, In!p!etor, Catalina and 
Dragon in Peruvian ports, all British ships_ The names of Arismendi and 
Calvo were listed aa -consignatorios- in mercantile affairs in regard to the 
Britishers.36 The British frigate Hercules wu also involwd in Peruvian 
traffic, as were the Dentlez, Hanez and Canton.39 These last three brought 
aJl{"uish to Cochrane who found them funning through the blockade or seUing 
)6. Holbrook, Autobiog!!pb,r, 274. 
37. Robin J.. Bumphre78, Liberation in South America 1806-1827 The Career of 
James Pariossien (London, 1952), 91-'92; also rootnote'85""" ~ in above work 
cited on page 91 and footnotes 1, 2 and .3 on page 92. 
38. Casado y Villena, Memoria Pezuela. 625-26, Jan. 3. 1620. 
39. P!!!t VII, 170, ReJai.gio de Domingo Silva to San Mart!n, Mar. 11, 1820. 
r--------------, 
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arms to the Boyalist8.40 Statistics 8how that between 1819 and 1821 the 
commerce of Peru had yielded to Spanish authorities 689,248 peS08 and the 
Consulado 966,17) pesos.41 Since these figures are isolated fram the bulk of 
statistics in connection with the Peruvian trade and since much of the trade 
was clandestine or at least dlsguiaed, they do not contribute measurably to 
the whole picture. 
Statistics for 1821 are also ver,y incomplete. At best most sources in-
dicate the presence of the British-Peruvian trade and let it go at that. 
There is little effort made to pinpoint either the individual merchants or 
ships that were involved. Some ships achieved notoriety but these were the 
exceptions. The British !zEerion, belonging to the notorious category, carri 
5 million dollars belonging to the Royalists from Callao to Eng1and.42 _r-
iean sources established the fact that the United States and Britain carried. 
on all the commerce in the Pacific.43 Holbrook's autobiograpbJ noted that 
in May of 1821 there were many British merchant ships in Callao "notwithstandq 
the blockade.- Be also stated that Amerie ... , prisoners found ellPloyment on 
merchant ships in the harbor. 44 The American agent, Forbes, wrote on Jul7 ), 
40. Romero, Ristoria EconOmica, 266. 
41. ~., 30). 
42. S"ccial Agents Robinson, Robinson to Adams, Mar. 7, 1821. 
43. :Navy Area 9 File (1801-1830 Folder, Box 1) Duplicate copy of Captain C. O. 
Ridgely's letter to the Secretary of the Navy, From aboard U.S.S. Constellat.1o 
Mar. 7. 1821. - - -
44. HOlbrook. AutobioF!Ppz, )01. 
• 
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1821, that Cochrane's paper blockade irritated the British Sir Thomas Harqy 
who found British merchant ships captured right under his eyes and thus pro-
tested to the Chilean government, condemning the blockade as illegal. Harqy 
was equal~ determined to protect British rights and property afloat but that 
the merchants would have to provide for their own security on shore or leave 
the country as "he could not extend aDiY protection to them or their property. It 
Forbes then added that "To stimulate a general resistance to the paper 
blockade of the Chileans, the Vice Ro.y has declared the trade of Callao and 
Lima free to all neutral flags •••• n45 
Another contemporary source, Miers,46 also wrote of the Vicero.y's resort 
to the system of licenses, a device with which the British were all too 
familiar. Sometimes these licenses were granted to Br1tishers in return for 
financial backing but the title always belonged to a Spaniard. Arismendi a.nd 
Abadia were well connected with foreign merchants a.broad. British vessels 
also took in Spanish cargoes and disguised them as Bri Ush property to pass 
the inspection of the rebel squadron. However, some such were stopped, as 
the Edward Ellice and ~ _.)u ... f;;.;f..,i..,e.;;l ... d and sent to Valparaiso for adjudication. 
The seizure of the British property was protested by HarctY.. Capt. Hall of the 
Conway and Capt. Mackenzie of the Superb. Miers made another noteworthy 
remark. He said that while previously British mercantile agents in Peru and 
Chile, "who had received constant protection from Lord Cochrane" praised his 
45. u.s. Consuls, B.A., July 3, 1821-August 6, 1826, Forbes, Ju~ 3, 1821. 
46. Miers, '!'ravels 12 Chile, II, 50-59 Eassim. 
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efforts, they soon heaped abuse upon him when he put an end to their smug,;:,;ling 
ria the use of "entremedios." Instead of a hero he became a pirate and robber, 
among other colorful titles. The ships seized carried two sets of papers, 
each giving a different ownership of the goods, and Cochrane plundered what 
he believed to be Spanish property, no matter what flag waved. When Capt. 
Mackenzie left the Pacific, however, he wrote to Cochrane and praised him for 
his cona'uct, sta.ting that "he neither knoew of any case of injury having been 
done to the British nag by the Chilean vessels of war, nor any impediment 
thrown in the way of British commerce •••• If The confiscated ships wera freed 
and in the process Chilean judges rose from rags to riches, "no less than 
80,000 dollars had been given to the judges •••• " The Peruvian viceroy also 
granted permission for British commerce contr~ to the rigorous colonial 
laws, which permission rested essentially upon financial and material need. 
Again false papers were substituted to hide the real identity of the ship 
or cargo, yet the greater part of the trade was carried on through smuggling 
without the cognizance of royalist authorities. Since the major ports were 
under surveillance, the smugglers resorted to "Entremedios," e.E;. between 
Pisco and Chile. The ship in question would come as close as possible to shore 
and then would be met by natives with money who would carry a'ltlay' their pur-
chases. When some of the cargoes were landed, Sri tish commission agents 
accompanied the ship. These agents often resided in Valparaiso or Oallao and 
guided the ship through its "selling stage." Sometimes these commission 
agents showed up in "native quarters." Their services were reflected in the 
exhorbitant prices that were asked for goods in market places. Miers' 
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friend found 40 British vessels at Aneon and after Cochrane took Arica he met 
8. market f1utted 'With Bri Ush r,oods. 
Cochrane's naval 8y8t~m of the floating custow~ouse with its accompanying 
exactions or cont.ributions was highly unpopular with neutrals who not, only had 
to pay Cochrane 18 1/2 percent duty on the amount of the €,ooda they carried, 
but once in port were subject to further duties. laturally the British 
merchants were aroused and Hardy sailed for Peru to see what could be done 
about this expensive orodedure. The blockade was confined from Ancon to Pisco, 
at lea.st on August 2, 1821. 47 as Robinson's letter to Adams makes clear. 
Earlier Hardy supposedly had tacitly assented to the blockade but on the above 
date he refused to adldt its existence. Robinson further informed his superio 
that on the morning this letter was written, "a British vessel hAd fone to sea 
without having eompUed with the restriction or having r,iven the bond.- HardT 
probably would protect this vessel, Robineon went on to say, despite the in-
fraction of Chilean municipal regulations. The explanat,ion of the "bond" is 
simply this. The Chilean government, in relation to exporting Chilean produce 
and provisions insisted that vessels post a bond p,uaranteeinr. that none of the 
stipulated goods find the:f.r way into royalist markets. However, "as the de-
mand is great and the prices excessively hieh at the ports in their possession 
these commodlt1~s will go where they are wanted •••• " The British vessel 
mentioned above by Robinson failed to comply wi th this bond and thus was 
htehly su~ct. How right Rob:ln80n was when he said that the Peruvians greatl 
needed the supplies. In addition to the controversy raging among the Royalist. 
47. Special Agents Robinson. Robinson to Adams, Aug. 2, 1821. 
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theMselves over the openil)? up of free colonial trade. the Chilean blockade 
restricted royalist supplies and kept the treasur.y in a state of bankruptcy.48 
Hall recounted the precarious state of Peru :1 n his VoVees.49 As captain 
of the Cornr![, previously mentioned in connection with the British and Peruvian 
trade, he stationed himself in ttle harbour of Ancon, "to be near the En~:'ish 
merchant-ships •••• It Although the Royalists had abandoned Lima, at least by 
July 13, 1821, the date of Hall's entry in the Voyages, they still held Callao 
which was constantly besieged and cut off by land and sea. Since the merchant 
vessels could not land in Callao, they headed for Arleon. The value of 
Peruvian trade was lauded in John Lowe's plea for British recognition of 
Colombia in 182).50 A1 though no specific figures were cited, he did aeknowlacte 
the existence of this lucrative market. 
Further proof exists in the iOl'1R of a letter from Pedro de Goysneche, to 
Sedor Juan Viguel de Lastra, Lima, February 22, 1822, charging that both the 
Jlaeedonian and the H:zperion were involved in royalist affairs to the extent 
of conveying royalist funds and goods out 0; royalist territory for safety.51 
Goyeneehe found the state of Peru 80 precarious that he made provision for 
sending his goods to Cuba or to London. He himself had made two unsuccesstul 
attempts to leave for Europe in British ships. The par~zing effects of 
San Martin's campaign upon royalist resources is vlvidly described in Pezuela's 
48. Hill. Voyages, I, 116-17. 
49. Ibid., 251. 
-
50. John Lowe, "On the Recognition of Colombia by Great Britain, It !!!!. 
!!!phlateer, XIII (London, 1823), 489-90. 
51. DASM, V, 164. 
-
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JJanifieau,52 upon his viceregal withdrawal from Peru. 
-
Cochrane also proved to be a good source of information concerning 
Sri tish commercial operations. On April 6. 1821, he notified the Ch:Dean 
minister of marine, Monteagudo, regarding the activities of the General Brown, 
a British vessel.53 Sometime in April. 1821, he mentioned the British £!!! 
Glendower. which came to Callao from Valparaiso, and the intended arrival of 
five or six British ships from Spain, probab~ the Besostris Giant and ~ 
among them.54 On April 17. 1821, he added the British ship Columbia to his 
list and made note of the disembarkation of three British ships with Spanish 
careo landing in .Arica.'5 In this same letter, which incidentally was written 
to the Clilean Minister of Karine, he referred to a French war ship and ~ 
French m.erchant ships in Peru waters. Cochrane patrolled Arica, .t'ully 
realizing its strategical location for commercial operations. When the 
Britilih merchant ship, ~ _C ... at.-he;;;.;;;,.;;art;;;;.,,;;;, .Cathcart., created trouble for Cochrane, 
he appealed to San MartIn for orders to detain her in whatever port she 
touched.56 Another British ship eluding his.blockade and aidillf. the Royalists 
was the Columbia. 57 On JulY' 2, 1821, Cochrane wrote to San Martin about the 
52, 'l'orata. Documentos, II, 270-73, 279-80 passim. 
53. DA&'Y, VIII, 315. 
54. ~., 23, Cochrane tc San 1hrt1n, April. 1821. 
;;;:;. 1'11111<38, Espedicion Libertadora .. II, 154. 
56. ~., 325, Coep.T<m.e to San Mart!n, May 20 .. 1821. 
57. .!2!9,., 54-55. 
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Colonel .Allen which cooperated with the Royalists and gave comfort through 
-
supplies tor the starving Limei1os.58 Along with other ships so involved. the 
Colonel Allen collected wheat in Mollendo and delivered it to lti!!la. Blockade 
-
infract10ns only det.ermined Cochrane to be more vigilant and he in turn made 
demands upon San Mart!n to make this blockade more rigorous. One such srpeRl 
came on July 22, 1821.59 In addition to violatine the bloekade. Coctwane 
accused the British .rehants together with the ].i'ranch of giving the Royalists 
ten million pesos. 
It was a well established fact that the British traded with the Royalists 
at one And the same time as they made pronouncements favoring the rebel cause, 
pronouneements backed with material aid. However, to substantiate the tmlount 
and nature of the trade carried on remains a perplexing problem, so few were 
the illegal transactions committed to paper. 
The Americans were equally careful not to incriminate themselves bY' 
pu.tt:i.ng on paper the trade they indulged in contrary to the law. of' SpaL"'l, and 
the policy of the United States government was often shown as partial to the 
revolutionari.es. The statistics for United States trade with the Royalists 
are even flimsier than the British. Still, they are indicative of such a 
trade and must be considered. 
Numerous Americans gained quite a reputation in connection with the 
royalist trade. The names of Henry' Hill and Estantslao Lynch appear over and 
58. .!2.!£.. Cochrane to San Martin. 
59. ~ •• :3.30, Cocr.rane to San Martin. 
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O"Ier again in the voluminous correspondence surroUl'rling the revolutionar,y 
period. Both were men with commercial vision. Some of the agents sent by the 
American government became involved in commercial ventures, case in point, 
William Tudor who formed a partnership with Nixon and McCall of Lima.60 
American naval commanders were not above protecting the commercial rights ot 
American citizens. For example, Killer, Memoirs, indicated that Commodore 
Stewart supported the merchants against the laws of neutrality. 61 
Some of the best evidence supporting American trade with Peru comes trom 
royalist sources. Pezuela'. notations indicated the presence ot the Sidney 
in Callao on Karch 9, 1817, Captain J. Mannerch, listing as supercargo an 
"!&mit" who had the privilege of selling his goods in this city. The notation 
also names the frigate Warren, as having permission to enter with its cargo. 
At the bottom of the above notation Pezuela listed the Chiston .Cllfton., 
Captain Davey, the Montesuma, Independencia, Romber, Tubey, .Q!, and Eapencer. 
The "nationalitT' of the last five is most difficult to detendne.62 On 
October 22, 1817, Pezuela notes the arrival of the Montezuma trom Talcahuano 
and information concerning the Canton, which carried contraband goods such a. 
guns, gunpowder, cartridges, pistols, saber. and other store •• 63 
Pezuela's biggest headaches came from. the American warships protecting 
60. 1fb1taker, United States ~ Independence, 153. 
61. ll1.l1er, lfem.oirs, II, 221-22. 
62. Casado y Villena. Kemoria Pesuela, 121-22. 
63. Ibid., 173. 
-
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the existent trade, not so much because they protected trade with the Royalists 
as their dupliCity in also safeguarding American efforts in supplying the 
rebel forces. He was well informed about Biddle and the Ontario.64 Captain 
Biddle, in company with Prevost, paid a visit to Lima in April, 1818.65 Upon 
their arrival, ther informed the Vicero.y of royalist defeats in Chile. 
According to the Ontario journal, Biddle and Prevost entertained and were in 
turn entertained by Don Felix Blanco. Another entry in this same journal 
listed the president of the Philippine company as Don Pedro Abad!a.66 
Prevost's correspondence is highly informative on the subject of trade. 
Contained in one of Prevost's despatches was Hill's notation of April 11, 1818, 
to a document dated April 7, 1818, concerning the case of John Robinson, 
American, who found his ships, crew and himself taken by the Spaniards, and 
the detention of a 111-. Samuel Curson, an American living in Lima. According 
to the deposition made by Henry Hill, Vice consul at Valparaiso, Robinson 
escaped from Callao on board the Will, Francis Hartler, master, a British 
ship in the port. Robinson apparently stayed on board this ship and assisted 
in loadin,; the cargo, eventually sailing in her as chief mate. Curson was 
also eventaally placed under restriction by the Royalists.67 
, Robinson's note to Adams mentioned the names of the Viceroy's agents 
conducting the exchange of prisoners with the rebel forces, among them that 
6L. ~., 229, Feb. 13, 1818; !.2!2., 259-61. 
65. Ontario Log and Journal, I, April 12, 1818. 
66. ill!:!., III, Jan. 29, (l818J. 
61. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr. 
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ot Senor Don Felix Blanco, a Lima merchant. 68 Robinson stated that this man 
.as a chief factor of the Philippine Company in Lima and questioned his 
presence in these negotiations. Robinson speculated on the possibility of a 
liberated Pe~ which would provide a most comfortable market for wheat, beef, 
tallow and mules and lIOuld yield sugar, bra.ndy and other exports from Lima to 
Chile. Furthermore, since considerable American capital was invested in this 
Pacific trade there was greater need tor naval protection. Robinson's diary 
for June 2, 1818, again referred to the tact that both he and Prevost agreed 
on one point-tithe protection of our commerce by force, .. 69 and the appointment 
ot an agent to royalist Peru to protect American interests. John HigginsoD. 
according to Robinson's Diary tor June 3, 1818, had been appointed vice consul 
at Lima and Callao the past April. Thi. diary notation also included tbe 
following statement: 
There is no doubt that Captain Biddle and Judge 
Prevost have in conjunction with John Higginson 
80me great mercantile speculation on toot between 
this and Lima. from wh ich they 81:8 to deri'V8 some 
benefit if carried into ettect.7 
Prevost had his own version of American activities in Peru. His reports 
to Adams did not convey bis personal interest in American speculative ventures. 
On June 10, 1818, be tells of a visit with the Viceroy and ot the American 
68. Special Agents Robinson, Robinson to Adams, June 1, 1818. 
69. Robinson Papers, Diar,y, June 2, 1818. 
10. Ibid., June 3, 1818. 
-
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ships Canton and Beaver which were in the rqyalist territory.71 The Viceroy 
prow~sed not to intcrf9re with &Tterican vessels and suggested the use of 
American sM.ps for the exchange of prisoners. P.lthough this meant a sacrifice, 
Prevost believed that it would afford the Americans greater protection and so 
discussed the matter with Biddle of the Ontario. Prevost suggested that 
Biddle was "induced" to act as protector. FUrthermore, the Viceroy addressed 
a note to the royalist squadron to let any ATterican ships leave Valparaiso 
without interruption. This same letter rather positive~ stated that despite 
monopolies, Lima was a scene of great commerce. Woolens, cottons and finer 
Goods were ~~rketed at a total cost of fifteen million dollars. Prevost did 
not fail to mention British interests in this region. 
Writing on board the OntariO, Rotinson remarked in his diary that he was 
received politelY by Don Felix Blanco.72 Robinson, however, flatly stated 
that British merchants were obtaining privileges from the Peru RoyaUsts 
,,rhieh were denied to United States citizens. To add to the confusion, 
Captain Hicky and Sherifr were entering into conrnercial arrangements. 
The August 31, 1818, memorandum from Robinson to Adams written in Lima, 
referred to Peru as a valuable commercial asset. If a change did taka p~ce, 
referring to a successful revolutionizing, the commerce would be highly 
profitable to individuals and interested nations alike. Robinson went on to 
state that "no Amerioan merchant shipping has entered the port before the 
71. Special Agents, Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Prevost to Adams. 
72. Robinson Papers, Diary, June 14, 1818. 
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visit of the Ontario excepting under special Licences from the King of Spain." 
Thjs hardly seems true in the light of existing evidence to the contrary, 
especially in the case of contraband materials. It would also imply that all 
ships that openly entered the royalist ports had received such a license. The 
last canot be substantiated through documentation. Robinson did mention the 
Governor Shelbz of Sew York which arrived in Callao with a cargo of arms and 
a license from the Spanish government. furtheI'llOre, he included the !!2 
Catherin~8, of Providence, with a cargo of wheat from Chile which would 
"probably be permitted to take a cargo away with her ostensibly for Europe but 
actually for Valparaiso.,,73 
Among the Hill Papers are references to latamalao Lynch and Henry- Hill 
as interested in the Peruvian trade and in connection with them were the ships 
Flyi&-fish, Beaver and £ata.lina..74 Casa Flores 'wrote to Viceroy Pezuela on 
October 8, 1818, Rio de Janeiro, about the F~ns-Fiah, Captain Beriah Fitch.7' 
Fitch was apparently interested in securing permission to enter Peruvian ports 
and to dispose of his cargo of naval goods. Also Don Pedro lico1&8 de Chopi te 
presUJlably put some goods aboard this ship with the intention of supplying the 
royalist marine. There are further references to the Governor Shelby and the 
13. Special Agents Robinson, Robinson to Adams, A.ug. 31, 1818. 
14. Salas, ~ Hill, 21-23 P8.8sim, footnote 23 cites K.S.I Stgo 24 de 
Septie1llbre d.--uJI8;-urll Papers. 
15. DAS!I", v, 213-14. 
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r\~o Catherines. In October, \~orthington told Adnms that the Governor Shelby, 
-
of t;ev;rYork, was sold to the RoyaUsts.76 Referrinf; to the Two Catherines 
. - ------...-.,;;.;.;.;..;. 
of Providen~e, a.I., he said this ship sold wheat in .Lima for :~16 per fanega 
while in Chile it only brought $~2 to $3 per fanega, hence the Captain of the 
Two Catherines, had boue;ht the wheat in Chile and sold it in Peru. 
-
\~orthington indicated that such trade waf; frowned upon by the revolutionaries. 
:3till, he admitted that iihile a short time ago it was criminal to speak of 
opening the trr>.de with Lima it was now openly agitated. In writing to 
F,cheverr!a, December 17, 1318, 77 ~"orthin:~ton again referred to the 1!2. 
Catherines, ,~harl-es Hyatt master, which stopped during her trip from Val ... 
paraiso to Callao. He further admitted that other ships were carrying on 
trade with the royalists, the British among them. l';orthingtont s notation to 
this letter again brought up the rn.'3tter of AmeriCan and British trade with 
Lima and presumably by means of the .!!2 Catberines for he added that the 
s:lpercargo and captain and the Lima eoverThllAtlt "all seemed to Uke it [and] 
I did not care a pin about what they were doing, so I did my own duty when 
.aPt'lied '-:'0. rt 
v,'hen Joel Roberts POinsett, ex-Agent of the United States to South 
AmerIca" wrote to Adams on r~ovember 4" Id18, he described the various Peruvian 
c011' ..mercial possibiU ties. 78 Among the products of Pern could be found wine, 
oil, sugar, corn, wbeat, bark, and (;oooa. The annual mine production amounted 
76. U. '5. ~!inisters Argentina" October 22, lB16.April 8, 1820, ~iorthington to 
Adams, Oct. 22, 1818. 
n. Ibid., worthington to :e;cheverria, Dec. 17, 1818. 
-78. Mannin Di lomatic Corre ondence III 1720-1728 assim. 
.!!!£
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to 4,500,000 dollars. The accuracy of these figures cannot be .as1~ checked. 
Tbe fact does reru1n that America.n ships put 1n at Peruvian ports and did thU 
1n search of more thau refuge from the storDw se&.. Wb11e there is l10 1nd1-
cation that man,y of the ships that entel'tld :PeruY1an ports traded ther., their 
presence is caul. for speculation. One such sh1p, the !!! 'f01ador, ••• 
mentioned b)" Pemuela in hi. Memoirs as bri1le:.~ng information.79 A logical 
question 1s what was this ship doing in .. r01'aUst port? 
PUOI, in Letters on .!!! Vatted ~O'fibC&S ... , wrltteu to Hfnl'17 C1q. 
lauded the virtue. ot Peruvian markets.80 !he pt'ox1Jld. t7 of the Un! ted States 
to this marketw.s of considerable adnntage, an advantage tha~ should be 
explOited to the ful.lest. Peruvian_tals were abundant and tn exchange thAt 
United State. cou14 supply Ooa.ztM cottons, ships, leather, turniture, nails, 
carriages and other goods which could mare ea8117 alld more cheap17 be obta1Ded 
in the United States than elsewbere. Puos quoted the s. of $),000.000 .. 
the alIlOUnt shipped aDl'luallJ to Cld.na trOll Peru for "the singl. article ot 
tea." Furthermore, trOll .1u11 1817 to April l.81.8,:lS, 700,000 (Spani8h dollars) 
arrived in Canton in American v .... l.. !be magnitude of the trade held great 
speculative prospects tor the United States citisens that would canto out 
their mercantile lot with tbe new "sister aepubUcs." 
Apparent1;y .. -n.T were wilUng to take this risk. Holbrookts!At1~to~b1!:!1t!1-!II'L 
referred to the American schooaer, ll!!2art, out of Baltimore, which had been 
79. Oasado '1 Villena. Memoria PElZuela, 391, Dec • .30, 1818. 
80. Vicente Paso8 JCanld., Letters on the United Proviaees !! Sou:th Amenca .... 
trans. Platt Cr08b7 (Nev Yori .. tBl.JT,'"'l4'1:na. 
r:::ac'::,d:)~.ian, 1..rhich ,.;a8 determined to Emter '::allao "blockade ~ E.2. blOCk,:ld:;;.nd2 
T:-:is course of action uatur:tlly caused frict,ion between the 'unericans an.d 
Cochr'me. However, Holbrook insi.sted th:lt thearriv.1.1 of the .ftlacedonian in 
Callao '.:'a3 a cause for re.joicinr;, for th9re N'ere man,y British and merlc&n 
ships carr,vin3 large Stuns of rrloney oresent in this port. Not only that, but 
t~,Rre were m3.n;,v merchant ships in this S,:lme harbor. Downes, Captain of the 
H~.cedonian, w~.s ap~)1a.uded for rnnning t."'J.rouih the blockade. Cochr:,me's 
orot~sts fell on deaf ears, for Dmmes stated he ~:lould remain in Cnllao until 
!!11 ~rr:er:5.can merch.:mt ships had g,dbd.83 The merchant captains henrti.1,y 
welcomed Doh"nes on this occasion and others when he eluded or succ~~i3sf'ul1y 
,'lnG op'3nly defied Ccorn-ane' s block~de. These conrrratulations were well :tn 
order since t.he safety of the m0rch~.mt ships depended he.1.Vily upon the daring 
.'1nd determination o.f the ~l,acedoni3.n. 8L 
tl.pparently, there 1"-3.3 another ship with the rt'4me of the M9.cedonian, this 
one alsc American with Capt. Eliphalet :3mith listed as sup3rcarr:O. This 
Macedoni~~ found itself in difficulty with Cochrane on several occasions. 
81. Holbrook, Alltobiogr!ebz, 267, (1819). 
82. Ibid., 257; Macl3donian did enter, ~ • .t 258-59. 
83. ~., 259, 1819. 
84. 11,1(\., 270. 
-
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The French brig Gazelle (Captain Rowcel) was involved in similar adventures 
1f1 th the Macedonian.65 On March 26, 1819, Cochrane wrote to Jose Ignacio 
Zenteno about a ship he had detained, an American ship which was running the 
blockade and carr.ying on aetivities with the Royalist Philippine comp~.66 
The detained ship was determined to have carried rifles, sabers, munitions, 
and naval provisions along with other contraband gooda. The mmers of the 
ship, not identified by name, were also the owners of the cargo earr:ted. 
Cochrane proved satisfactorily that the goods were being delivered at the 
request of the Peruvian Viceroy through the Spanish ambassador in the United 
States. Identified in the transaction was the Spanish royalist. merchant Pedro 
Abad!a. Cochrane's letter to Zenteno, dated April 8, 1819, mentioned Captain 
E. 8m! th of the Mac.donian and the money and cargo he carried as actually 
belonging to the Royalists. 87 The money, Cochrane illticated, belonged to the 
Philippine CODlPalV and Abad!. and Blanco. This letter showed that Smith 
acknowledged thE: house of Abad!. as the real owner of the money the 
Macedonian transported. The adventures of the Macedonian warrant much closer 
scrutiDT. In 1818 the brig llacedonian, owned by John 8. Ellery and eommanded 
by Eliphalet SDli th, sailed froll Boston with a valuable cargo belonging to 
Ellery and Perkins. The ship stopped at several places along the cUst of 
Chile and Peru, disposed of part of her cargo and then proceeded to Lima 
85. Barros Arana, Historia Chile, III, 2.3.3, footnote .38J Ibid., 25.3-54, foot-
note .3. -
86. Odriozola, Documentos, III, .3.36-.37, Mar. 26, 1819. 
87. ~., 34.3-45, Cochrane to Zenteno, April 8, 1819. 
191 
:'(,0, (lr;O of th:t.3 amonnt '1-7;:"8 f'Or"rJIlrCkd hy ',mi th throu;:;:h an agent to Gua'Tley. 
:~O()P. ·",!'ten{ardSrn.ith left., I,im:"!. Hith the remaini.ng ;~:30,OOO in specie, also 
h",·~;.dtn~ for (JUt3Jn:?y. At this point S:mi. th WiS intercepted by Chi l!~ ".n soldiers 
:m(: t."l~(en aboard the O'niZ.~ins around April 5, 1819, and released several days 
l~tcr but not before he hOld si:;ne(l away the ~qO,OOO. He proceeded to Gnal'J'1ey 
hopin::: to find the aGent there Hith the ~60,OOO. H01-l0VOT, the agent. involved 
hArtrd of' t,he first confiscation :rod dooidcd to de po si t the mone:; not on 
board his o.rn ship but the French brif, ,Ga.zella .. which was also lyinCT, in 
C}ua...l'J'1oy. Cochrane learning of this 4:60,000 boarded th6 Gazelle, capturing her 
and the mone-f. In 1820 EllerJ and ferldns presented a. memoria. to the 
Uni t~d States 21tate Depnrtment seekin:;: rf\sti tntton of all t~he money which was 
confiscnted. After no?,otiat:i.ons tdth the Chilen.n govern.ment .. this ~overnment 
agreed to pay the full qmount of tho '80,000 plus a part of the ,~60,OOO-a 
totn.l of $101..,000 with interest. 3ut, there was a third seizure invo1ved--
tM.s one rr.,ade by Cochrane in 1821. After the first seizures in 1319, the 
r'~a(ledonLm conttnued to trade along t.he various ':>outh American ports and 
f:tnally proci)eded to Canton .. China nwith a permit obtained from the authoritie 
in Peru, to ~r'\.,rt into that countl"'J a c:u-go from China.ha8 A.t Canton, on or 
ahout October 9, 1320, merchandise Wlounting to ~5h,ooo and upwards (cost at 
C8nton) WaS shipped on board the Macedoni~ b.1 the house of Perkins and 
Company of Canton. Involved in this house was Thomas Perkins, James Perkins 
and J ot}n B. Cushing. The rasidue of the cargo was made up by .3mi th from flmds 
85). Senate Document no. 58, 35th Cong., 1st Session, No.1, 3-5, Memorial of 
~ N 
o. 
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of other United States citizens. Early in 1821 the Macedonian arrived at 
Arica where he sold part of the goods and then to Tacna where more goods were 
sold at a profit of nearly $3 for one of the invoice cost. The total amount 
of his sale came to $70,000 and taking this sum and the residue goods he pro-
ceeded to Arequipa, Peru. 
On May 9, 1821, in the valley of Sitana, Smith was again arrested by 
Chilean soldiers and the money confiscated. He did, however, manage to obtain 
a receipt for the amount. All efforts at restitution failed when Cochrane 
was unwilling to give up the plunder. Perkins maintained in his memorial that 
the property of a United States citizen "openly engaged in a lawful trade" 
was unjustly taken for the United States maintained friendly relations with 
Peru and Chile. 89 The return of the money was highl,y in doubt as William 
Miller's deposition indicated that Cochrane had alreaQy distributed the 
1IlOney.90 Furtheraore, the Chileans argued that the goods and money were 
really Spanish property and associated with the merchants Abad!a and Arismendi. 
The whole situation became complicated when the Chileans advanced their proof 
for such claims. Arismendi, one of the factors of the privileged Philippine 
Company, secured, through the Vicera.r, permission to introduce goods up to a 
value of $200,000 from :::urope or Asia, "on board .2! .2!!!. .2! ~ vessels .2! !!!if. 
nation which 2 miiht choose," for which privilege he paid into the public 
treasury $50,000. In addition, he advanced $150,000 on the amount of duties 
89. ~., 5-8 passim. 
90. ~., Deposition of William }iiller, 14. 
~ 
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he would have to pay on such importation.91 To make such things even more 
complicated but also more interesting, Smith sold one half of the Macedonian 
to Don Felipe Mercier of Baltimore, but residing in Lima, for $15,000. Later 
Mercier transferred his half of the vessel to Arismendi on December 4, 1819. 
Arismendi then added $3,500 for expenses, bringing the total paid to $18,500. 
supposedly, this was not an uncommon transaction since Spanish merchants in 
Lima had interests in several vessels distinguished by foreign neutral owner-
ship. Among these was Don Francisco Xavier rIsoue) owner of the Pallas. The 
trip to Canton followed the above arrangements, the money for the Canton 
purchases was delivered to Smith on board the American frigate Macedonian by 
Vicente de Lazoano, the agent of Abad!a and Arismendi.92 There is considerable 
evidence to substantiate the claim that Arismendi had an interest in the 
Ma.cedonian. He had also negotiated with a British ship, Robert Page, super-
cargo.93 The contract signed between Arismendi and Smith, in addition to 
stipulating the costs of the Canton venture and instructions, allowed this 
Captain EUphalet ~ th to ship from ten to .fU'teen thousand dollars on his 
own account, "free of all deductions from the Ucense.n94 The clever Arismendi 
91. Ibid., 138, translation of the paper accompanying a letter dated Nov. 28, 
1846,-rr;;m Don Manuel Carvallo, Envoy Ex.traordinary of Chile, "~1emoria of the 
facts relative to the capture of a certain sum of money in the valle.y of Sita-
na, in the Peruvian territory, by' an offioer of the Chilean squadron, in the 
month of May, 1821,", Ibid., 154, Contract between Arismendi and the Govern-
ment of Peru, Nov., 18~ Import duties amounted to 30 1/2 per cent on the 
invoice oost. 
92. ~., 139-41, Memorial by an officer •••• , Mq, 1821. 
93. Ibid., 142, Carvallo's account, perhaps the Admiral Cockburn; Ibid., 162, 
EXtra'Ct"1rom the record of the Prize Court of Peru, Opinion of ilie F'iscal, 
April 16, 1822. 
94. ~., 153, Agreement between E. Smith and Arismendi (trans.). 
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had also secured a second contract from the Vicero.y, again using the 
~acedonian, this time to import much needed naval stored from the United 
states.95 One of the documents names Juan Tbwaites in connection with the 
Arismendi affair and the ships Cockburn, Lyndock, and Colonel Allen.96 San 
Martin's possession of Lima intertered with Smith's activities, who tound the 
house ot Abad!a and Arismendi dissolved b,y cause of revolution. Through his 
nephew. Stephen B. Howe, Smith managed to have the goods conSigned to the 
"English house of John Thwaites. 1t However, tithe military government of Lima" 
tound it necessary to condemn the ship Macedonian and her cargo, using the 
pretext that this propert,y belonged to the Spanish refugee Arismendi. The 
American, of' course, continued to den;y that Arismendi had arry part in the 
ship or cargo. Smith insisted that Arismendi failed to live up to his 
bargain and that he, Smith, made the trip to Canton "on his own initiative.1t 
United states protests were embellished with insistence of neutrality and 
Chile's illegal interterence.97 
The name of John Ellery, supposed owner of the Macedonian, was further 
mentioned in a document dated April 26, 1821. Ellery was in Tacna with his 
cargo where he kept abrp,ast ot the critical state ot Peru. He mentioned 
that five large vessels were in Arica laden with English goods and two or 
three more were expected daily, among them "Mercier's expedition." He 
95. Ibid., 158, Arismendi's Second Contract with the Viceroy, Aug. 19, 1820. 
This C'Ontract cost Arismendi :$10,000 as a bonus for the Viceroy. 
96. Ibid., 172-73, Petition of Palacios (trans.). 
-
97. ~., 184-85, 192,247-48 passim. Reply to Carvallo. 
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admitted selling over ~?60,OOO lforth of goods but this hardly fulfilled his 
ori,:;inal expectations. Ellery daaperatel;r tried to communicate with the 
commander of the !L. 1- ~_ Cousc,t:lllation, Captain Ridgely, with whom he hoped 
to deposit the proceeds of his sales "the only sa.fe depo~ite [sic] that ca.n 
be made of mone,y as times are at present •••• n98 
~ong the names enumerated as having interest in the sales at Tacna, 
LaPaz and ~requipa werea Perkins & Company, John Hart, S~el Russell, Pitman 
& Gordon, John Jones, J. E. Heron and others, J. S. Ellery and others, E. 
smith and others, Dan. Coit, Thomas Forbes, Edward Dorr, and Paqua, Hong 
(Kong] merchant. The total amount of sales distributed among the above 
individuals was $296,616 and 6 reales.99 
~Ierciert s name was affixed to a letter he sent to Ellery, Lima, May 11, 
1819. In this letter, Mercier admitted employing the Macedonian, Captain 
Smith, in the coasting trade which held much commercial promise. According 
to this letter, the Macedonfan was to make the trip from the port of ltuarney 
to Pisco, where she would take in a full cargo of branqy for "our joint 
account.'t From Pisco, the ~cedonian was to proceed to Guayaquil and back to 
Callao or as near to this port as possible, with a possible cargo of leather, 
coffee and straws. All in all, Mercier expected handsome profits from this 
98., ~., 267, John Eller,y to (ArismendiJ, April 26, 1821. 
99. Ibid., 274, Deposition of John S. ~ler, Feb. 10, 1848. 
l 
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r d ~ 11 . 21 1821.101 h vihen the }lRce oman una ~ arr~ved in Boston, June', , s e 
brought home 343,232 Spanish dollars and 30,441 ounces of silver for the 
account of the following persons: John S. Eller"J, ~t32,OOO; W. I,ewis ?c. Co., 
~2,OOO; Richard J. Cleveland, $3,000; W. b. :3wett, ~4,700; Ignatius ;;)argent, 
;;;;1,355--a11 of Boston; order, $1,500; Edward Carrington & Co., of Providence, 
~63,OOO; Jamuel Coop, New York, ;jil,224; order of Brown, Watson & Co., New 
York, ,~9,560 and 1,690 ounces of silver; Von Kapil & Brune, Baltimore, $78,861 
and 2,459 ounces of silver; Baptist Mezick, $6,000; Mrs. Eliza Farren, $),330; 
Thomas Tenant, Lemuel T~lor, and others, $51,440; John and George Hoffman, 
$6,125; Crosdale & Wilson, $2,012; P. O. Guestier, $1,728; John }wers and 00., 
$7,200; J. O. Nelson, $448; Edmund Didier, $174--a11 of Baltimore; to be 
deposited in the United States Branch bank, and to order $62,357, and 26,952 
ounces of silver. 
~mith had also availed himself of the Constellation for an invoice listed 
the amount of :Wl,143 shipped on the account and risk of James & Thomas 
Perkins, merohants of Boston. This document, however, was dated April 27, 
1822.102 The names of Perkins had previous~ been mentioned in connection 
wi th Ellery and the Macedonian. The letter books of Perkins & Company of 
100. Ibid., 297-98, Meroier to Ellery, M~ 11, 1819. 
-
101. Ibid., 1, 392, The Salem Gazette, vol. 35, no. 50, 3al$m, June 22, 1821, 
probablY quoted from the Boston Jazette. 
102. Ibid., 443-44, Extracts from the invoice book of J. and P. H. Perkins. 
1er
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Canton, showed that a letter dated Spril 17, 1820103 written to the house 1n 
Boston, annou.nced the intention or shipping goods to the west coast or South 
America., e.g. Chile and Peru as the markets wert~ highly tavorable. fbe 
Canton hr,anch requested the Boston branch to secure insuraace at a ta1r 
premia. The letter goes on to st.ate that American 8hips were ·allOwed to 
8811 their cargoes at Lima, and to carry on the coasting trade between Chil. 
and Peru .... ft Ano\her letter, this oae dated April 22, teS20, repeated the 
Wc.rll8.tlon that ftr07a118ts as well u patriots sutter AIle1"lcan YeSS8la, as 
, lOu 
well a8 all others, to trade at their portltu..... This Was a rather im-
proper usumptioa, tor Cochrane' 8 activ.1t1es bespoke quite &'DOth .. poUq 
toward vessels tra<.t1ng w1:t.h the J'01'3.1:1.8ta and eYen. with the "bela thems.1Yes. 
Among th3 &hips that Cochrane ordered O11t ot Callao, March or 1819, were the 
Mac.doDian, .!!! Catheri ... (a,.att), Beaver (Oleveland), Boxer (Skid",,) and 
Canton (Ooffin). lOS 
Goin.g back to Oocbrane, he IIftt another letter to Zen.tellO, April 8, 1819, 
berating the contraband t.rade and l11egal activities entered into between the 
-neu.trals" and the Royal1st8. Once IIOre the Maoedord.an 80bieTed notoriet7 
through her deaU:ngll with t.he l07al18ts, this time in compalV' with the British 
Coloabla. Cocbrtme 8uspected &11 neutral ship. leaving J'07a11st pona, 
103. ~., 446, Enracts trOll the letter books of Perk1ns It Company of Canton 
lOU. Ibid., li46, Lettsr ot April 22, 1820, Ex:trac~ from Letters, PerJd.na Ie 
Compan;r of qmton. 
105. Ibid., 393,I118s Rep.stier, vol. 16, 318. 
106. Odriozola, Docum.entos, nI, 346-h7, Cochrane to Zenteno, April S, 1.819. 
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especially since the sad state of affairs prompted the weal thy to despatch 
their holdinps to more secure territory and neutral ships offered the best 
protection. In this category one could list the Bri t1sh, American, and ,tI'rench 
ships. Especially the first two for there were always the protection of an 
important flag and more to the point the guns with whiot. to back it up-
Pezucla's ~moria107 also referred to the American "Shm1t" and tho 
Macedonian, which carried 62.000 pesos resultinr from the sale of goods in 
Callao. Pezuela noted the entrance of the American Btlavcr at Callao" r:ith 
royalist permission, and wi th a cargo of the mcuh needed wheat, rice and 
108 
other necessitie8. He admitted granting such permi.Jsion to oth.or foreign 
ships, having been driven to such measures by the restrictive blocka.de. On 
September 9, 1819, he indicated that the Pal ... , Captain Holl c Halla had 
permis,ion to trade in C81.1&0.109 On September 16. 1819, the ilona liaria 
'10 
was cited as having a similar privilege. - Both were Ame~'ican ships. Ac-
cording to a. September 23" lf31" notation, the British Catalina, proceedillg 
£rom Huanchaco with 1,300 f'aneg&a of wheat also had permission to transpc"4t 
suppli.s to Callao from. other ports of the Peruvian Viceroyalty.l11 
Adm! tting that the trade 1fi th royalist Peru was precarious, Prevost none-
107. Oasado y Villena t 1!ellOria Pezue13t 4.34-35, Informed by rebel deserters 
of the above, April 10. 'Ti, i2, 1819. 
108. .ill2,., L72-73, June 3, 1819 • 
109. ~ .. 521. 
110. ~. 
111. ~., "'''7 ."),' -l 
-
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theles. challenged Cochrane'. right to institute what he and others de8ig~~ted 
as a "Paper Blockade." He expressed himself quite frankly on May 16. 1819, 
in a letter to Adama.112 American correspondence generally indicated that a 
political change in Peru would most likely result in greator economic 
stability a."1d with it aecompan;:ring aLhnmtages 1'01' interested parties. 
Robinson. July 29, 1819. notified Adams that a complete change 'ilas necessary 
1.0 apolitical health and econom;,y.n1l3 
Auterican trade statistics for 1820 remain sketol:',y and not conclusive of 
a flourishing trade but they do admit the existence of A.>n€;rican...Royalist 
mercantile activities. Pezue1a's lIemoria for July 24, 1820, recorded the 
.ailing from Callac of the Warrior, Captain Elliot Lux, and i.nvo1ved the 
royalist merchants Aba.du and Arismendi.114 Rufus Cof:1in, Captain of tr..e 
Canton, was also implicated with the royalist merchants. l15 It dld not 
follow that American trade activi.ties necessitat€;c. loyalty te· t.he royalist 
cause. The ver,y Americ~n5 aecused of prejudicing the rebel C&~se by tr&dir~ 
with Per'U '''ere themselves suspeeted by thE'> l'OYtl1ists.116 
Some of the Americnn ships were not. fortunate enourhtto elude Cochrane 
and his squadron and thuz found themselves confiscated. The UacedofJ.ian. 
112. Special Avents Prevost, Biddl€, Dorr, Prevost to Adams, 1ic.y 16, 1819. 
11.3. Spectel Arent3 Rcbin6cn, Robinson to Adams, Jt)ly 29, 1819. 
114. Casadc y VUlena, Memoria Pezuela, 738. 
115. Hwq;:>hreys, uParo1ssien Notes," 256, Sept. 7. 1820. 
116. Casaz'.!o y VillcM, lI.em.ori8. Pezuela, 797. Nov. 9, 1820. 
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bnt, .r-dJ:tr .. :; to do DO l;~r:mt to Lima. Tho French 'brig ~~.!, C:mt.. Rot'IXell, 
lo~t ~6?,OOO dne t,C the conf"lsea.tlona.117 Holbrook's Al1tobi~graph;:Ment.ion6d 
tt,~ t 'Ot.mes of the Macedonian was anxious to seok the release of' an '1m eric an 
• 
ship carryin[: a cargo of muskets, pistols, powder and ottUftt warUke stores, 
aei:r:ed by the rebel s..".lp .b?-ut¥":O. The Macedof\1~ Holbrook f:Oes on, escorted 
merchantmen out of Callao While BritiAh cutters did the same tor British 
merchantmen. One of the !unerican ships r;;1ven this !'fservlce" was the Pantq.er, 
Cap~in Austin, out of L'IOston.ll.8 Althoueh only one Americ.'m ship is named, 
most likely there were others. '1'he journal of one Charles rJ'anntt of the 
I;;nc_odonian .. entry tor Decemher 28, 1320, referred to the LouiS'! of Providence, 
Cl1ptain Hicks, as being detained for carrying the prohibited oontraband. 
Gauntt wrote on the following dA..T that the Macedonian took the !puit'J,! out of 
Hn.acho. hfhile the rebel Lautaro followed, it hesitated about taking the 
~uisa by force. Sarlier, Ibwnes hlld written to San Mart!n concorning the 
119 Louisa but received !'tau evasive repl,ytt and decided to give ber hifi protection. 
The Constellation cruised the Chilean-Peruvian coa.stline in r'lorch of 
1821 and in one descr1pti. 't'e report to the Jecretary of the liavy, its ca.ptain 
117. TJ. S. Consuls B. A., Jan. 10, 1813-June 16, 1821, Forbes to I;;Cheverr!a. 
l~ov. l<i, 1320. 
113. iToibrook, f,.utobiotZ'?Ph,.:, 273-74. 
119. Gauntt, PriVata Rl3faarks, 109-110. 
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c. G. Ridgely, March 7, emphasized the need for more American warships to 
protect trade. Cochrane's seizures were becoming all too frequent and 
expensive not to mention irritating to the American traders and warships. 
Ridgely further added that he was cruising along the coast of Peru to afford 
whatever protection he could to American citizens and ·From Lord Cochrane 
being on that coast & prohibiting all intercourse I fear I will find many in 
want." Moreover, Ridgely made definite reference to a lucra.tive trade carried 
on from China to Chile and Peru by United Sta tee oj ti zens .120 Holbrook al80 
vouched for the trade carried on in Callao "notwithstanding the blockade.· 
During negotiations with the Viceroy, Holbrook indicated as we have seen 
. 
above, that American prisoners found employment in merchant ships anchored 
in Ca11ao.12l 
The revolutionizing of Chile separated her not only politically but 
commerciallY' from Peru. O'Higgins· manitesto to the peoIit of Chile, May 5, 
1818, had called attention to the market that Peru afforded to Chilean 
goods.122 Robinson noted on May 31, 1618, that Peru and Chile "are naturally 
friends" with Peru receiving among other items guano from Chile and Chile in 
turn supplying many d17 goods.123 On June 1, 1618, Robinson wrote Adams that 
120. Navy Area 9 File, 1801 Folder, Box 1, Duplicate copy of Captain C. G. 
Ridgely's letter to Secretary of Wavy, March 7. 1821, on board U.S.8. Constel-
lation; original in Captains' Letters, Vol. 1, 1821. ---
121. Holbrook, Autobiographl. 301, )lay, 1821. 
122 • ~ II, 65-66, Manitesto del Gobierno a los pueblos que forman el 
estado de Chile, Bernardo O'Higgins, Kay 5, 1816. 
123. Robinson Papers, Diary, May 31, 1618. 
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there were many ships in Valparaiso and if the Peru trade opened up there 
would be a market for wheat, beef, tallow and mules. Lima, he added, could 
we 11 provide sugar, brandy and other exports .124 
Worthington's correspondence also indicated a strong Chilean interest in 
the Peru trade.125 Robinson voiced similar opinions when speaking of the 
value of Peruvian markets.126 The high prices that Chilean grains might 
bring in Lima forced even the Chilean revolutionaries to speculate upon 
dealing with the Royalist en~.127 Interested in this grain trade were the 
British and Americans. Wheat, as has been mentioned above in the instance ot 
the ~ Catherines, sold for $2 a fanega in Chile but brought a price of 
,!~l6 per fanega in Lim&.128 
Merchants of Santiago and Valparaiso were despatched to Peru qy the 
Chilean government with the double purpose of espionage and the procurement of 
commercial markets. One such man was Don Rafael Garfias.129 Though 
apparently these activities did not alw~s meet Cochrane's approbation, 
Chilean s,ympathies were highly in favor ot the San Martin expedition and its 
124. Special Agents Robinson, Robinson to Adams, June 1, 1818. 
125. U. S. Ministers Argentina, April 26, 1817-July 9, 1818, Worthington to 
Adams, July 4, 1818. 
126. Special Agents Robinson, Memorandum, Robinson to Adams, Aug. 31, 1818. 
127. D~SMt VI, 315-16, To Supreme Director of the United Pr:>vinces from 
Guido, ept. 29, 1818. 
128. U. s. f.1inisters Argentina, October 22, 181S-April 8, 1820, !tiorthington 
to Adams, Oct. 22, 1818. 
129. Barros Arana, Historia ~, XII, 1.62-63, 480.82eassim, 1819. 
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promise of recol~ing a lucrative trade.l)O With all the information availa'l. 
on the great interest the Chileans had in the Peruvian trade, the statistics 
to back them up are rather inconclusive. Gauntt's Journal aboard the U.S.S. 
---
)lacedonian, dated December 28, 1820,1)1 noted. the presence of Chilean 
transports at Huacho, together with British and American vessels. 
Cochrane's displeasure to the contrary, the Chilean government issued 
licenses for ships wishing to trade in Peru. On ,'ebruary 16, 1821,1.32 
Admiral Cochrane wrote San I4art!n that the Montenoma, perhaps the U.S. 
JIontezuma, with a cargo of wheat and a Chileanlicenae was near Callao. Robin-
son advised Adams of the change in Chilean policy on July 6, 1821.1)3 Ap-
parently Chile had relinquished its pretensions to a blockade of the entire 
coast and maintained a feaaible one 1n certain restricted areaa. More 
strildng i8 the information that under certain conditions, Chile allowed the 
exportation of Chilean produce. Robinson' a estimate was that such a measure 
would only protract the existing conflict in Peru, and on August 2, 1821, he 
brought up again the Chilean licenses which favored the Royalists. l34 Be 
admi tted that a bond was extracted that the provisiona delivered to Peru would 
not be given to the Royalists, but the demand and prices were high and thus 
130. Ibid., 365-66, 1819. 
-
131. Gauntt, Private Remarks, Dee. 28, 1820, 109. 
132. DASi, VIII, 10, on board £'Higgins, Feb. 16, 1821. 
133. Special Agents Robinson, Robinson to Adams, July 6, 1821. 
134. Ibid., Robinson to Adams. 
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the coaod1t1.s would ft. their way 1IMrever the,. _re _at. wanted. Be 
ac:ktecl that a Br1tish ship hac! gone to ... without thie bODdiag but that 
Sir !houa IIard;r would J)l't'kat this ship cle.,1 te the dolation. The OW_ 
eftort ...... h,l,. diNe"" tcnrar4 tbe prope .. ot the Uftl ~n _ it, 
is not too 8111'PriaiDC. to tiad little intonation on o~.rcial _t1dUes. 
!bn too. Cbile. goods nre oarried 1n neutral bottou. • ach sat. riak. 
Ian JIuoth" dotori •• 111 Pera an4 hi. 8l1baequent ProteeMra'" .... 
the old aa4 beg ...... 0 .... 1'01al 1'Olie,._ fbi. was to be elCl*'W. ~. 
stuqol h1s .he_torate. belo •• _re propeJ'17 to ROo",1D,oMpter .. 
What 18 aipltt.. .. t heft 1 •. that duri.Jtc \he _UN t1ae ot the 8aa JIuoth 
0 .... 18-. the .. ~ Br1t1ah, .A.IIeI'1cua.aad ."" Cb1leaalt 1:nduJ.a" 1a 
..... la'bell .... w..cal b7 \be Chi1 ... ,Oftnaaat ... 80 .atonedb7 tM 
"belo .. lJI4tpt" C ......... be.nut, chU_:r will oonoera 1\aelt nth 
8ulla:.r\!at. '~_t •. aDd ,pe110iM .. up ...... ad ouried out clur1D1 
the • .,a!aa it. .. U \1P totu Pro".t.orate aDd oo1DD1tI.1.DI di .... tly n\h the 
period ......... b,y tid. ohap\er. 1'U.t did Sa a.rt.!n p:rcqd. .. the i~_nated 
power. that thq did not ~ po .... ,
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CHAPTER VII 
San Martin and Commerce 1819-1821 
With the noble purpose of the expedition extolled, a worable expeditionary 
force fitted out, tempting commercial inducements propaganized, it now remained 
for the expedition to liberate Peru and fulfill its promises. But between the 
departure of the Peruvian expedition and its culmination in the Protectorate 
1.r ~ crises and conciliations, each demanding the attention of San Kartln 
and each jeopardizing the successful outcome. Conflicts arose over British 
and American rivalry for trade, over the Chilean blockade and over Cochrane' s 
conduct. .ldmuttaa tMre ... re others, this chapter will concern itselt on17 
with a study' ot commercial problems that arose, with emphasis upon what San 
Kartin promised during the campaign itself and his efforts, if a:tf1', to thwart 
counter proposals of the Peruvian Viceroys. His attempted armistice and peace 
negotiatioll8 in 1820 and 1821 will conclude thi. chapter. 
It the statements of American observers are to be taken seriously. it is 
the British to whom San Martin evinced devotion.l Certainly the British put 
pressure upon the Chilean government and San Martin for trade privileges in 
Peru even betore the campaign had begun. Pressure was also exerted upon the 
Royalists, as the British pl~ed both sides favoring whichever seemed most 
likely' to concede better advantages. San Marta remained posted on these 
1. Special Agents, Robinson, Robinson to Adams, Mq 16, 1818. 
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duplicities and was encouraged by Guido to subvert royalist concessions if 
these were likely to occur.2 Ever ready to seize a profitable opportunity,i l 
British ships as the Il!!! and Andromacha lingered at Valparaiso, hoping for an 
open Lima trade. Worthington spoke of the change in attitude taking place 
within Chilean official and unofficial circles respecting free trade with 
Lima. Where it had been a criminal offense to talk openly of such possibility 
now it was aired freely. In fact, a British collDlOdore offered Worthington 
passage in his ahip to Lima.) 
Worthington estimated San Martin more liberal than Cochrane who, while 
prof'essing great admiration for civil liberties. insiated upon blockading 
Peruvian ports to American di8advantage. 4 The blockade viewed from the 
revolutionar.y angle .aa'not rigid enough, f'or it permitted a considerable 
sale of' arms and munitions to the Ro7alista by the British and Americans. 
Juan Thwaites so advised San Martin on March 16, 1819.' 
The damaging results of' a contraband trade with the Royalists under the 
very prows of' the Chilean squadron and the conatant barrage of' complaints sur-
rounding this trade brought about a more firm blockade declaration on March 1, 
2. IllSM, VI, 414-15, Guido to San Martin. Sept. 2, 1818; Ibid., )05, Guido 
to San iartIn, Sept. 9. 1818; Ibid., 314-17, Guido to Supre~irector of the 
United Provinces. -
3. u.S. Ministers Argentina, October 22, 1818-Apri1 8, 1820, Worthington to 
Adams, Oct. 22, 1818. 
4. ~., Worthington to Adams, January 26, 1819. 
5. ~,VIII, 249-50; ~., 252-53, Tbwaites to San MartIn, April 10, 1819. 
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1819.6 The tormal decree provided tor the bloekade of the whole coast of 
Peru; all vessels were strietly prohibited fro. arrr eOJlllllereia1 traffic in 
the designated area} neutral or friendly ships anchored in the royalist 
harbors had to leave wi thin eight days J neutral nags were not permitted to 
earry property belonging to the Royalists; neutral ships sailing under Al.se 
or double papers were liable to contiseation as enelV goods} neutral ships 
harboring officers. aa,sters, supercargoes or merchants subject to the Spanish 
ldng 'WOuld also be restrained and sent to Valparaiso for judgement according 
to the Law of lations. On April 20. 1819, the Supreme Director of Chile. 
O'Higgins, issued another deeree Which provided for the closer surveillance 
ot all Peruvian ports. 7 Atter a brief statement eondemning the oppressiveness 
of Spanish commercial monopoly "Which is carried on to the prejudice of all 
the other Mercantile lations of the World" the April 20 deeree virtually re-
iterated the stipulations made on March 1. This was a difficult project to 
put into operation since the Chilean squadron lac ked ships. 
Two specific ·Mercantile lations·, Britain and the United States. found 
the new restrictions more obnoxious than the old. Deblois' Macedonian Journal8 
verified the exemptive nature of this ship's eruise in restricted waters. 
While Deblois referred to the protection of whale fishing. he thought that 
one or two warships ·constantly on this coast I! 'WOuld do much toward freeing 
6. Odriozola, Doc um.entos, III, )59-)60, signed. by Cochrane. An English COPY' 
is found in British State P!Pera, 1818-1819, 1110-1111. 
7. U.s. Consuls B.A., January 10, l81B-.1une 16, 1821J English copy is in 
British State Papers, 1818-1819, 1110-1111. 
8. Deblois, Private Journal dface<ioniana, 1818-1819" Karch 31 .. 1819. 
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.American merchant ships from insult and plumer. 
The attitudes and policies of American commander. were not always con-
sistent. The middle of April, 1819, Captain Downes of the Macedonim was 
requested by the Chilean government not to enter Callao until his return from 
the Northwest Cout. as it might prejudice tm. cause of the revolutionaries. 
Down.s replied to the Secretary of State, EcheverrIa, on April 20, 1819 .. that 
he would delay his visit to Callao as requested.9 On April 2), 1819, however, 
Downes proteated to O'Higgins against the blockade stating that United States 
ships should not be excluded from the Peruvian coast unless the port was 
specifically blockaded.10 This was not the only letter in which the legality 
of the blockade was made dependent upon its effectiveness. A month later, 
Downes objected to the R~a1ist molestations of U.S. ships and made it quite 
clear that the object. of the laeedonim was "to protect American vessels 
trading in this area."ll JIost eertainl,.. this "trading- was contrary to the 
principles of the blockade announced by Chile and enforced b)" Cochrane. 
Deblois lamented that the blockade would "plq the devil 'With mereh. t vessels" 
a8 ships of all nations were proh1bi ted from entering any Peruvian port.12 
What kind of game was Downes engaged. in when he seemed to abide bY' Chilean 
wishes and then proceeded to argue the legalit)'" of their position? 
9. Captains' Letters, V01UM 4, Echeverria to Downes .. April 11 .. 1819, coP)" 
destined for O'Higgins; Ibid ... Downes to Echeverria, A.pril 20, 1819. 
-
10. .!2!!!., Downes to O'Higgins, April 2). 1819. 
11. ~., Downes to Pesuela, May 2), 1819. 
12. Deblois, Private Journal dlscedoniana, 1818-1819, Konday, Kay 24, 1819. 
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Little, if anything, is hLlOwn regarding San Martin's verbal statements 
concerning this blockade. In sending a copy of the blockade decree to the 
Supreme Director of the United Provinces he failed to make his opinions 
known.l ) O'Higgins was not so reticent in his proclamation to the Peruvians 
issued probably sometime in May 1819.14 Reference was made to nations who 
vied with each other to bring products of their country, their knowledge, 
their arms and even their personal aid to the independent United Provinces 
and Chile. Such pronouncements, however, tailed to cover up the stark reality 
of a commerce regulated to suit Chilean poliey. Perhaps a big factor behind 
San MartIn's "silence lt was the poor state of his health which coulrl well have 
limited his activities and to which he himself ar~ ethers alluded more than 
onee.
l
' 
San Martin realized the importance of a free Peru. 8S did Cochrane, but 
the two men differed about how this independence YlOlild be achieved. Of the 
tw'o, Cochrane was most vocal about the clash between them, San Marth choosing 
to operate through 0 'Higgins and Guido. Thus while 0' Higgins and San .MartIn 
expounded the glories of unrestricted trade, free of Spaniah monopoly, Cochrane 
was busily engaged in preventing any British or American trade with Peru. 
Although not altogether correctly. American agents complained that not only 
13. I!ASK, IV, 444, to lupreme D~tor, April 30. 1819. 
14. u.s. Ministers Argentina, October 22, l81S-April 8, 1820, O'Higgins to 
the Peruvians, trans., n.d. 
15. DASM, IV, 46" San Yart!n to Ministro de Estado, Don J. EcheverrIa, 
Kay 2),1819; Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Prevost to Adams, 
July), 1819. 
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san hrt!n but the Chilean r:overntnent and Cochrane favored the British. 
Robinson insisted that new Chilean tariffs gave the British an edge and that 
Cochrane displayed a good deal of national teelinv. probably keeping "a return 
hOme and a restitution of his lost honors in view. ft16 If Cochrane intended 
to frighten American warships he failed. The Jlacedord.an cruised t.he eoast 
of Peru to watch him and protect American ships on the coast. Downes was 
convinced that Cochrane's leeline's were hostile townrd Americans "in the 
extreme" and that Cochra.ne would "throw every obstacle possible. ln the way 
of our commerce on the coast of Peru •••• ,,17 In communication 'With the 
commander of t.he Galvarino. one part of the Chilean squadron. Downes was 
assured that Cochrane d~.d not intend to enforce the Peruvian blockade t() the 
full extent of the proelamati on. What Cochrane really intended was often a 
matter for speculat.ion. Most likely it was to blockade Lima and those ports 
before m.ch he wOllld have a competent force. 
Examples of his activities are many. On November 9_ 1819, Cochrane 
c hall€nged Downes' concept of the bloc leade arming himself w:tth extracts from 
the Law of Nations.18 Downes replied the same day attaelrlng extracts from 
S'!r W. Seott.19 Cochrane insisted that durillf. a blockade the enemy could not 
, 
be aided in any way; a nation was not to carry on trad.e in grain, or carry 
16. Special Agents, Robinson, Robinson to Adams, July 29. 1819. 
17. Captains' Letters, volume 4, Oct. 20, 1819. 
18. ~ •• vo1UJ1e 1, Cochrane to Downes, Iov. 9,. 1819. 
19. .!2!£., IkMnes to Cochrane, lov. 9, 1819. 
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enemy property or carry on commerce with a blockaded port. Downes demanded 
that before a blockade was errective it had. to be declared for all nations.li! 
and had to have an adequate rorce to make it bind. Because of the antagoni8lll 
existing between Downes and Cochrane, there was mcuh to support the contention 
made by" Lt. Charles Gauntt of the ~edonian on November 9. 1819. Gauntt 
believed that Cochrane intended to sink the Macedonian if she attempted to 
enter Callao which was blockaded by a Chilean rorce. Downes questioned this 
possibility but prepared for battle. All men alerted and guns manned, the 
1Aacedonian must have impressed Cochrane, for Gauntt reported that Cochrane 
"hailed us shortly after, and wished us a pleasant passave to our anchorage. ft2 
Apparently, merchant ships were far better prey than warships. San Martinis 
opinions on this matter were not available. How closely did Cochrane follow 
orders issued by the Chilean government and how far did he respect the wishes 
of General San Martin? One thing is certain, O'Higgins disapproved of cap-
turing veseels not laden with &rillS ror the Royalists.2l It is also a fact 
that both O'Higgins aDd San Martin had paid a call to the Vacedqnian on 
August 11, 1820, and had been received with a 21 gun salute.22 furthermore, 
there were other conversations between Downes and O'Higgins which dealthwi_th 
the ticklish problem or the blockade. Earlier. O'Higgins requested Downes 
not to proceed to Lima until the liberating expedition arrived. In mid-August 
20. Gauntt, Private Remarks, 69-70, Iov. 9. 1819. 
21. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle. Dorr, Prevost to Adams, llarch 29. 1820. 
22. Gauntt, Private Remarks, 91. Aug. 11, 1820. 
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Do1me. i~ it he could go to L1_ to attend. to American mercantile 
interests it the liberating terce was there, and O'Biggins gave hi. ap .... 
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Howeftr a tree Peru ftS &till in the tuture and to deal wi til the pr.Hnt 
o 'Biggins i.sued another blockading deoree on August 20. 1820.24 Tn. decrM 
forbade 8%17 trade with the eMII1 under the pe%lll.ty ot Hizu:re. Along with 
other minor change., there lI'a8 a major change in the cOl'IIIIereial polie1' o.f the 
Chilean tore.s during the a_palgn, nam.el,. tbat all porte or eo.ats 'Ullder the 
1lImedlate infiuence or protectionot the ll'bltrating arrq .ere declared tree 
and l:mllpt from the blockedl'h 
!he PeJ'Uvian expedition represented relat1veq vast financial n.c1"lt1oe 
tor Chileans. In view ot the complaint., Ian Karth received he pl'Oldaecl to 
repq the Chileans at -the first place be oonquers_ ,,2, lot on1.7 were the 
Chileans drained -to the la.t cent· but acoord1Dg to Gauntt of the !!9ed.or4az!. 
experienced lION oppre •• h>nthan under the Spanlard... .!htt Chilean plic" 0_ 
to the attention ot -Reyxaold." who wrote OtHiggina in late SeptEl111ber questJ.C!IdrII 
'an Marth'. eooncm1c poltcie •• 16 a.p1Olds clearly LJtateci that it San lart.h 
from the tirst day had. pel'lli tted a tree flow ot trade there would have bee. 
great amount. of mo.,. COIling IJ):to the i:reuury. Instead., San Mart1n pre-
tel'1"ed to ape. 111. U. finding __ a to prevent the contraband trait.. ftd.a 
2). Capt.aiu t Litter., 'Y01.. 1, :Downe. to OtHigg1u, 'UC. 18, 1810. 
24. Brl tiah State ••• 1820-1821, 1218-l22O.. Alii. 20, 1820,Capta1u' 
Lettera, vot .. J, ..• to 8aith !hoJIpecn, AuI. 22, 1820 and Decree. 
2,. Gautt, P.r1vat. leu.rk., '2-93, .lUl-. 21 .. 1820. 
26 •. hlnea! I cion tibertadora, II .. 21)9~, "Un d1at1Dn1do e.trwero que M::t:.o) 811 • C e•o que e.1"1b1a IIil e1 castellano,· to thi 
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letter clear~ blames 3an MartIn for the stagnant Chilean commerce and 
attributes much influence to him. 
In the meantime, Jan Mart!n had landed in Pisco and addressed himself to 
the Peruvians promising to fulfil their expectations of freedom. 27 Prevost 
advised Adams on September 28, that unless a material change took place at 
Lima during his absence, the Chilean expedition would 8acceed.28 Following 
the troop landings cae the rumors "that a monopoly of the trade of Peru for 
a specific period after the independence of that province shall have been 
established has been granted to several individuals who furnished money I 
29 proviSions, arms ••• for the expedition." Tbe estimate of the Chilean debt 
was between one and a half to two million dollars raised through forced loans, 
contributions and exactions. Apparently foreigners could not engage in the 
coastal trade) Chilean produoe would not be exported for some time either to 
Peru or ports north of Peru, and duties continued to be exorbitant. 30 
Robinson told Adams of a possible cooperative effort between San MartIn and 
BolIvar to free New Granada and the West Coast of l-Iexico.31 Robinson judged 
that suoh plans would involve a blockade of nearly the .hole Pacific coast 
27. Thomas Sutcliffe Sixteen Years in Chile and Peru 1822-1839 (London, 
[1841J), 43, San MartIn to Fe'opie at Hsco, Sept.,-rB2'OTO'driozola, Documentos~. 
IV, 33-34, San MartIn to the Inhabitants of Peru, ::~pt. 8, 1820. 
28. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Prevost to Adams, Sept. 28, 1820. 
29. Robinson Papers, volume " 1820, 1824, Oct. 2, 1820, letter had this 
information in a postscript dated Oct. 7, 1820. 
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nth the exception of Chile. Naturally this would conflict with the commercia 
interests of neutral vessels. 'merefere, Robinson advised Adams that a 
greater American naval force would be "indespensable necessary." The efficacy 
of the American ships cruising along the Peruvian coast in 1820 cont.rary to 
the decreed blockade could not be doubted. Gauntt of the :'1acedonian recorded 
a meeting with the Chilean sQuadron.32 Downes expected the Cochrane to attack 
the shipping at Callao and so rushed to the protection of American merchant 
ships anchored there. Following the Maoedonian, all the American ships sought 
her protection. The strategy worked and a frustrated Cochrane headed away 
from Callao. 
Ha.ving successfully landed at Pisco, San Martin issued a decree governing 
the commerce for Peruvian ports under his control. Dated October 21, 1820,33 
and countersigned by IJarcia del Rto, the decree promised to benefit free 
commerce and to promote agriculture and industry so long stified by monopoly. 
All ports under the protection of the liberating armf were to remain open 
to commerce of all .friendly, neutral nations under the following conditions. 
foreign goods brought in foreign ships were to pay an import duty of 20 per 
cent of the total value of the invoice presented by the importer; foreign goods 
32. Gauntt, Private Remarks, 97, Oct. JO, 1820. 
33. SpeCial Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, San Mart!n decree from Pisco, 
Oct. 21, 1820. This is a translation, ori;~ina1 copy in Spa.nish can be found 
in Peru, Archivo Historico, Ministerio Hacienda y COM3rcio, O.L. 1-1. Future 
references to manuscripts fro~ the above archives, which are on microfilm, 
will simply be designated as Ministerio de Hacienda. Manuscripts used were 
located through Catalo~O de 1a Seccion Republicans 1821-1822, Archivo 
Historico, Ministerioe Hacienda y Comercio, Republ!Oi orer-Peru (Lima, 1945). 
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imc)orted in ships f~!'inG an "indepfmdentrt flag i)uid only 15 pGr cent of the 
to'~al value; productions 0.[' inde,endent countries introduced in foreign 
vessels were to pay only lS per cent of value listed on the invoice; products 
of independent countries carried in ships f'13ing an indep(~ndent flag paid 
only 10 per cent; quicksilver, <%,?!'icul tural and mining tools, articles of 
war, books, scientific instruments, printing presses and machinery were to be 
free of all import duties in the stipulated ports; domestic commerce of the 
country under the control of the liberating armf remained SUbjl~t to existing 
regulation; coined silver which could be exported from liberated ports paid 
only S per cent and coined gold 2 per cent duty; plata pina paid export duty 
of 10 percent and virgin gold 7 per cent; wrought silver was assessed an expori 
duty of 8 per cent of market value and wrought gold .5 per cent; all other 
Peruvia.n products exported in foreign ships under foreign nags were to pay 
one third of the duties established, some products exported in shi~s with 
independent flags was to pay one-half of the duties assigned} merchants im-
porting and exporting in the designated areas upon presenting the invoice had 
to take an oath that the prices stated therein were legitimate and the "least" 
fraud woul.d subject the entire cargo to confiscation; the payment of >!uti6s 
was to be completed in three stages: the first in JO days, the second in 60 
d~s and the third p~ent in 90 days from the date the invoice was presented 
by the m;3rchant; arr:I discrepancy in either quantity or quality of the cargo 
listed would incur confiscationJ if the owner of the cargo also happened to be 
the owner of the ship, it too was subject to confiscation; if the offense 
were repr~ated a prison term of two months would be imposed and the merchant 
violating the laws would not be able to continue his trade either 
,I 
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activelY or passivel1; though the political and militarj situation of Peru 
did not then permit complete enforcement of the decree nevertheless it would 
remain subject to reforms and additions a.s :m.lbrht be required "without con-
tradictin,;; the liberal principles herein announoed •••• " 
'the lure of forbidden trade, however, with its rich rewards tempted many 
merchants and ships to run the blockade. In November of 1820, Cochrane 
plundered American goods) ships and money.34 Part of the mon~J had been in 
the hands of El1pha.t Smith, master of the Maoedonian, a.nd part on board the 
Frenoh brig Gazell!, Captain Rouxell. From the latter Coohrane "acquired" 
$62,000 belone;ing to Amerioan citizens. Cochrane seized the Gazelle on the 
charge thnt it was privately owned, was property oaptured on an enenf3' ooast 
without any ostensible owner, and because it had defied the blookade. Coohr 
insisted the money was "privately shipped" to prevent its confiscation under 
the municipal laws of Peru. Did Cochrane mean the laws of Peru as interpreted 
by the deoree and the blockade? It w~uld seem so, for ~th first tried to 
sell his cargo in Valparaiso and then had to sell it in Lima. though expressly 
forbidden by the new decrees. In some instances he did not adhere strictly 
to the proscriptions of the blockade. For example, Guarmey was not blockaded 
and Cochrane permitted all neutral vessels to go there exempt even from the 
paper blockade. Smith's experience led Downes to inform Smith Thompson on 
November 20, 1820, that American ships required the Macedonian.s protection 
ar;ainst Cochrane. 35 Cochrane had too few ships to polioe the extensive coast 
34. U. S. Consuls B. A., January 10, 1818-June 16, 1821, Forbes to Echeverria, 
Nov. 16, 1820. 
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north and south of Callao. Still foreign merchants objected to a:rI3 blockade I I, 
.h1ch threatened a profitable eontraband trade. British ships objecting to 
any eheck took advantage of a Spanish license but found themselves often de-
tained and seized and their commanders faced with the necessity of defending 
Dri tish commercial interests. The m.erchants who hoped for a free market in 
a liberated Peru ·were filled with exasperation by San Martin's Fabian 
tactics._36 John Begr, who was involved in commercial activities in Chile and 
hoped to embark on a trip to Lima, on arrival at Guayaquil in 'ebruar,y, 1821, 
found the port open Hbut under prohibitive duties on foreign trade." In ~ 
of 1821, Beg@' wrote to Paroissien that "The system your head man has adopted. 
for procrastinating the war ••• has not been attended with the great results 
expeeted." Begg then added that "had not this bloekade of the Coast been 
abandoned you would ere thia have seen a British squadron in front of Callao 
and the port open to even contraband of war.,,37 San Martin, b1aedtbr much 
of the disordered comeree, rightly or wrongly, was eOgnizant of the mer-
eanti1e speculations attending the Peruvian venture.38 
llueh of what Coehrane did on his own initiative W&8 blamed on San Jlart!n. 
When the Louisa was detained by the Chilean squadron, Downes proteated to San 
MartIn who replied on December 27, 1820, that he only had powers over the 
squadron's movement in military affairs)9 However, San Martin promised to 
36. Humphre7s, Liberation, 91, footnotes 4, 5 and 6. 
37. .!2!!!., 92, footnote 1. 
38. Bulnes, Espedicion Libertadora, II, 15, San MartIn to Zenteno, Dec. 3,182 
39. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, San MartIn to Downes, Dee. 27, 1820. 
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see to it tnat American ships should receive a fair trial and be set free if 
Papers were in order. Downes wrote to San Martin for a specific commitment 
on December 25 but San Mart!n had lett without giving Downes a~ sat.isfactoI7 
an .... er. Downes then sought the release of the Louisa through other channels;o 
On Februa17 21, 1821, he wrote to O'Higgins regarding this ship.hl ae accused 
Cochrane of wanting to destroy American co_erce on the. Pacific coast and the 
ruination of Louis.t. cargo. Part of this cargo consisted in 1,000 muskets 
boand for the Coluabia River.h2 The.e incidents aarrounding the detention of 
the Louisa took plaoe at Huacno afld were also recorde'.i by' Gauntt of the: 
Macedonian. Gaunt.t reported that. beside. Chilean transport.. there were J. , 
.e ... er.l British ships ami the A.merican Loui.a, Capt. Hicks, in Huacho, all 
de\a1Ded b7 the order of Lord Cochrane, charged with c&n7ing cOlltraband goods. 
The Kacedonian and. .Do1roea were primari~ interested. in securing the Louisa'. 
release. Sinee San Hartin wa.e gone, lJOwD •• 1IU determined. to take this ship 
ou.t under the Macedon1an's protec1.;1on, therefore, on December 29_ 1820, at 
1 p.m. the HacedoniaB succe.sfu.llJ escorted the Louisa out of Ruaeho although , 
followed. by the Chilean Lao.taro.1.3 EarUer correspondence between Downes and 
San Martin concendrJg the Louisa i8 a180 iuteresting. The Louisa ~ad a cargo 
40. Captain's Letters, volume 3, 1821. 
41.. ~., Do1mes to O'Higgins. 
42. !2!2., Ilotrnle8 to PreYOst, 'eb. 24, 1821. 
43. Ga.unt.t, Priva.te Remarks, 109, Dec. 28, 1820) also ~., 110, Dec. 29, 
1820. 
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amounting to ;$1.00 .. 000 some ot whieh was in the form of perishable goods.44 
According to Downes .. the 3an Mart1n pledge would app~ on17 if the Louisa's 
cargo was sUch that it would not indicate probability of oondemnation.4S 
Downes objected to suoh a stipulation. 
By January, 1821, the whole coast frOll Guayaquil to Atacamta, excepting 
the capital, had been Uberated and opened to oo_&rce. Prevost wrote ldams 
on that subject stating that this commeree would be charged a duty ot 20 per 
cent upon the invoice prices.46 In February ot 1821, h? the Chilean. senate had 
approved a decree whioh cha.nged' the duties on exported ~!OOd8 to Peru. A 
February 8, 1821, deere. reserved to nationals the exportation ot Chilean 
goods to tree Peruna POl"ts and reduced by o __ third the export duties on 
fioa.r and other goods. b8 '1'be Chilean :~overnment also issued licenses to trade 
in Peru.u9 Robinson told Adau the coasting trade could probably be carried 
on 1>7 neutral ships until the patriot governaent would oontine it to their 
own ships soon atter the tall of Lima.SO In that e'f'ent, the trade would then. 
44. Captains' Letters, volume .3, Downea to san Mart!n , Dee. 26, 1820. 
45. Ibid., nowes to San Mart;!n, Dec. 28, 1820. 
46. Special Agenta Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Pr8'V'oat to Adams, Jan. 6, 1821. 
47. En.oina,B1atoriaChile, X, 177. 
48. Ibid. 
-
49. DA.*. VIII, 10, Oochrane to San Mart!n, Feb. 16, 1621, refers to 
[Konten~j carrying wheat, .!!?!2,., Coohrane to San MarUn, Feb. 16, 1821. 
SO. Special Agents, Robinson, Robinson to Adus, Mar. 7 .. 1.821. 
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be eal~ried on by "naturalized foreigners." Prevost speculated, reporting to 
Adams in Maroh that as soon as tiTl1& fell to San Mart!n it would be open to 
commeroe.51 In this tetter Prevost also noted that French ships of war had 
arrived in Chil.ean waters. 
Cochrane's activities in 1821 oontinued to harass the British and 
Am.erieans. At times he permitted contraband runners to esc<\pe after al.lavia:t ... 
ing the desperate oondition ot his squadron w1th oonfiscated gOOds.52 More 
nUllerous were the oooasions where be l.auncbed tirades ,g,gainst ships defYing 
tb9 blookade.53 '!'be United gtates did not admit the blockade but Captain 
Ridgely of the U.9.3. Constellation wa.s told to avoid all coll.ision with 
............ 
Cochrane and to protect on~ tbe Amerioa.n 0 ause-commerce.Sh How Ridgely or 
other American naval commanders could have avoided an open collision with 
Cochrane undertbe eircwnstances is hard to envision. Of' course, Cochra.ne 
was quite willing to permit trade f'or a price. Prevost heatedl¥ inf'ormed 
Adams on Jul;r 6, 1821., that Cochrane had been selling licenses to trade along 
the ooast and in one instance gtv1n.g permission to proceed. to Lima.55 '!'wo 
aMps were singled out as examples. the Robert Forge or Liverpool had paid 
upwards ot $19,000 and the Rebeoca nearq as moh tor trading priv1leges. A 
51.. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Prevost to Adams, Mar. 10, 1821. 
52. Bulftes,Es2edtci&n Libertadora, II, 118. 
53. DASM, VIII, 310, Cochrane to sa Martin, Mar. 13. 1821. 
54. Private Letters, Navy Department, February 1, 1813-Janua.t"T 20, 1840, 319, 
SDdth ThompSOtl to Charles R14ge'b', Mar. 22, 1821. A similar order went to 
Charles Stewart of the t.rankl.1n, 324,27, Sept. 8, 1821. 
55. Special 19ents Prevost, Biddle, DolT, Prevost to Adams, July 6, 1.821.. 
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most unpleasant feature of this news flas that the British were the reci.pient. 
of Coctrrane's renerosity and Prevost insisted this information should be 
transmi.tted to the Chilean government and Cochrane's removal insisted upon. 
The Admira\ Cockburn was also granted a license from Cochrane to trade in all 
ports of Peru in return for supplyin~ the squadron with certain necessities.56 
San Mart!n's personal views in these matters cannot. be ea.sUy ascertained. 
Pta differences with Coehrane over naval cperations are however, well known. 
Furthermore, he was kept informed concerning Cochrane t s act! vi ties th:rough 
vario~s sources, one being O'Higgins.57 He knew that Cochrane had consolidated 
his position in the expedition by courting the favor of the Peruvians who were 
told to regard the Chilean foroes as liberators and friends. In one such 
address, Cochrane told of the unhappine.s pervading Chile becuase of an en-
slaved Peru.58 The royalist commercial m.onopoly hampered all concerned. Where 
was the coasting trade? Where .ere the open ports? Where were the factories? 
Where was foreign trade? Since the answer to theae must huve been in the 
nepative, Cochrane promised the Peruvi.ans independence, just laws, commerce, 
prosperous agriculture, all benefits cominr like manna from heaven through 
the aid of tho expedition. 
Th" comb:1.ned efforts of San Vart{n and Cochrane exercised ~eat influence 
upon not only Peruvians but also the foreigners who speculated upon the 
56. Ibid., lL9.y 12. 1821. Supplies came from lli.fman and Crammond, charterers 
of theAdmiral Cockburn. 
57. BASK, V, 289-90, O'Higgins to San Kart!n6 April 21, 1621. 
58. Ibid., VIII, 16-17, Cochrane to Habitantes de las Prorlncias del Sur, 
April"""Or'May. 1821.· 
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outcome of the expedition. On ~pril 1, 1821, Forbes described San Martin 
in less than glowing terms.59 If one were to believe Forbes, all had doubts 
about the sincerity of 3an Martin's "republican" vieli'S but, as for trade, 
Forbes did state that once the liberation of Peru was accomplished Lima would 
be declared a free port. 
The extensiveness of patriot success was explained by Prevost in a 
letter to Adams.60 Districts already under control by the liberating forces 
had set up temporary governments to maintain order and preserve "inviolate 
private property •••• " San Martin's capture of Pisco earlier had also assured 
him control of the most productive mining region. This same letter further 
mentioned the confiscation of several richly laden British mercha.ntmen 
captured b.1 Cochrane. One of these was the Rebecca. cited above as having paid 
Cochrane for trading privileges. The Rebecca was captured the same time as 
the Canton and found guilty. But '~revost was confident that Lima would fall 
to San Martin and in M~ wrote to Ridgely of the Constellation that he would 
.. 
visit the different ports of Peru and place agents in them for the protection 
of American citizens.61 
wbile the Peruvian expedition encountered one success after another, the 
blockade remained a constant irritant. Some of the complaints reached San 
Martin who was expected to intervene in behalf of the foreign mercantile 
59. u.S. Consuls B.A., January 10, 1818-June 16, 1821, Forbes to Adams. 
60. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr, Prevost to Adams, May 2, 1821. 
61. Robinson Papers, volume 4, Prevost to Capt. Ridgely, May 20, 1821. 
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interests.62 The British pressed their demands for lifting the blockade but 
according to Prevost's letter to Joaquin de Echeverria, Chilean Secretary of 
State, June 18, 1821. Sir Thomas Hardy had informed the British merchants in 
Santiago that the whole coast of Peru was blockaded. south of the capital. 
even though there was no force stationed at a~ port except that of Cal1&0.63 
Prevost challenged the Chilean position stating that sovereignty and exclusion 
from port demanded competent force to control the entrance of the port or 
harbor. 
Despite protestations Cochrane continued to police the Peruvian coast and 
went so far as to seize again the trouble making Louisa for attempting to ente 
the port of Lima. Downes wrote to the American Secretary ot the Navy on June 1 
1821, that he had gone to see San llartin about this matter.64 This time San 
llart1n gave Downes some satisfaction by indicating that he termed the Louisa's 
detention at Auacho unjust "but that he had no authority to release her." 
Downes insisted that he could not leave this ship in its present predicament 
and that San Kartin give his pledge that she would either be released or sent 
to Chile for adjudication within eight days or that he, Downes, would have no 
other alternative but to take her out to sea with him. San MartIn, "after 
62. DASJI, VIII, .526, Forster to don Antonio V icara, general de marina, 
Indepena;neia, May 31, 1821; Ibid., )29, Roberto Forster to San MartIn, 
June 14, 1821. -
63. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr. Prevost to EcheverrIa, June 18, 182 
64. Captaina' Letters, volume 3, document no. 8, Downes to Secretary of the 
Navy, June 19. 1821; see also San llart1n letter, Dec. 27, 1820. 
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some little hesitation" gave Downes such a pledge in writing. 
On June 22, 1821, O'HiJg1ns modified the August 20, 1820 blockade decree 
citing the principles of equity, justice and the successes of the liberating 
expedition as the motivating force for the change.65 The blockade was to be 
effecti va only between t!le Ports of Ancon and Pisco, and its enforcement 
dependent upon the stationing of an adequate naval force in front of every 
port so blockadej. On June 23, 1821, O'Higgins wrote to Prevost informing 
him of the modified blockade and reiterating the necessity of an "Actual Force 
to be stationed at the sight of the Ports that are to constitute the 
Blockade.1I66 Furthermore, O'I!igi5ins indicated that he was informing Sir 
Thomas Hardy "this very moment" of the change. The new decree would also be 
forwarded to Cochrane and San Mart!n. 
Much rejoicing accompanied the lifting of the blockade and Ridgely wrote 
the Secretary of the Nav.y th~t the areas possessed by the liberating forces 
would doubtless be opened for traffic.67 Strict control would be exercised 
over areas not under patriot rule. Ridgely's more pointedly accusing letter 
described the quarrel that had taken place between San r.1art!n and Cochrane 
over the latter's confiscation of $600,000. San Mart!n insisted this money 
was private property belonging to the government and Cochrane asked what better 
use it could have than as pay for his naval squadron. Ridgely believed that 
65. British state Pa~ers, 1820.1321, 1220, Declaration of Supreme Director 
of cbIts, June 22, 18 t. 
66. Special Agents Prevost, Biddle, Dorr. 
67. Captains' Letters, volume 5, Ridgely to Secretary of Nav.y, Nov. 2, 1821, 
enclosed Ministerial Gazette of Chile. 
f 
i
.  J
225 
Coohrane t 5 conduot was "publiokly approved of by the Director of Chili and 
the people of Chili are with him, but there is no doubt of a seoret under-
standing between General San llart!n & His .Exe1' O'Higgins, and Lord Cochrane 
must & will be sacrificed, whenever he shall have returned to Chili with hi. 
fleet.,,68 
Charles Stewart, Captain of the .!!.!. franklin called San Marth and 
Coohrane both rogues, both wishing to plunder Peru. Stewart insisted. to Smith 
Thompson that Coohrane sold "licenses to hi. agents and partners in commerce" 
thus enabling the royalists to retain Lima and Callao and thereby defeating 
the object of San Iart!n ••••• 69 
Cochrane' s variance with San Martin' 19 wishes were observed by Prevost 
and relayed to Adams on June .30, 1821. The latest Cochrane outrages were 
committed against the British flag, the seamen impressed and the ships used 
for transport. The Chilean government had disavowed such action and the 
British protests were loud and clear. Prevost asserted that "There have been 
upwards of a dozen English merchantmen under capture, some of which have 
already been dondemned •• • 70 In his own behalf, Cochrane justified hi. action. 
by pointing to infractions of the blookade. On July 2, 1821, Cochrane wrote 
to San Martin and explained hi. reasons for detaining the Colonel A.llen.71 
68. Ibid., volume 4, Ridgely to Thompson, June 14, 1822. This document i. 
11.3 wMch i8 a duplicate of document no. u5. 
69. Ibid., volume 1, Stewart to Thompson, May" 1822. 
-
70. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 826, Prevost to Adams, 
June 30, 1821. 
71. DA.SIt, VIII, ,4-,6, Cochrane to San Martin. July 2, 1821. 
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British CoJllJl4llder Thomas Hardy, angered by Cochrane's "paper bloclcad.e" 
protested to the Chilean government that the captured British property was 
sold without his presence and -.ithout legal adjudication." Having protested 
to the Chilean government, Hardy then wrote to the British merchants. Besides 
tt-..e above information, the Forbes report of July), 1821, gave Hardy' 8 eye 
witness account of the capture of several British merchant 8hips and the 
desertion of British seamen encouraged by Cocbrane. 72 Hardy challenged the 
legality of the blockade and informed the merchants that he was determined 
to protect British property "afloat" but that the Brl tilh merchants would 
have to "provide for their own security on shore or leave the Country as he 
could net extend a~ protection to them or their property." Forbes feared 
that the Chilean government would "yield to the _naMS of the British". To 
counteract Chilean policy, "the Vice Roy eof Peru. has declared the trade of 
Callao and Lima free to all neutral flags •••• 1t This same document questioned 
t~~ success of the San Martin Peruvian expedition stating it "is now worse 
than doubtful, it is now almost despaired of...... Forbes I estimate proved to 
be wrong for on July 28, 1821, San Karttn entered Lima and d9clared the inde-
pendence of Peru. 
Relegated to the last portion of this chapter are the peace negotiations 
carried on between San Martin and •• Co888ive Peruvian vioeroys Pezuela and La 
Serna. It now remains to sketch briefly the propoaals and counterproposals 
offered by each and to evaluate them in the light of the prinoiples motivating 
72. U.S. Consuls B.A., July), l82l-August 6, 1826, Forbes, July). 1821. 
L 
227 
the Peruvian expedition and the changes taking place within Spain and the 
Viceroyalty once the campairn had begun. Tomas Guido and Juan GarcIa del 110 
represented San KartIn at the conference at Miraflores and the Conde de Villar 
de Fuente, Dionisio Capas and Hipolito Unanue acted for the Viceroy. 
Neeotiations for this meeting began in October, 1820, and on September 1, 
1820, San MartIn accepted the Vioeroy's invitation to suspend hostilities and 
di3CUSS peace. 73 On September 19, 1820, Pezue1a informed San MartIn that he 
Ti'cl;ld do his best to end the bloodshed and discord which existed.7h The 
armistice was finally sifned on September 26, 1820.75 Difficulties arose from 
the beginn1,nf". San MartIn wondered if the Viceroy had the power to negotiate 
peace w5.th him. 76 On September 27, 18~0, the Viceroy proposed that, during 
tbe nerotiati0ns, the marit1,me activities be suspended, the naval forces be 
left at status guo and not increased, number of troops be not increased and 
the COlilJrterce of Chile sn.d Peru be returned to the pre-war buis.77 The next 
day the deputies of San MartIn presented the following c0ndi tional the 
commerce between Chile and Peru be open and a commission appointed for the 
t.wo part1es to consider a provisional commercial agreement.; the internal 
co~~eree also be unrestricted and a commission appointed to look into further 
73. Lanus, IOOependeneia!!! America, V •• 65, Sept. 1, 1820. 
74. Ibid., 10, Sept. 19, 1820. 
-
7). ~.. 79-80, Sept. 26. 1820. 
76. ~., 84. SEpt. 27, 1820. 
77. Odriosola, Documento8, IV, 70, Deputies of Pezuela to those of San 
MartIn, Sept. 27, 1826. 
, 
223 
agreem<3nts; British and p~erican naval commanders ~~ere to be invited to see 
to the fulfillment of the preceding articles. 78 On 3eptember '.3C, the Vice-
roy's deputies agreed thnt the com.;'l!erce betjleen Peru and Chile vlOuld remain 
free in the custom and form prevalent before the war and c()mmissioners would 
be named to solve the controversial issues of commerce raised during the 
liberating campaign.79 There was some disagreement as to the rights of 
Chilean vessels in ports under royalist control. 3an Hart!n challenged the 
legality of the Spanish constitution on October 5, 1820, stating he could not 
di3cuss peace on tha basis of this inadmissable constitution.80 According to 
Paroissien's notes, San HartIn proposed that the Peruvians be allowed to 
choose their form of bovernment, even if the,y wished a Spanish Bourbon king, 
but insisted that th~ seat of government be located in America.81 The 
Viceroy refused to agree to such terms claiming lack of authority to do so. 
VirtuallY doomed from the start, the negotiations failed to achieve peace 
and San Hart1n issued a manifesto on October 12, 1820, citing reasons for 
the failure.82 First of all he refused to swear allegiance to the Spanish 
constitution; secondl1, the terms were unreasonable and so he was resolved 
78. Ibid., 74-75. 
-
79. Ibid., 78-79. 
-
80. Lanzas, I~deEendencia ~ America, V, 97, San Mart!n to Pezuela. 
81. Humphreys, "Paroissien Notes," 265. 
82. British State Papers, 1819-1820, 989, Manifiesto of the General-in-Gbiet 
of the Liberating Arrow of Chili on the failure of the negotiations for Peace 
with the Spanish Viceroy, to the Peruvians; also see Despatches U.S. Consuls 
B.A., January 10, 1818-June 16, 1821, Forbes to Adams, Jan. 18, 1821. 
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on oontinuing the war to free Peru. Most unreasonable of the terms was the, 
evacuation of the Chilean army from Peruvian territory and :tndemnif1caM.on 
for oertain expenses. San llart!'n made no referenee to free trade preferring 
instead to extol the virtues of independence. 
On December 10, 1820, Pezuela wrote to Casa Flores, Spanish ambassador 
in London, informing him of the invasion of Peruvian terri tory by the Chilean 
forces and the paralyzation of oOJ!llDerce and industry in the Viceroyalty. 8) 
On December 14,84 Pezuela invited San Martin to new negotiations and on 
December 15, San Martin agreed providing that the independence of Chile, 
Bueno. Aires and Peru be recognized. 85 
In a diacU8sion with Manuel Abreu, a representative of the viceroy, San 
Marta indicated that the Peruvians were not yet ready to form themselves into 
an independent republic and that "out of honor and deference to the Peninsula, 
advantageous commercial treaties 'WOuld be made ••••• 86 General La Serna .. who 
became Viceroy after Pezuela, doubted San MartIn's intentions.87 
lamed aa San Mart!.n' s deputies to the new peace conference .erer TomAs 
Guido. Juan Garcia del Rio and Jon Ignacio La Roza.88 Acting in behalf of 
83. DASK, V, 241-42, Dee. 10, 1820. 
-
84. Lanzas, IndeE!ndencia de Amerioa, V, 152, Pezuela to San Martin, Dec. 14, 
1~20. --
85. ~., 152, San Martin to Pezuela, Dec. 15, 1820. 
86. E. Larrabure y Unanue, "The Monarchical Plans of General San llartln," 
!E.!. Pacific Ocean .!!: Histo17 (lew York, 1117), 313, Mar. 28, 1821. 
87. Torata, Documentos, 111-2, 257. La Serna to Hinistro de 1& ~Jer.ra. 
88. tan.as, Independeneia S! America, V, 247. April 27, 1821. 
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the Royalistsf D. 1fa.nuel del Llano y laxera. D. Manuel Abreu and D. Jose 
Maria Galdiano.89 Kay 7. 1821, the deputies of General La Serna offered 
trade concessions upon the signing of the armistice which provided for a de-
gree of commercial freedom. 90 A British guarantee of the armistice treaty 
was sought by San Kartin. but on Kay 13, San Martin was notified that the 
British Commander Spencer refused to act in behalf of his government.9l On 
Kay 23, 1821, a 20 day armistice was signed. San Martin proposed the recog-
nition of an independent Peru, provisional constitution and that commissioners 
be sent to Spain with notice of the constitution of a junta gub!rnativa under 
the provisional constituion "and to invite his majesty to place a prince ot 
his fanily on the throne of Peru, upon the condition that the new sovereigh 
should swear to accept and maintain the constitution.-92 
At first the viceroy agreed but two days later dubbed the proposals in-
admissable. .An armistice was signed June 12. 1821, and each party made 
certain that the other abide by the regulations it entailed. One of the 
articles dealt with the provisioning of the belligerents. Coohrane kept a 
watc htul eye on the loading of wheat in neutral vessels at 14011endo. He wrote 
to the governor of Arequipa suggesting a breach of' the armistioe. He was 
duly informed that the wheat belonged to Spanish merchants residing either at 
89. Ibid., 248, April 30, 1821. 
-
90. Odriozola, Documento~. IV, 155. 
91. Lanzas, fndependencia 2! America, V, 256, Kay 12, 18211 also ~., 257, 
Diputac:ion de la Junta de Paclf'loacI6n del Peru a1 San Martin" J4.ay I), 1821. 
92. Killer, Memoirs, I, 289. 
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L:tma. ar Arequipa and that no part of it belongs to neut.rals. the governor 
of Arequipa &freed that. if neutrals were supplying either belligerent it 
defini tely was a violation of thE' terms of Punchauca. Cochrane left. Mollendo 
but sent a boat to keep an eye on the act.ivities of this port. Report.s 
reached Cochrane that. the loading of the wheat continued so the "!!rr Hartin 
returned to Mo1lendo on the nineteent.h of June, and shipped the remainder ot 
the wehat found on shore. tl93 On June 30, 1821, the deputies of San Martin 
and La Serna signed an agreement for the provisioning of Lima calculated to 
be abso1uUly nec.ssary for the welfare of the 1'80p1 •• 94 
La Serna, now the Viceroy, addressed the people of Peru on July 8, 1821, 
brealdnf down any confidence in the liberal principles held by San MartIn and 
~"" 
the Chilean expedit10n.~' At the same time he was carrying on negotiations 
with San Martin who on July 10 throu~h his deputies sent proposals for a peaee 
settlement which included certain t.rade stipulations. 96 Ap,ain they agreed to 
unrestricted commerce between the states of Chile and Peru; the coin of the 
independent states to be recognized; and commissioners appointed to draw up 
a provisional agreement respecting commerce founded upon a liberal basis. 
Robinson evaluated the armistice situation in a letter to Adams, which indic 
that the Royalists wished to persevere in their allegiance to Spain, to make 
9). Stevenson, Historical Narrative, III, 3.36-37. 
91, '"+. Odrjozola, Documentos, IV, 196-97_ 
9~;. f!Documento8 i~dltos para 1a guerra de 1& Independencia." Revista 
Hi storic a, Organo del Inst:i.tuto Historico del Peru, VI (Lill"dl., 1916), 95-97, 
!jocumentos ineditos. 
96. Odriosola, Docum.entos, IV, 208, 209, 211, "lH.nuta de un Armisticio 
Definitivo," Jul 10, 1821. 
232 
the1r constitution the bada for their relations wtth the patriots, and that 
t:-l<~ royalists ?'"ere willing to offer free trade tc the patr:i.ots and neutrals 
t1uJlon condition that the revenue produced thereby be appropriated to the use 
of Collonial Gcvernment--To this overture, it is unde»8tood, that General San 
Martin had not agreed •••• • 97 
The peaee negotiations failed, San flartin' s military exp€dition did net. 
jt'()llowill€ tb.e declara.tion of Peruvian indpendence on July 28, 1821, San A-{artin 
pledged himself to guarantee the principles whieh motivated the expedition. 
The Protectorate was the crueial test of San Mart!n I s convictions and in-
evitably of those who followed him on the Peru"dan expedition. Brieny 
stated: we know what he promised but what did he really do--how tree was 
free trade? 
97. Special Agents Robinson, Robinson to Adams, July 16, 1821. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
Economic Pblicy Under the Protectorate 
The City of Kings watched the triumphant entry of the Patriot force. on 
July 6, 1821. Although the Royalists still controlled some areas of Peru, San 
Martin and Cochrane now leld Lima and much of the valuable coastline. The 
situation was provocative. Foreign interests iJIPatientl;r awaited the "new 
order" while the liberated Peruvians bound their wounds and prepared for the 
fruits of independenee. Chilean backers sought their dividends and compen-
sation after San Martin had declared Peruvian Independence and assUII8d the 
title of "Protector. - This chapter will concern itself only with the decrees 
and laws ot his economic polic;r as Protector while the next ohapter will in-
vestigate the actual operation of trade and commerce under the new regime. 
San Martin, 'was he despot or deliverer' Be has been called both. Bow capably 
did his Protectorate draft legislation during its precarious tenure thirteen 
months to fulfil the promise of free trade. 
San Martin issued a bI'Oad am nower;r proclamation of Peruvian indepel'ldama 
on July 22, 1821,1 and. followed this with a decree dated August 3, 1821, which 
established his Protectorate.2 In this decree he denied being motivated by 
personal ambition stressing instead the need for centralizing the political 
1. British State P!pers, 1821-1822, 1270-1271. 
2. Ibid., 1271-1273. Copy can also be found in Hall, VOlyes, I, 223-26. 
Hall CIiis the date as August 9. 
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and military power in his ,erson. 3ince beautiful phrases failed to sway many 
Royalists~ on AUGust 4~ 1821, he found it necesoary to issue Ii declaration to 
the European 3paniards which asked them to seek the protection of his liord in 
safe';uarding their person and property.3 Of course the alternatives were 
clearly spelled out: those who chose not to show confidence in his word were 
to leave the country t-Jith all their movable possessions. If, however, they 
preferred to rem1in and continued to agitate against the newly established 
government, they would "feel the whole Vigour of the laws'· and lose all their 
possessions. Hall r'1markt~d that the proclamation ~ave the "3paniards a shock 
from which they never recovered.n4 However, Han defended San Nart!n's 
assumption of the Protectorate in vi~d of a populace uneducated for self-
government. The Royalists found it difficult to adjust to the nffil reeulations 
and according to Hall t 11is preci,itated "r series of despotic measures on the 
part of the tJytotector" endinz thus in their banishment and ruination.5 
Sharin:: somewhat the bitter pill of the Royalists were the British and 
~merican ships confronted with Cochrane's system of "exaction or contribution. 
Robinson described this offensive practice to Adams on August 2, 1821.6 All 
neutral shipsl! before entering the port of Arica had to pay 18 1/2 ver cent 
duty on the total value of their cargoes. Once within the port itself, the 
3. Hall, VOlases~ I, 226-27. 
L. ~., 226. 
5. ~., 229, 232. 
6. Special Agents Robinson, Robinson to ~dams. 
ships were subject to municipal duties. Cochrane t s noating customhouse 
excited Hardy who left for Peru to see what could be done to resolve such an 
unpleasant situation. Did Cochrane proceed to levy his own custom dutie8 in-
dependent of San Martin? Robinson claimed that nei thar Cochrane nor San 
Martin felt bound to obey instruction8 from the Chilean government. His 
characterization of San Martin 1I'a8 anything but complimentary. Robinson be-
lieved San Martin to be motivated by ambition and unprincipled militarism 
and furthermore, the Peruvian8 suspected San :uartin of wishing to exchange one 
despoti8ll for another. Robinson did not state whaer San J4artin gave his 
b1essing8 to Cochrane's measures, but as was mentioned earlier .. the rift be-
tween the two leaders was public knowledge. Robinson did comment that the 
po1ic,. pursued by the Chilean government at this time favored the Royalists 
and tended to protract the total liberation of Peru. The Chilean government 
permi tted the exportation of provisions and Chilean produce demanding a bond 
that these goods would not go to the Royalists. However, since "the demartd 
is great and the prices exeessive1y high at the ports in their posseslion 
these commodities will go where they are waated, and prove the incompetency 
of this Chilean government to carry its partial restrictive SY8tem into 
effect.,,7 Robinson added that on August 2, a British ship had gone to sea 
without having posted the bond and its captain had expresse~ confidence that 
Hardy would protect his ship though it violated municipal regulations. 
O'Higgins expre8sed concern over Cochrane's activitie8 which were placing 
7. Ibid., Robinson to Adam8, Aug. 2, 1821. 
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him in a most hum1liating position with the Brltish.8 From the letter it is 
apparent that O'Higgins rebuked Cochrane severely I cautioning him to use 
moderation aDd tact. In addition, O'Higgins informed San Martin that he was 
sending him supplies and arms, naming Estanislao ~h as the purveyor. 
Hall'. account detinite~ placed British merchant ships in tbe harbor ot 
ABcon which 1q about twenty Jliles aortb ot L1ma.9 !he C0!!!!l, with Hall 
aboard, lett Call8.0 Roads "to be near the merchant ships,. since he had "no 
business of ar:J1' consequence to transact in Lima .... • While tbe Spaniards had 
abandoned Lima. to San Kart!n, th.,. still controlled Callao thou.gh blockaded. 
by land and sea. Hot able to land in Callao, the Bri.tilh merchant ships 
proceeded to Ancon to dispose ot tM1r cargoes. Hall bleed the present sad 
state of the Roya.Ust oanse upen an unrealistic attitude toward tree trade. 
Two years earlier ttclearsightedlt individuals had proposed an open trade to 
till the treulll7 and enable the Viceroy to meet war costs. Some ot tbese 
belonged to the group whioh bad _st to gain from th. monopolistic policy" 
Reluotant to act withou.t specific permission trom Spain. tbe local mtborlties 
confined tb ... lves to mer. discussion. While the Royalists discussed, 
Cocbraae acted.10 
Once \he patriot toroes controlled Lima. Chileans who ta.vored the ex-
pedition with loans clamored tor remnneration. TheBe loans were given tlin 
8. DASM, V, 498-99. 
9. Ball, ,&,,8., I, 2S1, Ju1113, 1.821. 
lO. Ibid., 1l.6.17. 
-
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expectation of and on promises on conditions of engaging exclusive prirl1eges 
and monopolies" and ~ thwarting of such indemnification might well have led 
to a revolt in Ohile.11 The Consulado or Board of Trade, assured Jos' Hipolito 
Unanue, Secretario del De$pacho de Hacienda, that the people of Lima G1ected 
to the Tribunal possessed knowledge and integrity and were cap~ble of dealing 
with economic problems to the greatest benefit of the merchants.12 Bow well 
tho Chileans fared under the earliest stages of the Protectorate is not too 
clear. Robinson wrote Adams on August 13, 1821. that the Peruvian porta would 
be open to neutral commerce but that merchants would be heavily taxed to gain 
revenue. Moreover, the regulations operated in favor of the people of the 
country and discouraged foreign competition.l ) 
Hogan and Robinson added to the discussion of Ohilean commercial relations 
with the Protectorate. Hogan, U.S. Commercial Agent at Valparaiso, wrote to 
Adams August 18, 1821, that an export duty of 15 percent was placed by Ohile 
upon all articles shipped from Valparaiso to Lima. lIany ships were prepared 
to leave Valparaiso once permission to do 80 was granted.14 Robinson wrote 
Adams on Auguet 24, 1821, alluding to the new duties of 15 percent upon pro-
duce exported from Chile. This 15 percent added to existing duties raised 
the tariff to 26 or 27 percent. Robinson believed these duties would continue 
11. Special Agents Robinson, Robinson to Monroe, Aug. 11, 1821. 
12. Mini8terio de Hacienda, O.L. 26-2, Oonsulado to Unanue, Aug. 11, 1821. 
13. S~ial Agents Reb6nson, Robinson to Adama, Aug. SI, 1821. 
14. American State Papers, Foreign Relationa, IV, 827. 
-- --- -- ~
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as there was great need for funds. Then came the signifieant part of this 
letter. RcbinMn claimed that Chilean vessels were detained in Valparaiso 
"to rive to those persons who had loaned money to the Government to aseist in 
fitting out the expedi.tion to Peru, on condition or' enjoying certain commercial 
privileges, a fair opportunity of profiting in thp highest possible degree by 
their contraets •••• •15 Other points in this letter are also worth considering. 
Robinson stated that no merchandise either in neutral or other vessels was 
landed in patriot ports near Callao with the exception of provisions and that 
no import duties had as yet been established. San MartIn's conduct was des-
cribed as "marked with clemency. moderation and good pOI1cy •••• ·16 A further 
hteh1ip,ht of the letter 1s Robinson' s statement that 'those who gave toward the 
Peruvian expedition now looked for a free trade with Lima and other types of 
recompense .17 
In addUion to the Chilean problem, San Mart!n received notice frO'll 
Cochrane. August 29, 1821, regarding the sad plight of the merchant ships, 
attributing their condition to present prohibitions and high duties. Coehraba 
hoped this situation would change .18 Some of Cochrane t. ambitions were ful-
filled when Callao capitulated on September 19, 1821.19 
15. Special Agents Robinson, Robinson to Adau, Aug. 24, 1821. 
16. Ibid. 
-
17. Ibid. 
-
18. DASIl, VIII, 343, Cochrane to San Martin, Aug. 29, 1821. 
19. Odr1ozo1a, Documentos .. IV, 362; DAS, VII, 337-38; Galvan Ioreno, Bando. 
Z Proclamaa, 219-20, contains terms of this capitulation. 
l 
~-----------, 
239 
Kany economic problems were clarified by the Protector's promulgation of 
the Reglamento Provisional de Comercia on September 28, 1821.20 It, intro-
duction announced that this is only a provisional law, the final draft would 
require tour to six months work. Until that time, however, to provide for 
the functioni.ng of commerce upon tl1e most liberal principles the following 
measures were enacted. Article 1 conceded free entrance into the ?orts of 
Callao and Ruanohaco to all friendly or neutral ships coming from Europe, Asia, 
Africa and America. Article 2 required that all such ships within ten hours 
of arrival to present a copy of all the carf!o carried signed by the captain 
or supercargo which was then sent to the customhouse for the assigning of 
duties. Wit.hin 48 hours, Article states, the captain or supercargo wa. 
obliged to name a trustee, who ought necessarily be a Peruvian citizen. .Ac-
cording- to Article 4, foreign ships were to pay 4 real •• and national ship' 
2 reales for anchorage and other services. Article 5 required that the 
trustee responsible for the ship to see to the fulfilment of all cu,tomhouee 
regulations and duties. Article 6 stipulated the L'BOunt of duties to be paid. 
All goods brouo-ht i.nto Callao and Huanchaco in foreign ships were to pay an 
import duty or 20 percent based upon current market price. Of this amount 
15 percent was to go to the State and 5 percent was assigned for the "dereohos 
de consulado." Since an adjustment of prices was necessary. Article 7 provided 
for the Tribunal del COll8ulado to submit to tr.e Supreme Government a list of 
twenty-four merchants of integrity and ability, who would not only compile a 
20. linisterio de Hacienda, O.L. 108-14a, signed by San Martin and UnanueJ 
Stevenson, Historical Narrative, III, 423-25. gives this date as Oct. 8, 1821. 
- - ---- - - ---- - - -----.
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list of new prices but oversee the affairs of the customhouse as to the 
collection of the correct duties. Goods imported from the newly independent 
statea of Chile, Rio de la Blata and Colombia were, according to Article 8, 
to pay only 18 percent import duty of which l~ percent was to go to st~te 
funds and three to the Consulado. Article 9 stated that ships flying the 
Peruvian nag were to pay only 16 percent import duty, 1.3 percent to the state 
and three to the Consulado. From the above data :it is rather obvious that 
favoritism was shown to national ships. 
As for the protective tariff, Article 10 provided that Jl1anui'acture:s which 
directly injured the Peruvian industry were to pay t'ftice the duties stipulated 
in articles 6, 8 and 9. In this category fell. dry goods, tanned bides, sole 
leather, shoes, boots, sofa chairs, tables, bureaus, carriages, saddle chairs, 
grain shovels, and gunpowder. Exempt from all import duty, according to 
Article 11 .. were all farming and mining instruments, articles of war, with the 
exception of gunpowder, all books, scientific in8t~nts.. maps.. and machines 
of any classification. Gold and silver needed careful regulation. 
Article 12 abolished all the interior customhouses, and inhabitants were 
permitted to carry merchandise and metals by land from one point to another 
without customhouse permits, at least those goods not prohibited in following 
artieles. Article 13 placed a 2 1/2 percent duty upon sealed or finished 
silver to be exported in ships of any land. Of this 2 1/2 percent, 1 1/2 
percent went to state funds and 1 percent to the oonsu1ado. Coined gold 
exported in any ships "ifas to pay only 2 1/2 percent export duty per Article 14 
of which only 1 pArcent went to the consulado. Article 15 prohibited the 
exportaticn of bulk raw silver, [dlver and gold plates and €Told manufacture •• 
Articl€) 16 placed a 4 percent export duty on all other Peruvian products 
carried by foreign ships, ttd s duty tc be levied aooording to current market 
price of the goods involved. Goods exported in ships carrying the flar of 
Chile, Rio de la Plata and Colombia were to pay only 3 3/'4 percent duties 
levied at current rr;.arket prJces, according to article 17. However, Peruvian 
ships were taxed onlY' 3 percent according to Article 18. 
The conduct of e,;porters and importers came in for legisla.tion. Article 
19 stipulated that the individual exporting the goods ha.d t.o pay the duties 
assigned, while Article 20 del:dCflAted the method in which these duties were 
to be paid. Captains and supercargoes, having petid the duties stipu.lated by 
articles 6 and 7, plus an additional 1 percent, transit duty, were permitted 
by articles 21 to reimbark imported goods for ports outside Peru. It any 
discrepancy were to occur between invoice and c~rgo. artjcle 22 permitted the 
confiscation of the cargo. provided the discrepancy was excessive. If the 
arr.i.ount was of 11 ttle consideration. double duty was to be placed upon the 
excess cargo net li sted in the invoice. Tho consignees were not to be allowed 
to carryon retail operations (Article 23) as this mi~ht prejudice the cause 
of shopkeepers and merchants. The ooastin~ trade was limited solely to 
Peruvian ships in Article 24. However, if thl s was not possible. licenses 
were to be issued to foreign shj.ps provided one-half the crew were Peruvians, 
and in the ease of Chllean, Rio de 1a Plata. or Colombian ships, only one-third 
the crew would have to be Perurlan. Article 25 further provided for the 
transport of territorial fruits from one point in Per.]. to another, e.g. Faita, 
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Huachc· and Pisco. Article 26 forbade contraband activities. In all instances 
favoritism was shown to Peruvia~s and newly independent states. 
Having established a basic code of 13'N8 for commerce, as might be ex-
pee ted, the San 1iartln government soon ha.c! to clarify its position with another 
set of regulations regarding Peru"vian trade with west coast ports and inland 
cities or provinces. Dated October 5, 1821. this document was signed by 
El Conde del Villar de Fuente, Manuel de Santiago and ~~uel de Barreda, and 
proved that in each instance foreign ships paid higher duties than the 
Peruvians.21 For exampler the .import duty from Montevideo and Buenos Aires 
per quintal upon tallow in fort:3ign ships was 20 reales am Peruvianships 20 
realasJ upon other products frO!ll these two areas in foreign ships 13 percent 
and national ships 10 percent; from Guayaquil, Realejo and Sonsonate, Cacao 
in fore4;n ships paid 20 reales lfh:Ue the national ships only 16 reales j duties 
on liquors brought in by foreign ships amounted to 20 perC'3n't Ylhj.le those in 
national bottoms only 13 percent; foreign liquors broUfht from Nasca, Pisco, 
Chincl'.a and Canete were charged -c,he huge amount of 80 percent.; from Cha.neay, 
Fiuacho, Hu.a.rmey Santa, Huanchaco, Pacasmayo a11d Payta, flours and wheat ifere 
charged 24 realee per quintal in foreign ships and 0:n1y 16 reales per quintal 
in na.t.ior.al ships. A similar discrepancy in charges existed also in regard 
to the products exported from Peru. For example, Peruvian goods en route to 
liontevideo and Buenos Aires in foreign Ships paid 10 percent while those 
belollfing tc Peru only I) percent. '1',,0 weeks later, October 18, further 
21. Ministerio de Hacienda, O.L. 26-4, enclosure 1. 
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amendments and modifications appeared in a supplement to the Reglamento 
Provisional de Comercio.22 Goods from Europe or Asia carried in foreign ships 
destined for Montevideo and Buenos Aires were to pay a total of 6 percent dut,y 
while those in national ships only 4 percent. The same figures held true, 6 
percent for foreign and 4 percent for national, also for goods traveling to 
Chilo', Valdivia, Concepcion, Valparaiso, Coquimbo, Huasco, Guayaquil, 
Sonsonate, Realejo, Nasca, Pisco, Chincha, Canete, Chancay, Huacho, Huarmey, 
Santa, Huanchaco, Pacosmayo, Payta and the Intermediate ports. 
The supplement contained further information on the coastal trade and 
the interior customhouses. Since the customhouses in the interior had been 
abolished, the goods from Europe and Asia were to pay a 4 percent excise upon 
the appraisals of the price in Lima instead of the 7 percent previously 
assigned. The apparent reason for this decrease was the shortage of mules in 
the overland trade and resulting high prices charged.23 There must have been 
some complaints about the quality of fiour being brought into the country, for 
another section of this same document stated that if rotten or spoiled flour 
was introduced it would be confiscated and both the seller and wholesale 
buyer were to suffer the penalty of contraband. 24 
Also dated October 18, 1821, but listing a different set of figures from 
the Suplemento just discussed, this addition to the Reglamento Provisional for 
E.'uropean and Asian goods "que habiendase comprado en esta" also shows a 
22. Ibid., O.L. 42b-143. 
-
23. ~. 
24. Ibid. 
-
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leaning toward national ShiPs.25 These goods carried in foreign ships destined 
for Montevideo and Buenos Aires paid 8 percent while those belonging to Peru 
5 percent. Foreign ships headed for Chilo., Valdivia, Concepcion. Valparaiso. 
Coquimbo were charged 6 percent and Peruvian ships 4 percent. For Ouqaquil, 
Sonsonate and ltealejo it was 8 percent for foreign and 5 percent for national 
shipa. For the remainder of the ports listed in the previous sup1emento the 
figures were the amet 6 percent for foreign and 4 percent national.. There 
is one more difference between the two documents. The document citing the 
8 and :) percent charges gave a greater portion of these charges to the Con-
sulado. In both cases the Estado and Consulado received their share of the 
duties. The specific qualifying factor differentiating explaining the 
difference in the charges cannot be determined easily. 
To confuse the iasue even more, there ia a third copy of the Suplemento 
al Reflamento Provisional de Comercio dated October 18, 1821, which does not 
contain either "que habiendose comprado en esta." This third document ia 
signed, unlike the others, by El Conde de Villar de Fuente and lIanuel de 
Santiago and carries notes with the date of November 21, 1821.26 The note. 
will be discussed later. Apparently, even the Peruvians and foreigner. were 
confused aa the intent of the two supplements of October 18, 1821, for on 
Rovember 23, 1821, a document sigtaed by Fuente and Santiago de iotalde and 
25. Ibid., O.L. 42b-143a. 
-
26. ~., O.L. 26-6, Item 4. 
l 
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sent to San Martin referred to this confusion. 27 One of the supplements ap-
plied to goods bought in Lima (afectos compradoa en esta capital) and then 
exported to other tree ports of Peru. The other concerned European goods 
wMch without changing ownership or authority (qua sin tranaferir domino se 
embareasen por el Interesado que la. introdujo con direcc\1 a los puertos libre 
del Estado.) were to be exported to other ports. There obviously was a tie-up 
between this supplement and Artiole 21 of the Reglamento Provisional de 
Comeroio 6£ September 28. A copy of the October 5 reglamento contained 
S8Teral notes and addi tiona made probably in 1822. Regarding imports from 
Montevideo and Buenos Aires. 28 a March 30, 1822, decree permitted postponing 
for one month the aa .. sament and payment of duties when the value of the goods 
was high. J. Jlay 28, 1822, deeree proVided that wheat, nours, rice, meat and 
tallows introduced into Oallao either in foreign ships or ships under the 
flags of other newly-independent states no longer were to pay the 13 percent 
duty .demanded on goods com1Df, from Montevideo and Buenos Aires. but instead 
were charged the same as national ships, 10 percent.29 On November 9. 1821. 
sugar coming from Guayaquil, Realejo, Bonaonate in foreign ships was no longer 
to be in the 10 percent categ0!7 assigned by the October 5 reglamento but was 
to be raised to 80 percent to protect natiTe produetion.30 Provisions for 
27. ~., Item 5. Question raised regarding duties by Catalina, 1l!!!. •• Item 
6. Written to Administrator General de Esta Aduana frqm Eugenio de .A.iBCO~. 
Lima, Iov. 3, 1821. 
2B. ~., O.L. 26-11. 
29. Ibid. 
-
30. Ibid. 
-
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liquor import were also modified. On March 15, 1822, it was ordered that 
foreign wines were to be charged only 48 percent instead of the 80 percent 
previously demanded.)l 
This same copy of the original reglamento dated October 18, 1821, con-
tained five additional articles cited as Reglamento del Comercio Estrangero.32 
Article 1 provided that the abolition of interior customhouses, referred to 
in article 12 of the September 28. 1821, reglamento bemporarily did not per-
tain to Iaa, Juaja, Paaeo, Huara and other villages. Haciendas and worksh1pI 
were to be appraised for purposes of taxation to compenaate, with a moderate 
imposition, the los .. s which the state might othani .. incur. According to 
A.rticle 2, goods imported by lIhip and then carried into the interior had to 
give evidence of having paid the proper duties. Similar proof was not de-
manded for goods brought in by any other meana or simply routed from one part 
of the country to another. Failure to comply meant confiscation. So. ex-
ceptions were made with respect to accompanying invoices. For example, 
Article ) stated that liquor, wines and goods enumerated in the last article 
of the "comereio terrestret! had to be accompanied by lists when carried from 
one province to another. Article 4 explained that the prohibition imposed by 
article 1) of the September 28 reglamento upon the export of silver and 
manufactured gold did not include that which was designed for personal use. 
The quantity and quality seemed to be one criterion for determining whether 
the gold and silver would be used commercially wrought gold and silver 
)1. Ibid. 
-
)2. Ibid. 
-
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desi;'1l::.ted for personal use held to be enumerated and listed with the aduana, 
or inland customs. Article 5 opened the additional ports of Nasca, Canete 
and Pacasmayo to commerce. 
A most interesting decree bears the date October 17, 1821, with the 
signatures of San Martin and Bernardo Monteagudo. 33 Apparently, this document 
was intended to clarity Article 3 of the Reglamento Provisional de Comercio 
de Ultramar. These are the clarifications. Foreign merchants were permitted 
to assign their shipments to Peruvian citizens and were assessed 20 percent 
duty upon the ~~oods. If, however, the foreign merchants ,~T'ose to RO into 
business for themselves the import duties were 25 percent. The foreign 
merchants were to make out their own invoices according to the current prices, 
and submit them for inspection. If a notable difference existed between the 
appraisal made by the foreign merchants and the current local market prices 
the government would levy an additional 10 percent duty upon the value of the 
goods. 
irlhat follows is also highly illuminating, dealing as it does with 
questions that "might" arise between the warship commanders of neutral nations 
and the Peruvians upon all the rights which foreign residents enjoyed and the 
obligations imposed on them during their residence. Foreign residents had the 
same rights as Peruvian citizens to the protection of the government. The 
foreigners were reciprocally subject to and obligated by the laws of Peru and 
33. Ibid., O.L. 26-11a, Item 3; see also Odriozola, Documentos, IV, 392, for 
Decre~larando que Quedan en Libertad las Comerciantes Extrangeros para 
Consignar sus Espediciones a los Cuidadanos del Peru •••• 
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had no right to seek the jnterventicn of the naval commanders. or consuls re-
presenting their respective ~ountries unless the law was contrad1ctor,y to the 
law of nations. Furthermore. foreign residents weI~ obligated to take arms 
to ma.i.ntain the domestic order but not against the "espafloles" as thlswould 
be contrary to their character as neutrals. Lastly. foreigners as inhabitants 
of the Peruvian Itate were obligated to pay the charges and contributions im-
posed upon them in proportion to their fortunes and to the benefits which thaT 
racei ved from free enterprise. The very real clash taking place betw.en 
foreign residents and naval commanders on the one hand and the policies of the 
new Peruvian eovernment on the other is clear throughout this work. Add to 
this Cochrane's interpretation of the laws and his personal whiJu and the 
above decree does not seem out of place. The last item in the decree 'WOuld 
naturally be considered onerous especiallT by the merchants who historicallT 
oppose any form of taxation or contribution. Notwithstanding possibilities 
of alienatlne many, San Vart!n needed money to maintain his government and all 
available resources had to be tapped. The deeree was designed to put a legal 
weapon in his hands. 
The Prov1.sional Statute for the government-of the Free Departments of the 
State of Peru issued on October 8, 1821, by San Martin broadly indicated his 
views regarding trade and commerce.J4 The preamble advanced reasons for the 
Peruvi.an expedition and his assumption of power as Protector. The entire 
statute consisted of ten sections plus additional articles but only those 
pertaining directly to trade and commerce 'Will be cited here. Several articles 
34. British State Papers, 1821-1822, 161. 
c:f hction II c9'l1 specifically rdth r'_'venue. II.rticle III st~ted that San 
'~art{n, as Protector, would impose contributions" establish dutie3, contract 
loans and meet public a~penses, acting on the advice of the Council of State. 
~ticle V gave San ~art!n tbe power to regulate domestic and foreign commerce 
"conformably to tbe liberal principles upon which the prosperity of the COlln 
essentially depend." San Martin cOllld also estabUsh the provisional coinage, 
1fithout altering tbe weight and quality (Article VII). Article VIII allowed 
:3an Mart!n to apooint enveys and consuls to foreir:;n states and to conclude 
diplomatic or commercial treaties. 
In bis addresses to the Peruvians, tbe Protector extolled the virtues ot 
U_berty and exph.ined the necessary reforms he was carrying out by means of 
the °rovisional Reglamento de Comercio and the blockade.3S Certain ports of 
Peru were still off limits to commerce according to his October 15" 1821" 
decree ~i'hich was "to take every measure which mI1Y conduce to fulfil the 
universal desire of all who have groaned under oppression.n36 This pro-
nouncement desL;nated all ports and creeks between 150 and 220 30' south from 
the port of Caballos to Cobija under riGorous blockade. Friendly and ne\ltral 
ships could not engae;e in commerce with the proh1bited ports and those caught 
in the blocka.ded ports, ca.rryln~ contraband of wart or without necessary 
papers would be sent to Callao. 
Protestations by San Mart!n to the contrary, \merican observers doubted 
tbe liberality of his reforms. Michael Hogan, stationed at Valparaiso called 
35. Hall, Voya.ges, I" 212-14. 
36. British State Paeers, 1821-1822, 804-805. 
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the transition ffOm Royalist to Protectorate government merely a change from 
"national steady onpression to that of individual Despotism •••• • 37 Prevost 
wrote Adams on October 16, 1821, that San Mart{n was so greatly irritated by 
the conduct of two American naval commanders, Downes and Ridgely, "that it was 
in agitation to restrict our intercourse by the imposition of additional dutie 
the idea however has been abandoned and we remain on the same footing with 
others.p38 Forbes, reportinv to Adams, October 26, 1821, stressed the fact 
that statesmen in Buenos Aires doubted whether the Protectorate would "ac-
celerate the great objects of self Oovernment ••••• 39 
Hogan also disapproved of Cochrane's plundering and interruptions of 
commercial actirlties.40 Cochrane condemned monopoly in an address to the 
inhabi tante of Guayaquil, probably on lovember 27, 1821, at the same time 
lauding the benefits of foreign trade.41 this is a 8Um1II&l"y of his mercantile 
policy. The exclusion of foreign trade was not to their best interests. 
Selling nat! ve goods for the highest prices and foreign goods at the lowest 
37. lianni!lF.. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 1058, Bogan to Adams, Oct. 9, 1821 
38. Cruise of Franklin. Downes because of his conduct regarding the Louiaa 
and Ridgely for giving Pez-uela asylum aboard the Constellaticn so that he 
could escape. 
39. u.s. Consuls B.A., July 3, l82l-August 6, 1826, f. 12. 
40. lIanning, DiElomatic Correspondence, II, 10,7, Hogan to Ad .. s, Oct. 9, 1821 
41. DABII, II, ,13-16. Date was found in the Dolphin Book OODlp&JV' Ltd., 
Cataloe no. 41, 1962, Latin Americar and PhilippineS, Rare Books and Manu-
scripts, 17, no. lOS. -
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was the best means of acquiring riches and political power. Furthermore, 
Cochrane insisted that foreign merchants should be allowed to settle free~ 
with their capital as competition was good for the economy. Regarding duties, 
Cochrane urged moderation to discourage smuggling and to promote greater 
consumption of domestic and foreign goods. The increased trade would fill the 
treasur,y. Then a most interesting remark followed. Cochrane called Gu~aquil 
the "central republic" and tiel centro de la energia agricultora, oomercio y 
riqueza en esta porcion del globo." Strange that Gu~aquil should also be 
the soene of the "kiss of death" to San MartinI s plans for northward expansion. 
Confusion was the order of the day when it came to interpreting the 
various commercial regulations and their supplements. Constant explanations 
were mandatory and the November 21, 1821, document referred to earlier was one 
example. Two of the four Itnotas" included in this document are of special 
importance. One of these notes insisted that sinoe the interior oustomhouses 
were abolished, duties upon goods had to be paid at the point of origin with 
attending proof so that other oharges would not be incurred. Note number 
three commented that the shortage of mules caused the prices of goods carried 
by land to rise. Therefore, the duties should be lowered from 7 percent to 
4 percent to compensate for the oompetition from sea tratfic.42 
There were further noteworthy developments taking place this same day. 
In his Narrative, Stevenson wrote that all merchants were ordered to sign 
their names at the Consulado "that they might all be equally taxed with such 
contributions as the government might judge necessary to exa.ct."l.d '!'be 
42. Ministerio de Hacienda, O.L. 26-6, Item 4. 
43. stevenson, Historical Narrative III 429. 
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October 17, 1821, decree with San MartIn' s signature mentioned earlier also 
imposed obligation. upon the foreigners living in Peru. 
The Protectorate faced ma~ economic problems including a persistent 
contraband trade. 44 Another problem was financial, and Abcorbe sought the 
advice of Gordillo, Administrador General de la Aduana.. to see whether grains 
carried by land and consu.med by the people would not be taxed. One of the 
most iBlportant grains in question was rice. i'he fact that the most 'Widely 
used grains were free of duty meant 1088 of money for the government. This 
letter had a notation in the margin dated November 27. 1821. signed by Unanue, 
which made the distinction that grains delivered by sea paid a duty while 
thoN carried by land did not.45 Gordillo vote to San KartIn on November 20, 
1821, concerning the duties upon rice.46 Still another problem concerned the 
"buquea balleneros" which anchored away trom the port, sent in smaller boats 
to shore and refused to pay anchorage chanrge. The foreign ships were a .... sed 
4 reales per ton while the national ships only 2 rea1es ?er ton. Although 
ships engaged in the export-import traffic paid duties, questions were raised 
as to the obligations of empty ships seeking provisions. This document is 
dated December 12, 1821, and signed by El Conde del Villar de Fuente and 
Manuel de Santiago.47 On February 21, 1822, it was decreed that balleneros 
44. Ministerio de Hacienda~ O.L. 26-8, Item 2, from Jose Ma• Aguirre to Uaanue 
Hov. 17, 1821. 
45. ~., 26-7, Item 1. 
46. ~., Item ), conta1.ns note by Unanue, l~ov. 22, 1821, in the margin. 
Fuente de Santiago also wrote to San Martin on this matter, Nov. 29, 1821. 
Fuente said the grains free if by land to encourage mule carrying trade; now 
there were enol1gh~ mule •• 
47. Ibid., P.L. 2-10. American "Ballenero" apparently precipitated this di.cussion. 
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coming into port for water and supplies had to pay the anchorage duties.48 
Viewed through tte eyes of the Norteamericanos, the Protectorate was 
plagued by two very serious problems--Cochrane's high-handed measures and San 
Martin's policy. Hogan classified Cochrane's actions as bordering upon piracy, 
"belonging to no nation", and he believed that possibly Cochrane was being 
countenanced only until the fleet could be taken out of his hands.49 Hogan 
made his protests in Chile and raised the question about how responsible 
Cochrane was to the Protectorate government. For that matter, how responsible 
was San Martin to the Chilean government? Forbes wrote Adams, November 8, 
1821, that San Mart!n tried to make himself "at his own choice. King, Dictator, 
or Director,U50 and again on December 12, 1821, that San Mart!n, "long seen 
a.s the Conqueror under the name of Deliverer of Peru,"probably intended to 
take possession of the entire naval force and place it under the Peruvian flag 
In such a case, "he (San Mart!nJ would have dictated the Law to Chili or 
declared himself independent of his authorit.y.u51 
Jer~ Robinson's observations dated November 29, 1821, are highly in-
formative about San Martin personally and his economic poliCies, as is reveale 
by his evaluations of the Protectorate.52 Robinson states flatly that San 
Martin had taken much power for himself without consulting with the Cabildo 
48. ~., O.L. 26-12, Item 1, point 5 of Notes to Reglamento. 
49. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, II, Hogan to Adams, Nov. 4, 1821. 
50. U.3. Consuls B.A., July 3, 1821-August 6, 1826, no. 23. 
51. ~., no. 26. 
52. Cruise of Ij'rankUn, pages numbered 1 to 6 by author but incorrectly 
arranged in bound volume. 
or other Juntaa) t.hat. all the important otfio1ala auch u Monteagudo, JUniataI' 
of War and Marine, Oarcta, Secret.&r7 ot State, Uun., Minister of Hacienda 
and Boa Uiaira all reoeive their ortiers trOll hill d1rect17. lTaluat~ t.be 
ecollOldo polloi.a. Robin80n had this t.o sa,.. the regulations governing 11Iport 
dutie., tu:e. and co.erce were clusitied .. "ftc1latirJg. teapor&r'1 m1 
vexatious. It At tirat, llob1n&on aa1d, the duti.a nre lIIOderate but the,- haw 
einea becoae alllOat prohibl tifton JIUUl7 oomodi ti... Thue dutl •• _" levied 
at ..,.:luat1ona either eqwU. or above the market price and amounted to troa 
...... nt:r to eicht,. percent. Robinaon adldt. that Peruriana had the lonat 
duti.a, pq1ng two percent. l.aa than Chileana, wbile tore1rnera paid tour 
percent IIOre than the Perunane, who h8d Itt" emlueive right to enter good. 
at the Ouatoa Hou •• 1t The reault ot auch pol1c,. 1& that toreigner. had onq 
a lia1'Md control OftI' ca.ercial tranaactioma. To c01lPlioate ut.ter., the 
ooamerce waa "l.ancU1d1t with ver:r little deJUnd for toreian gooda would in-
crease, the 1IIlport. would not. find an extensive urket, tor alreldT the 
IlArket ...... noode4 wi tb European gooda. Be ..... to think t.hat Chile 
would suppl;r Peru wi t.h prod.ions unle.. foreign countrie. _re 1ntereated. 
!he regulationa, then, 1I'OUIS detera1ne the extent. to which foreigner. could 
or 1IOuld beeoae involved in t.he proviaio~. 
A. to San MartIn, Robinaon citecl his pre_nt. difficulti •• which be might 
be able to work out with ChUe. San KaMin wu becoa1ng leu popular wit.h 
hie anr.y .& time ... nt on. partl,. becauee of t)'ramUcal and delPOtic ....awe •• 
With a little e1.lY7, Bobinaon noted that the Brit.i&h bad much better rapport 
with the Ohileana than did the United. Statea cit.isena. Specifically aingled 
,II' 
I'!I 
1':1 
i 
1 
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out were the American consular agents and naval commanders who presumably 
had shown favoritism toward the Royalists and used their flag to defend the 
clandestine activities of American citizens for pecuniary reasons. Also 
under fire were the unadmired activities of consular agent. themselves. 
Robinson believed that the attitude of the British Dval commander. had ~ 
to do with creating better relations with the new governments. Robinson said 
the Bri ti.h co_anders were more aware of the rights of the new governments 
to protect themselves against contrabandist. and did not listen to the selfish 
dictate. ot some of its citizens. This was not a realistic interpretation ot 
the situation. 
On Janua17 20, 1822, Robinson wrote AdaD18 a letter which discussed the 
regulations imposed upon foreign trade.53 He especially referred to the 
article, discussed above, which forbade foreign residents in Peru to claim 
the protection of naval cOJlllWlders or consuls unless there was definite evi-
dence of direct and positive violation of the law of nations. Then Robin.on 
showed that discrimination was practiced favoring the Peruvians who paid four 
or five percent less, and goods from Chile and Buenos Aires also enjoying a 
four percent advantage. Then he added' "it was not yet clearly ascertained, 
whether the vessels of those places, and the foreign good. which they carry 
will not be obliged to p~ the same duty as other foreign vessels, and goods 
imported by foreigners •• 54 Robinson also indicated that a tonnage duty of one 
53. .!2,!!., f. 4. 
54. Ibid., Jan. 20, 1822. 
-
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balf dollar per ton was laid on foreigh vessels but he was not oertain if a 
tonnage duty would be demanded from Chile, Buenos Aires or other patriot 
veasels. Then in a rather unexpected commentary, after noting that the import 
duty in Peru amounted to 20 percent, Robinson says that this duty was regu-
lated by oircUlIlBtances and in many cases as reasonably as could be expected. 
However. the government retained control over the tobacco monopoly and some 
articles were still very highly taxed.55 
To obtain 80me financial security, San Mart!n proposed the creation ot a 
bank and paper money and imposed new restrictions and regulations upon commer 
activities.56 A March 15, 1822, decree clarified further the eontrover.,y 
which revobred around the October 18 supplements, 57 stipulating that only 
those goods whioh were deposited in the warehouses of the aduana and then re-
moved for reimbarkation would pay the 1 percent duty- Those goods which had 
been transferred to the aduana or went to particular warehouses remained in 
the same category as those which changed ownership and therefore paid the 
dutie. established in the supplement U> the reglamento. Goods were permitted 
to remain in warehouses for a period of four month. from the day of deposit; 
if their removal was delqed, each item deposited would be charged two reales 
55. Ibid. 
-
56. )U.nisterio de Hacienda, O.L. 11-45, trom Fuente and Santiago to Unanue, 
Dec. 20, 1821; DASJl, XI, 517-19, "Idea de un Banco Auxiliar de Papel lloneda 
Para Lilla" written by San Mart!nJ Ibid., 520, 521, 524, 525, Reply ot Commis 
regarding paper money signed by And-rii Salazar, Pedro Abad!a. MatIas Vaeatro, 
Diego Aliaga., Antonio Alvarez de Villar; Ibid., >28-33, Observaciones Bobre 1a 
necesidad de estab1ecer e1 papel lIOneda eii"trma.. no date. 
57. ~ •• O.L. 29-30, signed by Unanue, March 15, 1822. 
ps 
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beginninr with the fifth month, four reales demerage on the sixth and each 
-
subsequent month would be charged according to the progressive scale indicated. 
it. decree of' AprU )0, 1822, treed from duties ships belongLne to Peruvians 
even tho~ part of the crew was foreign, this exemption referring to seal ski:ru 
58 
whale oU and fishing equipment. 
On ~,1ay 9, 1822 further deorees stressed adherence to earlier tariffs. 59 
Furthermore, transfer of goods to avoid payment or transfer without proper 
papers and payment of duties was illegal. One area in which such tranasactiona 
took place was the trade between spea1:f'1ca.lly designated ports. F'oreign sh1ps 
had to pay duties on current ll'8rket pdees at point or origin. 'lbe barrage of 
decrees, however, faUed to provide al\V cleareut solution to the problen\l!ll which 
60 
arose and San Mart!n found himself engagea in pt'eparing new oonmeroial laws. 
How oaretuJ.:lJr these decrees and Helamentos lVere enforoed, the extent of 
national favoritism, and nDst 1mportan't:J.y' the effect of the laaw upon British 
land United States trade is the subject .tter of the next chapter. However, 
a few aonments at this point 1t'OU.lu not be out of sequence. If you take 
iobinson as the guide, there were instances or British favoritism. His May 25, 
~822, letter to Ada.m'3 claimed that Bri tisb COI!Jlleree was very corrupt although. 
.lritiah warships apparently did not protect ships without genuine British 
papers. However, Robinson suspected that several vessels and cargoes desip:nated 
,8. Ibid.., O.L. 29-hl, sit?Jled by Unanue, April 30, 1822. 
-
so. Ibid., O.L. 26-1, Unanue to Tribunal del Consul.ado, Aug. 9, 1821. 
-
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as Bri Ush were "doubtless Spanish property.- Some of these were captured 
but set free to "avoid collision with 'the British Government. This embicility 
has displeased Lord Cochrane and astonished the British Merchants and under-
writers,--especially in the cases, where nearly all the cargoes were contra-
band of war._61 Robinson's letter of August 5, 1822, is even more critical 
of the San Mart!n regime. Perhaps the follOwing excerpt offers some inkling 
as to how "free" was free trade under the Protectorate. Robinson wrote that 
"General San Mart!n has sold the right of ).ntrodueing certain goods into 
certain ports of Peru and has thereby established a p,artial monopoly in the 
hands of individuals.,,62 Just who these individuals were Robinson did not 
specify. 
Sutcliffe's observations also merit consideration and part of his 
diagnoses attributed San Martin's difficulties to stagnant mines, agriculture 
and commerce. Faced with a critioal situation, San ¥~!n appealed for a 
loan in England. "The terms which these held out were not deemed too unsat-
isfactory by some of the more speculative of British capitalists, so that but 
a short while served to fill up the list of aubacribers.·63 Still another 
souree of discontent cited by Sutcliffe was thE! regulations for trade and 
commeree which "had fallen very far short of the end proposed, for, by their 
differing only in a few instances from the late colonial sYstem of commercial 
61. Cruise of Franklin, Robinson to Adams. 
62. .!£!9.., postscript to letter of this date. 
63. Sutcliffe. Sixteen Years. 53. 
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policy, they had increased rather than reli~ved the embarrassment of the 
country.,,64 In referring to the coasting trade, SutcUffe charged that only 
national ships were permitted to engage in this trade since the duties laid 
upon foreign ships virtually eliminated them from this traffic.65 In several 
instances SutcUffe, despite his tirade against a despotic Protectorate, made 
excuses for San Martin, choosing at times to blame his ministers, e.g. 
Monteagudo.66 An unanticipated solution to San Martin's problems l~ in his 
meeting with Bolivar in Guqaquil. The reasons for BoUvar's success are not 
within the province of this dissertation. Reasons for San Martin's failure 
lay in his fiscal and trade problems, his inability to draft and enforce 
commercial laws and the inen table demands for favon t1sm. San Martin left 
Peru in September of 1822 claiming to the end the purity of his intent to 
make the Peruvians free. The real extent of this freedom, economic freedom, 
will now be studied. 
64. ~., 54. 
65. Ibid. 
-
66. Ibid., 57-58. 
-
CHAPTER IX 
Trade and Commerce under the Protectorate 
It now remains to be seen whether San Martin's actions mirrored his words. 
Very simply stated, this chapter will cover the names of merchants carrying on 
trade with the Protectorate, the ships involved, the cargoes carried, duties 
paid and their compatibility with official pronouncements. Emphasis will be 
on British and American trade. Protective restrictions, frauds, penalties, 
provisioning of army and navy, and monopolies have their major share within 
this framework. 
The Protectorate opened for business when a considerable number of tradi 
Ucensesl were issued to interested individuals willing to pay for them. Juan 
Gordillo was named Administrador de 14 Aduana de Lima2 and Juan Gutierrez 
Quintanilla, Administrador de la Tesoreria General de Estado.3 In keeping wit 
Article 1 of the Reglamento Provisional, a list of twent,r-four merchants to 
1. Ministerio de HaCienda, 0.1. 5-4, Nov. 1, 1821, cites twent,r five copies 
of "licencias maritimas lt • O.L. 5-5, Nov. 9, 1821, cites fifty copies; 0.1.. 
5·16, Nov. 17, 1821, seventy-four "pasaports maritimas"; 0.1. 5-33, Nov. 28, 
1821, forty-nine tllicencias de buques." All of the above were signed by 
Monteagudo and written to the Ministerio de Hacienda. In addition see 0.1. 
38-31, Fob. 1, 1822, one hundred copies of licenses; a.L. 38-224, 3ept. 12, 
1822, thirty licenses "para que se sino. pasarlos a 10. Tesoreria General para 
su venta. 1t The last two documents were signed by Guido and directed to the 
Ministerio de Hacienda. 
2. lli2,., O.L. 1-9, signed by Unanue and dated Oct. 20, 1821. 
3. ~., 0.1. 1-5, signed by Unanue, Oct. 1, 1821. 
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over.ee commercial affairs was presented by the Tribunal del Consulado for 
San Martin'. approval.4 A comparison between this list and import-export 
record. indicates that many of these men were personally and deeply involTed 
in the trade they were superrls1ng, for example the name of Franc isco Xarler 
de Izcue. Izcue, Comparet and Mendizabal had already been inTOlved in the 
formulation of the reglamento.5 
Commercial interests found the Protectorate restrictions inhibiting and 
a barrage of complaints ensued. Cochrane alluded to such complaints in ad-
dressing the Merchants of England and other nations trading in the Pacific, 
January 4, 1822.6 First of all Cochrane expres.ed hi. ftheartfelt satisfaction" 
that port. once C10Nd by the Royalist monopoly were now open to all trade. 
Any re.traints imposed during the struggle for independence which curbed com-
mercial actirlties .... re merely those Itaanctioned by the practice of all 
civilised state •• • Although the "re.traint.· were not enumerated, more likely 
than not it was the enforced blockade and Cochrane's own policie. rather than 
San Jlartin" decree. that "aggrieyed" the merchants. To show his good in-
tention., Cochrane asked that the complaint. to be made known "through public 
4. II1nisterio de Hacienda, O.L. 11-27, Oct. 9, 1821, to San MartIn from 
Conde del Villar de Fuente, Manuel de Santiago. Para Ifectos de EDa:ial 
Francisco Xavier de Izcue, Martin de Aramburu, OerOri'!'mO E.pinoSa, ama.o 
Aria., Lorenzo Juan ~nacio Mendizabal, Juan Pedro Zelayeta, Lorenzo Santo 
Domingo, MartIn RodrIguez, Lino de la Barrera y Hern8ndez, Juan Macho, Fernand 
Ex-Helm y Oalecio, Felix Balega, Manuel Ex-Helm. Para Efectos de Chile I del 
Pais: Domingo Urquijo, Felipe Santiago Reborado, Antonio Sacro. - -
-
5. ~., O.L. 11-12, signed by Fuente and Barreda, Sept. ,3, 1821; O.L. 11-
14, signed by Fuente and Barreda, Sept. ,3, 1821. Both were addressed to Unanue 
Secretario del Despacho de Hacienda. 
6. Robinson Papers, vol. 5, Jan. 4, 1822. 
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presa" that he might answer or refute them. 
Some of the official decrees no doubt hampered the activities of zealot 
traders who found the coastal trade remunerative. One such directive demanded 
the posting of a 20,000 pesos bond guaranteeing that ships sailing from open 
ports, e.g. Callao, would not enter a.rrr blockaded intermediate area. Writing 
to the )(inieterio de Hacienda, March 4, 1822, To"a Ouido explained the pro-
cedures for controlling the above trade. 7 Two days later, a bond of 5,000 
pesos was suggested for those ships which traffic only with Piaco.8 In some 
instances, the British or Norteam.ericanos the .. elves were to blame for an un-
favorable turn of events. The conduct of the American captains DowDes and 
Ridgely in the Louisa and General Brown affair. and, their part in aiding the 
Viceroy's escape, foreed San Martin to con.ider placiDg "heavier deaer1minating 
duties on the ves.ela and produce of the U.S. than on the vessels and produce 
of othtm· nations as a retaliatory measure of descr1m1nation ••• and also to 
exclude the vessela of war from the ports of Peru particularly Callao •••• a9 
Captain Stewart of the Franklin considered San Martin and Cochrane rogue •• 
His lettftr to Smith Thompson, May 5, 1822, contained this bit of damning 
commentary. "Cochrane by means of licen.es to his agents and partn.r. in 
commerc ••••• was thus enriching h1maelf, while he was defeating the obj.ct of 
7. Ilnisterio de Hacienda, O.L. 38-47. 
8. Ibid., O.L. 38-49, Mar. 6, 1822. Bonds were to be posted with the 
Administrador de 1& Aduana and those paying were to receive a voucher for the 
amount. 
9. Special Agents, Robinson, Robinson to Adams, Kar. 7, 1822. Apparently 
General Paroissien informed Robinson of this possib1lity. 
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San Uart!n ••••• 10 The last referred to the length of time it took finally to 
control Lima and Callao. The Protector had collected money through plundering 
"and the sale of passports" and "this money he prudently put on board a vessel 
for safety, in ease he should be under the necessity of retreating suddenly." 
It was this money that Cochrane seized to pay his soldiers and brought about 
open war between the two men.ll Steart did not specify just what kind of 
passports San Martin was selling. Neither did he identity Cochrane'. commerci 
partner. and agents,' 
Prior to a detailed study of the import-export data. contemporar,r views 
describing trade under the Protectorate will prove worthwhile. tiera bluntly 
criticized the San Kart!n regime for persecuting the merchants Abad!a and 
Arismendi, who though men of considerable wealth and iniluence under the 
Royalists, "had been mainly instrumental in forwarding the cause of inde-
pendence. n12 tiers contended that the Protector soon found a pretext for 
seizing the merchants' property. A further charge levied against San Marta 
concerned the umrorked mines in Pasco, an Abad1a-Ari8llendi-Uv1l1e invostment 
which meant a 600,000 losa. Kiere attributed this loss to the political 
disturbances in the country and Monteagudo'. avarice .13 
Ball fS observations 1nc1uded recounting a visit to Huacho on August 2, -,I 
10. Captains' Letters, vol. 1, 1622, document no. 117. 
11. Ibid. 
-
12. liers, Travels in Chile, II, 76. _ ................ 
13. Ibid.. 442-43. 
-
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1a21, and the comment that one ship reflected recent political changes. tlA 
roll of English broad-cloth was resting on a French wine case marked MEDOC ••• 
the knives and forks were marked Sheffield, and the skreen which divided the 
apartment was made of a piece of Glasgow printed cotton.,,14 After discussing 
Spanish monopolistic policy, Hall said that "The operation of unrestricted 
trade is certainly the most conspicuous and strikir..g result that has followed 
upon the new order of things."lS Hall's mission aboard the COn¥3Y entailed 
visiting the Chile-Peru intermediate ports inquiring about British interests, 
assisting and protecting British citizens, and evaluating the commercial 
possibilities of this coastline.16 The visit to Lima proved fruitful, for 
Hall found the shops filled with British goods and foreign merchants doing a 
thriving business. Nonetheless, instability was very pronounced.11 If one 
chooses to look through Hall's eyes, one can see the harbor of Callao "open 
and free to all the world ••• crowded with ships unloading rich cargoes) while 
1.8 
the bay ••• was covered with others waiting for room to land their merchandise." 
Hall credited San Martin with a vigorous policy, permitting no appeals, and 
19 
opening the port (Callao) to all foreigners "without reserve or restriction." 
Attending apl~ in Lima on December 14, 1821, Hall found the seats occupied 
14. Hall, V9Yages, I, 267-68. 
15. Ibid., 313. 
-
16. Ibid., II, 1, Nov. 14, 1821. 
-
17. Ibid., 66. 
-
13. Ibid., 64-65. 
-
19. Ibid., 71. 
-
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by British, American and French merchants. 20 
Mathison's Narrative both agreed and disagreed with Hall. Once the 
patriots controlled Lima, Mathison reported a large number of British merchants 
from London and Liverpool coming into the city. He indicated that at this 
time trade was still in the hands of "foreigners and large capitallsts.,,21 
As to San MartIn, unlike Hall, Mathison noted the Protector's absence at a 
bullfight on M~ 4, 1822, but "since he professes to take no share in the 
22 government of the countr.y, he never shows himself in public." 
~n undated and unsigned "Expos1cion" citing various Gacetas from 1821 
and 1822, favorg,bly discussed the Protectorate's economic pollcy.2) The 
reglamentos of September 28, 1821, October 18, 1821 and January 1822, expedite 
the affairs of the Aduana and did away with much of the economic confusion. 
Another ftExposicion", 24 this one signed by Monteagudo, brought out the virtues 
of the Protectorate policy. Monteagudo cited the fishing privileges extended 
to coastal inhabitants and ships staffed by Peruvians as an example of economic 
20. Ibid., 82. 
-
21. Gilbert Farquhar. Mathison, Narrative of a Visit to Brazil, Chile, Peru 
and the Sandwich Isl~.ads, During tEe Years tB'2T and 1822 {ronJan, 1825),""'"89, 
m, April 17, 18~~. - - - -
22. ~., 300. 
2). Jose Manuel Valega, La Gesta Emancipadora del Peru (Lima, 1940.1942), III, 
48-52 iassim, footnote no:-l cites this as MemorIa'de1racienda, 1821-1822; 
DASM, 1,597, probably written in 1822 by Unanue whowas Secretario de 
JraCrenda. 
24. Odriozola, Documentos, V, 57-58, "Exposicion de las tareas administrativas 
del gobierno, deade au instalacion hasta e1 15 de Jullo de 1822." Ministerio 
de Hacienda, 0.1. 38-125; Guido to the Min1sterio de Hacienda, May 18, 1822, 
refers to the decree which exempted fish from taxation. 
r 
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beneficence. Duties imposed upon forei~;n goods '\tiera discl1.ssad cit:i.ng 
favorable discounts to native ships and those belonging to newly independent 
states. stress was placed upon the decided beneficial changes from a mono-
polistic to an independent state. 
Compliments notwithstanding, the Protectorate found itself criticized on 
many fronts. Cochrane's aotivities managed to remain a major theme discussed 
between tho Protectorate and the Chilean government. Aocused of selling 
"passports" as a fund raising project, Cochrane defended the practice based 
on precedent and financial need. He further excused himself with the argument 
that he sold the passports at a moderate price while others exacted ten times 
as much for similar licenses.25 
Another source of aggravation revolved around the poor bookkeeping 
proceedures during the early years of the Protectorate. Importers and 
merohants olaimed they were overcharged or charged twioe tor goods brought 
into Peru. One such complaint was lodged by Ambrosio Aldunate on June 7, 
1822, but apparently satisfactorily settled according to a notation dated 
July 5, 1822, which admitted that Aldunate was overcharged.26 Adding to the 
unrest was the resistance that merchants showed tor rapidly depreCiating paper 
money,27 and the problem of establishing rules governing ships emtering 
25. Riva AgUero, Mamorias I Documentos, II, 74, Nov. 18, 1822, Cochrane's 
reply to oharges of l"w-. 11, lB~2. 
26. fi-1inisterio de Hacienda, O.L. 2-40. 
27. Ibid., O.L. 52-29, Riva Aguero to Hinisterio de Hacienda, Aug. 1, 1822. 
-
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28 Peruvian port. for reasons other than commerce. Similar difficulties were 
faced when procledu:res for f:overning public auctions were debated. San Uartin 
finally permitted Juan Thwaites to hold public auctions and appended to the 
permission were rules concerning such transactions. Among the reasons cited. 
for granting the permis.ion was the existence of public auctions in virtually 
every country and the sateguarding of business freedoll. The Reglamento de 
Martillo signed by San MartIn on Januar,; 18, 1822, imposed numerous restrict 
upon Thwaites and others who would hold public auctions.29 Large quantities 
of one item could not be sold to a single aource j varied goods were not to 
be sold as a lot but divided and identified. by ldndJ lots were to be numbered, 
goods were to be exhibited before sold so that the government would know the 
ldnd and qualitYJ the action place must be large enough and centrall,. locatedJ 
and accurate sales recorda had to be kept. The government was to receive a 
duty of one percent levied against the total sales. 
COJllBlercia! pri vUeges were extended to toher indi Yiduals. On August 15. 
1822, Robinson notii·ied .Adams that San Martin had granted a coapan,y of English 
and North American merchants a special license to trade in return for "an 
iaenae sum of money.· Furthermore, San Marth was to aid these merchant. 
?!with some of his vea .. l. of war. lf30 The lieense granted to the merchants 
Juan Begg, Guillermo Hodgson, OuAllermo Cochrane, Juan Parish RObertson. 
28. ~., O.L. 2-10, signed by Unanue, Feb. 13. 1822. 
29. Ibid., O.L. 29-7. 
-
,30. SlJecial Agents, Robinson. 
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Jose RigIos, Manuel Oaatillo and Estanislao Lynch the exclusive privilege to 
import overseas goods amounting to 800,000 pesos and 3.000 quintalea of caea 
In return for this coneession, the above lI1fJrchants were to put at the dispos-
ition of the Peruvian governmAnt the amount of 120,000 pesos. Ot this total, 
70,000 pesos in caah had to be paid i_ediatley with the remainder in instal-
lment ranging over a period of several months. Prohibited goods and articles 
ot war were excluded by this contract. The imports covered by the 800,000 
figure were not duty free for a ten percent duty waa placed upon the total 
value listed in tre invoices. Goods not sold were exempt from the duty. The 
contract stipulated the importation and sale of foods into the Intermediate 
Ports under the protection of the Peruvian goyermnent but if thi.s was not 
teasible. the import and sale could take place in any other port ttnder the 
dom.ination of Peru. A time limit was imposed by the contract, a period ot 
four months from the day on which goods were disembarked in the stipulated 
ports. However, if th~ pooCis were sold beton the designated fClur month 
period, the conceesion ended. The Peruvian govermnent agreed to inform. port 
and sea authorities of the above exclu8ive contract. Juan Begg apparently 
had some difficu1ty in meetinp. his share of the loan.32 
The list of foreign merchants carrying on business in Peru is rather 
extensive and will be more tully di.sc'U8Sed in another section of this chapter. 
For t.ht'! m.oment, it i8 sufficient to ir.dicate that the mereh8..1"lts cited in the 
31. Minist.erio de Hacienda, O.L. 37-1. contract used. waa dated JUl'le 16. 1822 
although there was &.l1Other copy dated June 20, 1622 in O.L. 50-2. 
32. Ibid •• O.L. 40-15, document addreaaed to the JI1n1aterio de Haciellda and dated~. 12. 1822. 
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contract just discus .. d were not the only ones who sought privileges. "oll~ 
the fall of Callao, British merchants representing firms in Chile and el .. -
where quickly arrived in Peru to take advantage of commercial opportunities. 
In his larrati_, Mathison noted on Mareh 30, 1822, that he i was "struck by the 
mlJIber ot 8Dl8.rt ships, abounding in 'reuch silks and j ..... ll.r,y, and British 
goods of eTery sort and description ... 33 llathison descri~d Lima as a com-
mercial metropolis. British fino which carried on business in Chile or Peru 
included John Begg, J.P. Robertson, Thous Kinder, Robert Ponsoby Staples, 
the Iullett Brothers, and a man called J. D. Barbard. tinder supposedly lent 
DlOMy to Peru through his bankers Everett, Walker, ~tb7 and Ellis.14 Tbe 
British firm of Anthony- Gibbs and Sons also transacted business in Lima during 
the San Marth occupation.3S The names of Henry Hill, Istanisiao LJI;1ch, 
John C. Z1-.erm&ll, and Patricio L7JlCh appear very frequently in coaercial 
documents and diploll&t1c correspondence concerning Peruvian trade. 
San Marth's entruce into Peru did not tendnate the need for 110M,.. 
Docl1ll'1ents attest to the tact that loans were solicited.l6 both voluntaril,. and 
under duress. On October 8, 1821,37 Robinson referred to the exhauated a.no".' 
33. ,Mathison, Jarrative, 228. 
34. Humphre,rs, Liberation South America, 121-22. 
3S. Encina, Hiatoria Chile, X, lSS • 
.36. Jlin1sterio de Hacienda, O.L. 7-9, official notice to Secretario de 
Hacienda sending list of individuals who made voluntarily contributions for the 
liberating IU"IIJ", Aug. 31, 18211 O.L. 32-44, Monteagudo to lIinisterio de 
Haci.nda, Mar. 21, 1822, regarding a loan of 150,000 pesos exacted fran Lima 
merchants. 
37. Special Agents Robinson, Robinson to Adams, Oct. 8, -1821. 
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state of the San Mart!n government in Lima but believed San JIart!n would not 
dare resort to forced loan. and "other oppressive exactions ft aa had been done 
elsewhere. He added that the people of Lima had enough of free government and 
·protection,- On BoYUlber 4, 1821, Robinson again referred to the need tor 
IIOnay and characterised San Martin'. _uures aa judicious am marked with 
greater degree ot moderation than could have been expected,38 However, 
Robinson admitted that much preasure had been placed upon the Peruvians to 
raise DlOney to repay Chile. This prea8UlJe waa bound to excite emotions already 
taxed during the long Ja)ntha ot the Peruvian campaign. The Engliah were 
"double target.· as far aa loan. were concerned. First of all Jam.es Paroissien 
and Juan Garcia del Rio Dre sent to Europe for the expres. purpose of soli~ 
loans, Designated as envo,.s extraordinary and minister )ienipotent1ary, the,. 
Dre eaponrecl to enter into treaties of amity am co .. rce, treaties which 
would need no ratification in Peru. The quota set tor the.. two men was aix 
million dollara, One bait for .uch a loan waa conceasion of special privileges 
to Ilin1Dg companies desiring to operate in Peru.39 Ingliah merchants living 
in Protectorate Peru were asked repeatedly to contribute in the form of loana. 
When the Royalists threatened Peru in April of 1822, the English merchants, 
wrote llathiaon, volunteered to rai88 the neceasary funda.40 Along with the 
38. ~., Robinson to AdUl •• 
39. Humphrey., Liberation South .America, 101. 
40. Ilath1aon, larrative, 2.54, April 16, 1822. The amount cited waa a sub-
acription-of some thou.and dollars •• 
r 
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gathering of loans came the need to establish a bank to handle paper money 
~ich apparently was operating by November of 1821.41 
In addition to securing loan., it was necessary for San MartIn to continue 
finding supplie. for an a~ still militarily engaging the royalist forces. 
Among the ships whiehcarried supplie. were the Laura,42 Oaptain R. L. Lan, 
the lfontazuma,43 the Hercules,44 and the llaeedonian.4S Ind.i rlduals who 
actively aided the San Martin torces by supplying foodstuffs. equipment or 
Illmitions included the names of Estan1slao Lynch,46 aeorge Waddington, 47 
Waddington and Green. D • .,. Games,48 Juan .10 .. Barratea,49 Severino and 
41. JI1n1aterio de Hacienda. O.L. 9-29, signed by Ignacio Cabero, Oct. 11, 182 
O.L. 11-39, Fuente 7 Santiago to M1n1sterio de Hacienda, Iov. 21, 1821. 
42. DASII, VIII, 43S-36, July 21. 1821. regarding eupplies received b7 Cochrane 
ineludIDi meat. frijoles. and flour. 
4). timsterio de Hacienda, O.L. 20-22. JOM Antonio Rodriguez to San Martin, 
Aug. 20, 1821. 
44. Ibid., O.L. 13-6, Luis de La Cruz to Ministerio de Hacienda, Dec. 10. 
1821. ~ English Hercules, Capt. Juan Heron. carried beef. 
4S. Ibid •• O.L. )8-85. Guido to Kinisterio de Hacienda, April lS, 1822. The 
cargo '"TiiC'luded beef. cacao and bread. 
46. Ibid., O.L. )8-40, Guido to Ministerio de Hacienda, Feb. 23, 1822J O.L. 
38-5s;cruido to lI1n1sterio de Hacienda, Mar. 16, 1822; O.L. )8-6S, Guido to 
K1nisterio de Hacienda, ~~ 1822. 
47. Ibid., O.L. 38-96, Guido to Kinisterio de Hacienda, April 22, 1822; O.L. 
38-119,1'l'uido to tinisterio de Hacienda, Ma7 15, 1822. 
48. Special Ag6nts, Robinson, letter from one Englishman to aoother in San 
no names given, rlMicat1ng that Game. was involved in bringing supplies to 
Kendosa, Aug. 1), 1821. 
49. lI1msterio de Hacienda, P.L. 2-59. 
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lareiso Mentero,50 Juan Jose Uaandivaras.51 Lists ot names suPplying other 
necessities, but too long to mention here, are also available in the records 
U the Jlinisterio de Hacienda.52 The continued interest of Chile in the 
Perurlan campaign i. evidenced by the contract between the Ch:11ean Supre_ 
Government with BaIlon Bara. who ..... colllDissioned to supply the Peruvian anq. 
The date ot thia contract is July 29, 1822.53 
The tt. has COM to investigate the documents which show how' ~ ship. 
entered and lett Pe1"UYian ports, tlMt name. of the ships involved and their 
place of origin, naMa of _rchants and con81gne.s .. hich most frequentlY' a1'-
peared on invoices and port records. persons not paying duties, cargoes carri 
. . 
and total duties paid tor imports and exports during the San Martin Proteatom 
Once this is accomplished. a comparilJOn ot names will be JUde between those 
found in the above records and those involved in prorlsioning the San Martin 
torees for the Peruvian campaign. How I!&D.7 of the or1&inal contributors to 
the liberating expedition benefited from the Protectorate! Were foreigners 
1,,11 
I 
II 
I 
III 
permitted to trade without cumbersome restrictions? How tree was the free 'I 
I ~ 
I'll 
50. Ibid., O.L. 38-210, Guido to Kinisterio de Hacienda. Sept. 1. 1822. '11:,i, 
Goods""b'rOught in by the Jionteros were free ot duty. but tlMtae gooda were not 
identified. ' 
51. Ibid •• O.L. 38-222, Contract signed by San Martin and U.and1v&ru,· Sept. 7 
1822.--:iCcording to this contract Usandivaras was to supplY' San Martin with 
three hundred horse. within sixty daYII. The Peruvian govemll8nt guaranteed 
payment for said horae •• 
52. Ibid., O.L. 4-6, Aug. 17. 1821. 
suppl.I'88for the San Martin troops. 
53. ~., O.L. 5~)a. 
This was a list of persons who contrib 
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trade' 
The study ot imports from ~u1y 1821 to July of 1822. import. arriving 
from Europe and Asi& and going through the official ports of Jmcon and Callao, 
is baaed on records in the Ilinisterio de Hacienda.54 Only names of merchants 
which appeared with any degree of regularity or individuals involved in several 
transactions were used tor the study. SiJJce the nature and value of the c .... 
cannot e&8i11 be determinad it is difficult to tell whether or not the duties 
charged by the Peruvian government complied. with the provisions of the com-
mercial Reglamento reterred to in the previous chapter. 
A discussion of the European and. Asian imports follows. Of the ships 
entering the designated ports, eighteen .... re British. fifteen from the Un! ted 
States, tive fro. other countries and the nag of eight could not be deteradDed 
Among the Britillh .hip. were. the Uly .... , Laborite, ~ !!!i.&, Tobias, Olive 
Branch, ~ Francis, Calcutta, Hercules, and the Laura. Listed as coming 
trom the United States were the Diek, Mirror, Charley, America, Gallen, Panther 
Theis. lLacedonla. Semnt and the Savage. Other countries represented .... re 
France, Sweden and Holland. A total of 290.347.) 1/2 pesos dut7 was paid by 
all the ships engaged in this 1Japort trade. Among the BlOst frequently mentDBi 
JlaJles of consignees were. Juan JOM Suratea, Francisco Xavier Isscue, Pedro 
Abadla, Juan Begg and. Istam.lao L1Mh. Persons not paying duties for 80me of 
the cargoes were Juan Begg, Es~alao Lynch and. Juan JOM Sarratea. 
the next category to be discussed concerns the imports entering Oallao 
54. Ibid., O.L. 34-4&, July 1821 to April 1822) O.L. )4a-1&, May 1822 io 
July IB'H. 
f
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from other Latin ltmerican ports from July 1821 to Jul7 1822.5, Thirt7-five 
ships new the British nag, one the fl~ of the United States, four were 
French, two 5vredish. while the nSf of one hundred and seventy-f1.ve could not 
be determined although point of departure was listed. Among the British were 
the Maria, Louisa, lsa.bel Betty, Hercules. Neptune, Waleingham, Arriel, !!!z, 
Rebecca, lameralda, Roberto, Catalina, Enterprise, Porcupine, Laura, Caledonia, 
Will, Bet!l, Pacific, Hermosa, Elena, Leopold, Corona • .!!m! and V:!p!r. Ar-
riving from Ialparaiao ore the Perpetua, teodoa10, Carmen, Perla, Guerrero, 
Hermosa, Chilena, !aquena, B2! Amiso., Rapid, Aurora. Estrangero, Rosario, 
Tomas, and the ilinerva. COIling from the Latin American ports Huaoho, Guayaquil 
!neon, Paca8lUlJO, Piseo, Coqu1mbo, Arica, Pdta, Huanchaeo, Buenos Aires, 
Panam.a, Concepci6n and Talcabuano .... re numerous ship.. Total duties paid by 
ships from other Latin American porta amounted to )86,361.2 1/2 pesos. Moat 
frequent consignees appearing on the invoices submitted to port authorities 
aret Juan de Dios Zufliga, Juan 1'hwaites, Juan Jose Sarratea, William Cochrane, 
O$orge Waddington, Waddington and Green, Estanislao L;rnc h, Diego Portalea, 
Jose Riglos, Juan Begg, Francisco Sales Vidal, Joe' Cabenecia, Maximo Samudio, 
and Samuel Prioe. Cargoes most otten carried included graina, liquors, to-
bacco, meat, military and naval supplies and European goods. Thera was no 
indication as to 'Which of the above merchants failed to pay duty upon the 
goods imported although military items ftre often eUl'Ipt from. taxation. IIa.D7 
consigMe. were from England or the United States enm though the ship. were 
55. Ibid., O.L. 34-4c, JulY' 1821 to April 1822) O.L. 34a-lc. JIq 1822 to 
July!!!2. 
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not registered to those two countries. Many names which appeared as importers!' 
of European goods were elso involved as importers of goods from other Latin 
American ports. 
Exports to Europe and Asia from Call&o56 from July of 1821 to July of 
1822 ineltlded a list of ten British ships. eight fram the United States, with 
twenty-one ships having no flag designation although destinations were some-
times indicated. Total duty paid by above ships amounted to 106,169 pesos. 
lIany of these ships carried gold and silver belonging to private individuals 
as well as per80nal effects which were either tax exempt or paid very little 
duty. Other goods carried included dye., cacao, caacarilla, wine, liquor, 
vicuna, and quicksilver. On board the same ahips were quantities of gold 
valued at 32,314 pesos, silver worth 3,654,591.0 3/4 pesos, and goods valued 
at 256,211.0 1/2 pesos. How much of this was taxable could not be ascertail3ed 
from the official records. Carrying e. British flag 'Were the following shipst 
!l. Patrick, Panther, Arlester, A1aerit,. and Calcutta. Ships with the flag 
of the United States included. the General ~. MercurI, .America, Mainet and 
the America. Ports of destination were listed a8 llio-Glbralter, London, Cal-
cutta, Bordeaux, Cadis, and the United States. Participating in this export 
trade .ere the following individuals whose names ~ have already been listed 
as carrying on an import business as well al the export trade t ltatania1ao 
Lynch, Juan Begg, Juan Jos~ Sarratea., Juan Riglo8, Juan de Di08 Zui1iga, 
Francisco Sales Vidal, Francisco Iscue. Diego Aliaga, Juan Moans, George 
56. Ibid., O.L. 34-4b, Jul,. 1821 to April 1822; O.L. )4a-lb, April 30, 1622 
to .JuI7i822. 
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Waddington, Juan Begr. Francisco Izcue, Pedro Abad!a, Juan Jose Sarratea and 
Estanislao Lynch. 
Involved in the export trade to other Lati.n American ports, S~ within 
Peru, for the period from July 1821 to July 1822,7 were twenty British ships, 
seven Ameriean and seventy-five _ieh could not be easily traced as far as 
cnmership and nag were eoncerned. The ships carryi!W on this kind of export 
trade paid a total duty amounting to 40,627.4 pesos. The value of silver 
carried was noted as 682,171 ~S08, the ~o1d wat valued at 24,69),4 pesos and 
personal efreets and other goods at 1,4)0,21).7 pesos. Again how much of 
this ..... taxable could not be proven. British ships included the John Gordon, 
_ ....... ----
Aurora, Oolonel Yog, J.!ereules, Karl. Per"verenee, ~~eea, ~ Begg, 
Porc52ine, Laura, Tristan, Sir Ft:,ancis, Hermosa E1e~ ancl the LeoEa.rd. or 
United States oril!'in were the Amanda, Ma,.C',:net and the Dick. Unilentifiable 
q 'I ...-.-.... 
ships travelled to the ports of Guayaquil, Valparaiso, San BIas, Huacho, P.aeas-
lU.J"O, Piaeo, Huaneheeo, Paita, Pisco, Concepei6n, Valdivia. Taleahuano, 
Sansonate, Buenos Aires, and Rio de Janeiro as did tho" with Dri tish and 
Ameriean flegs. In this unidentifiable categol"J" could be found the ~xicana, 
Catalir..a, Peruana, Mereedes, Olmedo, !!!!, Golon<irina, Rosario, Resolucion, 
Terrible, Pilar, Roberto, Perl,a, ~ta Rtt!, Conatanoia, Emilia,ll Dolore8, 
Carmen, Bofia, San ~u8ti~, Do. Amigcs and the Gad! tana. The people carrying 
on this trade included names ment.ioned in the other three categories: Pedro 
Jo" Galarsa, Juan de Di08 Zuf1iga, Jo.e Rlg108, Diego Portales, William 
,7. Ibid., O.L. J4-lad, JulY' 1821 to Ka,. 1822; O.L. 34a-ld, lIq 1822 to 
Jul,. iB22. 
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Cochrane~ Manuel Helmes, Francisco Izcue.. Jose Cabenecia, Estanlslao LJlDCh~ 
Jua.l1 Jose Sarratea .. Bernardo Font, Pedro Cr:3.Ccn. Juan Begg, Fabia.."1 a6mez~ 
Jose Aria'''Asndi. Francisco Sales Vidal, Pedro AbadU., Felipe Reborado, George 
Waddington, and Waddington and Ort'en. Exempt from certain duties were Jose 
Cabenooia, Fra.neit!lOo Izcue. Estanislao Lynch, Jose R1.glos, Juan :BeLf, Wadding-
ton and Green, Bernardo Font.. Juan de Dios Zuaiga and Fabian a6m('.. Goods 
oarried by this last grouping of ships included cacao, wines, clothinc. gin, 
liquoT's. paper, tobacco, rjce~ indigo, cotton, sombreros, coffae.. sutr,ar, flour 
and European goods. 
From the preceding pages it 1. s obvious that certain individuals and 
companjes in fact, m<'nopoliozed Peruvian trade whether or not they were given 
legal nermissjon to do so. The same name:s appear and reappea.r with constant 
regularity although others cUd participate in the import-export trade. Among 
thp. individuals conrmercia1ly engaged durinr the Protector£i.te were several who 
originally contributed toward t.he Peruvt&n cam.;.)aign, individuals who contl~acted 
to supply 8&"1 MartIn's troops. The list :1ne1ttdes the names of Juan Jose 
Sarratea. Paulino Campbell, John Beg!:, James Barnard .. Wil1iQUn Hodgson, 
E8tan:l.sla.o Lynch~ Henry Hill~ Lynch and Zimmerman .. Edward Ellice, George Green, 
Thomas K::inder, Robert Ponaoby Staples and J(")se Riglos. 
Before discuS8i~ frauds, smuggling and confiscations a few observations 
on the i~ort-export trade are neeessary. As voluminous as the available port 
records are, they seem incomplete. The natien.s-1ity of ships cannot be deter-
mined, cargoes are not listed, and there is no way of determining whether or 
not the duM.es leTied corresponded to the pereentages stipulated bY' the 
'i 
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Reglamento de Comercie. TrUI? identification of the nationality is almost 
impossible, since ships stopped at various ports but onlY the last port was 
entered. Duties were most often paid in installments and a ~ecord kept of 
debts owed to the Peruvian government. 30~e goods entered duty free but no 
reason for such concession was noted in the port records. 11any consi,~nees 
were English or North American although they used Latin American ships for 
transport. Various records show the presence of maqy foreign merchants in 
Peru but there is little evidence indicating where their merchandise came from 
It was also true that Chilean and Peruvian merchants used British ships to 
carry on their commercial enterprise. A case in point was Juan Jose Sarratea~ 
A high level of smugglin~ proved annoying and prejudicial to the welfare 
of the 3a.n Mart!n regime. Some of this smuggling was carried on by United 
States citizens and reported in the Robinson-Adams correspondence. On 
October 8, 1821, Robinson accused the Beaver, Canton, Maaedonian, Ellen Maria, 
Flying !!!!!!, !!:2 Catherines, ,General Brown, Sav!ie, ZephYl;-, Emerald, Galen, 
1!! Plant, Amanda, !!!!, and the Stranser, of transporting belligerent pro-
perty and carrying on an illegal coastal trade.59 Worse than the smuggling 
itself, was the involvement of United States naval personnel. Robinson 
charged that naval officials on furlough bought ships, secured certificates 
from the vice-consul Henry Hill, and proceeded to trade with the Royalists. 
One ship, the brig vJarrior, commanded by a Un! ted States naval officer on 
58. Ibid., 34-4d, one ship used by Sarratea was the John Gordon. 
- _ ................... 
59. SpeCial Agents, Robinson, Robinson to Adams, October 8, 1821. 
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furlough, brought a cargo of arms, part of which was sold to the patriot.s and 
part to the Royalists. Then this ship carried freit;ht and smugt-;led to the 
highest bidder. The stranger, mentioned above, was owned by Santiago merchant 
under the name of tvlO United States oi tizens and flew the fla&; 0: the Un! ted 
3tates with a certilicat3 issued by the vice-consul. This ship ap?arentl.;r had 
just be,m sold by a Hr. iiogan. Not only naval perconnel but consular agents 
were iuvolved notoriousl;,y. The house of Lynch an~ Hill of Valparaiso and Hill 
himself acted as a&ents for the ~triot squadron and privateers, according to 
the Rooinu,)U report of October 3. The company of Lynch, Zimmerman and Company 
as well as Zimmerman acting as vice consul in i3uenos Aires, o",~ed pri vawers. 
The names of Iquch, Hill and Zimmerman were identifiod with Peruvian trade 
prior to and during the San ~'1art!n Protectorate. 
Illegal traffic and violation of co~~rcial regulations led to confis-
cation. The confiscat.i.ons evoked many heated arguments between the 3an 'fi:art:!n 
government and the Itvictims." The Louisa,60 Nancy,61 and the Macedonian62 
found themselves in just such a predicament. The circumstances surrounding 
the seizure of the Macedonian and subsequent attempts to secure restitution 
are worth investigating. The Hacedonian, owned by John S. Ellery, was seized 
60. DASH, VIII, 374, sept. 15, 1821; Ministerio cia Hacienda, 0.1. 20-30, 
Sept.-';-1821; Ru1nes, Espedicion Libertadora, II, 346-47, Sept. 15, 1821. 
61. Ninil:lterio de HaCienda, 0.1. 20-50, Nov. 16, lB21; O.L • .5-19, !iov. 19, 
1821. 
62. 3enate Doc~~nt no. 58, 35th Cong., 1st Jession, 3-1 ,ass1m, Memorial 
of Thomas H. Perkins to the honorable Secretary of State 0 the United States, 
Nov. 31, 1840. 
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the firat t..S.IIe OIl OJ' abollt. A¢l. S, 1819, Dr the C1d.le&rl UTal. squadron. 
Captain Sld.th C&l'I"iedproceecSa fl'oa .alae al.ona the Cbilean ud PC"UV"1an cou\ 
aDd..u 011 b.1e It.,. tit aa-" wbeD iDtenepW. Sld.th a1caed &1IItf' the $80,000 
he oani.... ,., ot tbe .. ., boa \he aaloa ... can1ed aboarcl aIlOtBer abl" 
tAle .i'lreDcb bril o.e\le, which abo totmcllte 'fItq into OGobr .... s banda. !Id.a 
.. tbe _aftCl ..uve ot ~ 1:Jel0Q81na to \he !!I!!!!se' a ~.. ftMt 
oaptan of tM auel.lI brotI&bt Oochr'aae 160,000. leaoUat1oft8 between \be 
U • ....c StatM uct 0ll11eaa g..,...... ... broa&h\ JUtr1iut..1.OIl of S1OL,ooo plus 
~"'. Tbo \bird ee11U.'H of ~, .. proper. took pl.aee on Mq 9, 1.821. 
Ioll.ald.ac 1IbfI1819 .:1urH. the !!!!!.te!ae .~ \0 wade tor ... w.. 
at. yarlou pGI'tra _ \be SOUth Aaae10a cout •••• • WlwD oapto.Nd - MIl' 9, 
0apta1n 3ad.th ba4~' t1n1ahed OCI'IIti81'01al tr ... ~ in Ar:I.oa and...." 
..... aDd OU'ri.ed o.t. .'0,000. '!be ~ 1IU aODf'1,..W ad ree.pt ttl .... 
'lbe ....... 1at--.tJ1oa Wall tNIO\INd ttw a ............ '1 dped ........ H. P8l1d.1ut, 
who wl\h Joha S. 11la7 waa· ........... of the ~ ...... leis. ia 1811 
and bad .. 1nt«ut s.r. _. 1821 P"Oi1te. tbe ...... tv.a\ton becoM .... 
... e.,u.oaW ",*,QapWa SIll"'"'. 1 .... 1. .... ' wi'" ........ '" Abadl& 
aact Ari--.ti .... to'U.lJa'- loooN!ul to de .... _, Ad ••• '*- ,.... 
..... of .. ~6) Ari ...... ~ ... 1.&_ ..."..,: 't7 Srld.tIb 
who oW'" ttsa\ Arl.,ad1· ... 11 ... ., .. ., ..... da __ betIrec ttl_ 8Ild 
the .. 1.e ..,.. , ... ,1fIOe. The NUOIl tor ttd.e d8a1al ... araotb .. _ ..... f
Jlacedonian this tiM by the San Marta governMnt -.bloh considered the ahip 
tfro;yal1stll propert,.. While San Mart!n ,was buy occUP1iDl Lim&" Sa;ith reai .... 
in Upper Pera .tUl controlled b7 t-belo,-ali.te •. Att..rSan llartin cOBvollecl 
L1u.. $rdth dec14edto avan himself ot the Lima. lI&l'UU NId coui&D8d. a oa'l"l. 
to 4bact!a and lriaendl, hi8 uual co._ion m.erohu:t.a. It turned out tbat 
the bou.. ot Abad!a and Ar.1aaeadl bad. bun dl.101ved by the San Uartfa &0V9.1'Il-
ment du6 to 1t. conneetion with the 107a11st reg1lle. 'I'hB carao Wall Ulen con-
signed to tbt! 1n61i$h house of Juan Thtra.1tel. the )(acedolliM: RS then t.aUta 
over by the Lima lOVeJ'llMnt to befitted. ,outa. a Yes .. l-of .... ar. It wu 
3'Odpd to. be the propert,- of tbe Spanish "1'1&- Ari_J1dl and 1100114 ........ 
to the use of the Itat •• ·& Sllith. "a. "err di..,..,haDted with San »arth and 
in a letter to 101m S. Illery, Sept.lIbel' 11, 1822, JUde the stat.eaent that 
1'roteoterat. Peru was in a terrible oond1tton. The Ban lIarth l'8gt." be 
olaimed., had no resources "except that ot laJing contr1butioJ18tt and he di4 
not believe -that. San Karta wUl be able to hold cut. two months. u be baa 
alr.~ 'beco_ verr \UlPOPular alIlODg the LiMllU. ,1.6 
Mathison aal'Md. w1th II1th with "~t to ttle cbaD1.ic 'Co»4lt-ion of i.ba 
Ban Jartln 1'8,ia. .. bell.wei t.ha.t the c0Dt1 •• .,1on of Brlt,uh u.cl Aaarlcu 
vessels tor blookade runnine de.mand.d t.he protection of naular11 •• tab11aW 
ccm.ula charged with protecting toreienproP4'n,...66 Coohra.' • .,o\1&U .. 
64. Ibid •• 1S4-86iM81m. l.epq to Don l'uuel C&n'Illo. inv07 Ixttr&OJ'Cl1Dar;r 
.,o!dIi: 
6S. .!!!J.! •• ,,,. 
66. .this .. luratt.,.. t6)-A. 
..:rUe .. chapter. 
Tbere .a 1IlCuh controYertr1' .•• towhether or not tbe San lla.rt!.n Protector'-
ate J)I"Ombcmeticial to a 11berate4"_. lo11ew:1ng an interview 'rlth San 
Marth. in Va,lparai .. ,Rbjllquent to his rfJti~nt. as ~tGr, ~vost wr«>te 
a _Jtinteftstblg letter to 8eer4ttU7ot State. Adams. Elated I QTe1Iber2, 1821 
,",,"It ~.... ftJ'prift ,tt.t San M.u-tbt stiU nttained oommand ot the a%'lt" 
ad ........ ,.t17 at1eipating lome exhibition or pTlbU.o teeltng in tima, ,... 
fll\1riag hi. NtVl) to pre.ide at the h.adot that 10000:rnment •• 61 Prevost 
al .. belie_ tbat s..Jlart.b lIOuld be ver:r d.1sappo1nted it he expected a 
pabUoebow1Jl1 ..... be cttdnot appear suf.f'1cientl;y aware of his lossot 
populuit7. 
Much of t]:,a di.satistaction with the Proteetorate was due to the aotlv11S111 
ota latym1niater, BernardoUenteagudo. Vier8 claimed that as long as Bonta.-
gudo 1fU inottiae prl ..... t. property was not 8ldo, cO!ln!lel"ee l-.gged. mQney be-
e .... lItUlree .8l'ld pa;p.? aQ!187. virtually worthless.68 Publio confidence was 
de.~ and the)" whodat"ed to retu.ae payment in paper money were threatened 
with. brpr1~t and contl.ation. Oortf'ronted on all sides by d1f.flcult1.a 
he could not control San Martin abdicated as ProteetorSeptember an, 16!2. 
Follo"bl.g San Martin'. abdication, 'orbes reported to Adams on the eir--
cuaatane •• ~. aueh a 1lOTe." One ,.. .. on wu the attitude ot the 
67.. Special ",eats P,,'8voat. B1d41e,.DoJT, Pnftn to Adaa, h.,. 2. 18ft. 
66. Jfiers. Tra'Mla .!! eWe. u, 78-7'. 
69. U .. $. ConrNla B.A., JulJ'" 1821-.&. ...... 6, 1826. forbea to Ad.a, 
Oct. 1, 18ft. 
Ch11e~ gO'ftrl'lllfSnt1l'M.ah luppOrte4 Ceeht'ul ag~at San Jfart!n. Suppo-dl7 • 
. Coch3;'ane ttprQpoaed. that the Chilean Gov.:rmuent~llqul.d u.n1te with Bolim 
'to ~~:t .the~o.t.tul41OJiinat1en of '."".1'~.1an ~~. !hen torb4t.'mad4t 
..... ry~t1c::_t. ~tutJ)t. -San ... Yart1n h4a ~·"'lllbr.e4 Bolivar ~t 
~l'bl;tlconc.i.ve that.j,t.4&e 'beentbe 1Q.~ otJu4Q laeariot."· Forbes 
·hoPflC1tb$t.1Jol1v~ lVQuld trl~ht,fIr. civil war;tp Pt;'\l wa.V8r:/ PM81ble 
wU.~i Jol1.~ ~_ 4"-:tator. ~\MrtAe .11b .. rato, would be able to calm . 
tbac.o ... re1al.cl .... and ntain t~ con£i.r..ceo! interested lox-.i&l'lpoqn 
1(U ano~T -.tter. tthe meet.i •• t. 0.,,44\111 ptovedmo.nto\\i f,nd_e4.Ua 
k1 ...... 'iveJ;, it "AI .. ld... of deat,h tor the pC)ll t.ical and eomm.ercial 
..wltioruJ of hoMctor 30" 4 •. s.n kart!a. 
CONCLU5101 
San Martin promised an end to the Spanish colonial closed port .,.stera. 
Prior to the Chile an capaign, during the Chilean campaign and during the 
PeruTian campaign, San Martin personally or through various officials and 
friends favored the extension of commercial advantages to both Great Britain 
and the United States. Considerable favoritisa toward the British existed, 
a favoriti_ JlUCh envied by commercial interests in the United States. Promi •• 
made by San Marta in the Chilean campaign were kept, for with the completion 
of Chilean independence in 1818 free trade existed. Individuals or companies 
representing business interests in Great Britain, United States, Argentina, 
and Chile, who either outfitted or financially aided the Peruvian expedition 
were granted concessions. 
A.lthough supporting the rebel forces, unofficially of course, British 
and North American mercantile interests indulged in contraband trade. This 
illegal trade was backed up by naval forces 1'1'011 their respective countr1es. 
These same interests urged the establishment of conaular agents and special 
agents empowered to protect their pro;ert,.. British and .American merchants 
had two big headaches' the Spanish naTT but most of all Cochrane. The Spanish 
navy was a poor match for British and American gunboats. The Peruvian Vice-
roys found they could not convince Ferdinand VII to revamp his monopolistic 
syste. nor were they able to auppress the illegal trade. Cochrane was quite 
another matter. Theoretically responding to Chilean control and instruoted 
to complement San MartIn' s land forces, Cochrane proceeded to act independent17 
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much to the chagrin of the Chilean government. San Martin. and British and 
American businessmen. Oochrane too believed in tree trade but his confis-
cations and "noating customhouse*' widened the breach already' existing between 
himself and San Ilart!n. Both favored tree trade but differed as to how to 
achieve it. 
Peace negotiations wi tJl Viceroys Pesuela and La Serna failed and San 
Martin proclaimed Peruvian independence in Lima. Ilonarchiacall,. inclined but 
pledged to guarantee the liberal principle of tree trade. San Martin issued 
various laws to guarantee such a trade. The Reglamento Provisional ~ 
Camercio, Supleaento.!l Reg1amento Provisional 2 Oomereio, !51amento S!!. 
Camercio Istransero, the Provisional Statute, and numerous other law. evi-
deneed his convictions regarding free trade. Documenta.r)r proof attests to 
the fact that San Martin .fulfilled JU.n7 proJlised cOJllmercial concessions. 
Success did not bring reconciliation with Cochrane. Mercantile interests 
clamored for more privileges. Chilean support vaccilated. Duties once termed 
moderate were considered increasingl,. prohibitive and designed to favor 
Peruvians and Chileans. These .ere two excellent reasona for British and 
American disenchantment. Protest brought little satisfaction and much 
aggravation. Contemporaries depicted the sad Qommercia1 and financial state 
of Protectorate Peru. The need for loans increased and regulations fell far 
short of the propo.ed end. 
Political difference. between San Martin and Bolivar were not 80le1,. 
responsible for San Martin's abdication as Protector of Peru. San Martin 
preached and delivered .free trade. His difficulties stemmed frOll fiscal and 
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tracte problema, inability to draft and enforce commercial lawa and the in-
evitable demand. for favored treatment nth which he could not cope. 
I 
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